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Two propositions meet in modern trinitarian debate. One, that ethical 
subordination of the Son to the Father in eternity is a modern innovation and tends to 
polytheism. Accordingly, Jesus' obedience is purely economic. The other, that the 
economic Trinity reveals the immanent Trinity. The question is: are both true? 
The thesis examines questions of Greco-Roman monotheism, the trinitarian 
accounts of five Patristic theologians (Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary of 
Poitiers and Augustine), and material in John's Gospel, perennially a focal point for 
trinitarian debate. 
It is argued that Jewish-biblical monotheism distinguishes the sovereign, 
uncreated creator, who must be worshipped in his revealed name, from dependent 
creation. This separates that tradition from monism, pantheism, polyonymous 
monotheism and from polytheisms envisaging gods as operating individually in 
independent, separate spheres, whether those spheres are defined geographically or 
functionally. 
The review of Patristic theologians is necessary to ascertain whether the 
ethical subordination of the Son is indeed an innovation. The review discloses 
(despite significant instabilities in the positions of Tertullian and Origen, and, to some 
extent, Augustine) a common nexus of topics, described here in terms of filial 
derivation, inseparable persons, and inseparable operation. Filial derivation grounds 
both ontological equality of inseparable, distinguishable Persons and eternal relational 
2 
obedience. The economy of inseparable (but distinguishable) operations reveals this 
filiality, equality and obedience. 
John's Gospel confirms these patterns, particularly by characterising the 
Father as supreme giver, to the Son in eternity and to the Son and believers in the 
economy. This giving motif portrays the Father as loving and as bearing an authority 
that the Son too obeys. The Father's giving in turn grounds the Son's own legitimacy 
as Lord, for the Son draws his authority from the Father's gift. 
Accordingly, the proposition that the Son's eternal, ethical, subordination is a 
modem innovation and tends to polytheism is rejected in favour of the position that an 
ordered economic Trinity reveals an ordered immanent Trinity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Genesis Of The Thesis 
This thesis is occasioned by the confluence of two streams in modern 
trinitarian thought. First, there is the contention of G. Bilezikian, amongst others, that 
the obedience of the Son (ethical subordination) seen in the Incarnation is only 
economic, not eternal, ' and that contentions to the contrary are modern in origin. 2 
Accordingly, the proposition that the Son is eternally equal to the Father in deity and 
essence but subordinate to the Father's authority is characterised as leading inevitably 
to Arianism and polytheism. 3 Apart from anything else, arianising theologies readily 
leave the Father, who alone is `truly' God, distanced and hidden from creation. 
Secondly, there is K. Rahner's dictum that the economic trinity is the immanent 
trinity and the immanent trinity is the economic trinity. 4 While the extent of 
identification between economic and immanent has been debated, 5 the revelatory 
value of the economy remains common ground. It is just there, of course, that possible 
friction between the claim of ethical eternal egalitarianism and Rahner's dictum 
arises. Is it possible to envisage the Son's obedience as purely economic, without 
jeopardising the revelation of the immanent by the economy? 
Bilezikian 1997: 59f. 
2 Bilezikian 1997: 57,60. 
j Bilezikian 1997: 64 and 66, where he characterises the position as leaving the Son as `the lower god in 
an Olympian hierarchy'. 
4 Rahner1970: 22. 
5 Some, e. g. C. La Cugna would develop this further, arguing there is no immanent trinity `beyond' the 
economic. She writes `there is neither an economic nor an immanent Trinity; there is only the 
oikonomia that is the concrete realisation of the mystery of theologia in time, space, history and 
personality. ' (La Cugna 1991: 223). Others, e. g. Y. Congar 1983: 13f, caution against taking the 
statement `... the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity' as allowing the immanent to be subsumed 
by the economic. 
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1.2. The Importance Of This Inquiry 
Two features suggest the importance of this question. Bilezikian rightly sees 
that it pertains generally to the relations between the Father and Son, 6 but for T. Smail 
it is this relationship that is `at the very heart of the Gospel', which sets out how 
humans may relate to God. 7 The Father-Son relation, then, has implications for the 
relations humans have with the triune God. Others, like J. Moltmann, would add that 
it is this relationship that so signally governs relationships humans have with each 
other, within the state, the church and the family, and can be used, wrongly in 
Moltmann's view, to legitimate `monarchical' and `patriarchal' rule. 8 
The question therefore bears on a matter of considerable cultural significance: 
to what extent, and how, authority can be legitimated. Put sharply, Smail sees the 
remedy for authoritarianism lying in `the rediscovery of divine authority', 9 rooted in 
the Father as the source of all authority, 10 a strongly patrocentric view, while 
Moltmann and others tend to disjoin love from authority. " On that view, Smail's 
conception of divine relations would actually constitute part of the authoritarian 
problem. 12 
6 Bilezikian 1997: 58. 
7 Small 1990: 9. 
8 E. g. Moltmann 1991: 2,4. 
9 Small 1990: 17. 
10 Small 1990: 16. 
'' E. g. Moltmann 1991: 11f draws this from his understanding of NT `Abba' language. In a similar 
vein, members of the `Open Theism' school argue for the primacy of God's love as parent/father over 
his will: e. g. R. Rice 1994: 15f and C. Pinnock 1994: 103. 
1' Admittedly part of the issue here is different conceptions of `authoritarianism'. 
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1.3. Background Features 
Two other relatively influential perceptions need to be borne in mind. First, 
the view is held that western trinitarian thought took a wrong turn with Augustine. 
This has been variously put, 13 but an important feature is the idea that with Augustine 
the west became increasingly wedded to seeing the works of the Trinity ad extra as 
undivided or indivisible. 14 For Rahner, this can only render trinitarian distinctions of 
Persons irrelevant to human beings, ' 5 because the work of the Persons becomes so 
identified in the economy that they cannot be distinguished in the economy. There is 
an implicit break between economic and immanent. Again, a feature of this is that the 
Father in particular, perhaps, tends to recede from view. This bears on the present 
inquiry because Rahner's dictum suggests one needs to provide some account of 
divine operation in the world that is neither polytheistic nor, as it were, personally 
monistic but which discloses the personal relations. Key questions are, then, how do 
the patristic theologians (including Augustine) integrate the Persons in their divine 
actions in the economy, and how does their source material in the Scriptures do this? 
A second related perception is that western trinitarian thought, again 
influenced by Augustine, tends to separate trinitarian questions from other issues 
relating to the doctrine of God: de deo uno is severed largely from de deo trino. 16 This 
impoverishes both, ' 7 raising the possibility that accounts of the filial relation 
(plausibly part of de deo trino) are inadequate without proper integration with de deo 
uno. 
13 See the review in chapter 7 below. 
" Rahner 1970: 13f and Moltmann 1981: 93,98f, 108f 
15 Rahner 1970: 14. 
16 Rahner 1970: 17. 
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1.4. The Scope Of Inquiry 
Therefore this inquiry requires several different foci. The charge of Arianism 
includes a charge of polytheism, and thus raises the question of what constitutes in 
orthodox theology authentic monotheism as against polytheism. Further, that charge 
is related to a charge of innovation, and accordingly a historical focus is required. In 
particular, was Nicene Trinitarian theology committed to ethical as well as essential 
egalitarianism in its anti-Arian programme? Lastly, does the data of the economy 
given in Scripture, on which the Fathers claimed to rely, support an ethically ordered 
or egalitarian eternal Trinity, or neither? 
In this way, the confluence of Rahner's dictum and the ethical egalitarian 
argument creates a somewhat novel network of questions, in which systematic 
considerations of monotheism/polytheism, historical considerations of patristic 
theology, and exegetical considerations all intertwine. The novelty of this network 
means that a conventional literature review of earlier dealings with the issue is not 
possible. Obviously there is enormous and fruitful literature bearing on certain 
particular aspects of this network, but less so for their synthesis. Accordingly 
literature is reviewed at particular points on particular topics, notably the criticisms of 
Origen in chapter 4 and of Augustine in chapter 7. The methodological commitment 
here is to analyse primary literature, both patristic and biblical (the later focussing on 
John's Gospel), with a view to the three foci outlined. 
17 Rahner 1970: 17ff. 
16 
The thesis reflects these three foci as follows. Chapter 2 deals with issues of 
monotheism and chapters 3-7 with Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary of Poitiers 
of 
and Augustine, who between them provide samplesttrinitarian thought before, during 
and after the classic Nicene period. ' 8 Consideration usefully starts with Tertullian and 
Origen as highly influential pre-Nicene theologians. Athanasius and Hilary both are in 
the thick of the Arian controversy, albeit at different stages and locations. Augustine 
merits inclusion both because he is not infrequently cast as somewhat at odds with 
Nicene thought and because he was expressly faced with the argument from Homoian 
theologians that the Son's obedience in the Incarnation showed exactly his inferiority 
ontologically to the Father. This argument bears strong similarities to the 
contemporary argument that eternal ethical subordination entails ontological 
inferiority. If it is correct that Nicene trinitarian theology must see ethical 
subordination as arianising, one might plausibly expect to find traces of that position 
in such supporters of Nicaea as Hilary, Athanasius or Augustine. 
The examination of these theologians has been cast both so as to try to 
consider accounts of divine operation and also to meet Rahner's observation that 
trinitarian theology must not be separated from theology more generally. Accordingly, 
the aim is to present these accounts of the Trinity within the overall context of a 
theologian's system: de deo uno is not to be separated from de deo trino. Chapter 8 
turns to the data of the economy as given in John's Gospel, 19 because it is here that 
these five patristic theologians stand or fall according to their own methodological 
commitments. Chapter 9 provides conclusions. 
18 This period is critical to this debate, because of the argument that eternal ethical subordination is 
arianising. 
17 
With this in mind, we turn to the question of monotheism. 
19 Referred to here as `John', not to prejudice questions of authorship but for convenience. 
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CHAPTER 2: MONOTHEISM AND MONOTHEISMS 
It is proposed that: 
2(a). The most prominent varieties of 'monotheism' in the Greco-Roman world 
tended to take monistic or polyonymous monotheistic forms. 
2(b). Jewish-biblical monotheism stands apart from monistic thought because 
it sharply distinguishes between the uncreated creator and the created cosmos. 
2(c). Jewish-biblical monotheism stands apart from polyonymous monotheism 
because worship must be in the revealed name. 
2(d). The pattern of divine operation in Jewish-biblical monotheism is based 
on God 's cosmic sovereignty, and differs from patterns of polytheistic 
operation predicated on the distinct and separate spheres of activity of divine 
beings, or their distinct localities. 
2(e). Jesus is intelligibly cast as divine within this Jewish-biblical monotheism 
since he is depicted as creator and sovereign and pre-existent. 
19 
2.1. Definitions Of Monotheism 
Ulrich Mauser comments: 
We talk of monotheism and regard it as a basis shared not only by all Christian 
denominations, but also with several non-Christian religions such as Judaism and 
Islam. ' 
However, he continues, such agreement on what monotheism means is `manifest only 
on the surface, ' whereas in reality there are `vast differences' of understanding. 2 These 
differences require exploration, both to clarify what version of monotheism Christian 
theologians thought they were defending, and also to evaluate charges that the Fathers 
drew too heavily on Greco-Roman thought. 
Some definitions start by negating any god other than the one affirmed by the 
monotheism in question, 3 notably at the level of existence: no other gods exist. But, as 
M. West notes, 4 this leaves the issue unresolved since the notion of `god' itself 
remains undefined. Moreover, it is unclear that what is negated need be existence 
rather than some other quality or attribute. This opens up the possibility of varieties of 
monotheism. 5 This is reflected in discussions such as G. Fowden's, 6 who initially 
defines monotheism as `belief in one unique god to the exclusion of all others' but 
then rightly immediately qualifies this in view of angels and other entities. 7 
1 Mauser 1991: 257. 
2 Mauser 1991: 257. Similarly, P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede caution against `simplistic' concepts of 
monotheism: 1999: 2. 
3 Mauser 1991: 257 fn. 2. West also comments on this `standard' species of definition: West 1999: 2 1. 
4 West 1999: 21. 
5 Implicitly recognised in OT scholarship's perceived need to use terms like 'henotheism'. 
6 Fowden 1993: 5. 
7 Fowden 1993: 5 quotes W. E. Gladstone on henotheism: `affirmative belief in one god without the 
sharply-defined exclusive line which makes it a belief in him as the only god. ' But again, what is 'god '? 
20 
Terms qualifying particular monotheisms such as `inclusive', `exclusive', 
`broad' or `narrow' rightly recognise there may be a spectrum of monotheistic 
positions, but risk imposing the observer's evaluations of what constitutes desirable 
monotheism, evident in terminology such as `pure' as opposed to `impure' or 
`nascent' monotheism. 8 Such evaluations, of course, could obscure what the 
practitioner of a particular monotheism considers defining features. Hence Mauser and 
also Athanassiadi and Frede insist a monotheism must be examined on its own terms. 9 
However, some taxonomy of monotheisms remains analytically useful. The 
factor adopted here as an underlying feature of monotheisms is uniqueness, 10 monos 
as one of a kind. Uniqueness, though, implies that others are excluded from 
participating in that unique factor, or factors. Concentrating on uniqueness or 
exclusivity permits analysis of what the monotheism itself considers the decisive 
factor excluding others, thereby facilitating examination of the monotheism on its own 
terms. This is especially important, of course, in the present case, since a basic task is 
to see how the Fathers examined here think their versions of monotheism are 
compatible with plurality, rather than imposing an alien monotheism and measuring 
them against that. Tertullian, for example, emphasised there could be a wrong kind of 
monotheism. 
8 R. Brague 1983: 150f notes both the habitual assumption that monotheism is superior, and the reaction 
that monotheism is undesirable and totalitarian. 
`' Mauser 1991: 257; Athanassiadi and Frede 1999: 2. 
10 Cp. Encyclopaedia Brittanica 1985 26: 599. 
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Given this, it is proposed to examine the uniqueness or exclusivity of various 
monotheisms with respect to: 
1. the existence of other beings 
Uniqueness may consist not so much in an entity being the only entity 
of a particular kind which exists, but rather in being the only entity 
existing in a particular way. 
2. the entitlement to worship 
L. Hurtado and R. Bauckham and others" have underlined the 
importance of this category with their insistence that worship is a 
crucial indicator of what Second Temple Judaism considered decisive. 
3. relationship to the world 
Here the emphasis falls on what may be exclusive to the entity in its 
relation to the cosmos. 
2.2. Species Of Monotheism In The Ancient World 
For simplicity, ancient monotheisms will be explored under the broad 
headings of Pagan and Jewish-biblical monotheisms. Naturally, this distinction should 
not be taken as precluding all commonality between Pagan and Jewish-biblical 
thinking (Philo could readily exemplify just that), but rather as attempting to reflect 
the bible's importance for a particular range of monotheistic views. 
Hurtado 1988, Bauckham 1998. 
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2.3. Pagan Versions Of Monotheism 
2.3.1. Philosophical Monotheisms 
Plato is obviously a dominating figure in classical Greek philosophy, whose 
positions also have significant religious implications. 12 Consideration of Plato 's own 
religious philosophy can usefully start with the late dialogue, the Timaeus, ' 3 and its 
highly influential cosmogony. The visible world is created (28), fashioned consciously 
as a copy of an eternal pattern (28-29) by a distinct entity, the Demiurge or God, who 
wishes (29-30) that everything should resemble him in his perfection as far as 
possible. Accordingly, the `visible sphere', which the Demiurge found in disorder, 
was brought to order (30). Other gods, including the traditional gods of Greek 
mythology, are themselves created beings (40-41). 
To what extent is this monotheistic? Obviously the title `god' applies to others 
than the Demiurge (the other `gods' at 40-41). The Demiurge differs, though, in being 
neither made nor formed. However, the eternal archetype and unformed matter also 
are not made but pre-exist. There seems to be no eternal network of correlative 
relationship between these entities in which each is what it is in relation to the others. 
What distinguishes the Demiurge is his response to the disorganised state of matter. 
The Demiurge reflects on things beyond himself and acts. Thus, the Demiurge's 
uniqueness lies in a complex of factors, both his unformed-ness and his capacity for 
action and reflection. 
12 Plato does not spring forth already fully grown, but inherits both problems and possibilities from, 
amongst others, Heraclitus and the Ionians, Parmenides and the Pythagoreans. See further Appendix 
1.1. 
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As regards being worshipped, Plato does not in the Timaeus apparently regard 
this as the exclusive prerogative of the Demiurge, although he might, no doubt, wish 
the popular cults to be purged of excesses. 
Moving, then, to the third area, relationship to other beings, the Demiurge 
forms the cosmos, but does not create it ex nihilo. Moreover, he is not the only one 
who forms, for the gods also `form' (they form mortal beings: 41-43). The Demiurge 
has other relationships than `former' and `formed'. He has not formed the eternal 
archetype but appreciates its perfection, and is not, it seems, its master. This would 
follow from its eternally unchanging status. 
In short, then, Plato's Demiurge is unique in some respects and to that extent 
this scheme could be termed `monotheist', but this uniqueness lies neither in being the 
only eternal entity, nor in exclusive entitlement to worship. This is of considerable 
importance when considering patristic monotheism. 
Aristotle's relations to Plato are complex, but interesting common ground 
exists theologically. Both reject the idea of creatio ex nihilo and postulate a God who 
is crucial for the order of the cosmos. But differences then appear. J. Hankinson 
comments that for Aristotle `God is neither the creator of that order, nor its continuing 
efficient cause. ' 14 `God' is rather an unmoved mover by being the object of desire and 
thought for other entities, 15 thus providing a `non-intentional teleology'. 16 
13 Taking the conventional view of The Timaeus: for discussion, see R. Kraut 1992: 15ff. 
14 Hankinson 1995: 127. 
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In terms of Aristotle qua monotheist, the uniqueness of an Aristotelian 
supreme unmoved mover lies in its complete actuality. Eternality is present insofar as 
the unmoved mover is always unmoved. Yet in one sense other entities also possess 
eternality, for with Aristotle there is no creatio ex nihilo. 
With respect to worship, F. Copleston argues the unmoved mover cannot be 
worshipped. 17 A rationale lies in Magna Moralia 1208b27-36. Here Aristotle 
comments that friendship for God and `soul-less' things [iä äyrvxa] is impossible, 
for neither class can reciprocate friendship [ttö ä výtuuplXcißOat] and such reciprocity is 
necessary for friendship. This is consistent with Aristotle's view that the unmoved 
mover is `thought thinking itself. Yet one cannot intentionally respond to a personal 
overture without thinking of the other. Hence, unless worship can properly take place 
where the object worshipped is oblivious to it, this view also excludes worship. 
In terms of the third category, relation to others, since this God's relationship 
with other entities is non-intentional, 18 he could only with difficulty be seen as 
exercising sovereignty, for that would normally imply intentionality. 
Seen thus, Aristotle seems problematic as a monotheist. The pure actuality of 
his unmoved mover stands out as a quality, but it is questionable whether it is a highly 
important part of his own system that this pure actuality be the exclusive prerogative 
of one being. 19 
15 Met. A vii. 1072a25. 
16 Hankinson 1995: 128. See further Appendix 1.2. 
17 Copleston 1947 I: 317. 
18 Hankinson 1995: 128. 
19 For `other gods' in Aristotle, see Appendix 1.2 
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Stoics, claims Diogenes Laertius, hold that the universe has two principles, 
one active and one passive: `The passive is unqualified reality or matter; the active is 
the reason inherent in the matter or God. 20 But this duality is not perhaps final, for the 
cosmos in its order emerges from the combination of the two principles, suggesting 
resolution into an underlying unity. 21 Matter has four primary elements (earth, water, 
air, fire), among which fire is the final category. 22 Logos, of course, is immanently 
present throughout, and informs the unfolding cosmos as logoi spermatikoi. 23 
Cosmology thus readily weds theology. Augustine comments of fire: 24 
Stoici ignem,... unum ex his quattuor elementis, et viventem et sapientem et 
ipsius mundi fabricatorem..., eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt. 
This fits neatly with a common Stoic definition of `god', cited by E. Arnold 
from Aetius: 25 `a rational [voEpöv] and fiery [itvpwbcg] spirit, having no shape, but 
changing to what it wills and made like to all things'. 
Aetius highlights the ability to metamorphose, which reflects a particular Stoic 
theme, that God has many names. 26 Thus Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus runs: 
O God most glorious, called by many a name [noX, ucbvvµ£], 
Nature's great King, through endless years the same; 
Omnipotence, who by thy just decree 
Controllest all, hail, Zeus, for unto thee 
Behoves thy creatures in all lands to call. 
20 Compare e. g. Frede 1999: 5 1. 
21 Arnold 1911: 156f comments that apparently dualistic statements are finally `subordinated to monistic 
statements' in Stoic literature. 
22 Copleston 1947 I: 387f sees Heraclitus' influence here, but it also modifies Heraclitus' position. 
23 Athenagoras Plea 6 describes stoicism as an immanent monotheism. 
24 Augustine De Civitate Dei Bk 8.5. 
25 Arnold 1911: 222, citing Aetius Placita Philosophiae I. 6.1. 
'`' Arnold 1911: 220£ 
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The hymn, then, suggests that Stoicism endorsed `one intelligent being which governs 
the world'27 Virgil famously captures this: `Mind enlivens the whole mass'. 28 
`Polyonymous' monotheism also apparently permits full participation in apparently 
polytheistic cults on the basis that each manifests the one metamorphosing God. 29 
Moreover, some rationale for these polyonymous operations occurs in Servius: 30 
Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae pro 
ratione officiorum [emphasis added] variis nominibus appellatur. 
The one God is variously manifested for different functions and the choice of a 
particular mode of manifestation might suggest that that form should continue to be 
observed religiously. 
It is perhaps overstatement to say that matter and God are completely 
interchangeable. Yet they cannot be readily separated. Moreover, although the 
periodic conflagrations do not annihilate matter but reduce it to fire, the primary 
element, only God is eternal in the sense of retaining personal continuity throughout 
the conflagrations. To that extent, Frede rightly comments: `It alone is eternal'. 31 
Turning to worship, while Cleanthes' hymn demonstrates a sense of personal 
intimacy, nevertheless, given Stoic cosmology and God's metamorphosing, 
polyonymous, quality, all worship apparently reduces to worshipping the one, in some 
ways hidden, God. 
'' Frede 1999b: 52. In the ancient world, e. g. Athenagoras Plea 6 also reaches this conclusion. 
2S Aeneid bk 6 11.726f: mens agitat molem... 
29 Stoicism was not an uncritical observer of polytheistic practice: see Arnold 1911: 233-237. 
30 Ad Verg. Georg. 1.5 quoted by Arnold 1911: 221 fn 25. 
1 Frede 1999b: 52. 
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As regards relationship with other beings, naturally this attenuates the more 
one stresses the underlying monism: this can reduce to the cosmos relating to itself 
Even so, the Logos appears as a creator in shaping or framing the world and indeed 
influencing rational creatures. Again, Cleanthes' hymn emphasises God's kingly 
aspect, and his ubiquitous cosmic sovereignty. 
Plotinus (204-270 A. D. ), the heir and successor of Middle Platonism, 32 
superficially has a triad resembling the Middle Platonist Albinus', in ascending order, 
Soul, Mind and the One. For Plotinus, Soul is `the author of all living things' who 
`has breathed life into them all'. 33 Soul, however, has an `upward neighbour', whose 
image it is and which it contemplates, Mind. 34 In considering Mind, Plotinus invites 
us to see, platonisingly, an Ideal, but (crucially) multiple, realm. 35 Beyond Mind, we 
can infer at another level of being, a unity which precedes multiplicity, 36 Plotinus' 
One. 37 
In this network, emanation is without diminution, and what emanates looks 
back to or contemplates its source. 38 Furthermore, emanation approaches, but is not 
quite, identity: `nothing separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same, 
that there is succession... ' 39 This account is significant since Tertullian, Athanasius, 
32 For a brief account of some Middle Platonists relating to monotheism, see Appendix 1.3. 
33 Enneads V. 1.2. 
34 Enneads V. 1.3. 
35 Enneads V. 1.4. 
36 Enneads V. 1.4 & 5. 
37 On Plotinus and the One, see Appendix 1.4. 
38 Enneads V. 1.3. when dealing with Soul contemplating Mind. Failure to look to one's source is 
apparently part of Plotinus' account of human alienation in the cosmos: Enneads V. 1.1. J. Dillon 
1991: xci prefers the term `illumination' to `emanation', since the latter may introduce Stoic 
connotations. `Illumination' is closer to the 
light imagery. 
39 Enneads V. 1.3. 
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Hilary and sometimes Augustine use similar imagery in portraying the Son's 
relationship to the Father, notably that of light, or sunbeam from the sun. 40 
Is Plotinus simply a monist? He writes: 
The One is all things and no one of them; the source of all things is not all 
things; and yet it is all things in a transcendental sense - all things having run 
back to it: or, more correctly, not all as yet are within it, they will be. 41 
This is clearly not straightforward monism, nor essentially Parmenidean monism, 
where differentiation is illusory. For, some distinctions seem to exist between the 
three hypostaseis, as well as between Soul and the world. Plotinus' trajectory 
nevertheless seems monistic, to re-direct us back to our source, to the god within. 
The distinction, though, is not that of personal relation. The One appears 
beyond even self-contemplation, 42 rendering knowing relation with others highly 
problematic. Certainly each hypostasis is unique by virtue of its position in the 
hierarchy, although the One clearly stands apart, for it alone is beyond Being, even 
though it is the generator of Being, 43 and it alone seems entirely self-subsistent and 
simple. 
Is this, then, a `true' monotheism? For Frede, Plotinus has first, second and 
third gods. 44 But this must be handled carefully, as Frede later explains: 
The second god, very roughly put, is simply the first god who in himself is 
beyond being and intelligibility, but reveals himself at the level of being and 
thinking as the divine intellect. 45 
40 E. g. Against Praxeas. Compare Against Noetus. 11.1. 
41 Enneads V. 2.1. 
1' Enneads V. 3.13,3.10. It would imply a duality of knower and known, contrary to the One's 
simplicity. 
43 Enneads V. 2.1. 
44 Frede 1999b: 54. 
45 Frede 1999b: 54. 
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This raises the issue whether monist tendencies do not ultimately so prevail as to 
entail that all things are finally aspects of the One (Compare Stoicism's polyonymous 
monotheism). Polyonymous streams are present in Plotinus's thinking. Subordinate 
deities are in some sense endorsed as discrete individuals yet also as sharing one 
existence: 
More truly this is the one God [sc Mind] who is all the gods; for, in the coming 
to be of all those, this, the one, has suffered no diminishing. He and all have one 
existence, while each again is distinct. It is distinction by state without interval: 
there is no outward form to set one here and another there and to prevent any 
being an entire identity; yet there is no sharing of parts from one to another. Nor 
is each of these divine wholes a power in fragment, a power totalling to the sum 
of the measurable segments: and so great is God that his very members are 
infinites. 46 
Since entities have attention directed primarily upwards, conscious sovereign 
control of the world is not strongly marked here. Nor is sovereignty based on creating 
ex nihilo. Worship, judging by Augustine, is not restricted to the One. 47 The One 
might be the logical destination of worship, but apparently must remain oblivious. 
This is not an exhaustive account of Greco-Roman philosophical theology, but 
other schools perhaps bear less closely on monotheism. It is worth noting that 
Epicureanism would tend either to regard the gods as completely separate from the 
world, or non-existent, while Pyrrhonian skepticism would methodologically have 
been committed to agnosticism. The aim, according to Sextus Empiricus is ätiapaýi. a 
through Eiroxrj, and thus the `dogmatism' implied by religious belief seems precluded: 
for one must cease any dogmatising. 
48 
46 Enneads V. 5,171- 
47 De Civitate Dei Bk 8.12. 
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2.3.2. Pagan Religious Monotheisms 
Clearly `religion' and `philosophy' cannot necessarily be treated as 
hermetically separated categories, for some philosophers participated in the cults. 49 
Nevertheless there is some virtue in treating the two distinctly, not least because of the 
distaste evident in philosophical circles, going back at least to Plato, for some species 
of popular religion, and clearly the relationship of philosophy and religion could be 
fraught, as the indictment against Socrates indicates. 
Consideration of Greco-Roman religious monotheisms appropriately starts 
with the polytheism from which they developed. Homer and Hesiod depict gods in 
mutual conflict, and also with distinct spheres of responsibility, something Augustine 
satirises extensively in De Civitate Dei. This pattern of distinct action merits 
comment. 
First, the gods tend to be distinguished from each other by different functions. 
Secondly, actions by such gods are in principle discrete. West posits that in practice 
the gods were conceived of as acting singly in discrete areas. 50 Operation may be with 
others' consent, but is not, in Augustine's terms, inseparable. Thirdly, while some 
polytheism arguably stresses divine ties to localities, 51 this does not necessarily 
remove polytheistic conflict, 52 but tends to make it conflict between local deities, 
rather than between deities with different spheres of interest. 
53 Again, though, divine 
48 Sextus Empiricus Outlines ofPyrrhonism I. 12. 
49 E. g. the conduct of Marcus Aurelius and the observations of Augustine De Civ. Dei Bk 8.12. 
50 West 1999: 22. 
51 E. g. I Kgs 20: 23 on the gods of the hills and 2 Kgs 17: 26 and the concept of the god of the land. This 
does not mean local deities were unimportant in Greek and Roman polytheism. 
52 See e. g. the taunts of the Rabshakeh 2 Kgs 18: 33-35. 
53 E. g. the divine conflicts over the legitimacy of Orestes' murder of his mother Clytemnestra. 
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action is not integrated in this version of polytheism. Fourthly, divine disorder may 
well not have been sensed at a popular level, 54 although the practice in incantation 
texts of invoking many names and deities suggests this could, perhaps, readily 
develop. 55 
West suggests a process whereby early Greek polytheism gives place to a 
pantheon where one god comes to dominate (so-called `henotheism'), ruling other 
gods as well as humans. 56 This process could occur through the example of earthly 
monarchies as well as a putative divine council where one will comes to prevail. Here 
a monotheism may not explicitly deny other supernatural beings exist, but has a 
strongly-defined celestial hierarchy. 
As well as this tendency within particular pantheons, different pantheons met 
each other in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. This, naturally, raises the question of 
assimilation between different pantheons. Greek polytheists appear readily to have 
`translated' deities between different pantheons by reference to common functions. 57 
Assimilation seems well-attested, 58 and it is worth asking how far syncretistic 
processes could go. 59 
54 Note, for instance, Hesiod's insistence on the rule of Dike in human affairs. 
ss See C. Arnold 1997: 18 and 64 for the pervasiveness of `spiritual' influences and the intensity of 
emotion they might evoke. Note too the prominence of apotropaic material. 
56 West 1999: 23f. W. Robertson Smith 1995 suggests a slightly different dynamic for Assyrian and 
Babylonian polytheism, whereby local deities are gradually aggregated to form a list of deities in whose 
names the empire could act. 
57 J. Assmann 1997: 2f: Roberston Smith 1995: 60. 
58 See J. Ferguson's examples. 1970: 211-220. 
59 I. Levinskaya 1996: 197-203 cautions against too facile a use of `syncretism' as an explanatory 
concept, for in fact it is used to describe 
different processes of interaction between religions. 
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Here we return to polyonymous monotheism, which could represent 
assimilation on two levels, between characters from different pantheons with the same 
function, and between different characters within the same pantheon with different 
functions. Three examples are worth noting. 
First, there is Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, already cited. This speaks, of course, 
of the universal reign of Zeus, who bears many names. Cleanthes, though, clothes his 
thought in the garb of existing religious categories. In addition, this Zeus does not 
exclude the existence of other gods necessarily, but those gods themselves are under 
Zeus ' reign and are thereby diminished. 60 
A second example is Isis in Apuleius' Golden Ass. Isis is described both in 
Lucius's prayer and also designates herself in her theophany. Lucius recounts: 
... 
I offered this prayer to the supreme Goddess: `Blesssed Queen of Heaven, 
whether you are pleased to be known as Ceres....; or whether as celestial 
Venus...; or whether as Artemis....; or whether as dread Proserpine to whom the 
owl cries at night... ' 
The one goddess has many names. Moreover, polyonymous identification 
occurs here between members of a particular pantheon, for Ceres, Artemis, and 
Proserpine all belong to the conventional Greek pantheon. Thus the principle of 
different gods for different functions evaporates. Divine action is the single operation 
of one Person, not the inseparable operation of several, nor the separable operation of 
several. It is especially piquant given the thought of Tertullian's opponent, Praxeas, 
that strictly Ceres and Proserpine are mother and daughter, for Praxeas maintains that 
the same person can indeed be parent and child. Finally, this also represents 
60 Supporting the contentions of West 1999: 24. 
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polyonymous identification across pantheons. Lucius prays to `Isis', who is not an 
original member of the Olympian cast. 
Turning, then, to Isis' theophany, she says: 
I am Nature, the universal Mother, mistress of all the elements, primordial child 
of time, sovereign of all things spiritual, queen of the dead, queen also of the 
immortals, the single manifestation of all gods and goddesses that are... Though 
I am worshipped in many aspects, known by countless names, and propitiated 
with all manner of different rites, yet the whole round earth venerates me... [she 
then gives examples of different names amongst different peoples] [The] 
Egyptians... call me by my true name, namely, Queen Isis. 
Isis appears here as the single divine principle of the cosmos. Other divinities 
ultimately reduce to her. Different modes of worship seem not to affront her, although 
she hints that the Egyptian method is superior . 
61 There is, then, a nuanced 
polyonymous monotheism: Isis has a true name, and a true cult. Moreover, 
sovereignty language features strongly: Isis is every inch a queen. Nevertheless, 
ambiguities remain in the Golden Ass. `Fortune' is close to personification in the High 
Priest of Isis' response to Lucius, yet she is apparently at odds with Isis, as callous as 
Isis is kind. Is Fortune different from Isis or her malign aspect? 62 Further, Lucius is 
subsequently initiated into the mysteries of Osiris, but the relation between Isis and 
Osiris remain relatively unspecified. 
The third example is an oracular response of Apollo to the question `Are you, 
or another, god? '63 It runs: 
Born of himself, untaught, motherless, immovable, 
Not contained in a name, many-named, dwelling in fire, 
This is God. We angels are but a particle of God. 
61 Perhaps ensuring the prestige of the particular mystery cult. 
`'' See L. Martin 1987: 20-22. 
63 Quoted by Athanassiadi and Frede 1999: 17. 
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Stoic analogies readily spring to mind here given the stress on fire and the pantheistic 
tone of the last line. 
These examples illustrate a polyonymous approach with three different 
original deities. Such a theological tool is attractive both philosophically (allowing 
resolution of the question of the One and the Many) and politically, given the Roman 
empire's religious multiplicity. 64 It also readily harmonises with Praxeas' 
presentation. 
Two other systems can be mentioned here. The first is the cult of Theos 
Hypsistos. While Athanassiadi and Frede see this as essentially pagan monotheism, 65 
Levinskaya argues convincingly that this cult at least substantially utilises Jewish 
ideas. 66 The data is certainly diverse, 67 but the more `pagan' features (e. g. traces of 
polyonymous monotheism) and the more Jewish features (e. g. the frequently aniconic 
data) perhaps add little to the considerations dealt with under those separate headings. 
The last cult, or family of cults, is Gnosticism. Generalisations about 
Gnosticism are difficult, but Dillon cautiously notes that, despite appearances, 
(gnostic systems feature bewildering arrays of supernatural characters at various levels 
of emanation), an underlying monism remains. 
68 This judgement seems well-taken. 
Gnosticism, despite its variety, can be represented, inter alia, as `a complex and 
64 Cp. M. Sordi 1986: 87,186. 
65 Athanassiadi and Frede 1999: 17. 
66 Levinskaya 1996: 95ff. 
67 See Appendix 1.5. 
68 Dillon 1999: 78. Athanassiadi and Frede 1999: 12-14 make similar points regarding the Hermetic 
literature and the Chaldaean Oracles. 
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distinctive myth of origins [emphasis added]'69 in which ultimately a unitary principle 
is the origin of all. Thus The Secret Book according to John states: `The unit, since it 
is a unitary principle of rule, has nothing that presides over it', 70 which is beyond 
divinity, utterly complete, eternal and ineffable. 7' It is, though, productive, 72 for it 
produces entities from which ultimately the spiritual and material worlds spring. 
Two things should be added. First, the language that the unit or monad is 
beyond divinity is striking. Secondly, given this, Dillon's further point again seems 
well-taken: `The Gnostic first principle. . . is a 
far more transcendent and impersonal 
entity than the Jewish or Christian God. '73 On such a view, relationship, including 
worship, with such a principle is highly problematic. 
This survey of pagan monotheisms highlights: 
1. The variety of monotheistic beliefs. 
2. The prominence of polyonymous monotheism. 
3. The importance of monistic thinking, which may erode absolute 
distinctions between God and other entities. 
It is now time to examine the species of monotheism found inside the explicitly 
Jewish-biblical tradition. 
69 B. Layton 1987: 9. 
70 Secret Book according to John 2: 26. 
71 Secret Book 2: 36-3: 17. 
72 Secret Book 4: 26 c£ 2: 28. 
73 Dillon 1999: 78f. 
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2.4. Jewish-Biblical Monotheism 
A central conundrum for early church studies is how early Christians could 
maintain their self-image as biblical monotheists, 74 while reverencing Christ as they 
did. 75 What permitted this development, without, as far as Christians were concerned, 
clearly perceived contradiction? 
Bauckham helpfully articulates two views about Jewish monotheism. 76 The 
first stresses a strict monotheism in which it was `impossible to attribute real divinity 
to any figure other than the one God', 77 while the second, `revisionist', way argues for 
intermediate categories between God and other entities. 78 However, both views must 
deal with what is distinctive about God (something remains distinctive about God in 
the second view). Methodologically, this should be determined not by alien priorities, 
but by the system's own. This will be done under the broad headings used earlier. 
2.4.1. Uniqueness In Terms Of Being 
Fascinatingly, terms translatable in English as `god' are not restricted to 
Yahweh. 79 Given this, some prefer to speak of Old Testament `henotheism', in which 
`theoretical' monotheism is not asserted: other `gods' exist but cannot compete with 
74 Note Rev 22: 8f which maintains the conventional Jewish prohibition on worshipping anything but 
God. 
75 E. g. Pliny's account of Christians singing hymns to Christ as to a god in his letter (Epistle 96) from 
Bithynia to Trajan 111 A. D. 
76 Bauckham 1998: 1 If It may be objected that talk of a coherent biblical monotheism is simplistic. 
Nevertheless, following Y. Kaufinann 1960, the material contains coherent features (see below), and 
arguably early Christians would tend to construe the material as a unity. 
77 Bauckham 1998: 2. 
78 For a typology of mediator figures and mediatorial functions see J. Davila 1999: 3-20. 
79 E. g. Exodus 15: 11. Deuteronomy 33: 26 and Psalm 89: 5-9. 
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Yahweh. `Theoretical' monotheism is felt to occur later, with, in particular, Isaiah 40- 
55.80 The New Testament also contains wider usages: John 10: 34-36 Jesus utilises an 
Old Testament example (Psalm 82: 6) of `gods' being applied to entities other than 
Yahweh. 8' 
Some such references to `gods' may deal with those who stand for Yahweh 
(e. g. Exodus 22: 28 and, on some views Psalm 82: 1 ff). However, elsewhere `god' 
terms are used, apparently, for supernatural beings other than Yahweh: see Psalm 
138: 1.82 This, of course, is vital. The Old Testament does not deny spiritual entities 
exist besides God: most notably Satan; 83 demons more generally; 84 and angels. 85 The 
New Testament likewise insists on spiritual entities other than Yahweh, in the angels 
of Revelation and the birth narratives of Matthew and Luke, in the exorcisms of the 
Synoptics and pauline language regarding `powers' and `rulers', notably in 
Ephesians, 86 and Satan's presence in, for example, the Synoptic temptation narratives. 
However, John's Gospel, so much the trinitarian storm centre and enlisted 
both by heterodox and orthodox, lacks both the exorcisms so prominent in the 
Synoptics, and the angelophanies of the birth narratives. Yet Jesus' passion itself has 
80 See e. g. B. Anderson 1999: 66 for an outline of such views. 
81 Jesus argues that if the Old Testament could so apply the term without blasphemy, then he, the one 
God sent, rightly calls himself God's Son. See H. Ridderbos 1997: 375. 
82 The LXX softens the Hebrew elohim to äyyEXwv. 
83 Job 1: 6f-, Zechariah 3: 2. 
84 Deut. 32: 17 and Psalm 106: 37. Both apparently deal with objective entities rather than merely 
adjudicating unfavourably on worship offered to objective nullities. Y. Kaufmann 1960: 63-67 deals 
with OT demonology. While he talks of the demonic being demythologised (65), the context shows that 
he is stressing i/ that Israelites were not merely assimilating pagan gods; and Ii/ that in Israelite 
demonology, the demons are not sprung from a primordial and therefore equivalent principle of evil: 
there was no effective rival to Yahweh's cosmic reign. 
85 Daniel 10: 21,12: 1 and conceivably 4: 13. 
86 See Arnold 1989 for full argument regarding the supernatural elements of thought in Ephesus. For 
nuanced appreciation of Arnold, see 
P. 0 Brien 1999: 541 
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exorcistic overtones, for the prince of this world is in conflict with Jesus (John 14: 30), 
influences Judas (John 13: 2) and is overthrown or condemned (John 12: 31; 16: 11). 87 
Moreover, the pseudo-believers of John 8 who defy Jesus' claims are depicted as 
children of Satan (8: 44), in terms suggesting that this is not merely mythopoeic 
language but refers to a real entity (the language about Satan's entry into Judas 
supports this (13: 27)). Arguably, there are not several overt exorcistic confrontations 
in John, but a single, large, underlying one. 
Turning to angelophanies, while a birth narrative is omitted, 88 the Gospel does 
refer to angels, and the account of angels in the Resurrection narrative (20: 12) betrays 
no editorial hesitation about their existence. 
Therefore, supernatural entities other than Yahweh were recognised in both 
Testaments, 89 and such entities could be described with terms normally translatable as 
`god'. Yet the bible also sharply distinguishes between such spiritual entities and 
Yahweh. The context of Psalm 106: 37 is criticism of practices blurring that 
distinction, worship alternative to Yahweh. As Anderson comments, 90 Israel 's faith 
`... was based on a fierce devotion to Yahweh. ' Yahweh, adopting terminology from 
Isaiah 40-55, is said to be incomparable: but on what basis of distinction? 
Jeremiah 10: 10 can be seen perhaps as summarising much biblical thought 
here. It reads: 
87 Compare G. Twelftree 2001: 141 f on Jesus' ministry as a battle with Satan culminating in the Cross. 
88 Also true of Mark. Arguably the omission is explicable for compositional reasons, to facilitate irony 
about claims by Jesus' interlocutors to know his origin. 
89 Also in the Apocrypha: e. g. Tobit features the clash between Raphael and the demon (see Tobit 8: 3), 
while 2 Maccabees 3: 26-34 has the heavenly flogging of Heliodorus. 
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But the LORD is the true God; 
He is the living God and the everlasting King. At his wrath the earth quakes, 
And the nations cannot endure his 91 
The setting is Yahweh's warning not to fear what the nations do, since their 
customs are false (10: 3). This recurrent motif of deception is associated with the 
created nature of idols. Verses 4f explain that the gods or idols of the nations cannot 
move, talk, do good or evil. This contrasts with the effective greatness of Yahweh, 
who is incomparable (10: 6f a typical deutero-isaianic theme contrasting Yahweh with 
would-be rivals). Jeremiah 10: 10 then contrasts God as a living and true God with 
idols, which are of human origination (10: 8f). Further, the subsequent logic of God as 
maker of all (v. 16) apparently precludes anything making him: nothing existed to do 
it. That suggests that the corollary of vv. 8f is that Yahweh is uncreated. A further 
important comparison then appears, in terms of creating (10: 11 ff). The idols do not 
create (v. 11), while Yahweh is declared both as the creator of all (vv. 12f and v 16), 
and also (v 13) as providentially controlling the elements of the cosmos, a sovereign. 
Small wonder, then, that idols are summed up (vv 14f) as lies and delusion, with no 
`breath' (ruach/ nvEvµa). The contrast with the God who breathes life in creation is 
hard to miss. 
Thus Yahweh's incomparability is maintained by a series of contrasts: 
Yahweh Idols (gods of the nations) 
Creates vs cannot create 
Uncreated vs created 
Sovereign vs Impotent 
90 Anderson 1999: 66. 
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These distinctions are prominent in Isaiah 40-55, but by no means confined to 
that material. 92 The created nature of idols is particularly important, 93 and is a 
persistent thought in the pre- and post-exilic prophets, 94 but also in pentateuchal 
material, 95 and extends into the deuterocanonical Wisdom literature, 96 as well as the 
New Testament. 97 Isaiah 40-55 also highlights Yahweh as creator, 98 but again this 
thought is persistent. 99 Yahweh's supreme sovereignty is likewise underlined in Isaiah 
40-55, (40: 23; 44: 25-28), notably in his long-standing and effective plans for salvation 
(46: 8ff). Again this motif of sovereignty is not confined to Jeremiah and Isaiah, '°° and 
is associated both with Yahweh as creator, 'ol and as unique provider of salvation, 
especially in the Exodus. ' 02 
In this way the vocabulary of Isaiah 40-55 which stresses Yahweh as 
incomparable and unique summarises considerable biblical data, and these themes 
continue in deuterocanonical literature. Hence, Mauser and Bauckham can appeal to 
considerable biblical support: '03 God's uniqueness or oneness lies not so much in 
being the only spiritual entity but rather in him being incomparable as one who 
91 NRSV translation. Unhappily the LXX omits v. 10. The word translated as `truth' is emeth. 
92 Although B. Halpern 1987: 107 rightly points out that earlier texts, while consistent with e. g. Jeremiah 
and Isaiah (hence it is possible to speak of a biblical monotheism), may reflect a less self-conscious 
monotheism. 
93 E. g. Isaiah 40: 19f, 44: 9-20; 46: 6 
94 E. g. Amos 5: 26; Hosea 8: 6; 13: 2; 14: 3; Micah 5: 13; Ezekiel 7: 20; 20: 32; Nehemiah 9: 18 and Daniel 
3 
95 E. g. Ex 20: 4f; 32: 8,31; Deut 4: 16,28; 
96 Wisdom 13: 13ff; 14: 8. 
97 Romans 1: 18 f£ 
98 E. g. 40: 21f, 26ff, 44: 24; 45: 9-14. 
99 E. g. Genesis 1 and 2; Pss 19: 1 ff, 24: 1 f, 89: 11 ff; 90: 2; 93: 1; Prov 8: 27ff; Nehemiah 9: 6. In the 
deuterocanonical Wisdom literature, see Wisdom 9: 9; 11: 17; Sirach 24: 8 
'°° E. g. Pss 2; 103: 19; Daniel 4: 3,17,34. In the deuterocanonical Wisdom literature, see Wisdom 
13: 15; Sirach 16: 26f£ 
101 E. g. Pss 24: 1; 95: 4f 
102 E. g. Deut 4: 32ff. 
103 Mauser 1991: 257ff and Bauckham 1998: 1Off. 
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vanquishes all rivals' 04 or as sole creator and ruler of all. '05 God is supreme in terms 
of his rule. 106 At the level of being, then, what is distinctive about God is that he is 
uncreated. ' 07 This suggests, consequently, God's independence of the created order, 
notably in that the passing years do not corrupt him (Psalm 102: 25-27). 
However, an obvious question here is whether the figure of Wisdom, 
especially as developed, contradicts this. The provenance of the biblical figure of 
Wisdom remains controversial, as does the extent to which Wisdom should be 
interpreted as a separate hypostasis. 108 Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
Wisdom is no rival to God. Her co-operation with God is evident in Proverbs 3: 19f 
and 8: 22-31 and this co-operation can be seen in terms of God's sovereignty even over 
Wisdom (Sirach 24: 8), a point re-inforced by the picture of God as the grantor of 
Wisdom to humans (Sirach 6: 37; Wisdom 9: 9). Hence Wisdom 12: 13 can, 
consistently with an elevated view of Wisdom, assert that there is no God besides God 
(Wisdom 12: 13), 109 for God's sovereignty remains intact. ' 10 
Bauckham observes that New Testament writers fully associate Jesus with this 
divine identity. ' 11 This is justifiable, given that uncreatedness is apparently ascribed to 
the Son, or Word, by John 1: 1 ff and Hebrews 1, the latter interestingly applying to the 
104 Mauser 1991: 262. 
b05 Bauckham 1998: 10. 
106 C£ C. Layman 1988: 291ff, and Halpern 1987: 81, following (here) Kaufmann 1960: 29. 
107 Kaufmann 1960: 22,121 stresses that in biblical monotheism nothing transcends God. 
108 J. Hadley 1997: 235 n. 7 notes that there is no agreed close definition of hypostatization. 
109 Compare Hadley 1997: 243 who comments wisdom remains ' "under the thumb" of Yahweh', and 
Murphy 1997: 232 
110 As Halpern 1987: 81 notes, this is the decisive criterion in Kaufmann's argument. 
111 Bauckham 1998: 26. 
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Son the language of incorruption from Psalm 102: 25-27 which the Old Testament 
applies to Yahweh. 
2.4.2. Uniqueness In Relation To Worship 
Israel, as Anderson notes, "2 was marked by a fierce and exclusive zeal for 
Yahweh. Bauckham, amongst others, comments on the link between God's 
uniqueness and monolatry. 113 The Old Testament critique of alternative objects of 
worship is well-attested, 1 14 but, of course, the New Testament retains this antipathy. 
Thus, Christians are converted from idolatry (1 Thessalonians 1: 9), and passages such 
as I Corinthians 10: 14 prohibit idolatry. At a visionary level, Revelation 19: 10 and 
22: 9 prohibit the worship even of angels. Theological justification appears in Romans 
1: 25 which depicts idolatry as worshipping the creature rather than the creator. This 
seems to show continuity between what makes God God (his status as creator, not 
created) and the rationale for prohibiting alternative worship. One must add Paul 's 
further observations in 1 Corinthians 10: 19f. Although idols are nothing in themselves 
(a continuity with Isaiah 44), nevertheless idolatry is not merely dealing with a nullity, 
for idols are vehicles for demons (a continuity with Deuteronomy 32: 17 and Psalm 
106: 37). All this justifies S. Johnson's verdict: `The earliest followers of Jesus were 
monotheistic Jews. ' 115 
"' Anderson 1999: 66. 
113 Bauckham 1999: 44. 
114 Further to the material from Isaiah and Jeremiah, note especially 2 Kings 17: 7-23, which diagnoses 
the Assyrian conquest as an outworking of God's anger at idolatry (v 7). 
5 Johnson 1949: 103. 
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However, not all forms of worship, even if `offered' to Yahweh, were 
acceptable. Some sacrifices were improper, 116 and the emphasis on Yahweh's unique 
name and its revelation undercuts the welcome to other names that is so conspicuous 
in the polyonymous monotheism of The Golden Ass. 
Obviously the New Testament's monotheistic monolatry does not preclude 
worshipping Jesus (e. g. Hebrews 1: 6, Philippians 2: 10-11 and Revelation 5: 12-14). 
Bauckham rightly stresses the use of Psalm 110 in relation to Jesus as establishing 
Jesus' sovereignty, l l7 while Jesus is also depicted as creator. '' 8 Bauckham argues: 
In this way they [sc. The NT writers] develop a kind of christological 
monotheism which is fully continuous with early Jewish monotheism but 
distinctive in the way it sees Jesus Christ himself as intrinsic to the identity of the 
unique God. 119 
Hence the worship of Jesus is utterly intelligible and consistent within this 
particular monotheistic framework, for he is creator and sovereign. 
There is, then, radical difference between this New Testament monotheism 
and the polyonymous monotheism of the Greco-Roman world, particularly in the 
former's exclusivity in worship. 
2.4.3. Uniqueness In Relationship 
Yahweh's uniqueness relationally, that he alone is creator, and sovereign, has 
already been mentioned. This raises the question of creatio ex nihilo. While not 
completely explicit in the Old Testament, it is, nevertheless, an attractive reading of 
1"'Eg 2 Kgs 21: 6. 
117 Bauckham 1999: 66. 
118 Bauckham 1998: 35, citing John 5: 21-23. 
19 Bauckham 1998: 26f 
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Genesis 1: 1 ff, 1 20 and this interpretation is certainly present in the intertestamental 
period. 121 It is also completely consistent with a God who is sovereign Lord of all and 
indeed whose relationship with the cosmos seems `proprietorial'. 122 This notably 
contrasts with the Demiurge of the Timaeus, whose creation is not ex nihilo, and 
whose sovereign relations are not grounded in this way. 
2.5. Conclusions 
This review obviously tends to distance Jewish-biblical monotheism from its 
prominent pagan philosophical and religious monotheistic counterparts. The 
conception of the creator-created relation tends to undermine tendencies to monism, 
while the strictures on worship in one name render polyonymous monotheism highly 
problematic. 
Moreover, while Jewish-biblical monotheism contemplates more than one 
spiritual entity, patterns of divine action remain markedly different from polytheism's 
separated spheres of operation, whether that separation be functional or geographical. 
With this review of Jewish-biblical monotheism in mind, it is not surprising 
that Jesus is treated as God in a full sense, for he is depicted as creator and sovereign 
and pre-existent. But this raises two vital questions for considering Tertullian in the 
next chapter: 
120 See G. Wenham 1987: 11-14. 
121 2 Mac 7: 28. 
122 E. g. Psalm 95: 5 links God as `owner' and lord to his position as creator. 
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1. To what extent does Tertullian reflect a biblical basis in his 
monotheism (or is Praxeas, his antagonist in fact closer to the 
mark)? 
2. Given that Jesus is God, what is, for Tertullian, his relation to his 
Father? 
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CHAPTER 3: TERTULLIAN AND MONOTHEISM 
In chapter 3 it is proposed that: 
3(a). Tertullian's monotheism is closely patterned on biblical-Jewish 
monotheism, rather than Greco-Roman monotheisms, for Tertullian stresses 
God's status as sovereign, uncreated creator. 
3(b). Tertullian links monotheism closely to divine monarchy. 
3(c). Tertullian upholds both monotheism and the plurality of divine Persons 
by ensuring the Son is no rival of his Father. This is achieved through a 
pattern of derivation, including a derivation of sovereignty and substance 
from the Father. 
3(d). This pattern of derivation is not ditheistic because the Persons are 
inseparable, have (unlike polytheistic action) a unity of action and are not a 
plurality of independent, uncreated entities. 
3(e). Tertullian shows the necessity of the orthodox position by reference to 
the revelation of distinct Persons in the events of the Incarnation. 
3(/). For Tertullian, revelation in salvation history enables us to see eternal 
relations because of God 's truthfulness. 
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3(g). Tertullian's own position is unstable because, for him, the primary 
relation disclosed in the Incarnation, Sonship, is not eternal. 
3(h). Tertullian's position is susceptible of logical development towards 
stability by seeing the Incarnate relationship of sonship as disclosing an 
eternal relation of that nature. 
3(i). On this reasoning, egalitarian presentations of immanent trinitarian 
relationships seem inconsistent with monotheism and thus ditheistic or 
tritheistic. Rather, for Tertullian, the filial derivation of the Son implies his 
obedience, as manifested in the Incarnation. 
36). Sonship matters greatly to Tertullian soteriologically, since Jesus must be 
known and believed in as Son. 
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3.1. Introduction: The Target Of Against Praxeas 
3.1.1. A Heresy Of The Unity 
Satan, claims Tertullian, `upholds the unique Master... so that he can make a 
heresy even out of the unity'. ' That heresy lies behind much of what Tertullian 
attacks in Against Praxeas. Tertullian's opening barrage is, however, striking. It is 
perhaps tempting to think that the problem in explaining the Trinity centres on 
accounting for plurality, and, consequently, the evaluation of trinitarian theologies 
may also focus on how those theologies deal with plurality, while God's unity is taken 
as a given, from which subsequent discussion proceeds. Tertullian undermines this 
approach. The problem is two-fold: how to account for the unity of, as well as the 
plurality within, God. One may be mistaken about the unity just as the plurality. 
This seems obvious, but is of the greatest significance. For if one evaluates 
plurality within God using a mistaken account of his unity, then acceptable accounts 
of that plurality risk being wrongly rejected. This, of course, is just what Tertullian 
contends has happened with Praxeas' teaching. 
However, Tertullian himself is certainly committed to some form of the unity 
or unicity of God. 2 This is quickly established in Against Praxeas3 and is no ad 
hominem concession. Tertullian asserts just this in a wide range of writing, 4 and as an 
1 Against Praieas (hereafter AgP) 1. Unicum dominum vindicat ... ut et 
de unico haeresim faciat. The 
text and translation used is E. Evans 1948. 
2 Similarly Hippolytus recounts elders both resisting the teaching of Noetus and also claiming to be 
faithful to monotheism £va 9E6v o'BaµCV &XiOwS. Against Noetus (hereafter AgN) 1.7. 
AgP 2 Nos vvc'ro et semper,... unicum quidem deum credimus. 
4 Including Apology 17; On Idolatry 6.2. Against Hermogenes 4.2,5; Against Marcion Bk 1.3; 
Prescription against Heretics 13, The Soul 's Testimony 2; An Answer to the Jews 2; Scapula 2. 




important, not incidental, part of his arguments. This is most conspicuous perhaps in 
Against Marcion (for unicity reveals both the error of Marcionism and its 
seriousness), Against Hermogenes (where it again reveals error, this time that of 
viewing matter as eternal) and in On Idolatry (where it helps establish the error and 
sinfulness of idolatry). Tertullian himself, therefore, uses divine unity or unicity as a 
criterion. Superficially, of course, Praxeas was also doing this. The question then 
arises, what did Tertullian think unacceptable about Praxeas' view of divine unity, 
and why? 
3.1.2. The Contours Of Praxeas' Views 
Tertullian describes Praxeas' view thus: the Father came down into the virgin, 
was born, suffered and is in fact Jesus Christ. 5 The key feature is Praxeas' 
identification of the trinitarian Persons with each other, in fact with the Father. 
Several points arise. First, it is difficult to be sure what this implies for Jesus after the 
Ascension. Possibly, the Father assumes the identity of Jesus purely temporarily in the 
Incarnation, surrendering it after the Ascension. Tertullian returns later to the content 
of the heresy, stating that for the heretics, Jesus Christ is himself the point where 
Father and Son meet: `... they say that the Son is flesh, that is, the Man, Jesus, while 
the Father is the Spirit, that is, God, Christ. '6 This formulation does not clearly decide 
whether temporal or eternal modalism is in view. 
Secondly, Tertullian concentrates on this identification of the Persons as the 
crucial issue, to which one may add, thirdly, that Tertullian is stressing that it is the 
Father who acts as `Son' and `Spirit'. Effectively there is just one Person, the Father, 
5 AgP 1. Compare ch 2. Hippolytus' account of Noetus' heresy AgN 1.2 is very similar. 
6 AgP 27. 
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appearing under different guises. 7 This is particularly serious for Tertullian who 
emphasises that humans may not see God (Tertullian strongly uses Exodus 33: 20). 
8 
An incarnation of the Father would deny this. 
Both these latter issues have implications for revelation in the Incarnation, the 
place of which in Tertullian's thought will be dealt with later. 
3.1.3. The Concerns Of Praxeas' Thought 
Tertullian also describes what motivates Praxeas' position. Two aspects are 
particularly pertinent. The first relates to systematic considerations flowing from 
God's unity or unicity. He points out in chapter two that Praxeas' view `... thinks it 
impossible to believe in one God [unicum deum] unless it says that both Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit are one and the same [ipsum eundemque]. ' This links Praxeas' view 
clearly with God's unity or unicity. 9 Praxeas is also depicted in chapter three as 
claiming to uphold the divine monarchy. The divine unity or unicity and the divine 
monarchy seem linked, so that infringing one infringes the other. This will be a 
feature of Tertullian's defence of orthodoxy, that a defence of the monarchy readily 
functions as a defence of the unity (see e. g. chapter 3). Further, this nexus seems in 
some respects common ground between Praxeas' view and Tertullian's, for in chapter 
twenty Tertullian links both divine unity and the monarchy when commenting on 
biblical texts which advocates of Praxeas' position ignore but which manage to 
preserve both unity and monarchy. 
7 There is, then, no hidden `fourth' element of the godhead. Again, compare AgN: 1.2: 2.3. 
8 He refers to it three times in ch. 14, and also in ch. 24. K. McCruden 2002: 334 thinks the Father's 
invisibility is a key value Tertullian wishes to defend. 
9 Compare AgN 2.1-3. 
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The second aspect for consideration is the claim of Praxeas and others that 
their view of God 's unity or unicity has biblical authority. Tertullian cites three texts 
used by them: Isaiah 40: 5, John10: 30 and 14: 9-11.1° 
In short, then, Praxeas' position turns on God's unity and monarchy, which are 
felt to require that the events of the Incarnation be explained by the Father being Son 
and Spirit. Hence, the concepts of monotheism and monarchy must be examined, to 
which task we now turn. 
3.2. Tertullian And Monotheism 
3.2.1. Monotheism Amongst Tertullian's Fellow-Christians 
Substantial evidence indicates that Greek Apologists argued for a biblically 
patterned monotheism as outlined in the previous chapter. G. Bray comments `... the 
first and fundamental concern of all the patristic writers was to preserve a pure 
monotheism. ' 1 This seems well-founded. Thus, it was noted above that the biblical 
material stressed God's uncreatedness, something the Apologists express as God 
uniquely being without beginning, or before the ages. 12 God is, however, creator of 
a1h13 ý'`W, `r' '` `ý`t- 
A ``; L creation must be ex 
nihilo, distancing this monotheism from various Greco-Roman philosophies. 
However, this creatorship is now described in terms involving the Logos. Theophilus' 
account of the involvement of the Logos is representative: 
10 AgP 20. Hippolytus refers to Ex. 3: 6 and Isa 44: 6, although Jn 10: 30 and 14: 9-11 also feature in AgN 
as texts requiring interpretation against Noetianism. It is intriguing that both AgP and AgN deal with 
texts from Isa 40-55, a `high-water mark' for OT monotheism. 
Bray 1980: 50, reacting to M. Wiles' contention that the patristic writers were concerned with the 
distinct existence of three persons. T. Rajak 1999: 67 comments of Justin in the Dialogue against 
Tinplio that monotheism is the `premiss behind the whole enquiry. ' 
12 E. g. Tatian To the Greeks 4; Athenagoras Plea for the Christians 4,10; Theophilus To Autolycus 2. 
10. 
13 E. g. Tatian To the Greeks 5; Athenagoras Plea 10; Theophilus Autolycirs 2.10. 
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God, then, having his own Word internal within his own bowels, begat him, 
emitting him along with his own wisdom before all things. He had this Word as 
a helper in the things that were created by him and by him he made all things. 
14 
Several points arise. First, the primary category for the Second Person here is 
Logos. When identifying who the Son is, Athenagoras comments tellingly `But the 
Son of God is the Logos of the Father. ' 15 Secondly, this Logos satisfies biblical 
monotheistic criteria for divinity. He is uncreated: he is a distinct entity within the 
Father before all ages, although not emitted until, apparently, the world's creation is 
in view. ' 6 Further, he is so closely associated with creation that he can fairly be called 
creator. 
Turning to worship, the Apologists are equally in tune with the biblical 
witness. Tatian comments in the context of worship: 
Him [sc. God] we know from his creation, and apprehend his invisible power by 
his works. I refuse to adore that workmanship which he has made for our 
sakes. 
17 
This language, so reminiscent of Romans 1: 18ff, reproduces the prohibition on 
worshipping the created. 
Latin writings evince similar concerns to uphold such a monotheism. ' 
8 
Particularly telling, though, for the argument in Against Praxeas is Minucius Felix's 
Octavius. The Christian `Octavius' claims (chapter 17) that providential order in the 
cosmos points to a supreme governor. 
' 9 He then argues (chapter 18) that such 
providential order presupposes a united rule, a monarchy rather than dyarchy, or 
polyarchy: 
14 Theophilus Autolycus 2.10. Compare Tatian To the Greeks 5; Athenagoras Plea 10. 
15 Athenagoras Plea 10. Although he later talks in Father-Son terms. 
16 This position's instability will be developed in 3.3.2. and 3.4 below. 
17 Tatian To the Greeks 4. 
18 See e. g. S. Price 1999: 122f on Cyprian and Minucius Felix. 
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Canst thou believe that in heaven there is a division of the supreme power, and 
that the whole authority of that true and divine empire is sundered...? 
Here one closely approaches the debate between Tertullian and Praxeas, for 
the relationship between the First and Second Persons, whatever it is, should not 
permit division of the divine power. 20 Division would imply that neither was fully 
divine. 
3.2.2. Tertullian And Monotheism Outside Against Praxeas 
Concerning God's unique or exclusive being, Tertullian defends God's 
eternity particularly strikingly in Against Hermogenes. Here he encounters 
Hermogenes' argument that God created using existing material . 
21 Hermogenes, of 
course, resembles the Timaeus here. 22 Interestingly, Hermogenes also contends that 
for God to be `Lord' there must always have been something over which he was 
Lord, 23 a species of the co-relativity argument which later proved so significant for 
Origen and Athanasius in their discussions of the Son's eternity. 24 
Tertullian reacts with characteristic vehemence, but his reasons are intriguing. 
Hermogenes has argued matter is eternal: but, Tertullian observes, `... what other 
essential property of God is there than eternity? '25 Even allowing for rhetorical 
exaggeration (there may be other essential properties), this is revealing. By `eternal' 
he means having always existed and going on to exist forever, 26 which includes being 
19 Providence also forms part of the monotheism of Novatian Trinity ch. 8. 
20 Novatian Trinity chs. 30 and 31 addresses a similar point and deals with it as God delegating power 
to the Son. 
21 Hermogenes argues the other alternatives, that God created out of himself or out of nothing, are 
either logically impossible or make God the author of evil. Against Hermogenes 2 (Hereafter AgH). 
221 J. Waszink 1956: 9 posits primarily platonic influences on Hermogenes, which is plausible. 
23 Tertullian's description: AgH 3.1. 
24 See P. Widdicombe 1994 passim. 
25AgH4.1. 
26 , IgH 4.1. 
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uncreated. This property is the test of true divinity. Tertullian argues Hermogenes' 
view has disastrous consequences: 
By possessing these He is God alone, and by His sole possession of them He is 
One. If another also shared in the possession, there would then be as many gods 
as there were possessors of these attributes of God. Hermogenes, therefore, 
introduces two gods: he introduces Matter as God's equal. God, however, must 
be One, because that is God which is supreme; but nothing else can be supreme 
than that which is unique; and that cannot possibly be unique which has 
anything equal to it; and Matter will be equal with God when it is held to be 
27 eternal. 
This prompts some observations. First, Tertullian's point is not simply that 
Hermogenes has two gods: the relationship between God and Matter in Hermogenes' 
system is also obnoxious. Tertullian argues that on Hermogenes' view `The fact of its 
past existence it [sc. Matter] owed to no-one so that it could be subject to no-one. '28 
Hence, since Matter is not dependent on God as creator, he is not its lord and 
therefore not supreme. So, for Tertullian the exclusivity of divine eternity is tied to 
God's sovereignty. This is of no little importance. `Monotheism' (taken as what is 
exclusive to God) and monarchy are not severable. Moreover, preserving supremacy 
or monarchy is a primary, if not the primary, concern: for the monarchy functions as a 
criterion to weigh issues about exclusivity. J. Moignt's analysis puts all this well: 
The unicity of God is, then, deduced from the existence of a single sovereignty 
[seigneurie], which can belong to only one person: unicus Dominus. 29 
Secondly, Tertullian is well aware of the objection that on his view we could 
share nothing with God. This would be unfortunate for the claim, for example, for a 
future eternity. Tertullian responds that God may bestow properties on his creatures, 
but those properties originate in God and therefore do not violate God's supremacy. 
30 
27 AgH 4.4-5. 
28AgH. 3. 
-)9 Moignt 1970: 342. 
30AgH5. 
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The importance of uncreatedness emerges elsewhere in Tertullian, 31 but 
Against Marcion I. 3 and 4 are particularly instructive. Here Tertullian again dwells 
on eternity as a `requirement' for being God. Being God means being uncreated, 
which, he asserts, God enjoys uniquely. Without this exclusivity, argues Tertullian, 
God will not be supreme: 
[What] must be the condition of the great Supreme himself? Surely it must be 
that nothing is equal to him, i. e. that there is no other great supreme; because if 
there were, he would have an equal; and if he had an equal, he would no longer 
be the great Supreme ... 
32 
This echoes the stress of Isaiah 40-55 on God's incomparability and 
consequent uniqueness. God's relationship to the world as its sovereign, reigning 
without rival, is intimately connected to what God is. 33 As creator from nothing, 34 
God is the proprietor of the cosmos: `All things belong to him... the universe belongs 
to the Creator... ', 35 which harmonises with the biblical conclusion from God's 
creative activity. 
Turning to worship, Tertullian stresses that the one God is worshipped by 
Christians, 36 but concedes clearly that Jesus Christ is too. 37 This is intriguing, for 
Tertullian strongly opposes false worship as On Idolatry shows. Tertullian utilises 
pagan concessions that cults arose around dead heroes, 38 and an underlying theme is 
certainly that idolatry is a human religious construction39 (literally, with the idol- 
31E. g. Veiling of Virgins 1; To the Nations 3. 
32 Against Marcion Bk 1.3. 
33 Again, compare Moignt 1970: 342, who speaks of God's relation as sole lord to the world, which 
only the creator has. 
' Creation ex nihilo occurs outside AgH, e. g. Apology 17 and Prescription against Heretics 13. 
35 Against Marcion Bk 1.11. 
j6Apology 17. 
37 Apology 18. 
38 On Idolatri- 15.1 & 2. The view is especially associated with Euhemerus. 
39 E. g. On Idolatry 4.2; 15.9. 
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maker). 40 Following 1 Corinthians 10: 19f, idolatry is linked to demonolatry. 41 
However, a crucial rationale for Tertullian's critique comes in 4.2. 
Antecesserat Enoch praedicans omnia elementa, omnem mundi censum, quae 
caelo, quae marl, quae terra continentur, in idolalatriam versuros daemonas et 
spiritus desertorum angelorum ut pro deo adversus deum consecrarentur. 
Omnia igitur colit humanus error praeter ipsum omnium conditorem... 
Idolatry, then, is a demonically inspired displacement of the creator (omnium 
conditorem) by what is created (omnia... quae caelo etc continentur). The true object 
of worship is the creator. 
Therefore several features emerge: 
1. Tertullian's underlying concern with the `ditheism' of Hermogenes 
and Marcion is that it undercuts God's supremacy or sovereignty. 
2. The exclusivity of God's uncreatedness helps safeguard this 
supremacy. 
3. Worship is properly directed only at the uncreated creator. 
However, this creates fascinating questions regarding Christ. For Tertullian 
consistently to accept the worship of Christ, this can only be because Jesus is: 
1. an uncreated creator 
and 
2. no `rival' to the Supreme God. 
Passages like John 1: 1 ff show why Jesus might be viewed both as a creator from 
nothing, and also as pre-existent. To that extent, the first criterion is satisfied. The 
problem is meeting the second. Here one can appreciate the `economy' of Praxeas' 
40 On Idolatry 6.2. 
41 E. g. On Idolatryl5.5. Waszink and Van Winden 1987: 75 summarise thus: `The real object of 
worship are [sic] the demons. The idol is something that serves as an intermediate entity between the 
man and the demon. ' 
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solution: Tertullian's principles are, at this point, compatible with Praxeas' 
identification of the Father with the Son. Furthermore, material in Against 
Hermogenes especially seems to create acute problems for Tertullian: 
[But] He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His 
having always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the 
Son, nor a Judge previous to sin. There was, however, a time when neither sin 
existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to constitute the Lord a 
Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not Lord previous to those 
things of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to become Lord at 
some future time: just as He became the Father by the Son, and a Judge by sin, 
so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He had made, in 
order that they might serve Him. m. 
On this view, `Father' is something God becomes. It is hard to see how the 
filial relationship is eternal. Of course, if it is not eternal, how can the Second Person, 
at least qua Son, be legitimately worshipped? Tertullian, then, faces the challenge of 
showing how two persons (indeed three) can be uncreated without attracting the very 
monotheistic criticisms he levels at Hermogenes and Marcion. His answer lies in 
Against Praxeas to which we now turn. 
3.3. Tertullian And Against Praxeas 
3.3.1. The Monotheism Of Against Praxeas 
Tertullian acknowledges in Against Praxeas that orthodox Christian belief 
includes the belief that God is `one' (unicus). 43 This is, however, immediately and 
significantly qualified. First, belief in God as unicus goes hand in hand with belief in 
the economy: `... unicum quidem sed cum sua oeconomia esse credendum'. The 
obligatory connotation of credendum44 covers both the unicity and the economy and 
also helps explain why Tertullian so stresses the economy. Secondly, obviously, for 
42 AgH 3. See too the striking language of 18 where Wisdom's birth and creation is contrasted with 
God who is unborn and uncreated. 
43 AgP 3. 
44Whether credendum is gerund or gerundive, an obligatory note remains. 
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Tertullian recognises, nevertheless, that the orthodox are accused of 
advocating two or three gods, the kind of criticism he launches so tellingly in Against 
Hermogenes and Against Marcion. He summarises Praxeas' party as claiming that 
they, at least, uphold the monarchy. This does not introduce monarchy as a 
completely new topic, moving the debate away from God as unicus. There are indeed 
two concerns, as Moignt aptly comments: 
[Tertullian's] second concern, ....., 
is to show that he does not destroy the 
46 unicity [unicite] of God, nor divide his power over the world. 
The discussion of monarchy is not, however, incidental nor merely illustrative, 
nor simply adopted opportunistically from Praxeas. 47 For the foregoing discussions of 
Against Hermogenes and Against Marcion show that monarchy is highly relevant to 
monotheism for Tertullian. God as unicus stands in the closest relation to God as 
supreme monarch. Rather Tertullian faces in Against Praxeas 3 the challenge of 
showing why his `supremacy/no equal' argument does not equally preclude the Son's 
personal distinction. 
Given Tertullian's extensive use of God's supremacy in connection with 
monotheism, he could not consistently reject the divine monarchy. Nor does he. He 
first defines monarchy, and then works out what would destroy it. This is consistent 
4' AgP 3 puts it thus: 'unitas... non destruatur ab illa [Sc trinitasJ sed administretur. ' 
46 Moignt 1966: 349. 
47 G. Lampe 1997: 56 describes the monarchy analogy as `unfortunate', presumably because he thinks it 
suggests subordinationism or polytheism. 
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with strategies in Against Marcion and Against Hermogenes, which also test positions 
with reference to supremacy. 
Definitionally, monarchy is `a single and sole empire'. 48 Tertullian contends 
that such a monarchy is not denied when its administration is in more than one pair of 
hands. A monarch may have provincial governors and so forth. Now for those 
familiar with Against Hermogenes and Against Marcion this would not initially seem 
very satisfactory. If power can be in more than one pair of hands, what was wrong 
with Hermogenes' position? 
Fortunately, Tertullian also explains how a division of power could destroy 
monarchy: 
Overthrow of monarchy you should understand as [taking place] when there is 
superimposed another kingship of its own character and its own quality [alia 
dominatio suae condicionis et proprii status] and consequently hostile [ac per 
hoc aemula] when another god is introduced to oppose the Creator, as with 
Marcion, or many gods according to people like Valentinus or Prodicus: then it 
is for the overthrow of the monarchy when it is for the destruction of the 
Creator. 49 
In fact, this resembles the `supremacy/no equal' arguments of Against 
Marcion and Against Hermogenes. Any given `power' must be analysed to see if it 
represents `another kingship', that is, one with its own position and standing. Such a 
kingship is a rival, because it constitutes an alternative, competing centre of 
sovereignty. If there is such an alternative sovereignty, supremacy cannot exist, at 
least on Tertullian's arguments. Fundamentally, the objection to such a rival dominion 
is its independence. Its power is underived and not traced back to God himself. 
48 'Singulare et unicum Imperium':: AgP 3. Evans' translation `Dominion' might more helpfully now 
render imperium. 
49 AgP 3. Aemula 'could also be rendered `rival'. 
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Moignt's summary is that since the Son's power has no independent origin, the 
monarchy is not destroyed . 
50 
Tertullian's subsequent exploration of the Son's position, in Against Praxeas 
4, supports this. The Son's authority has been delivered to him by the Father, and he 
does things by the Father's will (Propositions drawn from Matthew 28: 18 and John 
5: 19). Therefore, there is no alia dominatio, for all authority traces back to the one 
source. An important issue arises here. Tertullian may well be taking these verses as 
referring not just to the period of the Incarnation but more generally to Father-Son 
relations. 51 In effect, here economic trinitarian relations disclose immanent ones. Two 
considerations support this. First, Tertullian refers to I Corinthians 15: 27f, which 
deals with the eternal future, and which he interprets as the Son handing authority 
back to the Father. Secondly, for Tertullian's argument to succeed his account of 
Father-Son relations must not breach the monarchy in eternity. 
Thus Tertullian's framework means that he can assert the monarchy remains 
intact if the Son's position derives from the Father. Derivation is critical here, giving a 
certain patrocentricity to Tertullian's monarchy, for the Son's rule traces back to the 
Father. 
For Lampe, however, monarchy is an `illustration' that opens the door to 
`extreme subordination and at worst polytheism'. 
52 Naturally this requires further 
consideration. But it is notable that Tertullian's argument uses monarchy consistently 
with his theology elsewhere and that monarchy safeguards God's uniqueness rather 
50 Moignt 1970: 352-3. 
51 See below. 
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than dilutes it. However, assessing the success of Tertullian's approach also depends 
on his handling of the Father-Son relationship. To this we now turn. 
3.3.2. Tertullian And The Relation Of The First And Second Persons 
For Lampe, Tertullian's developed account of relations between the First and 
Second Persons essentially resembles that of the Apologists. 53 It is thus worth 
recalling how the Apologists might explain the relationship. Commenting on Tatian, 
Lampe writes: 54 
From eternity the Logos was present with God, immanent in him as the creative 
reason may be said to be immanent in a man. It was, as it were, a potential 
capacity for creating, and at the moment of creation this was actualised; the 
Logos was put forth to be the agent of the making and sustaining of the whole 
created order. 
Three things are striking. First, such a description is readily associated with John 
1: 1 ff. Secondly, the basic category for the First-Second Person relation is that of God- 
Logos. Thirdly, a question arises over the `unactualised' Logos before creation. Is the 
Logos genuinely subsistent in eternity? For Athenagoras, the Logos apparently does 
so subsist. He comments that while the Logos is the first `product' of God (projected 
in view of creation), nevertheless the Logos has not been brought into existence. 55 
Athenagoras's reason is significant: the Logos has always been immanent within God, 
for God has always been Xoyuxö . This suggests that without the Logos, God would 
have been lacking. The relationship is constitutive of something about the First 
Person. 56 
5' Lampe 1997: 56. 
53 Lampe 1997: 56. See too A. Grillmeier 1975: 117 `In the opinion of many writers, the older Western 
Christology finds its consummation in Tertullian. ' 
54 Lampe 1997: 34, explaining Tatian To the Greeks 7. 
55 Plea 10. 
56 M. Grant 1988: 108f comments on the way Athenagoras sees the Persons as united in power but 
distinguished in rank. 
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Turning to Against Praxeas, chapters 5-9 discuss this question of relation at 
length. The argument's goal is set out at the close of chapter. 8: 
In this way the Trinity, proceeding [decurrens] by intermingled and connected 
degrees [gradus] from the Father, in no respect challenges the monarchy, while 
it conserves the quality of the economy. 
The Father here is the `source' from which the other Persons proceed, and 
because there is then a principle of supremacy, the monarchy is safe, for the reasons 
Tertullian has already given. Equally importantly, such a procession preserves the 
economy. Quite why this preservation is so vital must be examined later. 
Tertullian draws heavily on John 1: 1 for a description of the procession of 
God's Logos. Before all things God was alone (solos) in that nothing was external to 
him. But he was not alone absolutely, for he had Reason (Ratio) within him and with 
him. 57 Tertullian's circumlocution here is interesting. The separation of `within him' 
and `with him' underlines that Ratio is not identical with God. Further, this relation 
predates becoming Son. It is, however, eternal. E. Osborn notes: 58 `God always had 
Logos as Reason... ' 
Ratio becomes sermo ('discourse' in Evans' translation) in view of creation 
(chs. 5-7). This can be described as `nativity' (nativitas), for Discourse has proceeded 
from God. 59 The filial relationship is, then, something that happens to the godhead. 60 
He comments later that `Son' is a name that is received . 
61 Tertullian remarks on the 
procession of Discourse: 
... thereafter causing 
him to be his Father by proceeding from whom he became 
Son, the first-begotten as begotten txi, re W1 things, the only begotten as alone 
57 `Habebat enim secum quam habebat in semetipso rationem, suam scilicet. ' AgP 5. 
58 Osborn 1997: 124. 
59 'e. -t deo [sermo] procedit' AgP 7. 
6o Compare McCruden 2002: 332 who stresses the Word proceeds at a point in time. 
61 AgP 8. 
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begotten out of God in a true sense from the womb of his heart, according as the 
Father himself testifies My heart hath disgorged a good Discourse 62 
Tertullian proposes, then, a relationship like this. The First Person has 
`another' with him and within him, so the Second Person does not reduce into the 
First Person. The First Person has a priority, thereby preserving the supremacy and 
monarchy. But the Second Person is not created ex nihilo (being ex nihilo is a 
criterion of not being divine), but shares in creating ex nihilo (a criterion of being 
divine). Tertullian is thus well-placed to show not merely that his trinity is orthodox, 
but also that Praxeas' is false, for Praxeas is not giving due weight to the claim of 
John 1: 1 that the Word was with God. 
However, since the God-Logos relationship is the underlying, eternal 
relationship, this aspect seems primary in the relationship between First and Second 
Persons. Filiation is something that happens. Tertullian's account of this differs from 
Hippolytus' and, later, Marcellus of Ancyra's, who both envisage sonship as 
apparently coming with incarnation itself, and not with creation. 63 Nevertheless the 
idea that filiation is an occurrence causes considerable unease. If God-Logos is the 
primary relationship, then would the Trinity be primarily a community of love, 
holiness and personal relationship? For a God-Logos relationship seems more 
impersonal. 
Yet Tertullian does not pursue this. Instead, what he emphasises in the 
trinitarian relations is precisely filiation. Thus the credal call of chapter 2 is in terms 
of the Second Person as Son. For Pollard, John's Gospel supports this. He comments: 
62 AgP 7. Tertullian quotes Ps 45: 1. 
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`The regulative christological concept of the Gospel is not Logos, but the Christ, the 
Son of God. ' 64 This apparently discloses a tension, if not a fault-line, in Tertullian's 
thinking. Certainly, Tertullian produces grounds for preferring filial language, for 
denying the Son means neither having the Father nor life. 65 Tertullian insists on 
sonship for soteriological reasons. 
However, this tension carries implications for the First Person as well as the 
Second. God is never without His Ratio or Logos. Otherwise he would impliedly be 
&XoyoS. 66 As noted earlier, Athenagoras asserts the eternal subsistence of the Logos 
partly because of what the First Person must have been from eternity. 67 Given a 
doctrine of God's immutability and perfection, this is highly intelligible. However, 
logically Tertullian cannot see God's fatherhood as eternal, for the Logos is not 
eternally son. The First Person becomes Father, indeed becomes so by his disgorged 
Son. 68 But soteriologically, to Tertullian, denying God's fatherhood is theologically 
fatal. 69 This underlines both why Praxeas' view appears so dangerous (it denies the 
First Person by denying the Second), but also that the tensions in Tertullian's 
exposition apply not just to the Second Person, but also to the First. 
Finally, this discussion highlights some slipperiness in terms like `economy'. 
The term's range will be discussed further below. 
6; AgN. 15.6 & 7. For Hippolytus, language apparently referring to sonship at an earlier stage is 
proleptic. For discussion see B. Capelle 1937: 109-124 and Grillmeier 1975: 116. For Marcellus see T. 
Pollard 1956-7: 345. 
64 Pollard 1970: 6-7. 
65 Starkest in AgP 31. Tertullian utilises I John 2: 22,4: 15, and 5: 9,12. 
66 Compare Hippolytus AgN 10.2. 




3.3.3. Tertullian and Terminology and Imagery 
In Against Praxeas 2 Tertullian deploys terminology and imagery of 
tremendous significance for his discussion. As regards terminology he gives three 
terms of unity as against three of diversity: 70 
Unity vs Three-foldness 
Status vs Gradus 
Substantia vs Forma 
Potestas vs Species 
Structurally, chapter 2 introduces Tertullian's argument, outlining points for 
later substantiation. 7' Chapters 3-8 elucidate the first contrasting pair, status and 
gradus. As already observed, status appears in chapter three's discussion of what 
overthrows the monarchy, where it refers to an independent rule or sovereignty with 
its own 'standing'. 72 This renders Moignt's observation73 that status suggests origin 
and independence more attractive than Evans' stress74 on status as existence. 
Gradus emerges most strongly in chapters 7 and 8 where the Word's prolation 
is described, first as Ratio within and with God, then as Sermo and filius in creation. 
In chapter 8, Tertullian describes this prolation with some recurrent imagery: root and 
shoot; spring and stream; and sun and beam. These cases share, for Tertullian, the 
70 Gnllmeier 1975: 125 notes other terms: of unity - virtus; of distinction -persona. 
7' Note the observations of R. Sider 1971 on the careful structuring of Tertullian's work. Tertullian's 
terms clearly fall for examination but Bray rightly observes that analysis should 
finally focus on ideas 
rather than mere terminology Bray 1979: 29. 
72 The phrase proprii status is best taken as coloured by alia dominatio suae condicionis. 
The 
adjectives alia, suae and proprii all point to some separation 
between the two dominions. 
73 Moignt 1970: 352-3. 
74 Evans 1944: 52. 
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pattern of origo and progenies, hence their aptness for discussing a Father-Son 
relation. This stress on origin matches, of course, discussions of status. To have a 
relation of gradus for Tertullian requires origin without separation or division. In fact, 
more strongly, one cannot have gradus without origin. As such, three-foldness in 
terms of gradus does not deny unity but presupposes some form of it. 
Some observations arise from this. First, the principle of unity is the Father, 
for he is the origo or parens of both Son and Spirit. Osborn acutely observes: `This 
Godhead is that of the Father, revealed in and by the others, as they are united with 
their first principle. '75 As with the pattern of the monarchy, derivation becomes 
prominent. Since the Father is origo, attention naturally finally focuses on him. There 
is, again, patrocentricity. 
This, however, is scarcely the usual characterisation of Latin trinitarian 
theology. Instead it strikingly resembles T. Weinandy's formulation of so-called 
`Greek' trinitarian theology: `The Father is the ultimate source both of the unity, and 
of the dynamic going forth of the Son and the Holy Spirit. '76 Weinandy observes that 
`Greek' thought is inclined to start with the Father's monarchy, " but this is also true 
of Tertullian. 78 
Secondly, these analogies could readily suggest that Tertullian is 
subordinationist ontologically. After all, a root can exist without a shoot. That, 
however, presses the analogy further than Tertullian envisages. He has observed 
75 Osborn 1997: 117. 
76 Weinandy 1995: 57. 
77 Weinandy 1995: 57. 
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earlier that God is never without his Ratio and that, even when the Ratio is not 
breathed forth as Sermo, it remains distinct (chapter 5). Further, even in chapter 8, 
Tertullian apparently has an eternal relation in mind, for he says, relying on John 
14: 11,1: 1 and 10: 30, that the Word is `always in the Father.. . and always with God... 
and never separate from the Father or other than the Father. ' 
Thirdly, these images help to clarify what species and forma mean. For in 
these images there is plurality of species without division, and plurality of forma but 
cohesion. The common factor, though, is that plurality of gradus, species, and forma 
does not constitute independence, for there is no independent origin and no 
independence arising from separation. 
This latter consideration about separation merits emphasis. The imagery 
employed repeatedly stresses inseparability. 79 Inseparability matters for Tertullian in 
repelling charges of ditheism: the Son is not another god because he is not separate. 80 
In contrast, Valentinian projection or emanation is noxious precisely because there is 
separation. 8' 
This coheres with Tertullian's use of substantia. For Stead, substantia is 
correctly seen primarily in a philosophical, rather than juridical, context. 82 He notes 
Tertullian's wide usage (in itself a caution against too procrustean a view of 
Tertullian's vocabulary), but sees in Against Praxeas a predominant usage as `the 
78 Analytical problems related to a division between `East'/`Greek' and `West'/`Latin' are deferred to 
the chapter dealing with Augustine. 
79 AgP 18,19,21 and 22. 
80 AgP 18. 
81 AgP 8. 
82 Stead 1963: 46, following Evans 1944: 38. 
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unique stuff which is, or composes, the divine corpus and which Tertullian denotes 
spiritus. '83 However, una substantia again seems to function to deny independence to 
Son and Spirit. Thus in chapter 13 Tertullian asserts the Persons are distinct, and once 
again uses the analogy of sun and beam forming two objects of one undivided 
substance. Monotheism is preserved because there are not two independent suns. 
Otherwise, the monarchy would be threatened because, on analogy with the reasoning 
of Against Praxeas 3 and Against Hermogenes more generally, God's supremacy 
would vanish. 
Turning to potestas, this naturally lies close to concepts of monarchy and 
sovereignty. More specifically, Tertullian uses this when underlining that the Son's 
power originates from the Father. 84 There is then one `power', the Father's, which he 
hands in full to his Son, which the Son exercises, but not as an independent 
sovereignty, for the Son is to return power to the Father (chapter 4, utilising 1 
Corinthians 15: 27f). 85 Again, independence is critical: if the Son has an independent 
power, the Father is not supreme and therefore is not truly God. 86 
3.3.4. Tertullian and Exegesis of John's Gospel 
Tertullian's exegesis and handling of scripture has received mixed reviews. 
For some he is a methodologically sound exegete, disinclined to over-allegorise. 87 Yet 
suspicion also lingers that Tertullian does not always meet his exegetical aims. 
83 Stead 1963: 62. Reiterated Stead 1977: 203. 
84 AgP 4,16 and IT 
85 Virtus, another unity term, is used similarly at the close of ch. 22 when discussing the unity of 
operation of Father and Son in the works of the Son. 
86 Discussion of oeconomia is deferred until Tertullian's guiding principles are considered. 
87 E. g. R. Hanson 1961: 275f. 
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In the present case, of course, his aim is less to provide a complete 
commentary or homiletical series on John but to deal extensively with the Gospel 
providing Praxeas' group with its New Testament textual proofs: John 10: 30 and 
14: 9-11.88 Tertullian's account of the Gospel is perforce strongly polemical, but still 
quite lengthy. Chapters 21-25 deal almost exclusively with the Gospel and questions 
arising from it. The Gospel, though, is dealt with unevenly in that unequal space is 
devoted to different sections. There is a clear concentration around these loci: 
1. John 1: 1-18, a dominating section in chapters 5-8, although 
combined with other texts. 
2. John 5: 17-43 in the latter half of chapter 21.89 
3. John 10: 30 in the latter half of chapter 22. 
4. John 11, especially vv. 41 and 42 in the first half of chapter 23. 
5. John 12: 28-30 and 44-49 in the second half of chapter 23. 
6. John 14: 5-11 in chapter 24. 
This is most readily explained because Tertullian must, first, deal with 
`Praxean' texts, and, secondly, introduce his own material to refute their claims. That 
suggests, further, that Tertullian envisages John 1: 1-18,5: 17-43 and 11-12 as 
significantly supporting his monarchy-in-economy model. Tertullian's unequal 
treatment could, of course, risk distorting the text. 
Tertullian's over-riding aim must be to show, first, personal distinction 
between Father and Son, but, second, that the Son is not independent of the Father, 
and has no alia dominatio. Otherwise the monarchy is lost. Tertullian's exegesis 
consistently serves this dual aim. 
88AgP20. 
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Turning, then, to John 1: 1-18, Tertullian frequently uses this, 90 but deals 
predominantly with the first three verses. These establish several things for Tertullian. 
First, John 1: 1 demonstrates a duality of persons: there is one who was and another 
`within whom'91 he was. 92 Tertullian has glossed the apud quem of his quotation 
(translating, of course, npo; tio'v OEÖv) as penes quem in his comment. 
Tertullian's duality point is in itself unexceptionable, 93 but he has grafted onto 
it his distinctive Logos theology whereby the Word was not merely with God but 
within God: God has with him (secum) the Reason (Ratio) he has within Him (in 
semetipso). 94 Psalm 45: 1 in particular is cited in support. There are clear New 
Testament grounds for taking the psalm at least partly christologically, 95 but verse 1 
less obviously demands a christological reference. Moreover, while apud could well 
denote `in the presence of or `within/in the house of, penes in fact seems more 
restrictive, suggesting more clearly 'within'. 96 There is an irony here. `Within' 
language, perhaps, tends to undercut personal distinction, the point Tertullian wishes 
to make. It is certainly not clear that a relationship `with' is exactly coterminous with 
a relationship `within'. Brown sees a `nuance of relationship' in npöS tiöv OEÖv, 97 and 
while this might not be precisely stated in John 1: 1 b, Tertullian's gloss risks 
obscuring this possibility. 
89 It is striking that here Tertullian simply quotes extensively from John 5, rather than taking a 
relatively brief phrase, his more normal pattern. This extensiveness suggests the passage's significance. 
90 Citations from the Prologue occur some 18 times. Precision is hard to attain because some phrases 
may echo and draw conceptually on the Prologue without explicit quotation. 
91 Evans' 1944 translation. 
92 AgP 13 unus qui Brat, et alius penes quem erat. 
93 E. g. Ridderbos 1997: 24 speaks of v. I showing the Word as `a being distinct from God'. 
94AgP5. 
95 Ps 45: 6f is used of Christ in Heb 1: 8f. 
96 Or even `in the possession/power of. 
97 R. Brown 1971 1: 5. 
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It is, however, easy to see why Tertullian might so gloss 1: 1b. The bald 
proposition that the Word was simply `with' God might imply two eternal principles, 
essentially independent of each other. This conclusion might especially be drawn 
given 1: 1 c, that the Word is God. Tertullian rejects just such a duality of independent 
eternal principles in Against Hermogenes as inconsistent with biblical monotheism. 
However, other aspects of Tertullian's thought could relieve this pressure. For 
Tertullian, in creation and salvation history the Word is clearly no longer `within' 
God, but has been breathed forth. This establishes that there can be a non-independent 
relationship between eternal Persons which is not `within'. A rigorous correlation of 
economic and immanent trinities would perhaps diminish the pressure to gloss apud 
as penes. 
The second point established from John 1: 1-3 is that the Word creates, 98 
indeed creates all. Brown observes that this suggests Jesus has `a claim on all' X99 
which is perfectly consistent with Old Testament linkage of sovereignty with creative 
activity. This creative activity is, though, carefully contextualised by Tertullian as 
creation at the Father's behest. Thus chapter 12 talks repeatedly of the Father 
`ordering' (iubeo). loo Again, this expands John 1: 1-3. 
The need to preserve the monarchy undergirds this: the Word cannot be a 
creator independent from God - that approaches Marcionism. Rather creation 
especially must be an activity of both, not the separable operation of the Son. 
98 AgP 2,7,12,16, and 19. 
99 Brown 1971 1: 25. Compare Ridderbos 1997: 36. 
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Justification emerges in particular from Old Testament wisdom sources, especially, of 
course, Proverbs 8: 22-30.101 Given Tertullian's views about biblical authority and 
unity, this is methodologically unexceptionable. However, again one notes the 
possible significance of salvation history. Tertullian, notably in discussing John 5, 
will go on to observe the Son's dependence in obedience in the Incarnation. This 
could suggest that all the Son's actions, in creation, as well as in the Incarnation, are 
in obedient dependence on the Father's will. 
The third point Tertullian draws from John 1: 1-3 is that the Word is 
uncreated. 102 In principio erat sermo is to be understood eternally. Exegetically this 
seems justified, for John 1: 1 ff seems not simply to paraphrase Genesis 1: 1 ff, but 
refers `to something behind Genesis... to the Word and to the Word's existence with 
God "before the world was made"...,,. 103 Tertullian anyway explicitly rejects 
interpreting Genesis 1: 1 as saying that in the beginning God made for himself a son. 
This is justifiable both because John 1: 1 itself contains no reference to the Word 
`becoming' in the beginning, 104 but also because God is never without his Word but 
would have been, had the Word been a created being. Interestingly, chapter 5's denial 
that the Word was made is followed by a discussion focused more on God always 
having his Ratio than on the Word. 
The fourth point is unsurprising after Tertullian's careful statement that the 
Word is both creator and uncreated: the Word is divine. ' 05 Tertullian here takes John 
10° Compare AgP 6. 
101 Employed in AgP 6 and 7. 
102 E. g. AgP 5 and 8. 
103 Ridderbos 1997: 24. 
104 Contrast the `became flesh' of 1: 14. 
105 AgP 12. 
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1: 1 c at face value as asserting divinity, but not personal identification of the Word 
with the Father. He rejects straightforward identification for essentially contextual 
reasons: having concluded that John 1: 1 b contemplates a and that creation 
(given Proverbs 8: 22 etc) is conducted by two (or three) persons, he is well-placed to 
argue that consistency means identification is not required. 106 
The fifth point drawn from the Prologue (particularly referring to 1: 18) is that 
the Son makes the Father known. 107 A crucial point here is whether the Son makes the 
First Person known as he is in eternity or purely as he is in creation and salvation 
history. From one point of view, Tertullian possibly ought logically to argue that 1: 18 
does not talk about the First Person as he is in eternity. The verse is phrased in terms 
of the `Father' not just `God', and, as indicated earlier, fatherhood accrues to the First 
Person when the Word is begotten as Son. Again, this raises the issue of the 
revelatory significance of the Incarnation for the eternal relations of the godhead. 
The next major locus of Tertullian's discussion, John 5, is dealt with largely 
by quotation. ' 08 From it Tertullian draws the distinction of persons, commenting owv 
John 5: 17: ` "My father and I" is what a son says'. This raises the genuineness of the 
relations which Jesus reveals, an important point to which we shall return. 
Further, there is the extended quotation from John 5: 19-27. This is left largely 
unexplained, but elsewhere John 5: 19109 and 22110 are used to indicate that the Son is 
106 The omission of the definite article with OEöS in 1: 1 c militates against identification: e. g. Brown 
1971 1: 24. 
1°7AgP7 and 15. 
'°8AgP21. 
09 4gP 4 and 16. 
11oAgP 16. 
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not acting independently, for he does nothing but what he sees the Father doing. This 
preserves the monarchy's integrity. However, the Father has delegated life and 
judgement to the Son, so that towards the created order the Son has the full powers of 
God, but as a delegate. 
Here, if anything, Tertullian under-utilises the text. M. Stibbe comments in the 
light of 5: 18 `The charge of equality with God is the paramount one. '"' He is surely 
right to do so, for equality with God in the sense of being an independent, uncreated 
principle is just what the monotheism of e. g. Isaiah 40-55 would preclude. Tertullian 
would accept that. But 5: 19ff is meant to be a defence to the charge of 5: 18, ' 12 and 
achieves this by explaining that the powers of life/creation and judgement are 
delegated. These powers are, of course, the `prerogative' powers of God, yet Jesus is 
here depicted virtually as shaliach or agent of the Father. 113 
On this view, 5: 31 ff continues the same thinking by pointing out that the Son's 
testimony (5: 31) is not self-motivated nor independent of the Father, 114 but actually 
consistent with the testimonies the Father himself supplies through the Baptist (5: 33- 
5), the works Jesus does (5: 36), and the Scriptures (5: 38ff). 
Thus John 5 provides further grist to Tertullian's mill simply because here 
Jesus confronts the charge that his claim to be Son, a distinct divine person, has 
broken the tenets of monotheism. Structurally, the chapter is crucial since it 
introduces the nature of conflict and rejection governing the rest of the Gospel. The 
11, Stibbe 1993: 77. 
112 So J. Neyrey 1988: 22-26 and Stibbe 1993: 77ff. 
1" See P. Borgen 1970: 138ff for analysis of shaliach material. 
114 Barrett 1978: 220. 
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impulse to kill Jesus is put in terms of the filial claim (e. g. John 7 and 8). The pseudo- 
believers in chapter 8 are condemned for their own claim to be sons of God (8: 41 ff), 
while the `Jews' claim Jesus' condemnation arises from his claim to be God's son 
(19: 7). 
Tertullian's next locus is John 10: 30, an inevitable stopping-place given its use 
by Praxeas' group. Tertullian's argument is largely based on the precise terms of 
10: 30, especially the plural `are' rather than the singular `am' and the neuter Ev rather 
than the masculine EiS. To this extent Tertullian is discussing one `thing'. Stibbe, 
following other, earlier, traditional exegesis, states this must be taken as claiming 
`ontological equality'. 115 Tertullian, though, sees a different emphasis, the unity of 
will between Father and Son. He comments, using 10: 37, on the works that have been 
done, arguing that these are the Father's works, which the Son does in obedience. 
This means that for Tertullian the operation of Father and Son is integrated. 
Obviously, this is already present in creating, but here it perseveres into the 
Incarnation. As such, the works of Father and Son are not the discrete works of two 
individuals, where each has his own sphere. That would be the pattern of `Greek' 
polytheism. Further, this integrated operation involves the Father's priority: it is joint 
operation at the Father's behest, thereby preserving the integrity of the monarchy. 
One response to this joint operation might be that Tertullian might have 
established only a unity of will without any ontological nexus (anticipating Arian 
exegesis). 116 This restrictive view need not necessarily follow given the nature of 
1 15 Stibbe 1993: 118. 
116 Referred to by Brown 1971 I: 403. 
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certain works, notably the Sabbath healings of John 5 and 9 which are justified as 
Jesus exercising full divine prerogatives. 
The next locus is John 11, especially vv. 41 f, and 12: 28-30 and 44-49.1 17 
Tertullian again draws out the distinction of persons, since both chapters contain 
dialogue between Father and Son. Tertullian sees very clearly that either this reveals 
distinction or the Incarnation does not disclose the `reality' of divine relations. 
Significantly, he rules out this latter alternative, which bears on his implicit view of 
`economic' and `immanent' trinities. "8 
The last locus is John 14: 5-11. Tertullian has several reasons for rejecting the 
Praxean identification of Father and Son. First, by now Tertullian has accumulated 
from elsewhere in the Gospel material pointing to personal distinction. Secondly, he 
sees that the passage's own terms fit poorly with Praxean views. Jesus is the way to 
the Father (14: 6): one must believe Jesus is in the Father, not that Jesus is the Father 
(14: 10): and both words and works ultimately originate in the Father (14: 10). Thirdly, 
the idea that the seen Jesus is the Father breaches Tertullian's fundamental tenet, that 
no-one has seen the first Person (Exodus 33: 20 is again cited). 19 However, much of 
chapter 24 in fact stresses the nature of the works. These works are the Father's and 
Jesus is his shaliach, to use Borgen's term. 120 This underlines a unity of operation 
opposed to polytheistic ideas of independent divine operations. 
117 See AgP 23. 
118 See below in 3.3.5. 
119 See McCruden 2002: 334 for the importance of this to Tertullian. 
120 Borgen 1970. 
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Tertullian's overall grasp of the Gospel is taken from the text itself. He cites 
John 20: 31 to the effect that the Gospel is written that one may believe Jesus is the 
Son, and his exegesis of `Father' and `Son' prevents him interpreting this as meaning 
that we are to believe Jesus is the Father. However, he clearly reproduces (for 
example in dealing with John 14) the significance of knowing the Father specifically. 
This comparatively moderate use of John 20: 31 is well-taken and provides a 
theocentric or patrocentric focus also adopted by some current commentators. 121 
On that basis, losing God's fatherhood has profound soteriological 
consequences, for the particular relationship we enter disappears. 
3.3.5. Tertullian's Guiding Principles In Exegeting John 
Several noteworthy features underlie Tetullian's exegesis. First, Tertullian's 
discussion of logos/ratio shows awareness of a species of argument from 
correlativity. 122 He realises, with the Apologists, that denying that the Logos is eternal 
implies God was once äXoyoq. The relations enjoyed start to seem constitutive. The 
relation of Father and Son re-inforces this. Chapter 10 makes it abundantly clear that 
being a father means having a son to whom one is father. No son means no father 
either. Tertullian, then, recognises that correlativity applies to the Father-Son relation, 
but, let it be recalled, does not envisage it applying in eternity, for the Word becomes 
Son and God becomes Father. ' 23 
1'`1 For comments on the theocentric rather than simply christocentric nature of the Gospel see Barrett 
1982: 3. Note also L. Bouyer 1999: 176 and, on the Prologue's theocentricity, R. Culpepper 1980: 1 ff. 
122 AgP 5. 
123 AgP 7. 
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Secondly, there is God's immutability. This is most clearly asserted as 
following from God's eternity in chapter 27.124 Indeed, La Cugna observes that part of 
the impetus behind Tertullian's assertion of personal distinction is to dissuade us from 
believing that the Father was born and suffered. 125 The doctrinal importance of the 
First Person to Tertullian must be stressed: true, there are several eternal Persons, but 
Tertullian has consistently upheld the First Person's monarchy and supremacy, and 
the Exodus 33: 20 principle that he may not be seen. 
Lastly, there is revelation. The weight of Tertullian's concern to provide a 
scriptural account of the Father-Son relation must be appreciated. 126 Tertullian 
acknowledges that with God all things are possible, but uses this to stress the 
centrality of revelation. 127 For we cannot argue that God could not do something 
(since nothing is impossible for him), but, since he has not done all things, we must 
examine carefully what he actually has done, that is, look to his self-revelation. 
Tertullian sees disregarding God's self-disclosure as having grave implications: that 
God is not true. ' 28 Tertullian argues that were God his own Son, he would have said 
so, for nothing would prevent him. He writes: 
One thing however he was afraid of, to belie himself the author of truth, and to 
belie his own truth. And so, believing that God is true [veracem], I know that his 
statements are consonant with his ordinance, and his ordinance with his 
statements. 129 
Comparable material emerges in chapter 23. While reviewing John 11 and 12, 
Tertullian remarks of the exchange between Father and Son in prayer that if there are 
124 Ceterum deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut aeternum. 
125 La Cugna 1991: 28. Wiles 1961-1962: 286 suggests this was also part of the momentum behind 
Origen's proposition of eternal generation. 
126 E. g. AgP 11 and 20. See R. Norris 1966: 83. 
127 AgP 10. 
128 AgP 11. 
129 This crucial sentence reads: et ideo veracem deum credens, scio ilium non aliter quam disposuit 
pronuntiasse nec aliter disposuisse quam pronuntiavit. 
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not really two, then God is a liar (mendacem). Instead, observes Tertullian, `[y]et in 
the economy itself it was the Father's will that the Son should be regarded as on earth, 
but himself in heaven. ' 1 30 This is worth underlining. It is the will of the First Person 
that his Son be regarded and honoured (John 5: 23). To resist the self-disclosure in the 
Incarnation is thus to oppose the Father's will, and is consequently an act of 
disobedience. ' 31 
This, of course, raises the question of the `economy'. R. Markus distinguishes 
two prevalent interpretations of the word in Tertullian: ' 32 first, as referring to the 
procession of the Persons as disclosed in `the unfolding of the divine plan of salvation 
in the course of history'; secondly, as referring to `the procession of persons in the 
godhead. ' 
133 
The initial discussion in chapter 2 is on the basis of God having a Son, his 
Word, who proceeded from him. This focuses on the unfolding procession within 
creation and salvation history. The importance of salvation history is reinforced by 
chapter 11, where statements within salvation history are related to God 's 
disposition, ' 34 and by chapter 23 where Jesus' prayer is part of the economy. 
Yet chapters 5-8 go beyond this. The discussion, which Tertullian sees as 
dealing with the economy, 135 has included (notably in chapter 5) relations in eternity 
130 Tarnen in ipsa oeconomia pater voluit filium in terris haberi, se vero in caelis. 
13 1 Norris 1966: 83. 
132 Markus 1958: 89f. 
133 Markus 1958: 96. 
134 Dispono in ch. 11 is etymologically and conceptually related to dispositio. Markus 1958: 96 fn. I 
comments on the synonymity (albeit not universal) to be found between dispositio and dispensatio. 
135AgP8. 
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between Ratio and God, before Discourse has been `disgorged'. 136 Such broadening 
of `economy' is readily intelligible, since the economy matters to Tertullian precisely 
because it reveals in creation and salvation history the eternal truth of a plurality of 
persons. Unless it does so, Praxeas' group remains effectively unrefuted. The 
distinction between the Persons of Father and Son would be a temporary expedient, or 
else, the worship of Jesus is finally revealed as infringing monolatry. Tertullian's 
insistence on the reality of revelation prevents this, a reality grounded on God 's 
character as truthful. Hence the final casualty of Praxean views held in the teeth of 
revelation in salvation history is God's character: he is treated as not truthful. 
This suggests that Tertullian closely links `economic' and `immanent' trinities. 
Yet the extent and stability of this require evaluation, a task to which we now turn. 
3.4. Evaluation Of Tertullian's Work 
Estimates of Tertullian vary, and have done so from early times. 137 In terms of 
refuting Praxeas' group, he has produced a biblically-based monotheism, centring on 
the notion of the Father's sovereign supremacy, which can resist charges of ditheism. 
It retains sufficient virility as a monotheism to be consistent with his refutations of 
Hermogenes and Marcion. Moreover, not only does he rebut the charge of ditheism 
against orthodoxy, but he also reveals Praxean thought as unscriptural, drawing out its 
consequences of demolishing the Incarnation as the revelation of God and of 
undermining salvation itself. In short, Praxean theology defined monarchy otherwise 
than from the economy of creation and salvation history. In modern terms it is an 
136 McCruden 2002: 330 likewise notes that Tertullian's economy covers the inner life of the Trinity as 
well as history. 
137 Contrast Cyprian's treatment of him as the `master' with Hilary of Poitiers' manifest distaste. 
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immanent theology of the godhead contradicting the economy. Hence Tertullian's 
opening remarks about a heresy arising from the unity. 
Nevertheless, Tertullian's own account of the Father-Son relation is not 
without difficulty. `Once the Son was not': at one level Tertullian would have to 
agree, for the Word was not always Son. Similarly, God was not always the Father: 
once the Father was not. Two reasons demonstrate the instability of Tertullian's 
position. First, his acceptance of correlativity over the Father-Son relation means the 
First Person changes: he becomes what he was not before. It is very hard to reconcile 
this with Tertullian's adherence to divine immutability rooted in God's eternity. The 
pressure is either to moderate monotheism to include changes in the First Person, or to 
relativise the importance of the Father-Son relation, prioritising instead the God- 
Logos relation. The difficulties in this have already been described. 
Tertullian, secondly, has stressed the importance of the Incarnation as the 
revelation of trinitarian relations, thus drawing `economic' and `immanent' trinities 
together. But prioritising the God-Logos relation tends to detract from this. For, 
although it is clearly the Logos that is incarnate in John's Gospel, believers focus on 
the different relational categories of Jesus as the Son sent, and God as the sending 
Father who adopts believers as children. Tertullian himself takes precisely this 
approach in handling John 20: 31. 
Hence, two streams of development (at least) flow from Tertullian's positions. 
In one direction lies a stress on the Word becoming Son at creation. The 
difficulty 
here, perhaps, is avoiding subsequent collapse into a species of Arian thought. 
For it 
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is not clear that a definite personal distinction between God and Logos is really viable 
when the Logos is `within' (penes) God. The stress there falls on the moment of the 
Son's prolation which, superficially at least, closely resembles the idea that once the 
Son was not. Therefore it is not hard to see why the stigma of ontological 
evict 
subordination clings to Tertullian's thinking, 138 even while`agree> with B. Piault 
that Tertullian does not intend to endorse the ontological inferiority for the Second 
and Third Persons. 
' 39 
The other direction lies in utilising more thoroughly principles that Tertullian 
already employs. He already uses correlativity to argue that the Second Person 
subsists eternally, thereby preserving the First Person's immutable perfection. His 
stress on the reality of revelation in creation and salvation history, based on God's 
truthfulness, permits him to predicate real personal distinctions in the godhead. But 
equally, the relationship stressed, especially in John's Gospel, is the Father-Son 
relationship. His position on the economic trinity of salvation history might well be 
extended logically to suggest the Father-Son relationship is equally eternal, just as the 
God-Logos relationship is. This avoids the theological awkwardness of `once the 
Father was not', and also the problematic nature of a God-human relationship in 
which revelation in salvation history does not extend to God as he is truly in eternity. 
Arguably, Novatian takes just this step, and uses arguments similar to Tertullian's. 140 
138 E. g. Lampe 1997: 56. 
1 39 Piault 19633: 203. 
140 Novatian Trinity 31 `He is always in the Father, unless the Father be not always Father... ' but later 
material in his chapter may mitigate this. 
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However, such a development involves a very specific idea of God's unity: it 
is monarchically based. 141 For the Son would necessarily be in a position of ordered, 
although not ontological, subordination to the Father. This would follow for two 
reasons: first, because Tertullian's monotheism rests on the supremacy of a single 
person. Second, because this development of Tertullianist theology posits that the 
economic trinity reveals not just personal distinctions but the contours of the relations 
between those distinct Persons. 
The corollary would be that egalitarian versions of the immanent trinity which 
feature Son and Spirit as independent Persons seem dissonant with the monotheism 
articulated by Tertullian. For in principle such versions resemble Marcionism. 
Moreover, Tertullian's position on revelation and the economy implies that such an 
egalitarian immanent trinity rejects revelation, precisely because the Father-Son 
relationship is patterned on obedience. Would Tertullian criticise such a position 
because, even if it accepts monotheism, it disbelieves in the economy of that 
monotheism as revealed in salvation history? He, of course, insists that the orthodox 
believe both. 142 This highlights what B. Studer sees as a dominating concern, '43 the 
relation specifically between the events and revelation of the Incarnation on the one 
hand and the eternal trinitarian relations on the other. If the Incarnation discloses 
eternal relations (as Tertullian insists), what would justify positing different relational 
contours in eternity? 
Further, if an egalitarian immanent trinity became an ordinal trinity in 
salvation history, would Tertullian feel God's immutability 
had been compromised" 
141 Compare Rahner, whose preference for the Father's monarchy is noted by La Cugna 1991: 215. 
4' AgP 2. 
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This is difficult to assess since, as we have seen, Tertullian himself risks 
inconsistency on a similar point. Nevertheless, since eternity and immutability 
strongly feature in his general theology, grounds exist for thinking that Tertullianist 
monotheism lies uneasily with egalitarian versions over immutability. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Tertullian produces a relatively consistent monotheism extending beyond the 
polemical needs of Against Praxeas. This monotheism envisages full divinity as 
involving cosmic sovereignty exercised by an uncreated creator. This follows a 
Jewish-biblical pattern rather than the monotheisms of the Greco-Roman world. 
Tertullian's response in Against Praxeas is consistent with this because in Tertullian's 
account the Son is uncreated creator, but nevertheless constitutes no rival to his 
Father. 
Critical to this position is Tertullian's use of derivation respecting the Son's 
own sovereignty: he reigns in his Father's kingdom. His obedience is an integral 
component. The Son is anyway not independent in substance, for derivation applies 
here too, although he is all that his Father is. This derivation is not ditheism since 
Father and Son are personally inseparable, and their actions in the world are united 
rather than resembling the polytheistic pattern of distinct spheres of influence. Father 
and Son are not a plurality of independent uncreated entities. 
To show this approach is not just legitimate but necessary, Tertullian 
consistently relies on the data of the Incarnation. The revelatory value of this data 
143 Studer 1993: 8. 
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rests ultimately on God's truthfulness. The revelation matters because we are saved 
by knowing Jesus as Son. Within that framework, egalitarian, immanent, trinitarian 
relationships of independent Persons seem inconsistent with monotheism and thus 
ditheistic or tritheistic. 
However, Tertullian's own position is unstable because, for him, the primary 
relation the Incarnation discloses, Sonship, is not eternal. Nevertheless, his position 
could be logically developed towards stability by seeing the Incarnate relationship of 
Sonship as disclosing an eternal filial relation. 
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CHAPTER 4: ORIGEN AND THE SECOND GOD 
It is proposed that: 
4(a). Origen has three major parameters for trinitarian relations: the 
distinction of the Persons; the divinity of each Person; and the propriety in 
monotheistic terms of worshipping the Son and Spirit as well as the Father. 
4(b). Significant problems arise for his trinitarian theology from his account 
of the distinction of the Persons. He provides three accounts of this, one 
proceeding from the Father, another proceeding from the Son, while the third 
relates to the analogies he uses to explain how two may be one. 
4(c). In discussing the Father's personal distinction, Origen suggests the First 
Person alone is avzöGeos, relating in particular to his simplicity. This leaves 
him as God in isolation, and he is not distinguished by correlative relations. 
4(d). Three consequences readily follow: first, relationality appears non- 
essential to the First Person, thereby almost rendering the Fatherhood 
epiphenomenal. Secondly, such a view of the First Person necessarily 
undermines the divinity of the other Persons: the Son clearly is neither simple 
nor avzö9Eos. This imperils the other parameters of Origen 's trinitarian 
thought, and ontological subordination is not far distant. Thirdly, the 
revelation of a simple Father by a multiple Son seems problematic. 
4(e). In discussing the distinction from the starting point of the Son, Origen 
sees the Son above all as Wisdom of God and his image. The Son derives what 
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he is from the Father, is eternal and incorporeal, and as image reveals his 
Father. 
4(J). As image the Son is given the Father's authority and he implements the 
Father's will so that their operation is one. 
4(g). This account of distinction is based on correlative relations. As such, it 
necessarily presupposes plurality of persons, and the Son appears necessary 
for the Father to be what he is. Some evidence suggests this might be 
developed towards consubstantiality. 
4(h). Origen uses analogies to explain how two may be one but these turn 
characteristically on a union of wills in which independence appears logically 
prior to union: this has polytheistic tendencies. 
4(i). Origen compares the divine union of wills to the union of the soul in 
Christ, itself an unstable union tending towards either the confusion of the 
natures or their fundamental independence. 
46). The presence of three, not easily reconcilable, accounts of personal 
distinction makes it difficult either to approve or reject Origen 's theology of 
trinitarian relations in toto: the material is disparate. 
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4.1 .A Presenting Issue 
Origen: Is it true then that there was a God, the Son of God, the only begotten of 
God, the first born of all creation, and that we need have no fear of saying that in 
one sense there are two Gods, while in another there is one God? ' 
Origen here poses a fascinating question to Heraclides, the bishop whose orthodoxy is 
under scrutiny. He uses `second God' terms emphatically to test the bishop's 
opinions, 2 and the bishop confirms his orthodoxy by answering `yes' to Origen's later 
question: `Do we confess two Gods? '3 For Origen, orthodox Christianity involves 
confessing there are, in a sense, two Gods. These terms are not to be surrendered 
because they are controversial (Origen notes some `take offence at the statement that 
there are two Gods. '), 4 but elucidated and used. 
Quite how Origen envisages that `the two are one God'5 will be pursued 
below. For present purposes it is worth observing why he thinks the question so 
important. He notes two errors to avoid, the Scylla of modalism that eliminates the 
Son as a distinct entity, and the Charybdis that denies his divinity. His account of the 
one-ness of the two Gods is designed to navigate between these perils: 
In this way we avoid falling into the opinion of those who have been separated 
from the Church and turned to the illusory notion of monarchy, who abolish the 
Son as distinct from the Father and virtually abolish the Father also. Nor do we 
fall into the other blasphemous doctrine which denies the deity of Christ. 6 
Since the modalising tendency involves separation from the Church,? and the 
denial of Christ's deity constitutes blasphemy, 8 Origen's strong insistence that 
Heraclides affirm the `two Gods' formula is readily intelligible. 9 
Dialogue with Heraclides (hereafter DH) 122. References are to H. Chadwick's translation. 
2 DH 122-124. 
3 DH 124. 
4DH 124. 
' DH 124. 
6DH128. 
7 For the Church's importance to Origen, see e. g. On First Principles (hereafter OFP. The translation 
used is G. Butterworth's) Pref. 
89 
The problem, of course, is how Origen's `second God' language does not 
sacrifice monotheism. He was certainly aware of this, not just because of disquiet 
within the Church, 10 but also through interaction with those outside her who 
forcefully argued that his position was incoherent. Oxigen quotes Celsus as writing: 
If these men worshipped no other God but one, perhaps they would have had a 
valid argument against the others. But in fact they worship to an extravagant 
degree this man who appeared recently, and yet think it is not inconsistent with 
monotheism if they also worship his servant. 
Celsus here neatly raises two fundamental topics. First, monolatry: Celsus 
implies that monotheism should result in monolatrous practice, and Origen agrees that 
humans should worship God alone. 12 The second issue is Christ's identity: Celsus 
insists Christians worship a mere man. 13 
Origen is clear that Christians indeed worship a distinct Christ, 14 but equally 
emphatic that this is consistent with biblical monolatry. For this to work, he must 
give, above all, a clear account of Christ's identity in relation to God. As such he 
adopts three parameters for his trinitarian discussion: 
1. the full deity of all three Persons; 
2. the distinction of all three Persons; 
3. worship of three distinct, fully divine Persons is not inconsistent with 
monotheism. 
8 Commentary on John (hereafter CJ) 11.2 describes the two doctrines in question as `false and wicked'. 
The translation used here is the ANF. 
9 This concern appears elsewhere in very similar terms CJ 11.2. 
10 See DH 124. 
11 Origen's citation of Celsus' argument in Against Celsus (Hereafter AgC) VII. 12. Chadwick's 
translation is used here. 
12 A recurrent theme in AgC: see I. 11; V. 4; compare 111.15. 
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To investigate his trinitarian account, it is fruitful first briefly to consider 
questions posed by secondary literature about his trinitarian thought, and then 
examine his doctrines of God the Father, of the Son, and finally his thinking on the 
Father-Son relation with respect to subordination. 
4.2. Questions Posed About Origen's Trinitarian Theology 
Chadwick describes the view that Origen is `a perennially enigmatic and 
embarrassing figure in the history of Christian thought'. 15 It is not difficult to see 
why: he has been associated with particular later doctrinal developments, Arianism16 
and Evagrius' extreme christology, ' 7 both of which were condemned by ecumenical 
councils. ' 8 Criticism of Origenism has not been confined to these issues, but both, 
notably, relate to a central issue of this chapter, Christ's identity. It is worth here 
recalling more general misgivings about Origen's trinitarian theology. 
4.2.1. A Platonising Trinity? 
This prominent and important charge suggests Origen's trinitarian account 
essentially provides a platonic hierarchy. Fortman comments representatively: 
Origen tried to build a harmonious synthesis of strict monotheism and a Platonic 
hierarchical order in the Trinity - and failed. 
'9 
This charge underlines the suspicion that Origen is over-committed to, in essence, 
Middle Platonism, with its arguably negative views of physical existence and 
13 The charge Oxigen quotes in AgC VIII. 14 implies worship of Jesus was a human invention, not 
response to God's will. 
14 E. g. AgC VIII. 26. 
15 Chadwick 1966: 123. 
16 Chadwick 1966: 95 quotes George Scholarius. 
" Described by J. Meyendorff 1983: 26. 
18 Nicaea 325 and Constantinople II 553: on the christological issues note especially anathemata 1,7 
and 8. 
19 E. Fortman 1972: 56. 
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creation, and its alleged tendencies to monistic Idealism. 20 If so, the result would 
arguably be inauthentic Christian trinitarianism. 21 
The question here is whether Middle Platonism (and some of its Stoic 
associations) was for Origen basically a useful vehicle for a fundamentally orthodox 
position, or whether his orthodoxy was compromised by the alien system. 
Kannengiesser argues powerfully for the former. 22 For him, Origen's great work On 
First Principles uses trinitarian thought as an organising idea, a three-fold pattern 
drawn, despite its Middle Platonic dress, from Scripture. 23 
Notwithstanding such sympathetic readings by Kannengiesser and others, 24 
over-commitment to Middle Platonism is strongly linked with other concerns, for it 
may provide conditions in which other problems flourish. 
4.2.2. Subordinationist? 
F. Cross is trenchant: 
`[Origen's] doctrine of the Godhead could not commend itself permanently to 
Christian thought on account of its subordinationism. '25 
For Cross this is linked to the way Origen consistently depicts Christ as the image of 
God in a way falling short of full equality, 26 Arguably the apparently different scopes 
of power and rule envisaged for the three Persons in On First Principles 1.3.5 support 
20 A. Harnack 1970: 195 remarks `.. in him a Christian soul was joined to a Hellenistic intellect. ' 
21 Only arguably inauthentic, because some would say that any platonising in Christian belief was a 
Providential gain rather than an erroneous distortion of the original deposit of faith. 
22 C. Kennegiesser 1988: 237£ 
23 Kannengiesser 1995: 351. Kannengiesser 1988: 242f suggests Origen may have adopted an 
established form of discussion for Christian purposes. The relevant parallel is Albinus. 
24 Notably H. Crouzel 1989 (esp. 159 for Origen's independence of Middle Platonism): J. Kelly 
1977: 128 and H. von Balthasar 1984: 14. 
25 Cross 1960: 134. 
26 Cross 1960: 128. 
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this. 27 Ontological subordination could well arise from overcommitment to platonic 
thinking. The crucial similes from The Republic, the Sun, the Divided Line and the 
Cave, 28 all feature a hierarchy of being culminating (in the similes of the Sun and the 
Cave) in a unitary point, the Form of the Good. 29 In the simile of the Sun, even the 
Ideas are, in a sense, ontologically subordinate. 30 
Nevertheless, it is not presently universally conceded that Origen 
unequivocally argues for ontological subordination. Fortman notes evidence tending 
both ways and concludes that Origen's thought contains non-subordinationist 
tendencies. 31 More strongly, Crouzel argues that the notorious 1.3.5 passage from On 
First Principles deals, not with ontological subordination, but with the appropriation 
of trinitarian activity to different spheres of life. 32 Hence some argue that Origen 
features economic rather than ontological subordination. 33 
4.2.3. Binitarian? 
Another charge is that Origen's pneumatology is exiguous. Fortman writes: 
`The status and the origin of the Holy Spirit baffled Origen. '34 In support one may 
note that Origen insists the Son is worshipped along with the Father, 35 but the Spirit's 
omission is at least curious, and possibly telling. Again, some Middle Platonic themes 
could tend to binitarianism. Both Eudorus and Plutarch favour dyadic structures of 
27 Other interpretations exist: see below. 
28 Republic 507a-517e. 
29 The Divided Line is not inconsistent with this final unitary apex. 
30 Republic 509b-c. 
;1 Fortman 1972: 56. 
- Crouzel 1976: 110. 
33 Thus K. McDonnell 1994: 19,29. 





reality, which is eminently intelligible in view of Plato's Craftsman contemplating the 
realm of eternal Ideas. 36 
Against this, On First Principles Pref. 4 stresses that the apostles taught `the 
Holy Spirit is united in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. '37 Further, the 
structure of On First Principles emphasises the Spirit in allocating a chapter to him 
immediately after dealing with God the Father and the Son. This is doubly significant 
if Crouzel correctly sees On First Principles 1.3.5. as discussion of appropriation 
amongst divine Persons. 38 
4.2.4. The Trajectories Of Origen's Thought 
Origen's association with the paths leading to Arianism and Evagrian 
christology has been noted earlier. This relates to a central difficulty with Origen: 
systematising his thought. M. Harl justly remarks that Origen possesses an 
extraordinarily complex view and that his works must be read as a whole, without 
attaching anachronistic meanings to his terms. 39 One may add three further 
observations. First, the systematic connections within Origen's thinking, while not 
simply absent, may not always be clearly articulated. Harl catches this well: Origen 
has a `... systeme coherent sinon organise '. 40 
Secondly, Origen characteristically multiplies insights. Thus his commentaries 
may well set several views alongside each other. To quote Harl again `La genie 
36 Other Middle Platonists may tend to a more triadic structure. 
37 Oxigen does not dispute this apostolic teaching. His questions in OFP Pref. 4 relate to the Spirit's 
procession, whether the Spirit is begotten, and another 
Son of God or not. These tend to presuppose the 
Spirit's divinity. 
38 Crouzel 1976 esp. 110. 
39 Harl 1958: 335. 
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d'Origene est un genie de surabondance. 11 sent rarement le besoin de choisir... 11 
accumule. '41 This may perhaps detract from obvious logical consistency. Crouzel 
cautions `The fact is that his thought is full of internal tensions and no text yields his 
thought precisely on a given point. A2 
Thirdly, some of Origen's major work was occasional. Against Celsus, a 
primary text for consideration, is, obviously, aimed at refuting Celsus. It contains 
much valuable argument about why `monotheists' may legitimately worship the Word 
as well as the Father, but Ongen's aim is not simply to provide a full explanation of 
the Father-Son relation. Similar polemical intentions surface in the Commentary on 
John: Origen's specific and frequent citation and refutation of Heracleon's views 
indicate these constitute a major target. 43 Even On First Principles is no dispassionate 
account of the entirety of Christian belief (although undeniably wide-ranging). Book 
III argues strongly for freewill against the determinism of Heracleon's doctrine of 
fixed natures (and quite possibly predestinarian strands in the beliefs of the `simple'). 
Book IV also strongly defends allegorical readings of Scripture, which again may be 
against implied opposition from the 'simple'. 
However, this occasional nature involves a risk of distortion if statements are 
taken as general propositions rather than as directed to a specific polemical question. 
As Crouzel notes, even in On First Principles Origen produces no specific 
40 Harl 1958: 333. 
41 Harl 1958: 352. 
4' Crouzel 1989: 49. 
4" Note in particular J. Trumbower 1989: 139 who suggests Heracleon's exegesis touched a nerve for 
Origen. By advocating fixed natures, Heracleon undercut the human 
freedom Origen thought essential 
in cosmic restoration (Compare OFP 111.5.8). 
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adjudication on some questions. 44 There is thus something problematic about 
Fortman's description of On First Principles as `... the first Summa ever composed in 
the Church' and as Origen's attempt `... to systematize all his doctrine'. 45 
Thus dangers exist in straightforwardly attributing tendencies to Origen's 
'theology'. Some elements show he is not simply incorporating platonic thought. His 
explicit debt is both to Scripture, and, importantly, the Church's tradition. 46 Implicitly, 
he is no `simple platonist', given his insistence on the scandal, platonically speaking, 
of the Word made flesh. Evagrius, for example, may indeed develop authentic 
Origenist emphases. It is quite different to assert that Origen himself would have 
agreed with Evagrius, or that Origen's christology had only the tendencies Evagrius 
saw. Origen's work, as Harl observed, is such that it contains perhaps not one but 
several theologies, whose mutual relationships are unarticulated and thus obscure: `Il 
accumule. ' 
47 
4.2.5. Economic And Immanent? 
One further question about Origen's trinitarianism merits attention: the role of 
the economic trinity. Reference was made earlier to the defence of Origen against 
ontological subordination. McDonnell in particular argues that subordinationist 
language relates to the economy rather than to ontology. 
48 This opens the way to a 
more positive evaluation of Origen's trinitarianism. If absolved of ontological 
subordination, he is also often credited with postulating the Son's eternal generation, 
`}`; Crouzel 1989: 46. 
45 Fortman 1972: 54. 
46 On the latter, note OFP pref. 2. 
47 Harl 1958: 352. 
48 McDonnell 1994, drawing on the analysis of Crouzel 1976 of OFP 1.3.5. 
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rooting a genuine trinity in eternity. 49 However, this does raise the question of the 
relation between economic and immanent trinities in Origen, which in turn necessarily 
relates to his Christology. 
4.3. Origen's Doctrine Of God The Father 
Sustained discussion of God occurs in On First Principles I. 1. Origen asserts 
that: 
1. God is incorporeal (I. 1.1-4); 
2. God is immeasurable (1.1.5); 
3. God is incomprehensible (1.1.5,6), although clues about him are 
observable in the world he has created (I. 1.6. ); and 
4. God is simple (I. 1.6. ) 
Similarly in Against Celsus God's true nature is described as `... entirely 
incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible. ' 50 These descriptions do not 
necessarily reflect platonised conceptions of God, but are readily intelligible when set 
against platonising theologies. In an atmosphere where corporeality has negative 
connotations, incorporeality is an apt starting point, 51 for it is associated with 
immunity from corruption and change. In that way, God's incorporeality relates to 
that recurrent question of classical and Hellenistic philosophy, Being and Becoming. 
Incorporeality means God exists as pure being. However, within platonising 
epistemologies knowability is linked to being rather than becoming. Hence 
49 Fortman 1972: 55 citing OFP 1.2.6. 
50 AgC IV. 14. 
51 Widdicombe 1994: 13 sees incorporeality as God's most basic characteristic in Oxigen. 
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incorporeality safeguards God's knowability in such a framework. 52 The descriptions 
of On First Principles and Against Celsus reflect a common agenda in slightly 
different terms. 
However, incorporeality and its implication of knowability stand in some 
tension with God's immeasurability. After all, immeasurability implies 
incomprehensibility, for what cannot be measured cannot be known. Origen returns to 
the conundrum of knowing the infinite when later discussing the Son as image. 53 The 
Son, however, does know the Father, 54 obviously a highly significant indication of the 
Son's identity. 
Both passages speak of God as simple and uncompounded. Several writers 
stress Origen's commitment to simplicity, 55 and it repays attention. On First 
Principles I. 1.6 reads: 
... 
[B]ecause our mind is of itself unable to behold God as he is, it understands 
the parent of the universe from the beauty of his works and the comeliness of his 
creatures. 
God therefore must not be thought to be any kind of body, nor to exist in a body, 
but to be a simple intellectual essence, admitting in himself of no addition 
whatever, so that he cannot be believed to have in himself a more or a less, but 
is Unity, or if I may say so, Oneness56 throughout, and the mind and fount from 
which originates all intellectual existence or mind. ... 
57 
52 Widdicombe, amongst others, notes the association between ontology and knowability in platonising 
thought 1994: 18. 
53 OFP 1.2.8. 
sa OFP I. 1.8. 
ss Cross 1960: 128, Pollard 1958: 107, Widdicombe 1994: 24. 
56 Rufinus retains Movä; and`Eväg for `Unity' and `Oneness'. 
57 It has been questioned whether Origen means the Godhead in its entirety (so e. g. Fortman 1972: 55) 
or the Father when he writes `Unity, or if I may say so, Oneness'. It is best taken as primarily referring 
here to the Father since structurally On First Principles I. I. apparently deals with the First Person. 
Within 1.1.6. itself, the Father is the subject of the immediately preceding sentences, and there is no 
clear movement to discussion of all three. Moreover, Origen later argues in 1.2.2 for the Son's 
incorporeality. This would be redundant were I. I. discussing the Godhead generally. Further, it is 
doubtful whether Oxigen could be so emphatic without further explanation that the Godhead was 
`simple', for he stresses that the three Persons really are distinct (E. g. DH 122 and CJ 11.2. ). However, 
such real distinctions do not obviously harmonise with simplicity, because simplicity precludes further 
division. Even if `simplicity' were attributed to the Godhead because of the homoousion, this would 
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Divine simplicity functions in several ways in Origen. First, it provides an 
ultimate point of origin, from which all else derives. This emerges later in I. 1.6: 
But God, who is the beginning of all things, must not be regarded as a composite 
being, lest perchance we find that the elements, out of which everything that is 
called composite are composed, are prior to the first principle himself 
Divine simplicity reflects another stock concern of Hellenistic philosophy. 58 
Divine incorporeality safeguarded God's unchanging nature by `locating' him in the 
realm of Being rather than Becoming, while divine simplicity helps address the 
perennial question of the One and the Many. It safeguards the unitary nature of reality 
since there is one single focus or source of being - as in the simile of the Sun. 59 
The rationale is that, as First Principle, God must be simple. 60 Here `simple' 
means primarily `undivided'. 61 The passage indicates that if the First Principle could 
be divided, then those elements into which it was divided would be more 
fundamental. However, God alone enjoys indivisibility. 62 God's simplicity thus has a 
compound connotation, comprising indivisibility and uniqueness. 63 
Secondly, there is an element of participation. God's simplicity in his 
intellectual nature is the beginning of all intellectual nature, in which humans and 
angels (and very possibly demons) share. 64 Again, the Form of the Good in Plato's 
not, it seems, have been transparent to Origen's readers. Yet he states the simplicity point as needing 
little explanation. 
58 Republic 507a-509e. 
59 Republic 507a-509e. 
60 Widdicombe 1994: 24. 
61 G. Stead 1977: 182 suggests that in this period `simplicity' was used for two distinct concepts: (a) 
unique and (b) undivided. 
62 R. Berchman 1984: 124 notes Origen's simple God is `radically different from all others [sc. Types of 
beings]'. 
63 Stead 1977: 183 observes that such thinking tends to be over-eager to assimilate the two senses. 
64 Incorporeality subserves this. For OFP 1.1.6 shows corporeality inhibits the intellectual function. 
This implies that God's incorporeality is a condition for the perfect functioning of his intellectual 
nature. 
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simile of the sun is strikingly similar. God in his simplicity is a noetic unity who is the 
`... 64 65 ground" of the whole noetic world'. 
The Platonic influence is strong in other ways too. Thus God transcends mind 
and being. 66 Obviously this can generate trinitarian tensions: how can the First Person 
transcend all else without suggesting subordinationism ontologically? 67 
Finally, there is the First Person's monarchy. The Father's omnipotence is 
clear, 68 and, while the Son serves the Father in creating the cosmos, 69 he shares this 
fully. 70 There is, then, but one power at work, 7' to one final end. 72 As with Tertullian, 
the Son is a genuine plenipotentiary, not acting independently of the Father, but in 
unanimity with his will. 73 As with Tertullian, this argues against ditheism for there is 
no alternative empire. However, Origen's divine monarchy is distinctive in being 
consistent with human freewill, and therefore persuasive rather than coercive. 
Two things stand out. First, the strong affinity with platonic thought, not just 
with the Republic but also with the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides. 74 Secondly, 
the First Person is described in strongly non-relational terms. Incorporeality, 
immeasurability and simplicity are not prima facie relational attributes. Thus 
Berchman perceptively comments that the Father is only irpo; aviö [sic] while the 
65 Berchman 1984: 125. 
66 AgC VII. 38. For the transcendence of the Form of the Good, see Republic 509a-c. 
67 Stead 1977: 187 notes the danger. 
68 OFP I. 2.10; 11.3.7; 11.9.6. Compare AgC VIII. 11. 
69 OFP pref. 4. 
70 OFP I. 2.10. 
7' OFP 11.1.2. 
72 OFP 11.1.2. 
7; AgC VIII. 12. 
74 Berchman 1984: 153. 
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Son and the Spirit are npoq ii. 75 On First Principles I. 1. largely analyses the Father 
with little reference to his fatherhood. 76 
The question of relation is indeed problematic. One reason inclining Middle 
Platonic thought to solutions involving two hypostaseis solutions, such as the 
Parmenides adumbrated, was precisely that the First Hypostasis could remain simple 
since the plurality of ideas lay elsewhere. 77 Likewise the First Person is simple in that 
the plurality of ideas lies elsewhere (in the Son). But obviously if the First Person is 
aware he is Father, he is presumably aware of himself as Father and of the Son as his 
Son. Plurality and awareness of it thus seem inescapable, and fit but poorly with this 
version of simplicity. 
Thus, while Origen provides material for seeing the Persons as distinct, and as 
one in rule, which aligns closely with notable understandings of biblical 
monotheism, 78 an outstanding question relates to the full deity of Son and Spirit, 
given his portrayal of the Father's uniqueness. It is, though, to the Son that attention 
now turns. 
75 Berchman 1984: 153. Considered further below when dealing with the Father alone being avT69co;. 
76 There is some, notably in the discussion about knowing God OFP I. 1.8, and elsewhere Origen 
dwells 
more directly on the Father's personal relations. 
Nevertheless, sustained discussion in On First 
Principles weights things in this particular way. 
77 Compare J. Feibleman 1959: 155. 
78 E. g. Bauckham 1998. 
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4.4. Origen's Doctrine Of God The Son 
This is perhaps best considered by dealing with Origen's presentation of the 
Son, first, in eternity, and, second, in the Incarnation. This reflects the order of On 
First Principles and permits special considerations to emerge that may flow from 
Origen's views of the Incarnation. 
4.4.1. The Eternal Son 
Having dealt with the First Person in On First Principles I. 1, Origen proceeds 
to the Son in 1.2. The chapter's structure is interesting. In 1.2.1-4, Origen lists a series 
of the Son's titles: wisdom; power of God; 79 the Word of God; 80 Truth; Life; Way; 
and Resurrection. 81 He draws from this the principle that the Son derives what he is 
from the Father, 82 which notably entails incorporeality and eternity. He then furnishes 
scriptural support for these propositions in I. 2.5-13.83 Sustained discussion focuses on 
three texts: Colossians 1: 15, Hebrews 1: 3 and Wisdom 7: 25-26,84 which he explores 
in order: Colossians 1: 15 in 1.2.6, Hebrews 1: 3 in 1.2.7 and 8, and Wisdom 7: 25-26 in 
I. 2.9-13. 
Origen is strikingly concerned here with Jesus' titles, something also evident 
in the Commentary on John I. 85 Scholarship rightly emphasises this concern. 
86 The 
79 Both in I. 2.1. 
80 I. 2.3. 
81 The latter four from 1.2.4. 
82 OFP I. 2.2. 
83 For Origen's doctrine of revelation, see Appendix 2. 
84 1.2.5. 
85 CJ I. 1 1 again has a list followed by explanation. It lists the Son as: 
life, light, truth, way, resurrection, 
door, wisdom, power of God, Word, righteousness, sanctification and redemption. 
86 E. g. Harl 1958: 121f, G. Lampe 1997: 
77: A. Grillmeier 1975: 164. 
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multiplicity of titles reflects how the Son benefits people in their different stages of 
maturity and development. 87 
However, Wisdom seems somehow anterior to the other titles. On First 
Principles 1.2.1-3 primarily emphasises the Son as Wisdom. Similarly in the 
Commentary on John, Origen comments while exegeting John 1: 1 a: 
And so one might venture to say that wisdom is anterior to all the thoughts that 
are expressed in the titles of the first-born of every creature. 
88 
Origen takes the ä pxi in the light of Proverbs 8: 22: K'Üptoq £K'LL«Ev RF- ccpx? jv 666v 
aviov Etq Epya avtiov, and concludes John 1: 1 a means that the Word was in an 
äpxij, namely Wisdom. 89 Such an interpretation readily suggests the priority of 
Wisdom in considering the Son, and this requires further attention. 
The stress on the Son as Wisdom is evident in Origen's exegesis of John 1: 1 a. 
Creation is certainly by the Word at the Father's behest, 90 but, for Origen, creation 
and its multiplicity reflects the thoughts of, specifically, Wisdom. Thus: 
Consider, however, if we are at liberty to take this meaning of arche for our text: 
"In the beginning was the Word, " so as to obtain the meaning that all things 
came into being according to wisdom and according to the models of the system 
which are present in his thoughts. For I consider that as a house or a ship is built 
and fashioned in accordance with the sketches of the builder or designer, the 
house or the ship having their beginning (arche) in the sketches and reckonings 
in his mind, so all things came into being in accordance with the designs of what 
was to be, clearly laid down by God in wisdom. And we should add that having 
created, so to speak, ensouled wisdom, He left her to hand over, from the types 
which were in her, to things existing and to matter, the actual emergence of 
them, their moulding and their forms. ' 
87 CJ 1.42 compare 1.11 - 88 CJ 1.22. Crouzel 1989: 189 suggests the `title Christology' derives from Wisdom. So too A. 
Meredith 1974: 349. 
89 Origen is not alone, of course, in seeing echoes of Prov 8: 22 in Jn 1: 1 a: see e. g. C. Barrett 1962: 127. 
More striking is his understanding of the verbal coincidence of äpxý in both texts as indicating 
identification between äpxrl and Wisdom. 
90 OFP I. Pref. 4. 
91 CJ I. 22. 
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Comparisons with Plato's proposal that physical creation is by reference to the 
Ideas readily arise. 92 Certainly, differences exist. Thus the Ideas are now located 
`internally' within the Second Person, Wisdom. 93 The rationale is clear: it obviates the 
need for multiplicity within the mind of the First Person. Thus it is unsurprising to 
find Origen continuing: 
Now God is altogether one and simple; but our Saviour, for many reasons, since 
God set Him forth a propitiation and a first fruits of the whole creation, is made 
many things, or perhaps all these things; the whole creation, so far as capable of 
redemption, stands in need of Him. 94 
This passage underlines that the variety of titles has salvific significance, 95 
providing for souls at various stages of their development, 96 but again the point is 
Christ's multiplicity. Grillmeier rightly remarks that Origen presents the Son as `an 
objective multiplicity', in contrast to the Father. 97 
Yet this contrast does not arise from playing different `parts' in a correlative 
relationship, as with the Father-Son relationship itself, where to be a Father presumes 
a Son. 98 Origen knows of, and uses, such correlative arguments, 99 but simplicity does 
not seem to entail multiplicity as a necessary correlate. The stock example in ancient 
philosophy is Parmenidean monism, where multiplicity is illusory. 
However, Grillmeier does not perhaps fully develop the significance of the 
contrast between simple Father and multiple Son. Simplicity apparently distinguishes 
the Father from the Son. In terms of the `second God' questions presented by the 
`'' Timaeus 28-29. 
93 So also Berchman 1984: 119. 
94 CJ 1.22. 
95 A further difference from the Timaeus where salvation is not an issue in this way. However, this 
raises the question whether redemptive multiplicity is purely economic. 
96CJ I. 11,42. Noted by, amongst others, Grillmeier 1975: 166. 
97 Grillmeier 1975: 165. 
98 Origen speaks of the Son needing the Father in OFP IV. 1.28. 
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Dialogue with Heraclides, simplicity indeed furnishes Origen with a principle of 
distinction. However, if simplicity is central to the First Person, but is not shared by 
the Son, does this distinction suggest that the Son is not fully divine, contravening 
another parameter of the Dialogue? A related question also arises: can the multiple 
Son reveal the Father in his simplicity? 
Origen and Plotinus seem somewhat similar here. For Plotinus there might be 
difficulty in the completely simple One, contemplating Mind, which is multiple. For 
the differentiation of self-aware knower from what is known might imply a duality in 
the knower's mind which is inconsistent with full simplicity. 100 However, Origen 
insists that the Father and Son do know each other fully. 101 This proposition is, 
though, drawn from a biblical datum, Matthew 11: 27, rather than inferred from 
simplicity and multiplicity. 
Turning to Origen's justifications for his central propositions about the Son in 
On First Principles 1.2 , 
he deals first with Colossians 1: 15.102 His frequent citation of 
the verse indicates its importance to him. ' 03 Here, though, Origen transfers the epithet 
in the phrase `image of the invisible God', so that what he actually discusses is the 
`invisible image'. 
Origen distinguishes two types of image. The first is a painting on a material 
such as wood or stone. The second is the child in whose features the parent's features 
99 E. g. OFP 1.2.3. 
100 On Plotinus and the One, see chapter 2. 
101 OFP I. 1.8. 
1 02 OFP I. 2.6. 
103 It is used at AgC IV. 85; VI. 63,64.69; VII. 
27; VIII. 12,17. where it plays a significant part in the 
various arguments. 
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are `in every respect faithfully reproduced'. 104 For Oxigen, the `image' of Colossians 
1: 15 is the second, parent-child. This is hardly surprising. Origen carefully specifies 
that the first kind of image is formed on a material substance and a material image 
would hardly be consistent with the Son's incorporeal deity, which Origen upholds. '°5 
By contrast, the parent-child alternative allows Origen to appeal to the model 
of fathers begetting sons of like nature to themselves, in their image in that sense. 
Origen comments of the son-as-image: `This image preserves the unity of nature and 
substance common to a father and a son'. 106 The true image of the invisible God must 
itself be invisible. 
Origen justifies such likeness from the correspondence of action between 
Father and Son. The Son does what the Father does, reasons Origen from John 5: 19. 
A difficult but important section then follows: 
And on this account my own opinion is that an act of the Father's will ought to 
be sufficient to ensure the existence of what he wills; for in willing he uses no 
other means than that which is produced by the deliberations of his will. It is in 
this way, then, that the existence of the Son also is begotten by him. 
This point must above all be upheld by those who allow nothing to be 
unbegotten, that is, unborn, except God the Father only. 
107 
The destination of this argument in the final sentence relates to the Father's 
uniqueness. This is further related to the sufficiency and centrality of the Father's will 
in two respects. For, first, the Son's actions are not merely similar to the Father's, but 
are communal actions of both in which the Father's will is done. 
' 08 Since the Son 
104 OFF 1.2.6. 
los One of the `givens' listed in OFP Pref4. 
106 OFP I. 2.6. 
107 OFF 1.2.6. 
108 Compare AgC VIII. 12, where Col 1: 15 is one supporting text cited. 
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executes the Father's will, his actions are the Father's. In this passage, though, 
secondly, the Son who implements the Father's will, is himself generated by that will. 
This is not, though, to deny the Son's eternity. Origen has already argued that 
God is never without his wisdom109 and was always Father. 110 Since an incorporeal 
being is indivisible, this does not divide the divine, and the model of an act of will 
allows Origen to maintain a begetting without division `... as an act of will proceeds 
from the mind without either cutting off any part of the mind or being separated or 
divided from Rather, there is an invisible Son beyond the senses even as the 
Father is, but who can reveal the Father. For the Father, his uniqueness as only 
unbegotten is preserved, as is the supremacy of his will. 
By this stage, however, Origen has furnished support for a Son who is 
invisible and incorporeal as his Father is, two key points he outlined in 1.2.1-4. 
Origen then moves to Hebrews 1: 3. ' 12 He uses the first phrase änavyaaµa 
of q Sö rlS to convey how the Son conducts us to God, drawing upon the light 
imagery suggested by äMavYaßµa. Given that God is light, ' 13 the Son is the 
änavyaaµa of this light. Here Origen applies the common image of brightness 
proceeding from light to the Father-Son relation. 
We become accustomed by this brightness to the Light and are thus led by the 
Son to the Father. This light from light image allows Oxigen to speak of the Son 
109 OFF 1.2.2. 
110OFPI. 2.3. 
III OFP I. 2.6. 
112 OFF 1.2.7 and 8. 
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`proceeding from God without separation'. ' 14 Thus the Son can be distinct without 
being separated. 
Next, Origen develops the second phrase of Hebrews 1: 3, xa paxtii p Tf q 
vnoaiäßccOS. 15 He questions how there can be another xapaxtiijp besides God 
himself. His answer deals again with how the Son makes the Father known. 
Acknowledging its imperfections, he uses this analogy: suppose there was a statue of 
infinite size. Such a statue would be unknowable. However, a second statue of the 
same features and material would be an express figure of the first, because it had the 
same features, yet knowable because finite rather than infinite. Origen's comparison 
likens the incarnate Jesus to the second, finite, knowable statue. 
The structural position shows that this analogy is important, but, even 
allowing for Origen's qualifications, it creates problems. First, Dillon notes this is a 
highly attenuated principle of revelation: the Son is `... still only an image of what we 
cannot see. " 16 
Secondly, the second statue lacks the first's infinity. Yet Origen's earlier 
description of God made infinity central. ' 7 As a result, a central part of what makes 
God God cannot be reproduced by the Son considered as the second statue. Naturally, 
how a human being can reveal in his person an infinite God is a perennial problem, 
and is not unique to Origen, but the analogy raises it acutely. 
1131Jn 1: 5. 
114OFPI. 2.7. 
115 OFF 1.2.8. 
116 Dillon 1988: 226. 
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Thirdly, it is in similarity of action rather than personal resemblance that the 
incarnate Son reveals God: 118 
[The Son] gave indications, in the likeness of his power and works to those of 
God the Father, of the immense and invisible greatness that was in him... 119 
Fourthly, the statue analogy deals with revelation of the Persons considered 
singly and not the content or existence of their relationship. The acts of power in the 
Incarnation may suggest an extremely powerful, even omnipotent, God, but they do 
not per se indicate the Father-Son relationship. To bring that out, Origen would need 
to point out that the Son's actions do not merely resemble but are at the behest of the 
Father, and that the Son in the Incarnation does the Father's will. He uses this 
resource elsewhere, of course, employing John 5: 19,120 but not here. 
Origen then moves to consider Wisdom 7: 25-26: 121 
(25) ätiµIS yäp £6ity tifiS toi 9ýov SvväF-wS 
xai Wroppota 'c% tiov itavtioxpätiopoS öö TT F-iXtxptvij 
btä 'tovio ovSEV µýµtaµµývov ai av'trv 1tapE µnti1ttEt. 
(26) äýavyaßµa yap ca utv cpuroS ätötoo 
xa1 Eaon upov ai Xiöwtiov Tf S toi 6cov Ev¬pyEiaS 
KM Eixwv ifjS äyaOötirJioc aviov. 
For Origen these verses are definitions, providing certain attributes of God. 122 
He develops the phrases in turn. The first, the breath of the power of God, is 
explained in terms of God's unlimited and eternal power. The Son is the one by whom 
God exercises his power and is eternal, for God always exercises his power. The 
1" OFP I. 1.5. 
118 So too Harl 1958: 115. 
119 OFP 1.2.8. Oxigen earlier remarks (OFP I. 1.6) that the infinite and unknowable God can be grasped 
indirectly through his actions. 
120 E. g. OFP 1.2.6. 
121 OFP 1.2.9f Irrespective of a christological interpretation, Wisdom 7: 25f represent an exalted view 
of wisdom: L. Grabbe 1997: 78 and J. Geyer 1963: 87. 
122 OFP 1.2.9. 
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Son's eternity is defended because the Father's eternity and immutability demand it. 
Again, this supports a proposition from 1.2.1-4, the assertion of the Son's eternity. 
Immutability also guides Origen with the second phrase, `Wisdom is the 
purest effluence of the glory of the Almighty'. 123 The Father did not `become' 
irav'toxpäi(, )p, for that would imply an increase in God, which is absurd. He always 
had objects over which to exercise his power. 124 That power is, though, exercised 
through the Son, Wisdom. Origen uses John 17: 10 to illuminate this. Since the Father 
has given `all' to the Son, this must include the Father's rule. The Son is consequently 
omnipotent too, for he shares fully with the Father. Nevertheless, Origen's account is 
`monarchical': the Son has no independent authority to rival the Father. 125 A defining 
aspect of biblical monotheism is therefore preserved, albeit without the term 
`monarchy'. This, then, is Jesus' glory, that He is co-wielder of the Father's 
omnipotent power, and its description as `pure' shows it is unchangeable and 
incorruptible. 
From the third phrase, `brightness of the eternal light', Origen draws out 
eternity. 126 In Wisdom 7: 26 `eternal' qualifies `light' rather than `splendour'. Origen 
transfers `eternal' to `brightness', presumably because a light without its brilliance is 
inconceivable, ' 27 so that, if the light is eternal, so is its brilliance. However, `eternity' 
is usefully glossed here as meaning without beginning or ending. 128 The relation of 
`brightness' to `light', though, emphasises that the Son's existence is derived. Again, 
123OFPI. 2.10. 
124 Hence the view that Origen endorses an eternal creation; Crouzel 1989: 206, however, argues that 
Oxigen only endorses the world of Ideas as co-eternal with God. 
125 Compare Tertullian AgP 3. 
126OFPI. 2.11. 
127 Compare Origen's remarks on Heb 1: 3 in OFP 1.2.7. 
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this supports points Origen has made earlier in 1.2.1-4 about the Son's eternity and 
derivation. 
From there Origen proceeds to `the unspotted mirror of the ... working of 
God 9.129 This re-inforces earlier discussion of Wisdom as the second statue, imaging 
the infinite statue. 130 Ongen notes: 
[Jesus says] `the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he hath seen the 
Father doing'. 
As regards the power of his works, then, the Son is in no way whatever separate 
or different from the Father, nor is his work anything other than the Father's 
work, but there is one and the same movement, so to speak, in all they do; 
consequently the Father has called him an `unspotted mirror', in order to make it 
understood that there is absolutely no dissimilarity between the Son and the 
Father. 1 31 
Thus the `mirror' language of Wisdom 7: 26 is explained in terms of unity of 
operation, again using John 5: 19. However, the Father's will has primacy, since the 
Son does not act independently. Origen emphasises that the Son does the same, not 
just similar, things. 
132 
The revelatory value of the Son's actions rests upon his relationship of 
dependence towards the Father. The actions would lack this mirroring quality if they 
were independent, rather than exercises of the Father's sovereignty and will through 
the Son. The stress laid once more on the one-ness of power and work between 
Father and Son is noteworthy. 
128 This is one of several places where it seems problematic to see Arius as faithfully reproducing 
Origen's overall thought. 
129 OFF 1.2.12. 
130OFPI. 2.8. 
3' OFP 1.2.12. 
132 OFP 1.2.12. 
Origen lastly develops `the image of his goodness. ' 133 He uses this to discuss 
several themes. First, the Father's primacy is again upheld, for he is `original 
goodness'. Secondly, this contributes to a `unified' structure of goodness, for the Son 
has no independent goodness, any more than he has independent power, again 
supporting the derivation idea asserted in I. 2.1-4. Thirdly, this does not mean that the 
Son has a lesser goodness, merely that it is not independently originated. 
It is worth briefly reviewing this material on the Son in his divinity. The Son 
emerges as an intermediary in several respects. 134 He is an intermediary between God 
and creation, in that the Father is simple and the multiplicity of creation is introduced 
in the multiply-constituted Son. He is an intermediary, too, in that through him God is 
known. He is an intermediary in that God rules and exercises power through him. ' 35 
In terms of the parameters Oxigen seeks to meet, this intermediary function requires 
distinction between Father and Son. 
A related point is that the Son's works not merely resemble the Father's, but 
are the Father's. Origen emphasises this, for all three principal texts refer to it, 136 and 
John 5: 19 provides an important foundation for it. This is highly significant and 
parallels Tertullian's reasoning: the position of the Father is not compromised because 
the rule of the cosmos is still one rule, done at his behest. Ditheism is thus deflected. 
Furthermore, the Son's full participation in his Father's power suggests the propriety 
of worshipping him. 
133 
"' So, e. g. R. Lyman 1993: 39. 
135 This is strongly resembles Wisdom as portrayed in Wis 7: 25. See Grabbe 1997: 78. 
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However, the Son's full participation in his Father's power is based on 
derivation. Just as the Son is what he is by receiving from the Father, his rule is 
likewise derived. The pattern of derivation means that in examining the Son one is 
inevitably led to look at his relationship with the Father. 
Nevertheless, suspicion lingers that the revelation of the Father-Son relation 
does not enjoy the prominence with Origen that John in particular gives it in, say, 
John 8. Origen has largely explored matters through `image' and 'mirror'. This 
though, raises the question of what the Son does in the Incarnation. 
4.4.2. The Son In His Humanity 
Origen resumes detailed christological discussion in On First Principles 
11.6.1 ff. Harl rightly stresses the acute conceptual difficulties the Incarnation poses in 
a platonising environment. 137 Knowledge of transcendent reality was precisely not 
derived from sense perception. Yet the Incarnation apparently contradicted that. Entry 
into flesh could be thought shameful. 138 Nevertheless Origen insists on the reality of 
Christ's humanity: 
... 
[W]e must pursue our contemplation with all fear and reverence, as we seek 
to prove how the reality of each nature exists in one and the same person... 139 
He adds, understandably, that explaining the two natures in the one being is 
surpassingly difficult, but presses on anyway. 140 In the background is Origen's idea of 
the Son as cosmic Wisdom. As such, he permeates all rational creatures, each 
136 Col 1: 15 in OFP 1.2.6, Heb 1: 3 in 1.2.8, and Wis 7: 25ff in 1.2.12. The last passage is most explicit 
on unity of operation. 
137 Harl 1958: 16f. 
138 As AgC IV. 2 testifies. 
139 OFP II. 6.2. 
140 OFPII. 6.3. 
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attaining a share. 14' This Wisdom notion is then grafted onto a Christological account. 
The share each soul attains varies, according to its affection for Wisdom. There is, 
though, one particular soul, of which Origen writes: 
that soul of which Jesus said, `No man taketh from me my soul', 142 clinging to 
God from the beginning of the creation and ever after in a union inseparable and 
indissoluble, as being the soul of the wisdom and word of God and of the truth 
and the true light, and receiving him wholly, and itself entering into his light and 
splendour, was made with him in a pre-eminent degree one spirit, just as the 
apostle promises to them whose duty is to imitate Jesus, that `he who is joined to 
the Lord is one spirit'. 143 
This soul acts as an intermediary between the flesh and the nature of God (en 
passant a strong indication of the Son's full divinity). It has affinity with God, for it is 
rational, but is also open to corporeality. Thus a human soul forms the intermediary 
between corporeal existence and incorporeal deity. Since this soul is wholly entered 
by, or has wholly entered, the Son, one can properly speak of the divine nature in 
human terms, and the human nature in divine terms. 
'44 
Christ's soul is distinguished by not partaking in the pre-mundane fall from 
affection, which Origen thought preceded bodily existence. 145 Rather it cleaved 
perfectly to the Son, 146 and became incapable of falling through prolonged custom. 
Christ had a human, rational soul without the possibility of sin. 147 
This union between soul and Logos is explored in three ways. Origen quotes 
`he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit' (1 Corinthians 6: 17). 
148 Further, a 
141 Compare D. Winston 1979: 38 on Wis 7: 24 `... wisdom pervades the entire cosmos... ' 
142 Again Oxigen uses verbal co-incidence to establish a conceptual point. Compare his treatment of 
äpxij in Jn 1: 1 a. 
143 OFP II. 6.3. 
144 For the association of Origen with a pre-existent soul of Christ see anathemata 1,7 and 8 of 
Constantinople 11 553 A. D. 
'4' See Crouzel 1989: 208-2 10 for discussion of the pre-mundane Fall. 
146 OFF 11.6.4. 
147OFP1I. 6.5. 
148 OFF 11.6.3. 
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comparison is drawn with marriage, which makes one flesh, 149 although the relation 
between Word and soul is closer than husband and wife. Lastly, the relationship 
resembles iron put into the flame. Kept in the flame, one is led to say the iron `... has 
completely changed into fire'. 150 
Several points require mention. First, two of these examples, one flesh in 
marriage and 1 Corinthians 6: 17, occur in the Dialogue with Heraclides. 15' There, 
though, they were used to describe how Father and Son might yet be one God. The 
common principle, of course, is that two things might yet be one. 
Secondly, 1 Corinthians 6: 17 is applied to the soul which united itself 
perfectly in the pre-mundane state to the Logos. ' 52 Yet clearly the text also applies to 
other souls which subsequently become united to the Logos. Grillmeier's reaction is 
apt: `... Christ is in danger of being still only a "quantitatively" different exceptional 
case of the universal relationship of the "perfect" to the Logos. ' 153 Here the trajectory 
to seeing believers as `isochristes' is intelligible. ' 54 
Thirdly, the analogy of iron in fire, certainly in Origen's pre-mundane account 
of the soul uniting with Christ, seems highly problematic. This risks appearing as an 
unstable christology, with, paradoxically, both `nestorianising' 
155 and 
`eutychianising' 156 possibilities. 157 `Nestori anising', because Christ's human soul 
149 OFF 11.6.3. 
150 OFF11.6.6. 
151 DH 124-126 
152 OFP 11.6.3. See also AgC VI. 47. 
15; Gnllmeier 1975: 169. 
154 Crouzel 1989: 177 sees it as an Origenist heresy. Again note anathema 13 of Constantinople II. 
iss So J. Rowe 1987: 122f. 
156 Clearly such labels have dangers, since neither Nestorianism nor Eutychianism were presented 
distinctly to Origen as christological options. Nevertheless comparisons may be drawn. 
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seems in principle originally distinct from his deity. This might seem to charge Origen 
with failing to provide an anhypostatic account of Jesus' humanity. Yet his approach 
does leave problems persisting in his account of the Incarnation. Thus Oxigen 
responds to the charge that if Jesus were divine he could not have been deserted as he 
was in Gethsemane: 
To which we reply, that even we do not suppose the body of Jesus, which was 
then an object of sight and perception, to have been God. And why do I say His 
body? Nay, not even His soul, of which it is related, "My soul is exceeding 
sorrowful, even unto death. " But as, according to the Jewish manner of 
speaking, "I am the Lord, the God of all flesh, " and, "Before Me there was no 
God formed, neither shall there be after Me, " God is believed to be He who 
employs the soul and body of the prophet as an instrument; and as, according to 
the Greeks, he who says, "I know both the number of the sand, and the measures 
of the sea, And I understand a dumb man, and hear him who does not speak, " is 
considered to be a god when speaking, and making himself heard through the 
Pythian priestess; so, according to our view, it was the Logos God, and Son of 
the God of all things, who spake in Jesus these words, "I am the way, and the 
truth, and the life; " and these, "I am the door; " and these, "I am the living bread 
that came down from heaven; " and other expressions similar to these. 
158 
Such thinking utilises the hermeneutical principle that some things are attributable to 
the humanity and others to the divinity. ' 59 Equally clearly, this preserves the real 
humanity of Jesus' soul. On this account, it has not been completely divinised. Yet the 
comparison with the Delphic priestess is troubling, because she is ecstatically seized 
by the god, and is no co-agent. More telling still, perhaps, is the parallel with the 
biblical prophets. On Origen's account, they seem to be instruments in giving God's 
word, not full conscious participators. Hence Rowe trenchantly, but understandably, 
remarks that the divine nature controls the human like a `marionette'. 160 Grillmeier, 
too, seems uncomfortably accurate in commenting that Oxigen risks imposing a 
157 It is no surprise that Origen may give rise to disparate theologies: Harl 1958: 351 notes 11 sent 
rarement le besoin de choisir'. 
'58AgCII. 9. 
159 Compare AgC 11.25. Pollard 1956/57: 337 and Wiles 1960: 113 note the exegetical principle. 
160 Rowe 1987: 1371 
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`double personality' upon Christ. 16' This model therefore tends to attenuate the 
uniqueness of the Incarnation as a revelatory event. . 
However, Origen's account has another strand. The `eutychianising' tendency 
is present in On First Principles itself. The iron in the fire somehow becomes fire. It 
no longer admits cold and functions like fire rather than iron. Origen in fact applies 
the imagery to the mutability question. What was mutable has become immutable 
through its union with the Word of God, ' 62 and hence impeccable. Here the divine 
seems fully communicated to human nature. 163 This is supported in Against Celsus: 
[W]ith respect to His mortal body, and the human soul which it contained, we 
assert that not by their communion merely with Him, but by their unity and 
intermixture, they received the highest powers, and after participating in His 
divinity, were changed into God. 164 
However, while humanity seems invested with divinity, the reverse is not 
apparently true. The Word did not acquire the capacity to suffer as the physical body 
or soul does. 165 An obvious question still arises: if the divine nature is communicated 
to the human soul, how can that soul experience what Origen regards as incompatible 
with divine nature (suffering etc. )? Passages such as Against Celsus 11.16, where 
Origen insists the death is real, suggest he is no docetist, 166 but it is not clear how that 
can be easily reconciled with this strand within his christology. 
This is an acute problem for two reasons. First, if the soul-Logos union 
resembles the Father-Son union (since both are examples of how two may yet be 
G1 Grillmeier 1975: 169. 
162 OFP 11.6.6. Compare 11.6.5 on acquired impeccability. 
163 Grillmeier 1975: 159 speaks of the ontic unity of the soul and Christ. Compare too Wiles 1960: 115. 
'64AgCIII. 41. 
165AgCIV. 15. 
Although Lampe 1997: 80 argues that Oxigen has an insufficiently serious view of the Incarnation. 
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one), ' 67 and if the soul-Logos union is unstable (having either nestoriansing or 
eutychianising tendencies), then similar considerations may also arise for the Father- 
Son union. There, the tendencies would be either towards ditheism (`nestorianising') 
or modalism ('eutychianising'). 
Secondly, the tendencies behind the iron in the fire analogy carry implications 
for revelation through the Incarnation. If the `nestorianising' tendency predominates, 
the transparency of the Incarnation as a revelation of God may be imperilled. It may 
be unclear what is attributable to divinity and what to humanity. Further, if we already 
possess a hermeneutical key by which we know what is attributable to which nature, 
the Incarnation becomes unnecessary for revelation, contrary to John 1: 18. Yet if the 
`eutychianising' tendency predominates, so that the humanity is divinised, the 
question arises whether Christ can truly reveal a perfect human example of a life lived 
under God's will. ' 68 If, again, this exemplifies genuine tension, 169 or even 
contradiction, 1 70 in Origen's thought, so that he really does present both tendencies, 
this too constitutes a revelatory problem, for one is left asking which framework 
should apply to particular cases. If, finally, revelation has become problematic 
because this underlying christology is unstable, that has consequences for trinitarian 
theology because the link between economic and immanent trinities itself may be 
obscured. 
167 DH 124-126. 
168 Harl rightly points to Origen's concern with revelation of the godly life, e. g. Harl 1958: 318. 
169 Crouzel 1989: 49. 
170 Harl 1958: 330. 
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4.5. Origen and the Relation between Father and Son 
Some scholars have argued that Origen furnishes support both to ontological 
subordination and non-ontological subordination. ' 71 At the risk of over-simplification, 
this section will deal with some considerations ranged on each side. 
4.5.1. Considerations Supporting Ontological Subordination 
Several factors strongly suggest ontological subordinationist tendencies, 
although Origen himself might well have resisted this. 172 That said, four areas 
especially need consideration. 
We turn first to the exegesis of John 1: 1 ff. Books I and II of the Commentary 
on John deal mostly with the Prologue, especially the first few verses. This gives 
considerable weight to the Prologue, ' 73 and to the Son in eternity in particular, 
although, of course, Origen deals with the fact of the Incarnation. 
As already observed, Origen exegetes Wisdom as an ä pJJJ in John 1: l a. 14 In 
reaching this conclusion Origen has rehearsed various possible meanings for äpxij 
and these bear on the relation of Father and Son. 175 He describes the Father as äpxi of 
the Son, but in two ways. First, the Father is the beginning of all things, for he is the 
beginning of the `demiurge' (sic) who in turn is the beginning of what he makes. ' 76 
171E. g. Fortman 1972: 56. 
172 The Dialogue with Heraclides shows a determination to defend the Son's real deity. Compare too 
AgC VIII. 12ff which vigorously upholds the legitimacy of worshipping the Son. 
173 The Prologue's importance is commonly acknowledged. Thus Brown 1971 1: 18 writes `[it] is the 
pearl within this Gospel. ' 
1'4 CJ 1.22. 
175 CI I. 16-22. 
176 CJI. 17. 
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`Beginning' denotes origin. Secondly, the Father is the äpx7j of the Son in that he is 
the form or original' 77 of which the Son is the image. "g Both involve derivation. 
This could initially suggest the ontological inferiority of the Son, but the 
material in On First Principles suggests caution. In terms of äpxii as origin, ' 79 this 
does not amount to saying that once the Son was not. Wisdom's eternity is strongly 
attested, 180 which precludes extreme ontological subordinationism. ' 81 As for &pxi as 
`form', this is related to Colossians 1: 15 and ideas of image. 182 Yet, as discussed 
above, while the image language may be problematic at points, Origen develops 
`image' precisely in terms such that the Son does not differ in substance from the 
Father. ' 83 Instead, `image' suggests co-extensive powers between Father and Son - 
they do the same things. ' 84 
Moreover, in the Commentary on John itself, Origen also draws out another 
meaning of äpxi , `that out of which a thing comes', 
`the underlying matter from 
which things are formed'. 185 Significantly, Origen does not say the Father-Son 
relation exemplifies this. If it did, ontological subordination certainly could be hard to 
avoid. For, unless the Son had the whole of the substance in question, his inferiority 
would be implied. 
"I CiI. 19. 
178 Col 1: 15 thus appears again. 
19 CJ I. 17. 
180 OFP I. 2.6ff, for example. 
181 As Lyman 1993: 51 observes. 
182 CJI. 19. 
183 He is clear that `image' in Col 1: 15 is not like that of a portrait on wood, where the wood bearing 
the image is of a different substance from the original. OFP 1.2.6. 
184OFPI. 2.6. 
185 CJ I. 18. 
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Since Origen does not think the Father-Son relation exemplifies this kind of 
ä pxl, it suggests Origen does not conceive of the Son as an emanation. 
' 86 It may also 
indicate, though, that Athanasian-style consubstantiality is not to the fore in his 
consideration of the Father-Son relation. Possibly, a writer who did think 
predominantly on consubstantial lines would not so completely dismiss this particular 
version of ä pxij although he would no doubt gloss it. 
However, this consideration of the Father as äpxi of the Son indicates the 
significance of the Father's will. The discussion of äpx'j as origin uses the pivotal text 
Proverbs 8: 22, which deals in Origen's view with the Son's work as demiurge 
creating the cosmos. ' 87 Origen refers to the same text later, when discussing which 
meaning to adopt. l88 In doing so, he stresses the command of the Father in the 
demiurge's creative work. 
The Father's will is also involved in the other meaning of äpxi , that of 
`form', where the Son is the image. The Son's work is like the Father's, but done at 
the Father's bidding, so that the Son as image `is like an act of [God's] will 
proceeding from the mind. ' 189 
The äpxij language does not, then, necessarily point to ontological 
subordination, but is in fact consistent with a `functional' subordination rooted in 
eternity rather than restricted to the Incarnation. 
' 90 
186 E. g. OFP 1.2.6. confirms this. 
187 CJ I. 17. 
188 CJ 1.22. 
189 OFPI. 2.6. 
121 
Ongen continues his exegesis of John 1: 1 ff in Book II of the Commentary on 
John. He comments on the phrase xai 0 ö70; iv irpög T0 'v eEov and notes first that 
the Word did not `come' to God, as it did, say, to the prophets and also that `to be' is 
used rather than `to become. ' 191 From this he concludes one cannot say either that the 
Word was originally apart from the Father and came into relationship with him, or 
that once the Word was not but originated in time ('became' as `came into being'). 
Thus he argues for the Word's divinity: `With God, however, He is God, just because 
He is with Him. ' 192 
In fact he sees John 1: 1 as a progression, culminating in 1: 1 c which asserts the 
Word's divinity as the natural consequence of what precedes. ' 93 The assertion seems 
two-fold: the Word is eternal, but has also always been in this particular relationship 
with God. 194 As regards eternality, Origen shows elsewhere the importance he 
attaches to worshipping the right object, 195 and especially refers to the impropriety of 
worshipping something created. But clearly if the Word is eternal, it is not created. 
The Word's eternality is then readily linked to his deity. 196 
However, the second aspect, relationship, also matters. Origen comments that 
John 1: 1 ends stating, xai OEÖS ijv o Xoyo; `so that it might be seen that the Word 
being with God makes Him God. ' 197 This means the Son's divinity must be discussed 
190 A broad agreement with McDonnell's general conclusions 1994: 19.29. 
191 yivo tcu is first used of the Word at 1: 14. 
192 CJ 11.1. Compare Ridderbos 1997: 25 fn. 23 who speaks of the disposition and orientation implied 
by the phrase. Brown 1971 I: 5 sees a `nuance of relationship' in Jn 1: lb. 
193 Cj 11.1. 
194 Modern commentators divide over the extent to which John depicts trinitarian relations and what 
kind they might be. Brown 1971 I: 5,23 argues for caution over the specific content of the relationship. 
195 Note AgC 1.23,111.15. 
196 Among modern commentators, compare e. g. Ridderbos 1997: 25. 
197 (, J II. i. 
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in terms of his relation to the Father. Ongen turns to this in chapter 2 of the 
Commentary on John Book II. 
In that section Oxigen refers to the fear some have of proclaiming two gods, 
which leads them either to deny the Son is distinct or to give him a separate existence 
`making his sphere of essence fall outside that of the Father. ' 198 In answer, he 
observes that John calls the Word `God' only without the article. 199 For only the First 
Person is avtiöOEoq, that is, God of himself. Origen develops this with reference to 
John 17: 3 where Jesus talks of eternal life consisting in knowing him, the Son, and 
also `the only true God' (iöv Rovov ('xXiOtvöv OEov). The consequence is: 
that all beyond the Very God is made God by participation in His divinity, 
and is not to be called simply God (with the article), but rather God (without 
200 article). 
This underlines that the Son's divinity is being-God-in-a-relation, more 
accurately still, being God because of a relation, namely participation. Conversely, the 
Father needs no such relation to be divine. Hence avtiöOcog emphasises not merely 
supremacy of will in relationship, but that the First Person is simply self-referring in 
his divinity. 201 This would support Grillmeier's charge that the Son risks being only 
quantitatively different from other beings: 202 the Son, like other beings the Scriptures 
call `god', is so only by participation. 
In assessing Grillmeier's comment, it is worth recalling more of the argument 
from Commentary on John 11.2. Origen does assert that: 
198 The same errors referred to in DH 128. 
199 Modern commentators draw less subtle conclusions. Brown 1971 1: 5 recalls the argument that 9E6S 
is anarthrous to show it is predicate rather than subject, while indicating that this 
is not decisive. Barrett 
1962: 130 sees OEÖS as anarthrous because the Word is not the only being of whom this might be said. 
200 CJ1I. 2. 
201 Compare Berchman 1984: 124,151 and 154 and Studer 1993: 84f. 
202 Grillmeier 1975: 169. 
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the first-born of all creation... is a being of more exalted rank than the other gods 
beside Him, of whom God is the God, ... It was by the offices of the first-born 
that they became gods. 
The Son is therefore distinguished from `the other gods'. Yet the qualitative 
nature of that difference remains problematic. Origen continues: 
The true God, then, is "The God, " and those who are formed after Him are gods, 
images, as it were, of Him the prototype. But the archetypal image, again, of all 
these images is the Word of God... 
Here Origen draws what seems like a platonic distinction between prototype 
and image. The prototype (the `true' God language draws on John 17: 3) is the First 
Person, and the Second Person, while pre-eminent as an archetype, is nevertheless an 
`image', and belongs with the other `gods' who are also images. The stronger the 
prototype/image distinction becomes, the more the Son appears as ontologically 
inferior. Like the other `gods' the Son is God `not possessing that of himself, but by 
his being with the Father. '203 Inevitably the Word seems not to be &XiOivöc when 
considered as OEög. This is highly problematic if John 17: 3 is taken as referring to 
traditional attributes of God, 204 from which the Son is excluded. 
Yet Origen recognises elsewhere that denying, for example, eternality to the 
Son involves disparaging the Father. It implies that he once lacked something, namely 
fatherhood, something he is by virtue of his relation with another. 
205 However, this 
lies uneasily with avtiöOEoq. 
Two solutions are perhaps possible. One is to see Origen as having two 
inconsistent accounts of the First Person, one of which leads to the Son's ontological 
subordination. The non-subordinationist strand, however, suggests Origen would not 
203 CJII. 2. 
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have been content with that development of his thought. The other solution is to see 
Origen as having some sense of hierarchy within the First Person, so that fatherhood 
is not a feature constituting his divinity. Rather, his uncreated, `stand-alone' quality 
does that. This, though, seems unattractive because it rests uneasily both with the First 
Person's simplicity, 206 and also with the importance attached to knowing God as 
Father. 207 Again this amounts ultimately to inconsistency in his depiction of the First 
Person, but at another point. 
Turning to other considerations bearing on ontological subordination, an 
obvious hunting-ground is John 14: 28, which Origen utilises heavily in refuting 
Celsus. 208 This is significant, because Oxigen defends the worship of Jesus while 
maintaining the Father's role and supremacy. 209 Oxigen does this by appealing to a 
unity of will, in which the Son again features as image of the Father. We have already 
seen how image terminology incorporates the supremacy of the Father's will. 210 This 
suggests Origen takes John 14: 28 as showing, not ontological subordination, but 
rather obedience. 211 
In his extended thoughts on prayer Origen suggests that perhaps `we ought not 
to pray to anyone born [of woman], nor even to Christ himself, but only to the God 
and Father of all. ..,. 
212 This is not, though, based on ontological subordination. He 
204 So R. Bultmann 1971: 494 n. 7 and Brown 1971 11: 74 1. 
205 E. g. OFP I. 2.2. 
206 It implies essential as against non-essential attributes. 
207 Widdicombe 1994: 2. 
208 ABC. VIII. 14,15. 
209 AgC VIII. 12. 
2t0OFP1.2.6. 
211 Compare Pollard 1956-7: 337-338 on Origen's view of John 4: 34 and 10: 30. 
212 On Prayer (hereafter OPr) 15.1. 
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stresses that Jesus is a high-priest appointed by the Father. 213 This priestly function 
explains why prayer is made through him to the Father, and is allotted at the Father's 
will. Neither function nor allocation point necessarily to ontological subordination, 
but only to obedience to the Father. This economically explains Origen's insistence 
on the propriety of worshipping the Son (because he is divine), 214 while still pressing 
for prayer to be made to the Father through the Son. 
Finally, the Father's simplicity as against the Son's multiplicity must again be 
considered. Within a platonising hierarchy of being, it is hard not to see simplicity as 
ontologically superior to multiplicity. Simplicity also does not depend on relation with 
another. Hence similar considerations arise as with Origen's conception of the Father 
as avtiöOEoq: he is God in isolation rather than relation, and the Son's lack of this 
attribute could suggest genuine ontological inferiority. 
4.5.2 Considerations Supporting Non-Ontological Subordination 
In Against Celsus Origen must meet the charge that Christians have 
contravened monotheism. 215 To do so, he invokes John 10: 30, as in the Dialogue with 
Heraclides. 216 The citation serves the same purpose in both places, to show the 
oneness of God. Origen explains oneness from the one heart and mind of the early 
Christians (Acts 4: 32), 217 thus emphasising the unity of will. Origen summarises: 
övtia 8 160 tfj vIroaiäaE i. ltp&Thatia, Ev Ss if öµovoia xai iýj auµcpcuvia 
Kai if iautiO CTJ r. toi ßouXijµaioq. 
213 OPr 15.1-4. 
214 E. g. AgC VIII. 12. 
215AgCVIII. 12. 
216 As he does in DH 128. 
217 InAgCVIII. 12. 
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The parallel material in the Dialogue with Heraclides proceeds a little 
differently. Origen compares two other unions with the God-Christ union. 218 The first 
is husband with wife and the second the righteous person with Christ. Each union can 
be characterised differently. 2 19 The marriage union is `flesh' (Genesis 2: 24), the 
righteous person with Christ `spirit' (1 Corinthians 6: 17), while the third union, Christ 
with God, can only be characterised as God. 
Two points should be made. First, in the comparisons, the union apparently 
rests on a unity of will: the wills to marry; the wills of Christ and the righteous. `Will' 
is then naturally inferred in the third case too. Pollard sums it up as `a moral unity of 
wills. '220 Secondly, Pollard, following Chadwick, 22' argues that this structure shows 
Origen envisaged two wills becoming one, and thus two Gods who become one. 222 
The Son's independence is prior, logically if not chronologically, to oneness. This is 
so, after all, with both marriage and the union of the righteous with Christ. 
It is important to note how Origen has structured this union of wills. It is not 
simply that Son and Father agree or mutually consent. Instead, the discussions about 
the Son as image and Wisdom demonstrate a definite order, for the Son emerges as 
expressing and performing the Father's will. 223 Almost ironically, Origen sees this 
primacy of the Father's will as the final reason for worshipping the Son as God: 
Celsus contends Christians exalt the man Jesus greatly by worshipping him. Origen 
218 DH 126. 
'19DH 128. 
220 Pollard 1956-7: 338. 
221 1954: 433. 
222 Pollard 1956-57: 339. 
223 OFP 1.2.6-13. See above, especially in relation to Origen's use of John 5: 19. 
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replies that the Father exalted Jesus to this. 224 Hence, McDonnell seems justified in 
talking of Origen holding a `non-ontological subordination' at least in this respect. 225 
It should be added that this `non-ontological subordination' is eternal. The 
procession in terms of will is eternal, 226 and the governing will is the Father's. 227 
Conformity to the Father's will is not, then, confined for Origen to the economy. This 
is, naturally, readily intelligible given the stress on the Father's unchanging nature: a 
change in his relationship with the Word at the Incarnation sits uncomfortably with 
immutability. 
As regards other material, a fragment of Origen's Commentary on Hebrews 
uses the term homoousios, dealing with Wisdom 7: 25. Fortman considers whether 
this means homoousios generically or whether it means that Father and Son are `of 
identically the same substance'. Fortman prefers the former, 228 but does so because of 
Origen's perceived subordinationism, which is exactly the point under investigation. 
Kelly suspects this passage for two reasons. It survives only in Rufinus' translation 
and thus could be an attempt to improve Origen's reputation. Further, in the surviving 
Greek material, the union is not consubstantial but one of will, love and action. 229 
The Rufinus point is not easily resolved: the evidence to decide the specific 
point is unavailable, and while it is prudent to be wary of accepting Rufinus, this 
should not methodologically become a procrustean bed excluding any orthodox 
224 AgC VIII. 14, perhaps from John 5: 23. 
"5 McDonnell 1994: 29. 
220 OFPI. 2.6. 
227 McDonnell 1994: 13 A. 53 describes this as a `psychological analysis of the trinity'. 
22S Fortman 1972: 56. 
229 Kelly 1977: 130. 
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reading of Origen. One might as well reject any negative evidence from Jerome and 
Justinian because they think Oxigen unorthodox. Kelly's observation about Rufinus is 
not, then, decisive. 
As for the other point, it is worth bearing in mind another major exegesis by 
Oxigen of Wisdom 7: 25f, in On First Principles. 230 Certainly, a union of will is in 
evidence, 231 and Wisdom is seen as the executor of the Father's will. It is also true 
that Wisdom is seen as eternally with the Father: he is never without his Wisdom. 232 
But Wisdom's omnipotence is the same omnipotence the Father has. 233 We have 
already explored how this functions to ensure Wisdom is no second god in the sense 
of an eternal entity independently ruling a rival kingdom. It should be noted that this 
shared omnipotence is predicated on the Father's donation of all things to the Son. 234 
Clearly Origen envisages that this sharing is extensive. It is perhaps worth enquiring 
whether this also leaves open a shared substance. Possibly, homoousios in its 
consubstantial sense is not wholly alien to this approach to Wisdom 7: 25f. In that case 
the fragment from Commentary on Hebrews develops a trajectory found in On First 
Principles. 235 This might caution against accepting too readily a subordinationist view 
of Origen, but it would, of course, be too slender and speculative to support full-orbed 
consubstantiality. This is particularly so given the exegesis of John 1: 1 when the 
Father is not seen as äpxij of the Son as the underlying material from which the Son is 
formed. 236 
230 Notably OFP 1.2.9-10. 
231 OFP I. 2.9. 
232 OFP 1.2.9 and 10. This is a consistent thought in this part of 
OFP. 
233 OFP I. 2.10. 
234 Drawn from Jn 17: 10. 
235 Stead 1977: 211 If accepts more strongly that the term shows the 
Son proceeding from the Father 
'while preserving a community or unity of substance' 
(212). However, he acknowledges the fluidity of 
the terms makes certainty difficult. 
236 CJI. 18. 
129 
Two other considerations require mention which fit badly with ontological 
subordination. Origen endorses (and encourages) worship of the Son, 237 whereas he 
does not accept the worship of angels. 238 This clearly suggests he saw the Son as fully 
divine. One does not worship a creature. 239 
Lastly, there are the implications of the mutual knowledge of Father and 
Son. 240 Given the Father's incorporeal infinity, he is, to us, incomprehensible. 241 Yet 
Origen is clear that he is not incomprehensible to the Son. This at once marks a 
difference between the Son and us. Moreover, given Origen's commitment to full 
sharing between Father and Son, 242 it is readily understood that the Father may fully 
communicate himself. Such full communication and knowledge may well point 
towards ontological equality, not subordination. 
4.6. Conclusions 
Origen strives to meet three parameters in discussing trinitarian relations: the 
distinction of the Persons; the divinity of each; and the propriety in monotheistic 
terms of worshipping the Son and Spirit as well as the Father. His reaction in Against 
Celsus shows how important he thought the last of these. Problems, though, relate 
principally to the first parameter, his account of Personal distinction. In fact his 
account has three strains, one starting from the Father, the other from the Son, and the 
third from his analogies of how two may be one. 
237 AgC VIII. 12ff. 
238 AgC V. 5. 
239 AgCIII. 15. 
240 Referred to in OFP I. 1.8. 
141 OFP 1.1.5. 
242 OFP 1.2.10. 
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In discussing the distinction of the Father, Origen proposes that the First 
Person alone is avtiöOEog, related notably to his simplicity. As such, he is divine 
without reference to the other Persons, a stand-alone God. 243 Such distinction is not 
based on correlative relations. Three consequences readily follow: first, relationality 
appears non-essential to the First Person, thereby almost rendering the Fatherhood 
epiphenomenal. 244 Secondly, this view of the First Person necessarily renders the 
divinity of the other two Persons suspect: the Son clearly is neither simple nor 
uvtiö9Eoq. This imperils the other parameters of Origen's trinitarian thought, and 
ontological subordination lurks at hand. Thirdly, the revelation of a simple Father by a 
multiple Son seems attenuated. 
However, when discussing the distinction from the point of view of the Son, 
different considerations arise. Here, above all, the Son, as Wisdom of God, is his 
image. The relation of image and original is central here to who the Son is and 
introduces a pattern of derivation in which the Son is eternal and implements the 
Father's will. Although not using Tertullian's terms, this is a similar monarchical 
conception, with one consolidated rule, in which the Son shares and executes the 
Father's power fully but at his appointment. Their operation is one, based on the 
Father's sharing all he is and has with the Son. This account of distinction is based on 
correlative relations, and relations, moreover, where the Son appears necessary in 
some way for the Father to be who he is: for God can never be without his Wisdom. 
43 See Berchman 1984: 124,151 and 153. 
244 Although Origen himself might well have been strongly disinclined to draw this inference. 
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Origen's analogies of how two may be one turn on a union of wills. The 
Father-Son union appears similar to those of marriage, of the soul in Christ, and of the 
believer with Christ. The christological union thus conceived is unstable, with 
tendencies either towards the confusion of the natures or towards their fundamental 
independence. Similar doubts could also arise over the stability of the union of wills 
between the Persons. Unclarities in Origen's doctrine of revelation exacerbate this 
problem. 
The difficulty, therefore, in evaluating Origen's theology of trinitarian 
relations is that there are several accounts of personal distinction. Nor are they easily 
reconciled, for one turns on independence, the other on correlative relations, and the 
third on an unstable union. None, perhaps, is entirely free from difficulty, but the 
account turning on independence intriguingly arises less from Origen's concern to 
defend the Son and his independence, but more from Origen's concern for the Father 
and his. 
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CHAPTER 5 ATHANASIUS: THE SOLUTION OF DIVINE 
SONSHIP 
It is proposed that: 
5(a). Athanasius defends a monotheism, which: 
(i) stresses the distinction between the uncreated creator (who 
is simple and unchangeable) and created; and 
(ii) endorses God's cosmic monarchy. 
5(b). To support this, he uses Sonship, because it provides: 
(i) Personal distinction (preserving the data of the Incarnation 
while avoiding Sabellianism); 
(ii) essential similarity (necessary for the Son to reveal the 
Father properly and perform the works he does); 
(iii) ethical relations which preserve the monarchy, for a true 
son is under his father's authority, not his rival; and 
(iv) an explanation of how something can be distinct from the 
First Person without being a creature. 
5(c). Derivation is important in this account since Athanasius traces the Son's 
sovereignty back to the Father's gift, and the Son's nature is derived in that he 
is `of' the Father and from no other nature: the Son is not an externality, 
which would imply polytheism. 
5(d). Father and Son manifest inseparability as well as distinction of Persons 
and a joint operation in which the Father's will 
has primacy. 
13 3 
5(e). Athanasius is methodologically consistent in using Scripture and the data 
of the Incarnation to discuss the eternal relations. 
S(f). Athanasius' proposal is a justifiable synthesis of material in John's 
Gospel dealing with Sonship. 
5(g). The Son's identity as fully divine is necessary for Athanasius, if there is 




For there is but one form of Godhead, which is also in the Word; and one God, 
the Father, existing by Himself according as He is above all, and appearing in 
the Son according as He pervades all things, and in the Spirit according as in 
Him He acts in all things through the Word. For thus we confess God to be one 
through the Triad, and we say that it is much more religious than the godhead of 
the heretics with its many kinds, and many parts, to entertain a belief of the One 
Godhead in a Triad. 
I 
Athanasius here portrays himself and his version of trinitarian theology as 
fully supporting biblical monotheism, with the corollary that his opponents do not. 2 
That is indeed G. Prestige's view - under Athanasius `Christian monotheism was 
saved from extinction'. 3 Those who charge trinitarian theology, so influenced by 
Athanasius, with inherent polytheism, might find this ironic. 4 It is intriguing to see 
Athanasius as defending monotheism, although the irony is perhaps less surprising 
given the immensely varied reactions he continues to provoke as a person. Sometimes 
seen as the victim par excellence of oppressive state action, to others he is himself the 
oppressor victimising his opponents. 5 
1 Contra Arianos (hereafter CAr) 111.15. Translations are from NPNF 2nd series vol. 4 unless otherwise 
stated. Kannengiesser 1993 suggests CAr III is pseudo-Athanasian, but the thoughts 
here can be 
paralleled from elsewhere, e. g. De Synodis 50-52, and Kannengiesser's suggestion 
has not yet been 
widely accepted. 
2 Primarily, of course, here the Arians, but also Marcionites and others: see earlier 
in the section. 
Prestige 1980: 76. 
4 Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphians, for example. 
5 K. Anatolios 1996: 265 notes of recent historiography that current chic sees Athanasius as violent and 
heavy-handed, although suppressing evidence of this. See T. D. Barnes 1993: 2 This study starts from 
the presumption [emphasis added] that Athanasius consistently misrepresented central 
facts about his 
ecclesiastical career. ' and Hanson 1983: 43f to the effect that 
Athanasius was unscrupulous, violent and 
justly disliked. 
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However, it is unnecessary to adjudicate here on Athanasius' moral probity. 6 
What falls for consideration is whether his trinitarian theology successfully preserves 
biblical monotheism. ' This will be done first by examining some central features of 
Athanasius' theology and method, briefly reviewing his doctrine of God, and finally 
describing and analysing his ideas regarding divine sonship in terms of scriptural 
derivation, contours, and scriptural faithfulness. 
5.2. Some Central Features of Athanasius' Theology and Method 
5.2.1. The Significance of Athanasius' non Arian writings 
The Arian controversy, in its various forms, 8 occasions an enormous 
proportion of Athanasius' writings. 9 This can cause some difficulty in establishing his 
theology more globally outside that question. It is therefore alluring to examine those 
extended writings not explicitly tied to the Arian controversy but presenting a 
sustained theological picture, namely Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione. 10 
The introduction to Contra Gentes is generalising: 11 although addressed 
ostensibly to an individual, Macarius, the discussion relates to the overall content of 
Christian belief Athanasius claims to be writing about what he himself was taught '... 
the faith, namely, of Christ the Saviour ', 12 to confirm Macarius in that belief 
13 The 
6 Indeed the methodology of T. D. Barnes 1993 makes it singularly difficult to do so, since protestations 
of innocence in Athanasius' works tend for methodological reasons to be re-construed as suppression 
of guilt, and, therefore, tacit admissions. 
7 Thus CAr 111.8 envisages the vindication of monotheism as a blessing for humanity. The rationale for 
this is connected to Athanasius' conception of the relation between the 
knowledge of God and salvation 
(see below). 
8 The point is well-made that Arius and, for example, Eunomius were not entirely of one mind. 
9 As G. Florovsky 1964: 53 notes. 
10 The case has been canvassed for a date in the 3330s 
for Contra Gentes -De Incarnatione (hereafter 
CG-DI) see e. g. M. Slusser 1986: 114-17. Contrast E. Meijering 
1974a: 109 who prefers an earlier date 
between 318-323. The text and translation of CG-DI used here is R. Thompson 1971. 
IICG1. 
12 CG 1. 
13 CGI. 
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introduction to De Incarnatione indicates it continues this project. 14 Therefore Contra 
Gentes and De Incarnatione may help delineate the broader theological context of 
Athanasius' anti-Arian polemic, especially since theological coherence exists between 
these general works and the explicitly anti-Arian writings. ' 5 The precise date of 
composition does not significantly alter the value of these works for this purpose. 
5.2.2. Broad Theological Features 
Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione aim to remind Macanus why the cross is 
no discreditable defeat for Christ but in reality a victory achieving salvation for 
human beings. 16 This draws Athanasius into discussing three related topics: creation, 
salvation and the knowledge of God, all developed in both works. 
Creation is central to both treatises. Athanasius is, of course, committed to 
creatio ex nihilo. '7 This sharply distinguishes creator from created, a fundamental 
consideration in these two treatises and the Arian writings, to the point that J. 
Roldanus comments that this idea '... governs all his thinking. ' 18 The Creator is 
uncreated, ' 9 and `incorporeal and incorruptible and immortal, lacking nothing 
whatever'. 20 By contrast, created things are changeable, 21 not self-sufficient, 22 and 
evil is not inherent to the cosmos, either as existing independently of God or as being 
14DI1. 
15 Slusser 1986: 116. Florovsky 1964: 53 notes that in general `there was a perfect consistency and 
coherence in his theological views. ' 
16 CG 1. 
17 DI 3& Eý ovK övtiwv Kai µr180Cµf µ018%t 6q UIt&PXOV'ca T& ÖXa Ei; to £ivat it£I[ourjK£Val 
Töv O£öv Siä toi A6you... 
18 Roldanus 1968: 349 `... domine toute sa reflexion. ' P. Christou 1973: 399 too draws attention to the 
fundamental role the distinction plays. See also J. Holland 1971: 72. M. Haykin 1982: 520-24 notes the 
importance of the `created' question in Athanasius' discussion of the divinity of the Spirit in the 
Serapion correspondence. 
19 CG 35. The term is äyevrtioS. 




created as evil by God. 
23 It is a corruption initiated by humans. 24 Florovsky captures 
Athanasius' distinction between creator and creature well: 
There was, in the vision of St. Athanasius, an ultimate and radical 
cleavage or hiatus between the absolute Being of God and the 
contingent existence of the World. There were actually two modes of 
existence, radically different and totally dissimilar. 25 
Creation thus establishes a relationship with very significant features. The 
Creator is benevolent towards his creation: his creative act came not from need, for he 
lacks nothing, but out of goodness, for he envies no-one existence. 26 As creator he 
rules his creation. 27 Since he creates all, 28 this rule is all-encompassing. 29 Crucially, 
therefore, there is one Lord of heaven and earth. 30 Concerning the cosmos, there is 
monarchy. 
Athanasius' doctrine of creation thus has an optimistic aspect: since evil is not 
inherent to his creation but, being created, is subject to him, there is every reason to 
think the ruling Creator can overcome evil. 
For the creature, there is profound dependence. The cosmos, being contingent, 
depends on God's will. 31 This is momentous in Athanasian thinking: contingency and 
dependence on will denote creatureliness, and exclude uncreatedness. This 
dependence is especially marked for human creatures, and Athanasius views sin 
in 
22 CG 27. 
23CG2and6. 
'4CG2. 
25 Florovsky 1964: 45. 
26 DI 3. A. Petterson 1998: 59 notes echoes of Plato's Timaeus. Compare 
Anatolios 1998: 41. 
`7 See the association between creation and rule 
in e. g. CG 27 and 41. Discussed below. 
28CG39. 
29 CG 6. 
30CG6. 
31 Cf. Florovsky 1964: 37. 
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the context of this creational, dependent, relationship. Sin certainly is disobedience, 32 
but is also an `unmaking' of creation. 33 Hence, salvation must be a re-making of 
creation. 
Moving to the topic of salvation, sin leaves humanity liable to death. 34 It is, 
though, important to stress this results from how God has actually created: in creating 
he stipulated a law, so death prevails by a law of creation. Creation, then, determines 
the need for redemption in that it would be improper for God's creative action to 
come to nothing. 35 Yet it also determines the contours of redemption: God cannot 
simply annul the word of creation which stipulates death for disobedience. If he did 
so, he would have lied: `For God would not have been truthful, if after he had said we 
would die, man had not died. '36 Nor does simple human repentance suffice, for 
similar reasons. 37 The enormous importance Athanasius attaches to God's 
truthfulness should be noted (a strong point of contact with Tertullian). For 
truthfulness determines the course salvation must follow, and truthfulness here is 
intimately related to the unchangingness of God's word. 
God thus must ensure both that creation is fulfilled (which means death must 
be conquered for humanity) and that the debt of death incurred by disobedience must 
be discharged. Only the creator can re-create, and, reasons Athanasius, since humans 
owe the debt, the creator can only discharge the debt as a human. Hence, says 
32 DI 3 talks of God giving a vöµoq which people might ztapaßaiv$ty. 
3; D14-7. 
;4 DI 6. 
35DI6. 




Athanasius, the incarnation of the Creator Son. 38 The Creator Son pays the debt of 
death in place of others: 
For since the Word is above all, consequently by offering his temple 
and the instrument of his body as a substitute for all men, he fulfilled 
the debt by his death. 39 
However, the Incarnation is not solely to pay the debt of death. It also renews 
the knowledge of the Creator in a created humanity rendered ignorant of its creator by 
idolatry. 40 
Athanasius' division between creator and created provides a very distinctive 
understanding of idolatry. Idolatry inverts reality so that men `... [consider] non- 
existent things as real', 41 and severs us from our source of life and blessing. 42 
Knowledge of God is not merely academic. Bereft of the knowledge of God, human 
beings resemble irrational beasts. 43 To know God truly is to be a truly human 
creature. 
Athanasius envisages God as providing four ways for humanity to know 
him. 44 The divine image in humans, in which they are made; 45 the works of creation 
in its harmony; the law and the prophets; 46 and lastly the incarnate Son. 
47 Idolatry 
38DI8. 
39 DI 9. bn¬p näviaS y&p 6)v 6 Aoyo; tiov Oeoü cixöTCc T6v i auiob vaöv icai c6 ßc)µaitxöv 
11 öpyavov icpoaäyuOv ävtii IJUXOV vn£p Itävtic, Wv enXijpou i6 
6(pEiXö 1Evov arv Tw Oavät(). 
`! 0 DI 11 if. 
" CG 2 r& oüx 6v'ca wS 6vta XoyiýöpEvot. 
42 CG 2. Cf Anatolios 1996: 276f; Meijering 1974a: 49 and R. Voyles 1989: 138. 
nDI11. 
44 Pettersen 1995: 39. Voyles 1989: 136. 
45 DI 11 There is some ambiguity as to whether humans are 
in the likeness strictly of the Son or of the 
Father. DI 12 opens with the comment that being in the 
image means we can know God the Word and 
through him the Father. 
46 DI 12. 
47DI13ff. 
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confines human sight to creation, corrupting these first three means of revelation, 48 
and necessitating revelation by the Incarnation. Idolatry weds us to worshipping 
created things, 49 but these cannot give life and blessing, for created things are 
dependent, not self-sufficient. Idolatry thus condemns us to corruption. 
Therefore, for humans to fulfil their original created purpose, knowledge of 
God must be renewed. To this end, the Son takes flesh and `enters' creation, the arena 
to which idolatry has confined human sight. Revelation in the Incarnation is an act of 
mercy. 50 Athanasius' thinking requires divinity be fully revealed through the Son. 
This further requires the Son's full divinity. Lyman comments that Athanasius saw 
this full divinity `... as essential to the security of the divine revelation. 51 Without 
Christ's divinity, ignorance of God must persist and humanity must be deprived of 
blessing. Hence the importance of refuting the Arians and retaining the homoousion. 52 
These three concepts of creation, salvation and the knowledge of God are 
therefore closely inter-connected. Creation determines the need for, and form of, 
salvation history, notably in the sacrificial and revelatory aspects of the Incarnation. 
Salvation from corruption involves re-creation. Humans are created to know God, and 
so their salvation is impossible without a renewed knowledge of God. Athanasius 
requires therefore a fully divine incarnate saviour. Yet this saviour cannot breach the 
single rule of the cosmos flowing from Athanasius' doctrine of creation. 
53 These three 
concepts therefore present parameters for trinitarian theology. 
48 DI 12-14. 
49 CG 8. 
50D115. 
51 Lyman 1993: 129. 
'' See Walker 1974: 270; Heron 1981: 69; Torrance 1981: xi. 
53 CG 6 and 39-40. 
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Further, strong theological continuity exists between creation and salvation. 
Just as God created from goodness, 54 so too this goodness underpins God's 
redemptive activity. 55 
5.2.3. Method in Athanasius: The Place of Scripture 
Given Athanasius' stress on God's truthfulness, he views Scripture, as God's 
words, as the criterion for resolving theological disputes. 56 However, some aspects of 
his method require consideration. There must be purity of heart in reading the 
Scriptures. 57 There must, too, be due attention to the `Scope' of Scripture. 58 
`Scope' deals with God's economy in creation and redemption, 59 and is thus 
connected with the Word's Incarnation. 60 `Scope' involves us in understanding the 
Word's double mode of existence . 
61 Hence, for example, the terms of Acts 2: 36 
(`... God has made him both Lord and Christ... ') do not support Arianism, because 
his humanity, not his pre-incarnate nature, is in view. 62 References to Christ's 
humanity (for example his suffering) therefore do not detract necessarily from his 
divinity, for such human references must be taken within the overall `Scope'. 
54 DI 3. See too Petterson 1998: 62. 
ss CG 41. Note also In Illud Omnia 2. Cf Anatolios 1996: 275 - God's perfection is expressed `in 
beneficence'. 
56 For further consideration of Athanasius' basic view of Scripture, see Appendix 3. 
57 DI 57. Widdicombe 1994: 155-58. J. Brogan 1998: 19. 
58 Many scholars rightly stress this e. g. Brogan 1998: 19, J. Ernest 1993: 342, Lyman 1993: 130, and H. 
Sieben 1974: 206. 
59 Lyman 1993: 130 rightly draws attention to C-Ir 1.55 in this respect. 
60 Ernest 1993: 347. 
61 Sieben 1974: 211. Obviously Athanasius was not alone in this strategy. Augustine has something 
similar in his forma set-vi/forma dei rules, see chapter 7.5 
below. 
`'2 C. Ar I1.16. 
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In this way `Scope' provides an overall context for reading Scripture. The 
Athanasian emphases on time referred to, person referred to and purpose, 63 could 
initially resemble modern strictures emphasising a passage's literary and historical 
context. It might, perhaps, produce some similar results and approaches, 64 but for 
Athanasius, context is wider and subtly different: it is ultimately theological or 
65 christological, and involves the entire canon. Athanasius' ready movement from a 
passage's immediate context, not merely to that of the book, but to that provided by 
the canon demonstrates this. Thus, the time with which a comment deals must be seen 
with regard to the Incarnation; the person referred to must be understood in the light 
of the eternal Son's Incarnation in a temporal, mutable world; and the purpose of a 
text must be read in the light of the purpose of our salvation. 66 The triad of time, 
person and purpose are not simply ways of finding the `literal sense'. 67 
This emphasis on `Scope' supports Athanasius' view of scriptural unity, 68 
which is itself clearly christological. Athanasius' other theological values tend to 
demand this unity of scripture. God's truthfulness requires that his word be fulfilled 
and not changed, 69 and also that the Scriptures cannot be inconsistent. 70 Moreover, 
God's sovereignty over his creation also suggests the need for only one economy of 
salvation. 
A modern exegete might fear that the canonical context of Athanasius' 
`Scope' might distort proper interpretation. Thus Athanasius addresses Christ's 
63 CAr 1.54. 
64 Note the way CAr 1.55 proceeds by analysing the surrounding context of Hebrews 1: 4. 
65 Ernest 1993: 342 prefers `christological' or `soteriological' in this kind of context. 
66 Ernest 1993: 350. 
67 Sieben 1974: 203. 
68 Brogan 1998: 19 and Ernest 1993: 342. 
143 
ignorance, and by using `Scope' and the idea that one must distinguish which of the 
Son's modes of existence is in view, readily explains that Christ is ignorant in terms 
of his humanity. 71 This can prompt dissatisfaction, for Athanasius does not fully 
explain how the one Son could be ignorant (in his humanity) and knowing (in his 
deity) simultaneously. 
Yet even this criticism requires caution. The difficulties over Christ's 
ignorance do not necessarily indicate that Athanasius is wrong about `Scope', rather 
that further explanation is needed about how the Word's double mode of existence 
leaves both modes entire. 72 Moreover, given his concern for Scripture in its entirety 
and integrity, Athanasius is compelled to face such texts which are employed in the 
Arian arsenal, and this may perhaps somewhat ameliorate tendencies to selectivity. 
More generally, it might be argued that the quest for a `pure' exegetical 
method is chimerical. In fact, if a `canon' indeed exists, inspired by one mind, then 
refusal to consider `Scope' or something analogous would itself be misleading, 
distorting and separating Scripture's data where its author intended unity. 
Nevertheless, given the importance of Scripture for Athanasius and his very 
distinctive method, his handling of it merits careful review. Granting the propriety of 
an exegetical method incorporating some `Scope', has Athanasius reached the right 
`Scope'? 
69 See DI 6 and 7 on Genesis 2: 17. 
70 See too Tacelli 1990: 101. 
71 CAr 111.43 dealing with Mk. 13: 32. 
72 Sieben's characterisation of the christological scope of Athanasius' exegesis: 
Sieben 1974: 211. 
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Two further matters require comment. First, tradition. Athanasius wants to 
show that the Nicene formulations accord with what previous generations thought, 
and hence must demonstrate the Nicenes used homoousios differently from the 
condemned Paul of Samosata. 73 Hence, too, his criticism of Arians for departing from 
what the Church set out at Nicaea and Ariminum: 
Whose heirs or successors then are they? How can they call men fathers, whose 
confession, well and apostolically drawn up, they will not accept? 74 
`Scope' does not, then, justify a purely individualistic reading of Scripture. 
Rather, for Athanasius, exegesis is `steadied by tradition. '75 
Second, Athanasius does not think the terms of revelation always retain the 
same meaning. Scripture has at least two senses for `son', and it must be determined 
which is more appropriate in a given case. 76 In particular, a word may not be univocal 
in divine and human contexts. Thus, `son' in a human context necessarily implies 
Coal --wºý begetting, but this is not so for God: `... [he] begets also not as men beget, but 
begets as God. ' 77 A critical question is how this avoids becoming uncontrolled so that 
`son' in the two contexts has nothing common. In practice, Athanasius constantly 
reads `son' terminology in the light of other biblical material. 
78 His conception of 
Scripture, therefore, as a consistent body of data mitigates the risk that `son' lacks all 
specificity. We move now to consider what doctrine of God Athanasius finally 
constructs. 
73 De Svnodis 43. Although Stead 1974: 238 doubts the term itself was condemned in 268 A. D. 
74 Ad Afros 7. 
75 Lyman 1993: 129. 
76 E. g. De Decretis 6ff. 
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5.3. Athanasius' Conception of God. 
5.3.1. The Example of Contra Arianos 1.17 
Meijering comments on the importance of Contra Arianos I. 17 for 
understanding Athanasius' conception of God. 79 There, Athanasius discusses what the 
Arian slogans `Once he was not' and `He was not before his generation' imply. On 
their view, argues Athanasius, 
... 
if the Word is not with the Father from everlasting, the triad is not everlasting; 
but a monad was first and afterwards by addition it became a triad. '80 
Athanasius develops this in various ways. 81 First, such a view involves our 
knowledge of God changing, in that the `him' we know changes. Set against a platonic 
epistemology this is serious indeed: if the supreme object of knowledge were 
changeable, this would render knowledge of him problematic. 82 In terms of personal 
relationship, too, this is troublesome, for the person one knows appears fundamentally 
changeable, and so raises the question of how that person is to be truly known. 
Athanasius then observes that once accessions to God are admitted, God may, 
theoretically, `grow' without limit, and may decrease. This exacerbates the precarious 
nature of our knowledge of God. Since Athanasius attaches such importance to the 
knowledge of God as a source of life and blessing, 83 it is no minor problem to have 
this knowledge rendered uncertain. 
" CAr 1.23. 
78 Thus he sees sonship as illuminated by other titles De Decretis 15-17. 
79 Meijering 1974a: 66. 
80 CAr I. 17. 
81 C4rI. 17-19. 
82 The ontological status of the object of a state of mind 
dictates the epistemological state that can be 
held with respect to it. Thus `Socrates' comments in 
Republic 508d `... when [the mind's eye] is fixed 
on the twilight world of change [ lit. that which 
becomes] and decay, it can only form opinions, its 
vision is confused and its opinions shifting, and 
it seems to lack intelligence [voüS]. ' 
83CG2. 
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Secondly, the change in question implies a previous lack in God: 84 
... 
[O]nce there was not a Triad, but a monad, and a Triad once with deficiency. 
and then complete; deficient before the Son was originated, complete when he had come to be. 
Athanasius here works through what an arianising trinity apparently implies: its pre- 
trinitarian form is a deficient form of trinitarian existence. The implicit argument, 
naturally, is that, since God is an eternally perfect being, it is wrong to see him as a 
deficient Trinity. 
Thirdly, a Triad comprising the ungenerate monad and the generated Son is 
truly mixed, composed of things that are of `strange and alien natures and essences. ' 85 
Athanasius deduces that this entails the creature sharing glory with its creator, an 
idolatry. 86 That would contradict his basic theological convictions that creature and 
creator are distinct, 87 and that worship belongs to the creator alone. Further, this 
`compound' trinity violates divine simplicity. 
Fourthly, Athanasius argues that, if originated, then the Trinity is reduced to 
being `creature'. For the Trinity is from nothing if the Son is from nothing, since 
without the Son there is no Trinity. 
88 This, of course, again conflicts with the prime 
theological value of sharply distinguishing between creator and created. Notably, one 
consequence he draws from eliminating this distinction is that it removes the further 
distinction between the sovereign, God, and his subjects, his creatures. 
89 
84 C41_ I. 17. Note the echo of the `once he was not' slogan of the Arians. 
vrl [sc. ij Tpt&S]. 85 C-1r I. 17.... ýirvatq xai äa, a, oipiaic cpüaEai iE Kai TaiS o1)ßia1S ßuvißTaµE 
86CG8. 
87 Of course others, including Arians, shared this value. 
88 C4r I. 18. 
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5.3.2. Observations on Contra Arianos 1.17f 
The discussion of Contra Arianos I. 17-19 reflects several concerns: 
immutability, perfection, the creator-created distinction and the knowledge of God. 
Significantly, these concerns cluster around a notable biblical monotheistic idea, 
God's incomparability with created things. 90 Thus the Trinity's eternity and 
unchangeability are related to the concerns of the biblical monotheism described in 
chapter 2. Hence Athanasius summarises his case against an originated Trinity: 
... 
it belongs to Greeks, to introduce an originated Triad, and to level it with 
things originate; for these do admit of deficiencies and additions; but the faith of 
Christians acknowledges the blessed Triad as unalterable and perfect and ever 
what It was, neither adding to it what is more, not imputing to It any loss (for 
both ideas are irreligious), and therefore it dissociates It from all things 




Therefore, the Son's eternity is defended because one must not dishonour the Father, 
but must uphold certain concepts associated with a particular monotheism. To these 
concepts we now turn. 
5.3.3. Unchangeableness 
Athanasius keeps returning to God's unchangeableness. 92 In the context cited 
above, Athanasius argues for an uncreated Son because only thus can the Father's 
unchangeableness be preserved. However, unchangeableness bears on other questions 
too. 
89 CAr 1.18. ow cu uY9E [sc. The Arians] ... toy 
ßc n? a Kuptov Eaßaco9 Toi; ünrlxoot; 
ßuviättovTES. 
90 See the earlier discussion of Jeremiah 10 and Isaiah 40-55 which deal with God's uniqueness, and 
the conclusions of Mauser 1991: 262 that God is not rivalled, and Bauckham 1998: 10 that God is sole 
ruler and sole creator. 
9' C4r I. 18. 
92 Thus of the Father, he writes (CAr 1.35) ö µ'Ev yäp llaiilp äipEnTOS xai äva? AoS oto;, xai 
th avicoS Exci, uai ö c(i)to; EaTty. Also Expositio fidel 3; Ad Episcopos Aegytpi 17; C4r I. 10,52; 
11.10; Ad Afros 7. For the Son's unchangeability see e. g. CAr 1.35 and 36. 
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First, there is revelation. Human beings need to know this unchangeable God 
but sin's effects mean both that this unchangeable God must be revealed to them, 93 
and that this must happen within the confines of creation, within, that is, the realm of 
change. 94 Meijering rightly draws attention to the oddity of an unchanging God 
revealing himself and acting in a world of change. 95 Yet this conception of God also 
strongly connects God immanently and economically. The economy is the economy 
of an unchanging God and thus reflects him as he is immanently. Meijering 
comments: 
96 
If God reveals Himself in the Son, then God must be in essence the eternal 
Father of the eternal Son, otherwise men could not trust God's revelation, since 
God could then cease doing what He does. 
For this reason, amongst others, Athanasius cannot be content with a kenotic 
Christology that envisaged the Son relinquishing some aspect of deity. That would 
involve the unchangeable changing. 97 Rather he upholds a deity incarnate. 98 Nor 
could one argue that only the Son changes while the Father remains unchanged, since 
Athanasius sees the Father's fatherhood as co-relatively related to the Son's 
sonship. 99 If the contours of the sonship change, so, too, does the fatherhood, and the 
First Person's fatherhood is, to Athanasius, the primary way in which he is. '°° This is 
important: the economic Father-Son relation cannot have changed from the immanent 
one. Hence the sonship the Son enjoys in the Incarnation does not differ from, but 
reveals, the immanent sonship. 
93 DI 11,12. 
94 DI 13. 
95 Meijering 1974a: 102 and 1974b: 168. 
96 Meijering 1974a: 124. 
97 Athanasius regards the Son too as unchangeable. 
98 CAr 1.42. 
99 As in the CAr I. 17-19 passage. 
100 E. g C4r 1.34. Lyman 1993: 134 and Widdicombe 
1994: 159ff comment on this. 
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Secondly, unchangeableness bears on God's truthfulness. Stead strikingly 
observes that Plato associates the gods' unchangeableness to truthfulness. 101 They do 
not, argues `Socrates', appear deceptively to humanity and their words are 
trustworthy. Athanasius, equally, insists that God's word is unchanging: he does not 
withdraw his words. 102 This is of no little pastoral and soteriological significance. For 
Athanasius, humans need idolatry and demonolatry to be conquered, 103 but only the 
Son's work and reliance on it achieves this. Precisely because Athanasius conceives 
salvation is wrought by God in his mercy, it is imperative that God be trustworthy in 
his unchanging promises. 
It is, then, unsatisfactory to see Athanasius's emphasis on divine 
unchangeableness as merely `hellenising'. He links unchangeableness to God's 
faithfulness and the biblical depiction of God's character as covenant-making and 
covenant-keeping. He comments: 
Now the so called gods of the Greeks, unworthy the name, are faithful neither in 
their essence nor in their promises; for the same are not everywhere, nay, the 
local deities come to nought in course of time, and undergo a natural dissolution; 
wherefore the Word cries out against them, that `faith is not strong in them, ' but 
they are `waters that fail, ' and `there is no faith in them. ' But the God of all, 
being one really and indeed and true, is faithful, who is ever the same, and says, 
`See now, that I, even I am He, ' and I `change not' and therefore His Son is 
`faithful, ' being ever the same and unchanging, deceiving neither in His essence 
nor in His promise.. 104 
Athanasius holds that an unchangeable God is required by the biblical concept 
of faithfulness, not by `Greek' thought. 
101 Stead 2000.11: 14, citing Republic 380-38 1. Perhaps still more striking is the statement of 382e `God 
is therefore without deceit or falsehood in action or word, he does not change himself nor deceive 
others... ' 
1°2D16and7. 
103 The two are linked. E. g. CG 1. Christ's work on the Cross is a victory in both respects. 
104CArII. 10. 
150 
5.3.4. The Simplicity of God 
Pettersen states: `The simplicity of God is... for Athanasius, the basis of his 
understanding of God and the security of our holy salvation. '105 This judgement is 
well-taken for the following reasons. Certainly, Athanasius frequently maintains that 
God is not compound. 106 Simplicity here is apparently related for Athanasius to 
several doctrinal loci. First, there is the distinction between creator and created. If 
God is compound or composite, then the question arises of how the composition was 
accomplished and by whom. Hence Athanasius observes that God is not composed 
from different parts but is himself the creator composing the different parts of the 
cosmos. 107 Here being `composed' is set against being creator, implying that being 
composed means being created. ' 08 The rejection of composition in God then pertains 
to God as creator, not created. 
Secondly, composition conflicts with God's sovereignty. Athanasius reasons 
`that nothing masters [God]' 109 since he is fundamental and independent. 
110 However, 
a composite God, the argument runs, could be reduced into more fundamental 
constituents. il Composition is thus associated with being created and to be created is 
necessarily to depend on another's Will. 112 Yet to be dependent on another's will is to 
have a master. 
105 pettersen l 995: 189. 
106 CG 28; Ad Episc. Aeg 16; Ad Afros 8. Stead, for instance, 2000 XXI: 262 observes that `simple' 
bears various meanings. 
'o7 CG 28. 
108 For in Athanasian thought there are only two categories, creator and created. Pettersen 1995: 143. 
109 CG 29.... xai µr18'v a''rov xpaticiv. Strictly, Athanasius introduces this as a 
hypothesis, but the 
argument requires it be uncontentious. 
"0 CG 28. 
111 CG 28. 
112 Since to be created is to be created from nothing in Athanasian thought 
DI 3. The non-existent 
cannot will itself into being. 
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Thirdly, a composite God rests uncomfortably with God's unchangeability. 
Athanasius develops his rejection of composition on the grounds it conflicts with 
God's unchangeableness. 13 Indeed, simplicity in this sense is closely connected for 
Athanasius with God's trustworthiness. He associates the unreliability of people's 
words with humanity's composite status. 
' 14 
However, Athanasius is discussing one type of composition. This type of 
composition is from initially or logically discrete and separate units, so that 
analytically separation is possible, by division back into more fundamental units. 
Athanasius has not necessarily excluded differentiations where separation is not 
possible. On this basis Athanasius' insistence that the differentiation yet 
inseparability of Father and Son does not violate simplicity is intelligible. 
For Athanasius there certainly are differentiations within the godhead. He 
rejects Sabellianism and does not see the homoousion as rendering the Father and Son 
mere clones. 115 However these differentiations do not constitute separability. The 
Father and Son are indivisible. "6 Athanasius returns persistently to the metaphor of 
light and radiance. ' 17 Contra Arianos I. 12 is indicative: `when did man see light 
without the brightness of its radiance? ' Since without radiance, there is no light, there 
is no composition by a joining of two independent parts. Without the Son, there is no 
Father, and vice versa. This clarifies that the images of indivisible simplicity bear 
1 13 Ad Afros 8 citing James 1: 17. 
114 Ad Episc. Aeg. 16. 
1 15 The Son has all the Father's attributes except Father. But, the Father-Son relation is not 
symmetrically reversible (see below). Ad Episc. Aeg 16, De 
Synodis 45 and De Decretis 21. So too 
Stead 1974: 249. 
116 E. g. De Sent. Dion. 8, Ad Episc. Aeg. 13, CAr 1.12, II. 32, 
I1I. 5. 
117 The scriptural justification is above all Hebrews 1: 
3. There are other motifs, detailed by Stead 
1974: 247f. Beside divine fatherhood, the most prominent ones are: spring/river, word/thought and 
vine/branch. 
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again on unchangeableness. "g Since the image of light/radiance is of indivisibility, if 
one is unchanging, the other must be too: if one is not, neither is the other. 
In short, Athanasius' conception of simplicity involves the notions of no 
composition and no divisibility, but leaves room for differentiation which is 
adiairetos. This illuminates Pettersen's contention that Athanasius' conception of 
divine simplicity precludes a purely `social' model of Trinitarian relations, ' 19 at least 
where those relations are based simply on `will' rather than `nature'. For as such, they 
render the Trinity contingent and thus both changeable and in principle separable into 
independent constituents. 120 This risks vesting sovereignty ultimately in these 
constituents, with considerable consequences for the divine monarchy, to which 
attention now turns. 
5.3.5. The Divine Monarchy and Monotheism 
In much of the foregoing, especially in his use of the creator-created 
distinction and conceptions of divine unchangeableness and simplicity, Athanasius 
has reflected concerns of biblical monotheism. Does Athanasius conceive of God's 
monarchy in similarly traditional terms? 
Athanasius normally only employs povapxia terminology in his accepted 
writings when quoting others. 121 On these occasions, though, he seems to endorse the 
118 As Meijering 1974b: 161-2 astutely observes. 
119 Pettersen 1995: 189. 
12° See e. g. CAr III. 10 and 65, Ad Afros 7 and 8 and De Si nodis 48. See below on the discussion 
between being a son by will and by nature. 
121 Notably De Sententia Dion. The monarchy was a concern for Sabellians as well as orthodox, and, 
suggests R. Arnou 1938: 271, was part of the Arian concern too. The term is present in CAr IV. 1 but 
this is commonly considered inauthentic: see Hanson 1988a. 
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views expressed, and anyway the question is whether Athanasius employs the idea, 
not simply the term. 
The idea of monarchy certainly is found. In Contra Gentes 6 Athanasius faces 
the proposition that evil is a distinct entity, a view he associates with some `Greeks' 
and some heretics, unnamed but probably Marcionites. 122 For Athanasius this would 
mean either God creates evil or he is not Lord of all creation. He regards both 
alternatives as preposterous. His rejection of the latter alternative suggests that he 
thinks God is indeed lord of creation. 
His detailed discussion supports this. He links together Jesus' 
acknowledgement of Deuteronomy 6: 4 `The Lord God is one' 123 with his confession 
of `I acknowledge you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth. ' 124 Lordship vocabulary is 
prominent here, and the great affirmation of monotheism of Deuteronomy 6: 4 is 
strikingly joined to an affirmation of universal lordship, 125 thereby glossing 
monotheism with monarchical concepts. Athanasius reasons that this precludes the 
existence of `another god besides him. ' 
Yet what counts as `another god'? Answering this crucial question will 
significantly clarify whether Athanasius' Trinitarian theology is consistently 
monotheistic. Several comments are necessary. First, Athanasius echoes the first 
commandment of Exodus 20: 3, that Israel should have no other gods. 
126 His 
122 So Thomson 1971: 15 fn. 2. 
123 Mark 12: 29. 
124 Mt. 11: 25. 
125 Taking the pairing of heaven and earth as a pair denoting totality. 
126 Compare Deut. 5: 7. In neither case, though, does the LXX use napä. Rather Ex 20: 3 reads `... AEo\ 
ETEpot it? v£ tov and Deut 5: 7 0Eoi 
ETEpoi npö npoachztou µou. 
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description of the heretics' alternative or second god shows just this is at stake: it is 
äXXo;... 8E na pä ioüiov (another god besides God). Clearly dangers exist in 
theologising by prepositions, but the phrase `besides God' readily suggests another 
independent entity, the physical reference of `beside' carrying connotations of 
discrete and separable objects. 127 The terms of Romans 1: 25 are illuminating: `they 
worshiped the creature in place of the creator', suggesting `they worshiped the 
creature in a place alongside and hence usurping the place of the creator. ' 128 
Secondly, Athanasius reasons that if this other god besides God existed, that 
would falsify God's claim to be Lord of heaven and earth. He later suggests that there 
cannot be two gods because this means neither was sovereign - each could exist 
despite the other. In effect Athanasius employs two propositions: 
1. Being God means being Lord of all; 
2. God is not Lord of all if there is another `besides him': such a 
being would rival and affect his complete lordship. 
Hence if God is not Lord of all, because there is another God `besides him', then he is 
not God (nor is the other entity: they `annihilate' each other, Athanasius reasons). The 
alternative to monarchy for Athanasius appears to be anarchy, 
129 and, in effect, the 
alternative to monotheism appears to be `atheism' (on Athanasius' definitions). 
Much thus depends on Athanasius' conception of `monarchy'. His reasons for 
asserting divine monarchy are further developed in Contra Gentes. Athanasius 
127 Although care needs to be taken not to bound by an etymological 
fallacy. 
" Comment and translation are Porter's 1995: 166. The 
Greek is... EXäTpEu av ip KT't E1 nap' cc 
Kt cNavia. 
129 Compare Gregory of Nazianzen Third Theological Oration on the 
Son I and 2. who canvasses the 
possibilities of monarchy, polyarchy and anarchy, 
but ultimately brackets polyarchy with anarchy. 
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observes that the cosmos is comprised of natural opposites, ' 30 but these are in a sense 
united, `making a unity like a single body. ' 131 He infers that this harmony of opposed 
parts is produced by a ruler who can command these naturally opposed cosmic 
constituents. ' 32 His next question concerns the kind of master `who unites and binds 
the elements together, bringing them into harmony. ' 133 He summarises his inferences: 
... 
[From] the order and harmony of the universe, we must think that God is its 
leader, and that he is one not many. And this same orderly arrangement of the 
cosmos and the concordant harmony of the universe show that its leader and 
governor is not many but one, the Word. 134 
Three observations are required. First, Athanasius infers monotheism from 
apparent monarchy in the cosmos. Hence denying the monarchy denies monotheism, 
as with Tertullian. 
Secondly, polytheism's obnoxiousness is related to divergent and conflicting 
wills towards creation, and thus to anarchy: 
For if there were many leaders of creation... all would be in disorder on account 
of the many leaders, as each one drew everything to his own will and fought 
against the others. 135 
Therefore divergent or conflicting wills among `divine' entities would undo the 
monarchy. It is thus of first importance for Athanasius to show that the Persons do not 
relate as `rivals'. Similarly, Athanasius insists elsewhere that his trinitarian theology, 
which speaks of Father and Son, is not asserting there are two gods simpliciter, as 
Marcion and Valentinus did. 
136 
1 30 CG 3 6. 
1; 1 CG 36. 
132 CG 37. See Meijering 1974a: 32-33. 
"; CG38. 
'3,1 CG 38. 
"s CG 38. 
136 De Syn 52. 
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Thirdly, Athanasius sees the `leader and governor' of the universe as the 
Word, insisting that the cosmos is created through the Word. The obvious question is 
then how the Father can be Lord of all if actually the Son created. In Contra Gentes 
40-44 Athanasius stresses the Son's character as Word and wisdom and notes this 
coheres with a cosmos created with `reason, wisdom and understanding'. 137 He likens 
the cosmos to a lyre played by the Word/Wisdom of God, but, crucially, the musician 
`moves everything as seems good to the Father. ' 138 The Father, therefore, rules the 
cosmos through his Son. 139 Athanasius thus preserves monarchy and the biblical 
datum of creation by the Word by the way he envisages the Father and Son relating. 
However, neither Father nor Son are independent in this monarchy. The Son's 
rule derives from his Father's gift. 140 The Father, though, does not rule independently 
of, but rather through, his Son. The monarchical reign is an inseparable operation of 
both, by the Father, through the Son. 141 
5.3.6. The Relation between Athanasius' Theological Themes and his 
Doctrine of God 
The attributes of God discussed above must not be isolated one from another. 
If God is not simple, then he is composite, and thus compounded by another. This 
both undercuts his monarchy qua creator and entails both his subjection and his 
changeability. Thus all three major aspects of his doctrine of God relate to this 
`governing' distinction between creator and created. 142 The creator is not created, and 
"'CG40. 
138 CG 42. 
139 CG 47... Si ov iä iävia o Hati1p StaxoaµEi Kai ßvv'Xcl... 
140 E. g. In Illud Omnia 4. 
1" CAr 1.61 suggests that the Son's judgement is the Father's work. 
Compare Ad Serapionem I. 19f, 31. 
142 Roldanaus 1968: 349. 
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his non-contingent existence relates to his unchangeability, simplicity and freedom 
from external subjection. 
However, there are also certain soteriological requirements for the cosmos, 
including revelation of God as unchanging, simple and as monarch. Athanasius 
retains throughout strongly monotheist commitments. He criticises Marcion and 
others for forsaking monotheism143 and relies on the Father-Son relationship to 
distance himself from this criticism, for the Son is `from the Father' 144 and 
Athanasius distinguishes this from a relation of existing `beside God'. 145 Thus 
attention now turns to the scriptural basis for, and conception of, Sonship. 
5.4. The Scriptural Basis for Sonship 
Athanasius quotes a wide range of Scripture but keeps returning to relatively 
few texts. 146 The principal texts are John 10: 30,14: 6,9,10 and 11 and Hebrews 1: 3, 
frequently cited together, 147 so that what falls for consideration is the cumulative 
effect and mutual influence of these texts. 
Athanasius cites the texts John 10: 30,14: 9 and 10 together because he sees 
the same sense in each. 148 Indeed, he sees these texts as especially underlying the 
143 CG 6, De Syn 52. 
14' CG 41 The Son is o Eic IIa'cpb5... 
145 CG 6.... äXXo;... O¬bS napä 'coi tov. 
146 Compare Leemans 1997: 351. 
147 Thus NPNF 2°d Series vol. 4: 326 n. 7 dealing with CAr 1.34 remarks on the frequency with which 
Jn. 10: 30,14: 6 and 11 are found together, notably in C Ar. III (e. g. 5 and 16). For the use of Hebrews 
1: 3 in conjunction with other texts note Ad Episc. Aeg 13. 
148 CAr 111.5. 
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Nicene term homoousios. 149 The sense is that all the Father's attributes belong to the 
Son. 1 50 Athanasius continues: 
And the Son, being the proper Offspring of the Father's Essence, reasonably 
says that the Father's attributes are his own also. 151 
Athanasius could be described here as asserting the unity of Father and Son 
according to John 10: 30, but doing so in the light of John 14: 9 and 10. Thus one starts 
with a proposition of unity, ' 52 and a central feature is then the exegesis of John 10: 30. 
For Tertullian and Origen, alike concerned with monarchian challenges, it was 
vital to preserve the distinction of the Persons. A one-ness or harmony of wills 
achieved that, by necessarily presupposing personal distinction. ' 53 This no longer 
suffices in the Arian controversy, for an arianising interpretation of John 10: 30 would 
suggest exactly that the relevant one-ness was a harmony of wills, ' 54 but only that. In 
principle, the one-ness of Father and Son is similar to that we have with each other 
through the Son. 155 Asserting the Son's full divinity is unnecessary. Athanasius's 
task, then, is to show that John 10: 30 requires more than unity of will. 
Athanasius' response is consistent with his underlying theology. John 10: 30 
means there is no partition into two. ' 56 Such a partition would be inconsistent with 
Athanasius' conception of divine simplicity. Yet he also takes John 10: 30 with 
'49 Ad Afros 6. So too J. Walker 1974: 263. 
150 CAr 111.4. 
% 151 CArIII. 5 tug S£ oußtag rou Ila'cpog LSiov (JV y£vvlµa 0 Yiog, 
£uKOtcog Kal Ta Toü Maipos 
A, Ey£i iraviov £ivat. 
152 CAr 111.4 citing John 10: 30. 
1'; Pollard 1956-7: 336 sees Tertullian as having both `moral' and substantial unity. On Origen he 
suggests the emphasis is on two wills becoming one. 
See above. 
154 Cf. Pollard 1956-7: 341. 
iss Evidenced in CAr 111.16. 
156 CAr 111.4. "Ev yap £ißty, ovx cog Evög RaXtV £'I; 81)0 PEP71 
81aip£9Eviog. 
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14: l 0. ' 57 The latter stresses the mutual in-dwelling of Father and Son, which 
presupposes genuine distinction since one could not in-dwell the other without 
distinction existing. This Father-Son language, then, precludes Sabellianism. 158 Hence 
Athanasius remarks: 
But they are two, because the Father is the Father and is not also the Son, and 
the Son is Son and not also Father; but the nature is one; (for the offspring is not 
unlike its parent, for it is his image), and all that is the Father's is the Son's. 159 
This ultimately focuses attention on the Father. For it is from him that the Son 
has derived, albeit eternally, his nature. '60 The pattern of derivation undergirding the 
Son's sovereignty continues with his nature. 161 
While consistent with the anti-monarchian work of Tertullian in particular, 
this approach does not alone repel the arianising exegesis that community of wills 
adequately explains both texts. For this, Athanasius appeals to unity of operation, 162 
but more particularly to John 14: 9 and the work of revelation. 163 It is imperative the 
creator be made known to his creatures, but who can reveal the unchangeable God but 
one who is himself unchangeable? 164 If unchangeable, then the Athanasian 
creator/creature distinction entails that this revealer must be uncreated, that is, fully 
divine, too. Arian exegesis asserting only a harmony of will between creature and 
creator destroys such revelation. 
157 The two are cited together at the end of CAr 111.3. 
158 Explicitly rejected in CAr 111.4. 
159 CAr 111.4. 
160CArIII. 4. 
16' This is not derivation as Cross 2003: 467f attributes it to Athanasius. Cross's definition entails that 
the Father has no properties peculiar to himself. Yet Athanasius envisages the Son as all the Father is 
except `Father': see note 114 above. 
162 Pollard 1956-7: 341 cites CAr 111.11 in this connection. See Ad Serapionem I. 19,20,31. 
163 CAr 111.5. Note the same conjunction elsewhere, e. g. Ad Ai-os 7-8. See also e. g. DepAr 3; CAr I. 21; 
De Syn 38 for the importance of revelation. 
1"AdAfros7. 
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Further, Athanasius argues, if the one-ness is merely of will, this renders God 
compound, for his one-ness with the Son becomes only contingent. ' 65 This would, of 
course, violate Athanasius' cardinal value of divine simplicity. Indeed, since harmony 
of wills also marks God's relations with the unfallen angels, a relation based purely 
on harmony of wills obscures the Son's uniqueness. 
'66 
Athanasius nuances John 10: 30 using well-established theological values, 
unchangeableness, simplicity and the knowledge of God, drawn from John 14: 9 and 
10. Behind these lies Athanasius' prime distinction between creator and created. 
Arian assertions that the Son is a creature, curiously, blur just this distinction with 
respect to the Father-Son relation. ' 67 Athanasius cannot concede that our relationships 
with each other through Christ are completely comparable with the Father-Son 
relation. The former, being creaturely, are contingent, the latter are not. 
Sonship language therefore does double duty for Athanasius. First, it explains 
how one may properly speak of the unity of nature of Father and Son. In the section 
of Contra Arianos III under scrutiny, this is expounded in terms both of light and 
radiance (once more) and of image and original, explored using the analogy of the 
Emperor's image. 168 Both have scriptural warrant, from Hebrews 1: 3169 and 
Colossians 1: 15 respectively. On this basis, Athanasius draws the crucial conclusion 
that monotheism is not infringed: 
Wherefore the Son is not another God, for he was not procured from without, 
else were there many, if a godhead be procured foreign from the Father's. 
170 
165 Ad Afros 8. 
166CArIII. 10. 
167 Curiously, because Arianism in other respects was concerned with a creator/created distinction. 
168 CA r 111.5. 
169 The relevant term is änaüiyaaµa. 
170 CAr 111.4. Diö oü8£ äX7Xos O£öS 0Y oq ov yäp Eýa)eev £ncvoi Oii En&I nävtwOS xai 7EOXXoi, 
ýevic napä i11v toi Maipo Enivoovµtvnc OEötfTOS. 
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This contains interesting concepts and terminology. There is the vocabulary of 
`another god'. '7' Further, the term EgwOcv sets out what constitutes `another god'. 
This language of externality forms the opposite of derivation, that the Son is `of the 
Father. Lastly, the preposition behind the translation `foreign from the Father's' is 
% once again na pä. ' 72 Thus, a vital conception for Athanasius is that the Son is not 
`independent' of the Father. 
In fact, Athanasius regards the two as indivisible and necessary implicates of 
each other: to name the Father is to imply the Son, 173 and vice versa. This again 
shows how important the light/radiance imagery is for Athanasius and his reliance on 
Hebrews 1: 3. There is no light without radiance, no radiance without light. 174 
The second duty this cluster of texts with their conception of sonship performs 
is that distinction is preserved. The Son is and has all that the Father is and has, 
except he is not the Father. 175 This does not mean that Father and Son are completely 
interchangeable, for the Father-Son image itself could suggest asymmetry, as does the 
imagery of light/radiance and image/emperor. In fact the light/radiance distinction is 
used precisely to say that there are not two lights. ' 76 This re-inforces Athanasius' 
refusal to see the relation as that of 'brothers'. 177 
171 See also CG 6. 
17' Compare CG 6. 
173 CAr 111.6. 
174 Ad Episc. Aeg 13. 
175 CAr 111.5. 
176 CAr 111.4. For Arnou 1938: 271 it is exactly the processions that are so helpful in preserving a proper 
monotheism. 
177 DeSv-n51. C. lr1.14. 
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Of course, Athanasius faces an Arian version of an `ethical' or `social' trinity, 
that is, one where the wills of creature (thus contingent) and creator (thus non- 
contingent) are in harmony. It differs from the `social' thought proposed by, for 
example, Moltmann, 178 where the communion of wills is not between creature and 
creator. However, obviously the question arises whether Athanasius' misgivings 
would also be applicable there 179 
5.5. The Conception of Sonship 
5.5.1. What kind of Son? 
Athanasius is aware of numerous pitfalls when describing the divine Sonship. 
While Sonship is scripturally given, and therefore authoritative, the term `son' has 
different scriptural senses. Thus Athanasius distinguishes between a sonship of 
believing and obedience, and `natural' sonship such as Isaac's to Abraham. 180 
Athanasius' Arian opponents adopt the former meaning. He objects that this 
eliminates the Son's uniqueness, 181 and entails that God was not always Father. ' 82 For 
Athanasius, God's fatherhood is not contingent or secondary but `essential', given 
that God is unchanging and simple. ' 83 
Athanasius is therefore left with the second possibility, that the divine sonship 
must to some extent resemble natural human sonship. 1 84 However, since divine 
sonship deals with the immaterial and incorporeal, divine and natural human sonship 
178 E. g. Moltmann 1981. 
179 See 5.5.2. below for discussion of some aspects of this. 
180 De Decretis (hereafter De Decr) 6. 
181 De Deer 6. 
182 De Decr 10. 
183 See e. g. Ad Afros 8. 
184 De Dc'cr 10. 
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do not completely correlate and some changes of understanding are necessary. 
' 85 The 
divine begetting is without partition or passion, ' 86 and is eternal, not temporal, 
187 but 
it is time to address another central question, whether the divine begetting is willed or 
not. 
5.5.2. Begotten not Made - Contra Arianos 111.60-65 
The distinction between being begotten and being made is fundamental to 
Athanasius. ' 88 To be made is to exist by virtue of another's will and to be contingent. 
Such contingency in the Son would necessarily undermine the salvation and 
revelation he offers. Contra Arianos III 60-65 explores whether the Son is begotten 
by Will. 189 Athanasius observes that claiming God's will or pleasure is precedent to 
the Word has a Valentinian rather than scriptural ring. 190 He then argues that God 
creates according to his will but does so through his Word. 191 He thus brackets God's 
will and Word together, establishing the principle that God's will is accomplished by 
his Word. However, adds Athanasius, this leads to a regress: 
For if He too came to be, as you maintain, by will, it follows that the will 
concerning Him consists in some other Word, through whom He in turn comes 
192 to be... 
Athanasius next faces the argument that the Son must be by will, because 
otherwise he is Son by necessity `and against his [God's] good pleasure'. 
193 Behind 
this, impliedly, is the thought that God, as monarch, cannot be subject to constraint. 
185 De Decr 10. 
1 86 De Decr 11. 
187 De Decr 12. 
188 E. g. CAr 1.25. 
189 Meijering 1974a: 72 stresses this passage's importance. 
190 CAr 111.60. 
191 CAr 111.6 1, citing James 1: 18 `Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth. ' 
192 C4 111.61. This resembles the argument against God creating the Word in order for the Word to 
create the rest of the cosmos. Both cases raise the possibility of an 
infinite regress. 
193 
... Kat µj1 9 Ao)v'ßxýv ö OE0S Yýöv. 
CAr 111.62. 
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Athanasius responds that the Arians correctly see what is contrary to will but 
not `... what is greater and transcends it... '. His argument is that what is according to 
nature (iö 1caiä cpv(Fty) is not against will (ib irapä yvcognv) but transcends it. He 
distinguishes the house a man builds `by counsel' (ßoukcuöpevoq) from the son he 
begets `by nature' (xath (p&nv). The building is external to him, the son is not. 
Athanasius then validates his point about things in God being by nature by appealing 
to attributes that belong uncontroversially to God, 194 that he is good and merciful. 
Should one apply the Arian argument about will here, it would mean `... we must 
consider that He began to be good, and that His not being good is possible... '. 1 95 
This is impossible: it introduces both changeability, since God might will to 
become not good, and also composition, in that the attribute of goodness is not 
essential to God but contingent on his Will. 196 However, unchangeability and 
simplicity (qua uncompoundedness) are associated with being creator rather than 
created. Hence, argues Athanasius, just as we accept God as being good by nature, 
not by will or external compulsion, so we should accept God as father by nature and 
the Son as son by nature. ' 97 Prestige is judicious: God's `... fatherhood is not 
adventitious. ' 
198 
Athanasius does not, then, accept a purely ethical trinity constructed by the 
Father's will any more than an ethical trinity constructed from the harmony of wills 
194 At any rate in the Arian debate. 
195 
6KOIEF-I &i 6n. 1 jp aio µv Vivat äyaAöS, xai To, µil Eivai 8E U )tOV &ya0öv 
EV EX6pEVOV Eßii. 
196 Ad. -l fros 8 regards this as 
denying divine simplicity. 
197C4rIII. 62. 
198 Prestige 1952,1981: 154. 
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between creature and creator. Now, clearly, Athanasius was not faced with the 
proposition that trinitarian relations are purely relations of will between two eternal 
beings. However, his rationale for rejecting the Son being Son by the Father's will 
suggests an answer to this proposal: it apparently violates unchangeability. After all, 
`will' involves the possibility of the opposite, 199 The fact that two wills (eternal 
Father and eternal Son) are involved is irrelevant to that point. Further, simplicity is 
likewise violated precisely because fatherhood and sonship appear adventitious for 
the First and Second Persons respectively. Athanasian principles thus suggest that, 
despite the non-Arian flavour of two eternal entities having a harmony of will, this 
proposal erodes the distinction of creator and created. 
Athanasius appears sharply different here from one aspect of Origen's 
thought: `Origen seems to have interpreted the Generation of the Son as an act of the 
Father's will, ' comments Florovsky, 200 seeing Origen as to this extent equating Son 
and Creation. For both are attributable to the Father's will as a sufficient cause. The 
cost of this position within an Athanasian framework has already been outlined. 
S. 5.3. A Good Son? 
Athanasius uses two illuminating illustrations concerning the Son's position. 
When discussing in Contra Arianos 11.3 the distinction between `begotten' and 
`made', he observes that sons are often called servants, because of the natural 
authority of fathers. 20' Therefore Athanasius apparently saw a father by nature as 
having authority over his son. This suggests that the filial relation between the Father 
and Son also involves natural authority. 
199 Certainly if one accepts the definition of Cr 111.62. 
200 Florovsky 1964: 42 citing a quotation of Justinian but also relying largely on OFP 1.2.6. 
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This is re-inforced by Athanasius' argument that if Solomon is treated as a 
proper son, although called a servant, the same applies to the Son who is also termed 
servant. 202 Sonship of the `natural' type involves authority. 203 This is doubly striking 
since Athanasius uses his doctrine of scriptural Scope to ascribe other problematic 
texts to the humanity of the incarnate Son. Yet here the servant/son terminology 
applies to the eternal filial relation. 
The second illustration from sonship in the world comes from Absalom and 
Adonijah in Contra Arianos 111.7. The context is the refutation of the charge that 
monotheism has been denied. Athanasius comments on what David heard about 
Absalom204 and Adonijah. 205 In both cases there has been revolt from David by 
disloyal sons attempting to overthrow their father's kingdom. Yet, says Athanasius, 
the Son is not like Absalom and Adonijah. There has been no rivalry, 206 nor has the 
Son called himself God and fomented revolt from the Father. 207 Rather the Son has 
glorified the Father and done his will. 208 
Athanasius, then, recognises that natural sons sometimes infringe their 
fathers' sovereignty, `unnatural' though that is. Yet this is not necessarily so, indeed 
should not be so, and is actually not so with the divine Son. Rather the sovereignty is 
preserved, but within the framework of divine sonship. 
201 CAr 11.3. 'co' µ'v yäp En ir4oußiaS, (i)S ira'rEpE;, A, iyouai. 
2020 lr 11.4. Athanasius applies Ps 116: 16 to the Son. 
203 The Son is such by nature, not will: see the above discussion and CAr 111.60-62. 
204 2 Sam. 15: 13. 
205 1 Kings 1: 11. 
206 CAr 111.7 äµ t Ua. 
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5.5.4. Sonship and the Repudiation of Polytheism 
Here discussion must turn to Athanasius' handling of polytheism, of which he 
was apparently accused, 209 and for which he also condemns others. 210 His defence is 
intimately related to sonship, which functions in several ways. 
First, sonship means the Son is not an external ('E (okv) being. Externality 
and being `of (Ex) form another Athanasian antithesis. Externality certainly partly 
distinguishes making from begetting. Created-ness involves being an external being 
with respect to one's creator. Thus: 
For what man of right understanding does not perceive, that what are created 
and made are external to the maker; but the Son, as the foregoing argument has 
shown, exists not externally, but from the Father who begat Him? 211 
However, while creatures are external to their creator, externality also marks 
out polytheism. In the passage already cited from Contra Arianos 111.4 Athanasius 
remarks that were the Son `from without', there would be polytheism. If, then, the 
Persons were external to each other, this would suggest either: 
(a) one of them was created (Arianism); or 
(b) both were created; or 
(c) if both were uncreated, they were basically separable from each other and 
so independent. (`From without' strongly implies separability). 
Option (c) further suggests that the mutual relations indicated by the correlate terms 
of Father and Son appear secondary: `father' is not the fundamental naming of the 
First Person, contrary to Athanasius' insistence. This falls foul of Athanasius' 
207 CAr 111.7. 
208 CAr 111.7 quoting Jn 6: 38. 
209 Note here CAr 111.7,15. 
210 CG 6; De Syn 52 and CAr 111.15. 
211 De Decr 13. The relevant terms are that created things are EýwOcv roc) notovvioq, while the Son is 
ovx JýwOEV äý, Ex toi yEvwvios na'rpbS 
ünäpxEt. For ýýwOev language see also De Decr 3,23; 
CAr 1.20,25.29: 11.2,58; 111.4. 
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requirement of simplicity and potentially renders both First and Second Persons 
fundamentally unknown. 
This `externality' language must also be taken with that of `foreign-ness'. 
Sonship means that the Son is not foreign to the Father's essence. 212 Foreign-ness and 
externality are associated: the creature is both. Foreign-ness is, naturally, the contrary 
of homoousios, which is Athanasius' synthesis of the scriptural data. 
The obvious target here is Arianism, within which creature and creator are 
pre-eminently essences foreign to each other. Yet sometimes Athanasius speaks more 
widely, 213 and importantly describes Marcionism as involving foreign essences too. 214 
He characterises Marcionite-style thought as having several entities called 'god '. 215 
To Athanasius, such `gods' are not homoousioi, but of essences foreign to each other. 
This suggests that for Athanasius homoousios was not a term simply denoting the 
same generic substance, an extremely significant point. 216 
The reason for thinking Marcionite `gods' were not homoousioi is readily 
apparent. Homoousios in Athanasius' terms involves inseparability, while Marcionite 
systems need not include this: thus light and radiance for Athanasius are one, and also 
homoousios with each other. There is not one without the other, neither is contingent 
212 See De Syn 50 and 52 where the terminology involves ýFvrl ovßia, äAxoiptoovßto5 and 
£'EpocpurlS. For similar terms of foreign-ness note De Decr 24; CAr I. 19,20; CAr 11.32; CAr 111.4,14. 
213 Note especially De Syn 5--52 and CAr 111.15. 
214 Note that C4r 111.4 moves quickly from externality to foreign-ness. 
215 CG 6. 
216 Stead 1974: 251 sees the light analogy as suggesting numerical identity. 
169 
for the other. Hence Athanasius' understanding of homoousios is intimately related to 
seeing the Son as Son by nature, not by will. 217 
Thus, if First and Second Persons were mutually external and foreign, 
Athanasian unchangeability and simplicity would be violated. Arian christologies, 
which presented the Son as a creature, albeit uniquely privileged, 218 were examples of 
externality and foreign-ness. Yet Marcionite systems too involved externality and 
foreign-ness. Athanasius' reason for the Son not being external and foreign is 
precisely that he is the Son ix the Father and therefore not the Son £ýw9¬v. 
Marcionite ditheism cannot employ the principle of derivation on which Athanasius 
relies. A relation purely of will would not suffice for this. 
The stigma of polytheism is further rebuffed by insisting the Son reigns in the 
Father's kingdom. Here Athanasius's solution is fundamentally the same as 
Tertullian's. In part this derives from the Contra Gentes account of the Son creating 
at the Father's behest, 219 but elsewhere it is noted that the Father gives authority to 
the Son over creation. 220 Thus the Lordship is the Father's221 (for he gives it) but he 
gives it fully with respect to creation. The Son then claims no independent 
sovereignty, 222 and is no rival disputing the Father's due claims, but rather upholds 
them. 223 The monarchy remains intact precisely because the relation is sonship, 
connoting authority and loyal obedience, as noted above. 
224 This means that a 
polytheism with its patterns of separable operation is far distant. Father and Son reign 
217 CAr I1I. 60ff. 
218 Florovsky 1964: 43. After all, in one version of Arianism, the Son alone is made directly by God. 
9 See above. M. Barnes 1997: 213-215 stresses Christ as God's own power. 
220 De Decr 30. 
221 In Illud Omnia 4. 
222 Contrast the situation envisaged in CG 6. 
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inseparably, although the Son is given sovereignty by the Father. However, the 
question then arises whether the Father's monarchy is defended at the Son's expense. 
S. S. S. Egalitarianism and asymmetry in divine sonship 
The foregoing clearly shows that Athanasius' soteriological scheme demands 
the Son's full divinity. The question is whether he envisages this including a 
relationship without authority between Father and Son. After all, Contra Gentes 
insists that God is not ruled by another. 225 Why should this not apply to the Son? 
Some passages might incline one to such an egalitarian view of Athanasius' 
thought. He asserts that the Son is to be given the same glory as the Father, 226 and that 
Father and Son have co-extensive authority for, if `all' really has been given by the 
Father, then the Son has it all and has it as an equal. 227 There again, strikingly, the 
`sending' language is taken as referring to the humanity and the Son, although sitting 
on the Father's right, sees the Father sitting on his right. 228 
In fact, two issues are at stake. One is the Son's authority over creation. The 
second is the Son's relation to the Father. Concerning the first, clearly the Son 
possesses `full' authority: he is creator and sits on the same throne with respect to 
created things as the Father. 229 It is, however, possible to be a delegated or derived 
plenipotentiary. This takes us to the second issue. 
223 CAr 111.7. 
224 Note also Arnou's remark 1938: 271 that the processions ensure the monarchy remains intact. 
"s E. g. CG 29. 
Exp. Fid 1. Commenting on John 5: 23. 
227 The strength of the `all' is emphasised in In Mud Omnia 5 although the implication about equality is 
not expressly drawn. 
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As regards the Son's relation to the Father, Athanasius maintains that the Son 
is given what he has by the Father. 230 The relationship, then, features derivation and, 
therefore, asymmetry. 23 1 The relation is, though, filial which for Athanasius, as 
observed above, suggests the Father's natural authority. It also suggests the Father's 
love, for giving readily links to such a concept. 232 This giving then means that the Son 
is obedient qua Son, not because he is a creature, although creatures also obey. He 
would not be a `true' Son if he did not obey. 
This is in fact what the Incarnation reveals. Athanasius quotes Jesus' words of 
John 6: 38,233 while arguing that the Son is no other, second, god, but stands in 
obedience to the Father. This cannot be confined to the Incarnation for two reasons. 
First, the context is the eternal relation between Father and Son. Athanasius fails to 
meet his objectors' point unless he shows that the eternal relation satisfies the 
monarchical principles of monotheism. Secondly, Athanasius' requirement that the 
Incarnation truly reveal God entails that the economic relations reveal the immanent 
relations. As such, his conclusions, although differently phrased, resemble 
Tertullian's: the relation of obedience seen in the Incarnation reflects the eternal 
relation. 
Is this inconsistent with the idea that a god is subject to nothing? In effect 
Athanasius must meet this argument by glossing the objection thus: a god must be 
subject to no external compulsion. Here Athanasius can appeal to his conception that 
228 C4r 1.61. 
229 CAr 1.61. 
230 For example on the basis of John 16: 15. 
231 Stead 1974: 247-9 emphasises that the images of homoousia involve asymmetry. 
232 The Father's giving and loving (see C4r 111.66) certainly are present in Athanasius. It is another 
issue whether these motifs are as prominent as suggested in John's Gospel. 
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the Son is not external and foreign, but `of and `proper' to the Father. Hence there is 
no external compulsion. Yet he can go further on the basis of his argument about will, 
necessity and nature. 234 Athanasius, like his opponents, is concerned to maintain that 
God is not liable to compulsion from outside. He is not even compelled to be good. 
He is, though, good by nature, and is also Father by nature. This is however 
extendable to the Son too. He is what he is by nature, and what he is by nature is Son, 
which Athanasius conceives as connoting natural authority in the Father. 
Thus Athanasius' conception of revelation in the economy of incarnation and 
salvation together with his doctrine of God provide strong reasons for seeing sonship 
in non-egalitarian terms. An eternal Son by nature does not violate unchangeability, 
simplicity and divine monarchy, and meets the need for a revelation of the eternal 
God in the Incarnation. It is therefore a notable defence of biblical monotheism, in the 
terms in which Athanasius has conceived it. 
Conversely, a sonship in eternity solely by will, not nature, would sacrifice 
that monotheism. For then the Trinity would not be unchangeable and simple, and the 
monarchy would be rendered contingent. Further, asserting an egalitarian sonship in 
eternity different from the obedient sonship of the Incarnation infringes Athanasius' 
principle of revelation as well. Hence, Athanasius' principles suggest that a Trinity so 
structured tends to be polytheistic. 
All this is, of course, within the parameters set by Athanasius' reading of the 
Sonship/Fatherhood material. This must be briefly evaluated. 
233 CAr 111.7. 
'34 CAr 11 1.60-62, esp. 62. 
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5.6. Is Athanasius' Conception of Sonship Biblical? 
This requires examination under two headings, first, the significance of 
`Abba' language, and secondly the import of father-son language more generally, 
notably the father-son language of John's Gospel, on which Athanasius draws so 
heavily. 
5.6.1. The `Abba' language 
`Abba' language has soteriological significance for Athanasius. Quoting 
Galatians 4: 6,235 he associates the sonship humans enjoy with God with the Sonship 
the Son enjoys. It is the Spirit of the Son who cries `Abba' and so the Son's relation 
with the Father patterns our relation with him as `Abba'. Others also lay great stress 
on the relations denoted by `Abba' terms, notably Moltmann who comments that 
`Abba' terminology `reveals the inner heart of the relationship between Jesus and 
God'. 236 This apparently takes seriously the tie between economic and immanent 
trinities: starting with the Incarnation, one looks within that for what is fundamental. 
Obviously, however, one must ask how `Abba' should be understood. 
For Moltmann this `Abba' language is non-patriarchal, so that Sonship here 
does not connote the natural authority of which Athanasius spoke when discussing 
Solomon and David. 237 Instead the keynote is an `unprecedented intimacy' which 
excludes authority. 
235 DeDecr 3 1, and CAr 11.59 (bis). There is another citation in the probably pseudo-Athanasian CAr 
IV. 22 
'36 Moltmann 1991: 11. 
237 CAr 11.3. 
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This, of course, contributes to Moltmann's more general project of opposition 
to hierarchy in state, church and family. For our relation with the First Person is 
patterned on the Son's. Moltmann describes God's new kingdom: 
In this kingdom God is not the Lord; he is the merciful Father. In this kingdom 
there are no servants; there are only God's free children. In this kingdom what is 
required is not obedience and submission it is love and free participation. 238 
Moltmann appeals precisely to the Sonship relation revealed by the `Abba' 
language to show that authority is not present between Father and Son. 
Moltmann cites Jeremias' work on `Abba', 239 although without specifying 
how much of Jeremias' argument he accepts. Jeremias certainly stresses the novelty 
of Jesus' father terminology, which naturally makes it an important field of inquiry. 
Jeremias has also been associated with arguing `... that Jesus held and taught a unique 
and novel view of God as near, loving and accessible, rather than distant and 
remote. '240 M. Hooker describes Jeremias' case as being that `Abba' is `especially 
intimate'. 241 
However, M. Thompson notes that Jeremias both retracted the view that 
`Abba' is baby-talk and anyway held it is not simply an indication of familiarity. 242 In 
fact, Jeremias includes obedience as an element: `He spoke to God as a child to its 
father: confidently and securely, and yet at the same time reverently and 
obediently. ' 
243 
238 Moltmann 1981: 70. 
239 Moltmann 1981: 69 n. 17; 70 n. 19. 
240 Thompson 2000: 25. 
24 ° Hooker 1991: 348. 
242 Thompson 2000: 27. Hooker notes the criticism that the term can be a courtesy address from a 
disciple to a rabbi (Hooker 1991: 348), and refers to the objections of Vermes and Barr to Jeremias' 
case. 
243 Quoted at Thompson 2000: 27 from Jeremias Prayers of Jesus 62-63. 
175 
Hence Jeremias does not support Moltmann's contention of familiarity 
excluding authority. Nevertheless Moltmann may still have correctly understood the 
`Abba' language, where Jeremias has not, a possibility now falling for consideration. 
It has often been observed that `Abba' is recorded just once on Jesus' lips 
(Mark 14: 36). This is perhaps a slender basis on which to construct a dominant 
theological theme. However, it must be remembered both that retaining the Aramaic 
term suggests significance, and also that `Abba' terms are found on the lips of 
believers in Galatians 4: 6 and Romans 8: 15, at structurally important places in Paul's 
argument. 
However, while Mark 14: 36 certainly reflects intimacy, the whole verse and 
its context must also be considered. The context is prayer. While prayer may suggest 
intimacy, it may also imply acknowledgement of authority and obedience. The rest of 
the verse bears this out. God is addressed as `Abba' in a petition where the Father's 
will is preferred to Jesus'. Hooker comments both on the echo of the Lord's Prayer 
and also that `Once again we are reminded by Mark that Jesus is obedient to God's 
will. '244 Moltmann's disjunction between obedience and intimacy is not apparent. 245 
Turning to Galatians 4: 6 and Romans 8: 15, neither text demonstrates that 
intimacy excludes authority. 246 In Galatians 4: 6, a slavery is in question, but it is to 
something other than God. Deliverance from it does not show that intimacy with God 
excludes authority. As for Romans 8: 15, the issue is life according to the Spirit and 
X44 Hooker 1991: 349. See too her stress on obedience in the Passion 1991: 22f. Similarly Cranfield 
1977: 433f sees the verse as upholding Jesus' obedience. 
245 Moltmann cannot have recourse to the `Athanasian' style of response that the `will' refers, as a 
matter of `Scope', to Jesus' humanity. 
Moltmann's argument requires the divinity to be in view. 
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life according to the flesh. However, the life of a son according to the Spirit is not 
said to be one of intimacy without authority. The association of disobedience with the 
flesh (8: 7) and the command to put to death the misdeeds of the body (8: 13) suggest 
rather that life according to the Spirit is marked by obedience. 
Therefore, Moltmann's contention that `Abba' language shows intimacy 
excluding authority must be adjudged a failure. However, does other Father-Son 
language support it? 
5.6.2. Father-Son Language 
Under this heading, the passages in which John 14: 9 and 10 and 10: 30 figure 
must be weighed, for Athanasius relies so heavily on them. However, John 5 also 
falls for more extended consideration. Athanasius cites this at structurally important 
points, 247 but by no means as frequently as these other texts. Yet John 5 is central for 
the johannine material on sonship and opposition. Moreover, precisely because 
Athanasius does not deal with the passage at length it provides an opportunity to 
weigh his account of Sonship against the material he claims to synthesise, the 
Scriptures. 
John 14: 8-11 falls within the Upper Room Discourse, at a point where the 
argument's progression is sometimes obscure. However, B. Witherington helpfully 
points to a series of questions or topics and explanations within John 13 and 14,248 
within which 14: 8 provides one topic. Thus in this pattern 14: 1-4 deals largely with 
140 For fuller discussion of these Pauline texts see Appendix 7. 
247 E. g. C. -lr 111.7 (of Jn 5: 23) and 36 (of 5: 26) De 5' 49 and Ad Afi-os 7 (both of 5: 19). 
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where Jesus is going but also introduces the way Jesus is going (verse 4), which, he 
says, the disciples know. Verse 5 responds to this latter element, so that 14: 6f deal 
with the way, but also introduce the related theme of knowing not just the Way 
(Jesus) but the Father and seeing him. Philip's question (14: 8) then picks this up. 249 
The theme, then, to be developed is that of knowing/seeing the Father in relation to 
Jesus. 
The next question comes at verse 22. However, Jesus has already traversed 
several themes. From seeing God, he has moved to what the disciples will do (14: 12), 
obedience to his commands (14: 15), the Spirit's coming and the indwelling in the 
believer of Father and Son. These different topics are, of course, loosely related by 
the over-arching theme of indwelling. This is introduced in verse 10 to help explain 
that he who sees the Son sees the Father, and persists in verses 15-21 as Jesus 
comments on the Spirit and the relation between the Father and Son on the one hand 
and the believer on the other. Given this, verses 8-11 will be taken together, since 
verse 8 decisively moves the discourse on from verses 4-7,250 which deal largely with 
`way', to seeing the Father, while verse 12 passes to a new subject, what the believer 
can do through God. 25' 
Within this framework Jesus has pronounced that he is returning to God (14: 1) 
and is going to prepare places for his disciples (14: 2). Verse 4 has introduced 
`knowing', so important in what follows. At this stage, the knowledge could simply 
248 Witherington 1995: 249. Thus in 13: 25 the question is who will betray, in 13: 36 where Jesus is 
going, in 14: 5 about knowing the way, in 14: 8 about seeing the Father and in 14: 22 about being 
revealed to the world. 
249 Compare the remarks of R. Schnackenburg 1980 111: 63 on the sub-unit's ending at v. 7. 
250 For vv. 4 -7 as a sub-unit see 
Schnackenburg 1980 111: 63 and Witherington 1995: 249. 
251 So Brown 1971 11: 632. Ridderbos 1997: 496 also sees a transition here. 
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be intellectual. This is apparently Thomas' initial understanding (14: 5), with the 
objects of knowledge being the destination and the way. However, verse 6 develops 
knowledge more personally. 252 The way is a person, Jesus, as is the destination, the 
Father. Jesus presents himself as the way to God (14: 6a), whom he refers to as the 
Father, and to whom he alone leads (14: 6b). 
This implies that the disciples, and by extension the rest of humanity, do not 
already have places with God and without Jesus have no access to God. The 
conditional clause of verse 7a confirms this: `If you have known me you will know 
my Father. ' Similar charges of lack of knowledge of God occur earlier, notably at 
8: 19,253 where lack of knowledge of Father and Son is related later to dying in one's 
sin. `Knowledge', then, has salvific associations. 254 However, 14: 7b sharpens the 
point by stating that the disciples already know the Father and have seen him. 
Philip's question (verse 8) takes the language of knowledge and sight in a still 
more strongly revelatory direction ('show us the Father'), while the importance of 
revelatory knowledge is evident in the closing phrase: `it will suffice for us'. 255 
Verse 9 next indicates several things. First, revelation of the Father has taken 
place in Jesus. Second, this is a full revelation since one has seen the Father in seeing 
Jesus, implying no additional revelation is necessary. 
256 Third, the revelation of God 
that Jesus brings subtly differs from an ordinary prophet's. Jesus' revelation is not a 
252 Ridderbos 1997: 493: `It is a way he not only points to but is... ' 
253 See also 7: 28 and 8: 55. 
254 Note in this respect that Brown 1971 11: 631 explores echoes of covenant relationship in the 
knowledge terminology. 
255 Again, see Brown 1971 11: 632 for the idea that Philip has in mind a theophany on the Sinaitic 
model. 
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body of information external to himself, something already alluded to in verse 6.257 
Verse 9 stresses rather that he himself in his person reveals the Father. Fourth, not 
knowing that Jesus is this revelation of the Father means one does not know Jesus. 
Jesus' own identity is inseparably linked to his relation to the Father. Fifth, revelation 
of the First Person is not simply revelation of `God' but of the `Father'. 
The obvious issue this raises is how Jesus can so reveal the Father. Verse 10 
starts to answer this: Jesus and the Father in-dwell each other. Some factors suggest 
that this relationship, while thus certainly mutual, is not completely symmetrical. 258 
First, the relationship is Father-Son, which prima facie hints at some irreversibility. 
Secondly, a certain priority for the Father appears. Jesus' words are not `from 
himself ((xi igau rov), indicating his verbal revelation is ultimately initiated by the 
Father, not independent or self-generated. 259 Similarly, Jesus's actions are not simply 
independent but rather originate with the Father. They are joint actions, in which the 
two are inseparably involved. 
The significance of inseparable operation will be further developed in chapter 
7.6 below. Suffice it here to observe that this again recalls earlier material, notably 
5: 30 and 36. There Jesus asserts his actions are not independent (5: 30) but are what 
his Father has given him to do, and testify that the Father has sent him (5: 36). For 
Ridderbos, Jesus' speaking the Father's words illustrates that Jesus in-dwells the 
Father, while the Father's acting through Jesus illustrates his in-dwelling Jesus. 260 
256 Compare Barrett 1978: 383 `... all search for God must look to the decisive revelation in Jesus. ' 
257 Jesus himself is the wvay, not merely one who discloses it as something external to himself. 
258 Thus Barrett 1978: 383 `The relation... is not completely reciprocal... ' 
259 Compare earlier material in similar terms (8: 28 and 38 and 12: 49-50). 
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The material in verse 10 is striking. First, Jesus' revelation of the Father is tied 
to his personal relationship with the Father. That relation is described in these unusual 
terms of mutual indwelling. Secondly, this relation, during the Incarnation, to put it 
no higher, is marked by Jesus' insistence that he is not acting independently. 261 Non- 
independence is therefore critical in understanding the Father-Son relation. Brown's 
comment is apt: `Thus, precisely because neither his words nor his deeds are his own, 
these words and deeds tell men that Jesus is intimately related to the Father. '262 
Thirdly, Jesus' words and works are yoked together here, as elsewhere. 263 
Verse 11 features a call to believe. The content of belief is that Father and Son 
indwell each other. The context makes this eminently intelligible. Jesus is the access 
to the Father and makes him known. Jesus uniquely can do this because of his 
relationship with the Father. Believing that Jesus has that relationship is thus critical. 
Verse 11 closes by commenting that one must believe, if nothing else, because of the 
works, which, earlier material has already told us, indicate the Father's relation with 
Jesus. 264 
Athanasius evidently catches some of the key-notes of this sub-unit. He uses 
verse 9 above all to draw out the fullness of Jesus' revelation, and verse 10 to 
illustrate a unique in-dwelling relationship, marked by unanimity of word and action. 
However, while often citing the verses together, each verse tends to be a separate 
citation. This obscures their connection, which would actually strengthen his case that 
260 Ridderbos 1997: 495. 
261 The relevant terms are än Eµaviov (5: 30and 8: 28 in reference to `doing'; 7: 17,12: 49 and 14: 10 in 
reference to speaking; and 7: 28 and 8: 42 in reference to coming) and k p' ärauTov (5: 19 in reference to 
`doing'; and 7: 18 and 16: 13 in reference to speaking, although the latter deals with the Holy Spirit). 
262 Brown 1971 I1: 632. 
263 E. g Jn 8: 28. Barrett 1978: 384 `... both [sc. Words and works] alike are revelatory... ' 
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Jesus can only reveal as he does because of his relation with the Father. Moreover, he 
does not draw out the emphasis in verse 10 on the Father's priority and the non- 
independence of Jesus' words and works (effectively he relies on verse IOa). This 
omission tends to obscure the close relations this passage has with other material, 
notably chapters 5 and 8. However, verse 10b and c again support his case. After all, 
as will be evident in dealing with John 5, this intimate execution of the Father's deeds 
and speaking of the Father's words supports Athanasius' thesis of a divine Son who 
satisfies the requirements of monarchical monotheism. 
Brown remarks that the passage `has only secondary metaphysical 
implications about life within the Godhead' and stresses the importance of the 
shaliach motif for understanding how Jesus' actions are the Father's. 265 Athanasius, 
of course, concedes that his synthesis of such passages uses a term Scripture does not. 
His point, though, is that his synthesis is a necessary implication. For without the 
implication, the primary work could not be done. 266 
Turning to John 10: 30, this is a vital member of Athanasius' catena of 
texts. 267 The unit in which it falls is best taken as verses 22-39. Verse 22 marks the 
start with editorial comment giving time and location markers, the Feast of the 
Dedication of the Temple in the Temple. 268 In verse 40 there is a shift of place (back 
beyond the Jordan) and subject-matter (the fulfilment of the Baptist's testimony). 
264 E. g. 5: 36. 
265 Brown 1971 II: 632. 
266 Thus Stibbe aptly comments 1993: 156 `... the suggestion of divinity is... implicit. ' 
267 It is quoted or referred to some 30 times. 
268 Stibbe 1993: 118 comments on the symbolism: Jesus is the New Temple (2: 13-22). The Temple is, 
of course, the place where God is known and worshipped. 
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The comment of 10: 30 comes in Jesus' response to the question whether he is 
the Messiah (10: 24). 269 His reply is disturbing. Verse 25a seems to imply a rebuke in 
that his earlier words render their question redundant. Verse 25b refers to his works 
done in the Father's name, which testify to him, again implying that this is testimony 
already known, but rejected. 270 Once again Jesus' words and works are paired '27 
1 and 
once again Jesus refers his works to the Father's initiative, not his. 
Verse 26 states why the extant evidence of Jesus' works has been rejected: the 
Jews272 constituting the audience are not `of my sheep'. 273 Hence, it is small wonder 
that the evidence is rejected and the question of Jesus' identity continually recurs. 274 
With this introduction of who Jesus' sheep are, the discussion takes another turn. 
Verse 27 explains Jesus' contention that this audience is not of his sheep. His sheep 
are distinguished by `hearing' (obeying or responding positively to) his voice. 275 
Having introduced the relationship between Jesus and his sheep in terms of 
their response to him, Jesus now describes how he and his Father treat the sheep. 
Jesus the shepherd gives life (10: 28). Life is, of course, a major johannine theme and 
the immediate link is no doubt with earlier material in chapter 10.276 Chapter 11 
greatly develops what is said here, especially as Lazarus `hears' the voice of Jesus 
269 Brown 1971 1: 406 notes that the question is apt in its present setting given the shepherd imagery 
earlier in the chapter, a motif which could have messianic overtones. 
270 Note how 10: 19-21 frames the question, by telling the reader that the Jews know of Jesus' works. 
The healing of the man born blind (ch. 9) raises similar issues. 
271 In contrast to the Jews of 10: 19-21 who apparently find great difficulty in joining what Jesus teaches 
(His sonship) with what he does (the signs). 
272 The term `Jews' is retained, but it must be noted that in the dialogue the Jews tend at times to 
assume a representative character for humanity in rebellion against God (Cp. 8: 23). For simplicity, the 
designation the Jews' is kept here, but with that representational connotation. 
273 Note the contention of L. Keck 1996 that the language of origin also is indicative of destiny. 
274 Stibbe 1993: 118 observes `... the perversity of their [sc. the Jews'] intense hostility... ' throughout 
this unit. 
275 See 10: 4 and 14. 
X76 Especially 10: 10. 
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(11: 43-44) even in the tomb. However, chapter 5 provides highly significant paving 
material, with its depiction of the Son who gives life and calls people from the dead 
(5: 25ff). In this sense, it is unduly atomistic to read chapter 10 without chapter 5. 
Verse 28 ends with the assurance that Jesus' sheep cannot be taken from his 
hand. This forms the parallelism between verses 28 and 29. Nothing can take the 
sheep out of the Father's hand either. The correct reading and syntax of verse 29a is 
obscure. 277 However, two points do emerge: first, the Father gives to the Son, thereby 
co-ordinating their action. The Son's actions, then, in holding his sheep in his hand 
are not independent of the Father, but are actions at the Father's initiative, in line with 
verse 25's statement that Jesus' actions are in the Father's name. 278 Their actions are 
integrated. Secondly, as regards the sheep, being in Jesus' hand can also be 
represented as being in the Father's hand. Being with the one necessitates being with 
the other. 279 
At this point, the statement of 10: 30 is readily intelligible. `Small wonder' the 
one-ness of action in verses 28f leads to the one-ness of Father and Son. 280 However, 
this obviously raises the question whether Athanasius has not placed too much weight 
on one-ness here. Calvin's comment is telling: 
The ancients made a wrong use of this passage to prove that Christ is 
(%tooü(Yto; ) of the same essence with the Father. For Christ does not argue 
about the unity of substance, but about the agreement that he has with the 
Father, so that whatever Christ does will be confirmed by the power of his 
Father. 28' 
277 See Brown 1971 1: 403 and Ridderbos 1997: 370. The smoothest construction is to take the passage 
as talking about the Father, who is greater than all, giving sheep to the 
Son. 
278 D. Carson 1991: 393 comments: `All that Jesus says and does is merely the embodiment of the 
Father's will. ' 
279 Compare the general johannine theme that he who has the Son has the Father too. Cf I Jn 2: 23. 
280 Carson 1991: 394. 
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Harmony of will is undisputed. The question is whether harmony of will alone 
sufficiently explains this one-ness. Carson writes: `The immediate context is the most 
important single control. '282 It is vital to observe that the Jews respond by proposing 
to stone Jesus (10: 31). Jesus' response (10: 32) refers again to his works, effectively 
forcing his accusers again to consider his words and works together. 283 The `making' 
terminology of verse 32 is picked up as the Jews specify their charge, that Jesus has 
`made' himself God. 284 The phraseology is not identical to the accusation of 5: 18,285 
but similarities exist, notably in the `making' language and the charge that Jesus does 
this himself. 286 Once again, the significance of the chapter 5 material emerges. 
The subsequent context of 10: 30 therefore shows that the Jews see Jesus as 
claiming more than a harmony of wills between a creaturely man and his god. There 
is an element of blasphemy: making oneself God. That implies independent and 
rivalling action, although verses 28f have underlined precisely that the Son is no rival. 
Jesus responds in verses 34-36 that Scripture can legitimately call those to 
whom it came 'gods'. 287 It is then even more fitting for the one whom God set apart 
and sent into the world to be called 'son'. 288 This distances Jesus' sonship from the 
sonship mentioned by Psalm 82. This also tells against mere unity of wills. One Arian 
contention turned on the similarity between the one-ness of Jesus and God and the 
one-ness others enjoy with God. Jesus' words go beyond that. Hence Athanasius 
281 Calvin Translation Society edition. 
28' Carson 1991: 394. 
283 See above on 10: 19-21 and 25. 
284 flotEiv. 
285 making himself equal to God. 
286 Brown comments on the Jewish error 1971 1: 408 `For John, Jesus never makes himself anything; 
everything that he is stems from the Father. ' 
287 Quoting Ps 82: 6. 
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rightly objected that the Arian solution did not preserve the uniqueness of Jesus' 
sonship. 289 
In verses 37f, Jesus reverts to his works and urges the Jews to believe. Once 
again, Jesus' actions are presented as grounds for belief. Action and person are 
linked, as in chapter 14: 8-11, and this tends to tie the two passages. This is re- 
inforced by `belief in Jesus being associated with the Father and Son indwelling each 
other (verse 38b). 
This final statement repays attention. First, it glosses the one-ness of 10: 30 by 
reference to mutual indwelling. 290 This vindicates the refusal to take verse 30 in a 
Sabellian or modalist direction, since indwelling presupposes personal distinction. 
Secondly, this further ties this passage to 14: 8-11. This significantly supports 
Athanasius' consistent co-citation of John 10: 30 with 14: 9 and 10. The explanation of 
oneness in 10: 30 in terms of revelation (14: 9) and in-dwelling (14: 10) is less arbitrary 
than might first appear. 
Thirdly, Jesus reiterates that the works are his Father's, underlining that there 
is `unity of action'291 and that Jesus' deeds are neither independent of the Father nor 
inconsistent with his will. 292 However, at another level, this can suggest that Jesus 
does the kind of things that God does - divine actions. Hence it is appropriate to recall 
Ridderbos 1997: 374 contests this, but understates the extent to which the sending language is tied to 
the uniqueness of Jesus' relationship with the Father. 
's9 E. g. CAr 111.10. See also CAr 1. 
290 Cf. Barrett 1978: 321. `John here refers back to v. 30... ' Compare Carson 1991: 400. 
"91 So Stibbe 1993: 118. 
292 Barrett 1978: 320 helpfully refers to ch. 8 and the principle that a son's actions resemble his father's. 
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chapter 5's discussion about Jesus doing the same kind of things on the Sabbath as his 
Father does. 293 Two factors suggest this idea of divine actions is included here: the 
subsequent reaction of verse 39 (see below) and the discussion in verse 28 of what 
Jesus will give his sheep, eternal life. 294 That appears to be a divine prerogative: the 
action is tied closely to the agent's identity. 295 
This unit closes with further action by the Jews (10: 39). They seek to stone 
him, but he moves `out of their hand' - an ironic contrast to the hand of the Father and 
Son, for nothing can remove one from there. This second taking of stones re-inforces 
the interpretation of verses 30f, since the Jews continue to think in terms of 
blasphemy. This strengthens the case against seeing the unity of verse 30 as simply 
referring to harmony of wills. 
Is Athanasius mishandling the text, as Calvin implies? No doubt John's 
discussion has been of the `functional' and `operative' rather than expressly 
metaphysical. 296 The question, of course, is how these `functions' can be performed 
without metaphysical implications. Calvin himself opens the door to this when 
commenting on 10: 37 and the statement that Jesus' works are those of the Father: 
He gives them this name, because those works were truly Divine, and because 
so great power shone in them, that they could not be ascribed to a man. 
297 
On that basis Carson's judgement is apt: `... some kind of metaphysical unity 
is presupposed. '298 Athanasius draws this out less by extended contextual exegesis, 
but rather by reading the passage in the light of chapter 14: 9 and 10. This seems 
203 Developed by Carson 1991: 399f. 
294 Again, a theme of chapter 5. 
19-i Especially when in the context of 10: 18 which refers to Jesus being able to take up his life again. 
296 Brown 1971 1: 407 comments of 10: 30 `... it is a unity of power and operation. ' 
297 Calvin Translation Society. 
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legitimate given the links between the two passages. 299 It has, however, been 
observed in this discussion of John 10: 30 that another cognate passage is the Sabbath 
dispute of chapter 5. 
The foregoing material has noted the way that chapter 5 relates to both chapter 
10: 22-39 and 14: 8-11. Chapter 5 itself seems self-contained, 300 sandwiched between 
the Galilee material of 4: 46-54 and 6: 1 ff. The content contrasts both with what 
immediately precedes, 301 and with the other Sabbath healing that John records. 302 The 
tone is strongly forensic, with terminology of evidence and accusation. 303 The chapter 
moves from Jesus as `defendant' (5: 17ff) to the accusers becoming accused in their 
turn (5: 45 fl, 304 
The unit starts with a deceptively straightforward healing miracle (5: 1-9a). 305 
The sting comes when verse 9b states the day, the Sabbath. This immediately changes 
the tone for the reader, since what had appeared unproblematic now has the colour of 
illegality. 306 It is scarcely surprising that an investigation into legality follows, 
culminating in the Jews' discovery that it was Jesus who had healed and instructed 
298 Carson 1991: 395. Also Stibbe 1993: 118 `... this [sc. v. 30] is to be interpreted as a claim for 
ontological equality... ' 
299 Obviously the preferable exegetical strategy is to work both with the cognate passage and the 
immediate context. 
300 So Witherington 1995: 133. 
301 In 4: 46-54 Jesus is sought, is in Galilee (associated often with faith), and discovers the ruler's faith. 
In ch. 5 Jesus seeks out the paralytic, is in Jerusalem (associated with disbelief) and is delated by the 
one he heals to disbelieving authorities. 
302 In ch. 9 the man born blind wants to believe vv. 35-38. 
303 So J. Neyrey 1988: 11 and Witherington 1995: 136. Neyrey even talks of a formal process, while 
Witherington sees it as informal. 
304 See Witherington 1995: 136. 
305 Barrett 1978: 208 notes the similarity to many synoptic miracles. 
306 See Ridderbos 1997: 187 on the illegality of carrying objects on the Sabbath. 
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the man (verses 10-15). Verse 16 then summarises that the Jews persecuted307 Jesus 
for doing this on the Sabbath . 
308 
Verses 17-19 report Jesus' initial defence to this charge of Sabbath-breaking. 
He answers that his Father continues to work and so does he. Impliedly this appeals 
to the principle that God `works' on the Sabbath without breaching it, exercising his 
unique creative and judging powers. 309 
Two issues lurk in Jesus' words. One is his relation with the Father, which is 
immediately pursued in verse 18, and the other is the nature of the works Jesus does 
on the Sabbath. This issue is developed in verses 19-30. 
The Jews' reaction in verse 18 treats Jesus' defence as exacerbation, not 
exculpation. It provides another, greater, reason for seeking his death. 310 
Illuminatingly, they focus on the claim to a filial relationship, which they interpret as 
Jesus `making himself equal to God. -)311 It is this charge that Jesus answers in verses 
19ff. 312 
Notably, personal distinction is preserved. Jesus has not been understood as 
saying he is the same as God, but equal to God. `Equal' suggests another to whom 
one is equal. Next, there is the formula `making himself, implying Jesus simply 
307 A possible translation of F- ' (oicov would be `prosecute': Harvey 1976: 50 and Witherington 
1995: 139. 
308 The verb for `doing' is once again Jtoi£iv but here it is not yet loaded with the same significance as 
later in the chapter. 
309 Compare Neyrey 1988: 22-26; Brown 19711: 217. 
310 This becomes a theme running through subsequent chapters, that the Jews wish to kill Jesus. Barrett 
1978: 214 suggests sabbath-breaking was a 'comparatively trivial offence' as against what had just been 
said. 
31 1'1 ov £Clv'LÖV itoi 
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claims this for himself. This strongly recalls Adam's pride and rebellion in his 
attempt to be like God. 313 'Likeness' language is, of course, immensely important in 
OT monotheism. Creatures are not `like' God, a frequently recurring point. 314 
`Likeness', though, again implies distinction, and so saying one is `like' God means 
setting oneself as `another' god, beside Yahweh, 31 5 In that way Jesus' claim prima 
facie infringes biblical monotheism, for someone other than God is claiming likeness. 
Athanasius' own concepts of monotheism co-incide with this. 316 
Jesus' defence from verse 19 unfolds interestingly. The crucial point is 
indicated by the inclusio between verses 19a and 30a, that the Son 'does' 317 nothing 
on his own. 318 This meets the `making himself equal' charge (5: 18). If the Son `does' 
nothing on his own, that includes the `making' of verse 18, so Jesus has not acted 
independently in claiming God as his Father. 319 If he has not acted independently, 
with whom has he acted and how? Verse 19b provides the answer: what Jesus does he 
does because he sees the Father doing it. The Son does `like' actions. 320 This 
establishes a central principle for what follows. The Son does `like' actions - the 
actions that are the divine prerogative - but does so, not independently, but at the 
Father's behest. Jesus then describes in verses 21-29 just the `prerogative' actions of 
God, giving life and exercising judgement. 
312 See Stibbe 1993: 77-78; Neyrey 1988: 20. 
313 Brown 1971 1: 213. 
314 Note the use of the ogou group in this connection. God cannot be `likened': Isa 40: 18,25; 46: 5, 
and the king of Babylon is judged for his attempt to liken himself to God (Isa 14: 14). For the thought 
but different terms see also Ezek 28: 2,6. Jer 10: 6,7 (not in LXX); 49: 19 (=30: 13 in LXX ii5 d)'ßnEp 
Ey(o; ); 50: 44 (= LXX 27: 44 ti dianEp Eyth; ) 51: 19 (= LXX 28: 19 ou ioiavirl JEpiS'w ICE OI3). 
315 Thus the king of Babylon (Isa 14: 14) and the king of Tyre (Ezek. 28) are not necessarily claiming to 
be Yahweh, but to be 'another'. 
316 See e. g. CG 6 on `another god besides' and CAr 111.4 on an external god being `another' god. 
317 11ol£iv again. 
318 S. Pancaro 1975: 209 draws attention to the inclusio. Neyrey 1988: 16f discerns a slightly different 
pattern. 
319 C£ e. g. Carson 1991: 250. 
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It is important here to advert to the shaliach or agency principle. 321 After all, 
an agent can represent his sender without being ontologically equal. The classic 
biblical example is Moses, made `like God' to Pharaoh (Exodus 7: 1). 322 Agency 
principles are certainly strongly suggestive for passages like this one, for example in 
the way that an agent is like the one who sent him, but is obedient to his sender. 323 
However, for Borgen this may not entail being content with Arian explanations, for 
he points out that specifically the Son is sent and he is a heavenly figure who 
descends, not simply an obedient man. 324 One may add that the full vesting of these 
particular powers, as well as the Son being worshiped as the Father is (5: 23), suggests 
something beyond a merely human shaliach. 325 
The theme that the Son is no independent rival is finally repeated in verse 30b 
- the Son seeks the will of him who sent him. Therefore, to refuse to accept Jesus as 
the Son who rightly does these things on the Sabbath does not uphold, but defies, 
God's honour (5: 23b). Those so refusing the Son are revealed ultimately as God's 
enemies. 326 Importantly, verse 30b finally and decisively glosses the lack of 
independence initially mentioned in verse 19. That lack of independence is not simply 




321 Associated particularly with Borgen's essay 1970. 
322 Cited by Carson 1991: 249.... 5E8coxä ae 9Föv «apacw... 
323 Borgen 1970: 138f 
324 See 3: 13,31; 6: 46. 
325 Thus. an angel could be described as a shaliach but must not be worshipped. 
326 Stibbe 1993: 77. Elsewhere he describes such a person as theomachus 1993: 118. 
327 See Carson 1991: 250 and 259. Compare Jn 4: 34 and 6: 38. 
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This primacy continues in 5: 31 ff where Jesus discusses testimony about 
himself. He is not self-attesting (verse 3 1). 328 Instead there is other testimony, notably 
that of the Baptist (5: 33), of the works (5: 36) and of the scriptures (5: 39). Yet, finally, 
these testimonies all originate in God. 329 The Father provides testimony to the Son, 
that he is the Son. 
330 
The chapter closes with the tables turned. 33 1 At verse 19 Jesus was defending 
himself against charges of blasphemy. By verse 45 Jesus points to the indictment 
against his accusers, that they have not listened to Moses, something associated with 
their seeking glory from each other and not from God (5: 44). 
Several features merit comment. First, the relation between words and works. 
In chapter 10: 33 the Jews drive a wedge, as it were, between Jesus' words and works: 
their objection focuses on the blasphemy of his words, not his works. Yet here in 
chapter 5 the works present the initial problem, but are legitimated by Jesus' words as 
divine prerogatives. 
Secondly, those divine prerogatives are not asserted to rival the Father. Jesus' 
defence is that he asserts these things not in independence of, but in obedience to, his 
Father. 332 This is part of the Gospel's general pattern. His mission, 
333 his words, 
334 his 
328 Jesus does not pose as an independent authority: Barrett 1978: 220. Similarly H. Odeberg 1929: 219 
and Carson 1991: 259. 
329 Brown 1971 1: 227. 
330 That Jesus is the Son is above all `the truth' to which the Baptist testifies (5: 33 in the light of 1: 29- 
34, esp. v 34). 
331 See e. g. Brown 1971 1: 229. 
332 In particular note the legitimation of Jesus' sonship in ch. 8 where obedience to his Father is its 
hallmark (8: 38,47). 
33' 7: 28 and 8: 42. 
334 7: 17f, 8: 38,12: 49 and 14: 10. 
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supporting testimony335 and his works336 are all not independent but in conformity 
with his Father's will. The Gospel presupposes and vigorously asserts a divine 
monarchy. 
5.7. Conclusions 
Athanasius' basic theology provides these constraints for a trinitarian account: 
1. the difference between created and uncreated creator; 
2. the consequent need to preserve God's monarchy (although this is not his 
terminology); and 
3. the need to ensure and respect a true knowledge of God through the 
Incarnation of the Christ. 
His understanding of the eternal filial relation is integral to satisfying these 
constraints. Since a `Son' is not necessarily a creature, he can assert that the Second 
Person may be distinct from the Father but uncreated. Athanasius combines this 
distinction of Persons in a filial relationship with a pattern of derivation. The Son has 
no independent, rival sovereignty, but derives his rule as something the Father gives. 
As a `true' son, the Son does his Father's will and carries it out. Hence the divine 
monarchy is upheld. Further, as Son, the Son derives his nature from his Father and 
so must be truly `like', indeed the same, in essence as his Father. This gives 
Athanasius' account of the Trinity a patrocentic orientation. This is reflected in his 
account of the primacy accorded to the Father's will, while the Father's loving 
generosity to his Son, although present, is less emphasised. 
"' 5: 3 1 ff, 8: 18. 
336 5: 19,30 and 8: 28. 
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While distinct, Father and Son are nevertheless inseparable and this is 
reflected in their joint works of creation and in the Incarnation. This repels 
polytheistic associations that might arise from the idea of personally distinct spheres 
of operation. 
This understanding of Sonship is warranted because the Scriptures, especially 
John's Gospel, provide a description of the relations between the Persons, which in 
turn furnishes a rationale for the fulness and adequacy of revelation in the incarnate 
Son. This preserves the knowledge of God, which was so important to Athanasius 
soteriologically. 
This presentation is authentically johannine. For in John's Gospel the Son has 
full divine powers with respect to creation and is, of course, presented as uncreated, 
yet God's monarchy is preserved, because the Son's relation to the Father is precisely 
that of a `Son', one who does what his Father does and does his will. Within this 
framework, an exclusively ethical account of the Father-Son relation does not 
adequately account for the divine prerogatives, but a union of substance with 
concomitant ethical relations does. 
Hence, for all the peculiarity of Athanasius' citations, his trinitarian account is 
consistent with, and supportive of, his account of monotheism, drawn as it is from his 
understanding of the unchanging, simple, creator. There are two important 
corollaries: this is a strongly monarchical account, in which the monarchy is an 
eternal feature. Further, the economic relations are indeed revelatory of the immanent. 
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CHAPTER 6: HILARY OF POITIERS AND PERFECT BIRTH 
FROM A PERFECT GOD 
It is proposed that: 
6(a). Hilary's account of God's nature dominates his trinitarian theology, 
because the Son is generated `ofthis nature. 
6(b). God is presented as a fully self-authoring and infinite being who is 
unknowable through human speculation. 
6(c). Knowledge of this God is nevertheless necessary for human felicity. 
6(d). Accordingly this fully self-authoring being can be known only through 
his own self-disclosure, which takes place in the Incarnation of his Son. 
6(e). Since God is fully self-authoring, there can be no externality that is 
independent of him or more powerful than him. 
6(f). Since God is a fully self-authoring being who is perfect, he begets 
perfectly without division in that his begotten Son must partake perfectly of his 
nature and he himself continues to do so. 
6(g). Hilary'S trinitarian account heavily utilises language of derivation (`of) 
and in-dwelling, grounding the latter in the former. 
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6(h). Derivation by generation from such a God precludes both God being 
solitary and also ditheism. 
6(i). Ditheism is excluded by developing johannine `of' and 'in' terminology, 
which together negate externality between Father and Son, while upholding 
personal inseparability and asymmetrical distinction. 
6(j). Hilary envisages order in the eternal relation between Father and Son 
because the Incarnation, his source of revelation for Trinitarian relations, 
reveals this. 
6(k). The `of' and `in' terminology protects Hilary's account of the Father-Son 
relationship from ontological subordination because, while the Son obeys, he 
obeys as a son, and does not obey an external independent being. 
6(l). The Son 's works in the economy are presented as also works of the in- 
dwelling and inseparable Father. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Hilary of Poitiers' writes: `[My soul] was inflamed with a passionate desire to 
apprehend Him or to know Him. '2 It is clear why. All Hilary's hopes ultimately fix on 
God, 3 particularly the hope of eternal life, 4 since there is no eternal life without 
knowing God. 5 True knowledge of God thus matters enormously for Hilary. 6 
There is, however, a problem. This God is not easy to know, for he is infinite. 
Hilary writes: 
For it seemed that the greatness of God so far surpassed the mental powers of 
His handiwork, that however far the limited mind of man might strain in the 
hazardous effort to define Him, the gap was not lessened between the finite 
nature which struggled and the boundless infinity that lay beyond its ken... 7 
Hilary presents himself in De Trinitate as realising this independently of Scripture, 8 
but adds that he finds it confirmed there, citing Psalm 139.9 Is there not, therefore, an 
awful problem, that, while our hope lies in this infinite God, his infinity renders him 
undiscoverable? God's very character and nature create the problem. 
Hilary's answer is that true knowledge of God is found through his Son. His 
fears of extinction are answered as he contemplates Scripture's teaching about the Son 
' R. Hanson 1988b: 459 notes the paucity of information about Hilary's personal life, estimating his 
birth 310-320 and his death ca. 367 (1988: 468). 
2 De Trinitate (hereafter Del) 1.3. The Latin text is that of Cerf 2001, and the English translation that of 
NPFF 2nd series. 
3 DeTI. 3. 
4 DeT I. 9 and 10. See DeT 111.14 on John 17: 3. 
5 DeT 111.14 notes that eternity of life involves knowing the true God and the Son he sent (quoting. 
John 17: 3). In DeT I. 11 Hilary refers to knowledge of Father and Son as cognitio salutaris. 
6 Cf. Meijering 1982: 23. 
7 DeTI. 6. A. Harman 1973: 388 remarks that God transcends human thought and speech. 
8 Doubts have been voiced about whether DeT I. 1 ff is intended as a historical autobiography. 
9 DeT I. 6. 
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of God in John 1: 1-14.10 The Incarnation is indispensable for our knowledge of God: 11 
for the Son has the fulness of the Godhead (plenitudo divinitatis) 12 and so reveals God 
the Father. Further, the true Son alone knows God the Father truly. ' 3 The Son's own 
divinity makes this knowledge of the infinite possible. This underlines the 
extraordinary danger Hilary sees in Arian thinking: a Son who is ultimately only a 
creature, albeit uniquely exalted, and therefore no `true' son, cannot provide salvific 
knowledge. The soteriological considerations here resemble those found in 
Athanasius. 
The question, though, is how there can be a true Son. Hilary's basic 
explanation uses exactly that feature creating the original epistemological and 
soteriological problem, the nature and character of God. This perfect and infinite God 
can only generate perfectly. The Son can therefore do what he does because he is 
perfect, and he is perfect because he is born from the perfect. 14 
This in turn means the doctrine of God the Father is foundational for Hilary. 
Generation certainly is a focal point for Hilary, 15 as Fortman argues, from which he 
can repel heretical criticisms, but it can only play that role because of the nature and 
character of the God who generates. This nature helps determine both Hilary's 
theological method and the contours of his trinitarian theology. Consideration, 
therefore, must start with God's nature. 
° DeT I. 10. 
" D. Bertrand 1997: 399. 
'2 DeT 1.113 and IIL 17. 
13 Hilary Ps 53. Para 6. The Son `... qui solus patrem vidit, qui solus patrem scit... ' Cp. C. Borchardt 
1966: 66. 
14 DeT Il. 11, De S'nodis (hereafter DeS) 22. P. Burns 1993: 26 notes just this. 
15 Fortman 1972: 129. 
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6.2. The Nature and Character of God in Hilary 
6.2.1. The Infinity of God 
Both Meijering' 6 and J. McDermott'7 stress infinity in Hilary's account of 
God, such that Meijering can treat God's infinity as the Leitmotiv gathering Hilary's 
various themes into a systematic unity. 18 
Undoubtedly infinity is central to Hilary's conception of God. It appears early 
in De Trinitate 1.6, and stimulates Hilary's joy and awe in worship, '9 while precluding 
unaided human comprehension. 20 Nevertheless, to say that this is the Leitmotiv risks 
over-statement, at least without an examination of how Hilary constructs his case. 
6.2.2. Hilary's construction of his doctrine of God - God's Self- 
Authorship 
Two passages are extremely significant. The first is De Trinitate 1.4-8, and the 
second De Trinitate 11.6-7. Regarding the first, a slight complication is that some 
considerations Hilary mentions relate to his pre-conversion life and the `knowledge' 
he had there. Is Hilary committing the methodological fallacy he later castigates in the 
Arians, covertly starting with human reason? 21 Three considerations offset this. First, 
Hilary sees the insights of his pagan days confirmed but also surpassed by Scripture, 22 
especially Exodus 3: 14. Secondly, his pre-conversion insight is essentially negative - 
16 Meijering 1982: 14 on infinity in DeT I, but more generally 1982: 183f. 
17 McDermott 1973: 172. 
18 Meijering 1982: 183. 
19 DeT 1.7. 
20 DeT I. 6. 
1 See Borchardt 1966: 46 on Hilary's criticisms of Arian use of reason. 
22 DeT I. S. 
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a God who transcends understanding. 23 Bertrand speaks rightly of a tension in the 
converted Hilary between apophaticism and knowing God, 24 but this pre-conversion 
`knowledge' is apophatic. Therefore, thirdly, this pre-conversion knowledge is not 
salvific. Saving knowledge is of God as Father, ex hypothesi unavailable in pure 
apophaticism. 25 
De Trinitate 1.4-8 does not start with God's infinity. Rather, Hilary refers to 
God's self-existence. Thus in 1.4 he canvasses some pagan possibilities: that God 
exists, but is unconcerned with the universe; and that there are gendered divinities 
who procreate. The first he rejects as unworthy of God, 26 since God's creation of the 
cosmos implies concern. The second he envisages as absurd, for sexual gender 
implies some lack in the power of the divine nature. 27 He then justifies this in a 
significant way: 
[For] that which is self-existent cannot have left outside itself [extra se] anything 
superior to itself. Hence omnipotence and eternity are the possession of One 
only, for omnipotence is incapable of degrees of strength or weakness, and 
eternity of priority or succession. In God we must worship absolute eternity and 
absolute power. 
This suggests Hilary's basic concept is God's self-existence, a relatively 
uncontroversial starting-point in Hilary's setting. 28 From this he generates (an apt 
term in Hilary) several points. First, most obviously, the absence of gender in the 
divine being. The term translated in the NPNF series `without distinction of sex' is 
indifferens, translatable more broadly as undifferentiated. 29 Secondly, there is God's 
23 Harman 1973: 388. 
24 Bertrand 1997: 394. 
`5 DeT I. 17. 
26 Compare Athanasius' arguments in De Inc. 6ff on what is worthy of the creator. 
27 Perhaps because another independent being is needed for completeness and satisfaction. 
28 One recalls. naturally, the Arian stress on God's uncreated, unoriginated nature. 
29 G. Durand, C. Morel and G. Pelland in their French translation prefer `indivisible'. 2001 I: 211. 
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oneness, 30 a central point of debate between Hilary and the Arians31 and Sabellians. 
32 
Thirdly, there is God's omnipotence and fourthly, his eternity. 
For Hilary these flow from the corollary of self-existence: [divinum et 
aeternum] nihil necesse est extra se quod sui essetpraestantius reliquisset. It is worth 
pondering briefly why Hilary thinks self-existence entails that nothing more excellent 
or powerful exists outside (extra)33 the self-existent being. It stems from Hilary's way 
of putting self-existence: 34 `id quod Bibi ad id quod esset auctor esset... ' - the divine is 
the author of what it is for itself. The divine defines itself completely and 
independently of external `others'. 
Hence, if another being existed who causes or could influence God's self- 
definition, this would preclude God from being fully his own author. This does not 
deny that God's character and nature have definite contours (goodness and so forth), 
but he is not dependent on something external (extra se) for them. 35 But since he is 
fully his own author, this does then preclude other beings more excellent than he. 
This also precludes composition, for no-one can `compose' God, who can be 
described as `one' in this sense. It further implies eternity, for if the divine being once 
30 See Meijering 1982: 29. 
31 It has been rightly observed that differences exist between the theology of Arius and his 
contemporaries and the theology of signatories to the Sirmium Creed: see e. g. D. H. Williams. Yet it 
remains that Hilary and other pro-Nicene writers felt that `Arian' still applied to `Homoian' theology. 
He is also content to quote extensively from Arius' letter to Alexander to set out the case he wishes to 
answer. Nor is it clear that pro-Nicenes thought this an empty, if useful, slander. Accordingly Hilary's 
designations are retained here since it is his theology that falls for investigation. See Appendix 5 for 
later Arianism and Homoianism. 
32 Hilary is well aware that Arians and Sabellians and orthodox appeal to the monotheistic text of Deut. 
6: 4. The debate is over what kind of monotheism. 
33 One notes the language of externality (compare Athanasius). See 6.5.3. below. 
34 The NPNF translation tends to compress and flatten out Hilary's thought here. 
35 Again, compare externality in Athanasius. 
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was not, then it would, presumably, be absurd to envisage self-authorship: there 
would be no self to be author. Hence Hilary can support an anterior eternity. 
Posterior eternity tends also to follow since nothing could deflect a fully self- 
authoring being from being what he is. Thus eternity and omnipotence are closely 
related outcomes of this self-authorship. That is where Hilary rests his argument in 
De Trinitate 1.4. `In God we must worship absolute eternity and absolute power. '36 
Here one approaches the concept of divine monarchy, albeit not the terminology. 37 
The priority attached to self-existence continues in the next section. Quoting 
Exodus 3: 14,38 he comments: 
For no property of God which the mind can grasp is more characteristic of Him 
than existence, since existence, in the absolute sense, cannot be predicated of 
that which shall come to an end, or of that which has had a beginning. 39 
Again anterior and posterior eternity are linked with an existence unqualified by 
externalities. Hilary only later develops infinity and the epistemological difficulties 
that arise for finite creatures trying to grasp the infinite. 40 God's infinity does not 
simply refer to God's physical unboundedness and his total presence throughout his 
cosmos, although Hilary upholds these, 41 but can also be related to his eternity and 
omnipotence, founded on his full `self-authorship'. To that extent Meijering's 
original contention42 is defensible only by expanding the connotations of infinity. It 
is, perhaps, preferable to retain Meijering's right stress on the importance of the 
36 
... in 
Deo autem nihil nisi aeternum potensque esse venerandum. ' Again the NPNF translation is 
quite bold. 
37 Hanson 1988b: 472 rightly points to considerable influences from Tertullian. This is notably present 
in the exegesis of John 10: 30. 
38 Ego sum qui sum and is qui est. esst 
39 Non enim aliudproprium magis Deo quamLintellegeretur, quia idipsum quod est neque desinentis est 
aliquando neque coepti. 
4°DeTI. 6. 
41 DeT 1.6. Inest interior, excedit exterior. 
42 Meijering 1982: 183£ 
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doctrine of God's nature and character as an integrating and over-arching factor, but 
based on God's full self-authorship. 
The second major passage in De Trinitate to discuss the being and attributes 
of God, 11.6-7, confirms this stress on God's `self-existence'. He begins: 
It is the Father to Whom all existence owes its origin. In Christ and through 
Christ He is the source of all. In contrast to all else He is self-existent. He does 
not draw His being from without, but possesses it from Himself and in Himself. 
He is infinite, for nothing contains Him and He contains all things; He is 
eternally unconditioned by space, for He is illimitable; eternally anterior to time, 
for time is His creation. 43 
The starting-point is again God's distinctive self-existence as author of all. This self- 
existence again is glossed as independence from external contribution or influence. 44 
This in turn suggests his self-sufficiency in terms of his self-definition. 45 This leads 
Hilary again to the difficulties in comprehending such an infinite God: 
Let imagination range to what you may suppose is God's utmost limit, and you 
will find Him present there; strain as you will there is always a further horizon 
towards which to strain. 46 
This is followed by the transcendence that God's eternity provides, with the 
consequence that human reason cannot comprehend God. 47 
Gird up your intellect to comprehend Him as a whole; He eludes you, God, as a 
whole, has left something within your grasp, but this something is inextricably 
involved in His entirety. Thus you have missed the whole, since it is only a part 
which remains in your hands; nay, not even a part, for you are dealing with a 
whole which you have failed to divide. For a part implies division, a whole is 
undivided, and God is everywhere and wholly present wherever He is. Reason, 
therefore, cannot cope with Him, since no point of contemplation can be found 
outside Himself and since eternity is eternally His. 
This partly re-states De Trinitate 1.4-6, but here God's indivisibility is more 
prominent. Such complete self-authorship, implying omnipotence, 
48 means no-one 
43 DeT II. 6. 
44 
... non aliunde quod 
est sum ens.. 
45 
... sed 
id quod est ey se adque in se obtinens. 
46 DeT II. 6. 
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could divide such a God. Yet posterior eternity, which Hilary also links with such 
self-authorship, also tends to preclude God dividing himself. God is then indivisible. 
This will provide an extremely important parameter for divine generation, as well as 
relating closely to divine unchangeability. 49 
M. Figura and J. Doignon summarise this doctrine of God thus: 
Dieu le Pere est eternel, insaisissable, infini, invisible, parfait. Il est, par rapport 
au Fils, inengendre et innascible. 50 
This rightly lists specific items, but understates the logical connections of these 
attributes arising from God's independent self-authorship. It is the method for coming 
to know this God that we now address. 
6.3. Method and Coming to Know God 
Hilary envisages Scripture as God's self-attestation51 and accordingly spends 
some time discussing its right handling. This is necessitated by the way the heretics 
also cite the Word of God. 52 The debate does not centre on producing new and 
unexpected texts, 53 but rather on interpreting and handling old favourites and on 
synthesising them. 54 Differing interpretation was not adiaphorous. Hilary must, then, 
establish there is a wrong way to handle the right text. 
47 Compare Harman 1973: 388. 
48 See on DeT 1.4 above. 
49 The importance of which is rightly stressed by Meijering 1982: 129. 
50 Figura and Doignon 2001: 83. 
51 E. g. DeT IV. 14. 
52 Borchardt 1966: 48, Meijering 1982: 68f. 
53 When DeT was composed the Arian controversy was about 35 years old. No doubt there were few 
textual `surprises' by then. 
sa In particular Hilary accepts Deut 6: 4 as a point of departure. His point is that the Arians and 
Sabellians are wrong about the monotheism it proposes. See DeT IV. 15 where he comments of the 
heretics' citation of Deut 6: 4 `... is this a truth which anyone has ever dared to doubt? ' 
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6.3.1. Coming to Know God Wrongly 
Borchardt rightly sets out four factors that Hilary considers contribute to the 
heretics' wrong handling of scripture. 55 Hilary's starting point is that the biblical text 
is not intrinsically defective: `the crime comes from the construction not the word'. 56 
First, and perhaps most importantly, Hilary deplores how heretics bring their 
own preconceptions to the text. They interpret according to their own wish. 57 His 
example is how the words `Father', `Son' and `Holy Spirit' are evacuated of their 
proper meaning. Presumably he has in mind the preconception that God simply cannot 
be a `real' Father. 
For Hilary, the doctrine of God suggests this is defective. Since God surpasses 
human comprehension, one simply cannot approach him with preconceptions: 
... 
[We] eschew all blasphemous and reckless assertions concerning God and 
cleave to the very letter of revelation. 58 
Instead, God must, in Hilary's celebrated terms, be the witness to himself. We either 
know him as he chooses or not at all. 59 Paradoxically, Arianism, so often associated 
with asserting God's transcendence, is accused of failing to respect just that in its 
theological method. 
Borchardt's second factor is that Arians quote texts in isolation. 60 This 
fragments God's witness, and constitutes a `stringing together of isolated phrases'. 61 
Instead one phrase should be interpreted by another, and so on, giving a contextual 
ss Borchardt 1966: 49. 
56 `. et sensus, non sermo fit crimen. ' DeT I1.3. 
57 DeT II. 3.. pro voluntatis suae sensu, non pro veritatis ipsius absolutione. 
58 DeT IV. 14. 
S9 DeT I. 18. 
60 DeT IV. 14. 
61 DeT IV. 14. 
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analysis tending to maximise coherence. Coherence and consistency in his self- 
disclosure are, of course, to be expected from the single, omnipotent and eternal God 
Hilary has earlier outlined. His own perfect singularity might well suggest a similar 
singularity in the sum of his self-disclosures. 
This does not necessarily mean that the heretics' case will be incoherent. The 
coherence will, though, be the reader's. The catena of isolated texts referred to in De 
Trinitate IV. 14 will be the result of wanting particular answers. Hilary suggests that 
desire forestalls reason, 62 and that in practice `we set up our desires as doctrines', 
rather than letting `our doctrine dictate our desires'. 63 This results in using Scripture to 
discover what one fancies, not what one ought to learn. 64 Hilary sees this as fulfilling 
the description of 2 Timothy 4: 3 f. 65 
This raises some interesting features. First, concerning reason. Later Arianism 
especially has sometimes been associated with a kind of rationalism: it is 
inconceivable to the human mind that God could generate a Son, so he did not, putting 
the argument very crudely. Hilary's point is that in fact heretics (in which he would 
certainly include Arianism) subtly prefer desire to reason. 
Secondly, if we consult the Bible only to confirm existing desires, this 
precludes our learning anything new. The Bible would cease to function as revelation 
from another person of himself, which is disastrous when the revealer is an infinite 
God encountering finite minds. 
62 DeT X. 1. 
63 DeT X. 1. 
64DeTX. 2. 
65 DeT X. 3. 
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Thirdly, Hilary observes that appealing to the Bible becomes a mere veneer of 
truth and piety. 66 We appear to listen to God's self-disclosure, but the authority of 
divine revelation merely cloaks what in reality are our desires. 
This relates to Borchardt's fourth point, that humans declare war on the Word 
of God. 67 Hilary contends that humans would, if they could, `pluck God from his 
throne', but, being unable to do so physically, we display this in our treatment of 
God's words. Here, one has moved from preconception, or the arbitrariness of isolated 
texts, or from the preference of one's desire, to a fundamentally malign motivation. 
Hilary has a well-developed `hermeneutics of suspicion' directed against the heretics. 
In the background are the principles that God must be his own witness, 68 a 
necessity born of his infinite character, and that we must recognise this in faith, 69 
rather than rebelliousness. 70 This is very suggestive for considering the right way of 
coming to know God through his Scripture. 
6.3.2. Coming to Know God Rightly 
Naturally Hilary advocates approaching Scripture without preconceptions. 7' To 
a modern reader this sounds like yearning for pre-suppositionless hermeneutics. He 
was certainly acutely aware of the heretics' deep-rooted biases, 72 but doubtless was 
66 DeT X . 
2. 
67 DeT 111.2 1. 
68 E. g. DeT I. 18. 
69 Cf. Borchardt 1966: 51 If 
70 DeT III. 1. 
71 DeT 1.18. 
72 See above on DeT III. 21. 
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less aware how difficult it is to shed, or even spot, these presuppositions. Has he fully 
realised the orthodox too have presuppositions? 
However, this risks unfairness, and not just in applying anachronistic standards 
of hermeneutics. De Trinitate I. 18 asks not so much for presuppositionless exegesis, 
but rather for exegesis with correct presuppositions. Hilary has two in view. One is 
that we start from the perspective that we are dealing with God and must adjust our 
thoughts accordingly, remembering we are `judging as of infinity'. 73 Thus his method 
reflects his overarching doctrine of God. 74 God is his own best witness and we must 
use the forms of speech about himself that he has given. 75 
The second presupposition is a much more general rule: 
For he is the best student who does not read his thoughts into the book, but lets 
it reveal its own; who draws from it its sense, and does not import his own into 
it, nor force upon its words a meaning he had determined was the right one 
before he opened its pages. 76 
This rule maximises the integrity of the text's own meaning. It stands sharply opposed 
to some modem thoughts that the reader is the author, either as something that is 
inevitable, or as something that is ethically desirable. Assuming the text conveys the 
author's meaning, Hilary's rule is strongly personalist, allowing and respecting the 
meaning of another to be recognised, rather than suppressed. 
Interestingly, both rules can broaden, not restrict, interpretation. One does not 
reject a meaning because one thinks it simply impossible (the finite must be wary of 
judging the infinite) or contrary to one's own desires (one is looking for the thoughts 
73 DeT I. 18. 
74 In support of Meijering's contention 1982: 183, with the qualifications mentioned above about the 
wider associations of `infinity. ' 
75 Harman 1973: 390. 
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of the other, not one's own). This is perfectly intelligible given Hilary's need to ensure 
divine generation is not ruled out a priori. 
In contrast to the heretics, Hilary undertakes not to de-contextualise scriptural 
texts. 77 For words `must be explained by circumstances, not circumstances forced into 
conformity with words'. 78 This prompts three observations. First, Hilary does indeed 
try to deal at crucial points with the circumstances when particular words are spoken. 
A good example is his handling of John 5: 17-19, where he stresses that verse 17 must 
be related to the Sabbath breach earlier in the chapter, and verse 19 to the enmity of 
the Jews mentioned in verse 18.79 Of course, he does not do this every time he 
mentions a text for he returns repeatedly to the same texts. 
Secondly, Hilary provides in De Trinitate IV. 15ff an example of a broader 
kind of context. Taking the seminal text of Deuteronomy 6: 4 he analyses how that 
verse must be construed given what Moses says elsewhere (notably the plural forms 
in the creation account). 80 From this he concludes that the `Mosaic' books themselves 
are against the heretics' interpretation of Deuteronomy 6: 4.81 
From there Hilary moves to the still broader context of other Old Testament 
corpora, notably Psalm 44: 882 and Isaiah 45: 11-16.83 The order is suggestive: Hilary 
deals with the closer context first (the `Mosaic' literature), before moving wider. To 
76 De T I. 18 . " DeT IV. 14. 
78 DeT IV. 14 `... quia non sermoni res sed rei est sermo subiectus. ' 
79 DeT VII. 17. 
80 From DeT IV. 16. 
81 DeTIV. 34. 
82 DeTIV. 35. 
83 DeT IV. 38-41. Isaiah 45.11-16 is significant for Hilary given its role here and in DeT V. 38. 
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that extent his contextual work ultimately relates to the canon, but this is evidently 
somewhat nuanced. 
Such a canonical context suggests, thirdly, the need to synthesise different 
texts. 84 An example is De Trinitate 11.10 where John 14: 28,10: 30,14: 8ff and John 
1: 18 are brought together. These are very much the usual references of pro-Nicene 
theologians, but, as will be described below, Hilary welds them together to make a 
coherent case. These attempts to provide context, both immediate and canonical, tend 
to mitigate the charge that Hilary, just like the heretics, merely has his own catena of 
isolated texts. 
It naturally follows from these remarks on context that words should bear their 
contextual meaning. This is particularly sensitive for Hilary. He observes that we are 
baptised as Christians into the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 85 This is the God 
we know. However, the heretics, he observes, empty this baptismal formula of 
meaning. 86 This means we are baptised in a name which does not reflect the truth 
about God. For a race whose felicity lies in knowing God, 87 this is salvifically 
disastrous. Hence a primary, specific concern that two particular words, Father and 
Son, be given their proper meaning lies behind Hilary's insistence that we find the 
true purport of scriptural words. 88 He writes: `we must emphasise the truth which 
those Names convey. ' 89 
84 M. Buttell 1933: 13 comments on Hilary's skill at synthesis. 
85 DeTII. 1. 
86 DeTII. 5. 
87DeTI. 3,9,10. 
88 E. g. DeT IV. 14. 
89 DeT 11.5. ... nos naturam nominum proferamus. 
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He understands that this involves using human language and is not entirely 
straightforward: 
We are well aware that neither the speech of men nor the analogy of human 
nature can give us a full insight into the things of God. 90 
He concedes that human speech characteristically deals with matters within our 
compass, the finite things within our world. Nevertheless, this is offset by his 
conviction that in Scripture we have words God chose for his self-attestation: 
We must make our choice between rejecting his witness, as the heathen do, or 
else believing in Him as He is, and this in the only possible way, by thinking of 
Him in the aspect in which He presents Himself to us. 91 
Hilary requires, then, a revealed theology. This is intimately related to his 
views of the transcendent, eternal and infinite God. His approach to Scripture reflects 
this, for he sees the Son revealing the truth about God, that he is Father-of-the-Son: 92 
this is the `name' of the God who sent Jesus. 
Subsequent questions doubtless would be concerned more with the possibility 
of revelation than with its need. The next question, therefore, is how such a God can 
reveal the truth about himself. This takes us to Hilary's magnum opus, the De 
Trinitate. 
90 DeT IV. 2. 
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6.4. The De Trinitate: Questions of Structure 
6.4.1 The Movement of Argument 
Some perceive a difference between Books 1-111 and IV-XII of De Trinitate. 93 
Books 1-111 have been described, with some justice, as a positive presentation of the 
baptismal faith, 94 while IV-XII refute Arian christology and provide a polemical 
explanation of orthodoxy against the texts the Arians used. 95 
Books I-III, however, do more than just present the baptismal faith of Matthew 
28: 19. Undoubtedly this is at the heart of Book 11,96 but Hilary has carefully framed 
the significance of the baptismal faith. His 'autobiography' 97 has indicated both the 
character and nature of the God of this faith and the importance of knowing him. 
Moreover, Book III develops the theme of the Father in the Son and the Son in the 
Father, 98 thereby linking the baptismal formula with the circumincession of Father and 
Son. 99 This implies that the reality of the baptismal words may be underpinned by this 
circumincession. John 14: 11 and 10: 38 therefore emerge as critical texts for Hilary. 
This positively presents the faith rather than purely refuting error, and 
demonstrates, as Meijering saw, Hilary's positive skills as a systematician who was 
not merely driven by his opponents' agenda. '°° This does not mean that Books I-III are 
polemic-free zones. Thus, I. 15-18 outlines heresies opposed to the faith Hilary wishes 
91 DeT IV. 14. 
92 DeT 111.17 on John 17: 6. 
93 E. g. Figura and Doignon 2001: 54 and S. Galtier 1960: 36. For considerations about structure and title 
of DeT, see Appendix 4. 
94 Figura and Doignon 2001: 54. Note the prominence of Mt. 28: 19. 
95 Figura and Doignon ibid. 
96 Introduced as its dominant theme in 1I. 1. 
97 The historicity of this is difficult to assess. While not intrinsically impossible, it certainly contains 
stylised features. 
98 111.1 states this, so to speak, as the topic. 
99 Not Hilary's term, but used here for convenience. 
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to express (I. 19) and heretical understandings are attacked as evacuating the baptismal 
formula of meaning. 101 The context of Book I makes this enormously serious, since it 
suggests that heretical christology means that claims to know God are empty. 102 The 
judgement that Books IV-XII are polemical103 is perhaps best seen as a matter of 
degree. 
Books 1-111, anyway, do not readily constitute a `stand-alone' composition. 
Hilary's acknowledgement that heretics have their own texts (albeit twisted from their 
true intention) 104 means he must deal with those texts, which is implicitly recognised 
in Book I as Hilary describes his lengthy plan for dealing with the problem. 
For Figura and Doignon, Books IV-XII also divide into two parts. '°5 The first 
part comprises Books IV-VI, which deal with Arius' letter to Alexander. 106 Here a 
particularly important contention is that the Old Testament supports orthodox readings 
of Deuteronomy 6: 4, and that the Son has true divinity (notably book V). 
The second block comprises Books VII-XII, characterised by Figura and 
Doignon as a series of ripostes to Arian counter-arguments. 107 Hilary himself draws 
attention to the importance of Book VII. 108 There he explores the orthodox unity of 
nature of Father and Son. The importance he attaches to the issue is intelligible given 
that here above all he must tread between Sabellian evaporation of personal 
ioo Meijering 1982: 183f. 
101 DeT II. 5. 
102 Arians and Sabellians alike end up denying the Son's divine generation. 
10; Galtier 1960: 36. 
104DeTII. 3. 
ios Figura and Doignon 2001: 55. 
106 The consistent reference to Arius' work is explicable on the grounds that Arius is the fons et origo 
of the heresy. 
107 Figura and Diognon 2001: 55. 
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distinction, and Arian assertions of personal distinction rendering Father and Son 
`unlike', or `not like in all respects'. 1 09 
In the course of this block, Hilary meets the arguments that the unity is merely 
of will (Book VIII), that the Son himself acknowledges inferiority (Book IX, 
especially important texts being John 5: 19 and 14: 28), and that the Son cannot be true 
God because of his sufferings (Book X' 10) Only in Book XII do we finally encounter 
the Arian flagship, Proverbs 8: 22. By then, Hilary's argument has both isolated the 
Arian interpretation of Proverbs 8: 22, and also lined up statements of Jesus supporting 
the orthodox view, so that the Arian interpretation is an evidently dissonant reading. 
Quintilian has been suggested as an influence on Hilary. ' 11 It is perhaps not over- 
cynical to see the overall structure of De Trinitate as accomplished rhetoric, one of 
whose objects is to render the Arian view of Proverbs 8: 22 solitary and implausible 
even before it is discussed. 
6.4.2. The Purpose of De Trinitate 
While Books I-III can be characterised as positive, even within them the 
work's controversial setting is clear. Hilary brackets Sabellian and Arian heresies 
together, 112 commenting `My soul has been burning to answer these insane attacks. ' 113 
This suggests both that the work's fundamental purposes include polemic and also 
something about the centre of controversy. For it is not immediately obvious why 
108 DeT VII. 1. 
109 The emphasised phrase helps demarcate the difference between innocent and guilty uses of 
homoiousios. 
110 It has been felt (very strongly by e. g. Hanson 1988b: 500f) that this is one of the less satisfactory 
areas of Hilary's christology. As stated above, the issue is the `reality' of Christ's sufferings. The logic, 
though, of Hilary's soteriology seems at places (e. g. Ps 53. para 13) that the Son must really die. 
... Discussed by Buttell 1933: 15ff, and Meijering 1982: 5, as a result of Jerome's comments. 
112 DeT I. 16. 
113DeT1.17. 
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Arians and Sabellians should be thus lumped together. Arians, after all, had enjoyed 
certain advantages in the controversy precisely because they could not be accused of 
Sabellianism. 14 Indeed, the Nicene homoousion was partly attacked just because of its 
`Sabellian' associations with Paul of Samosata. ' 15 Similarly, Sabellianism was at least 
not ontologically subordinationist as Arianism was. 
However, both deny that the Father is really Father and the Son really Son. 116 
Sabellians do so claiming that the Father is the Son, ' 17 while Arians do so by taking 
the sonship as adoptive only, but the net result is identical. Claiming to be loyal to 
God's unity, they both deny generation, and `... isolate a solitary God at the heart of 
the faith'. 118 The alternative, both argue, is two gods. 
This, then, helps define the area within which Hilary must establish his case: 
But we, divinely taught to confess neither two Gods nor yet a solitary God, will 
adduce the evidence of the Gospels and the prophets for our confession of God 
the Father and God the Son, united, not confounded, in our faith. We will not 
admit Their identity nor allow, as a compromise, that Christ is God in some 
imperfect sense; for God, born of God, cannot be the same as His Father, since 
He is His Son, nor yet can He be different in nature"9. 
Hilary consistently maintains this emphasis, that he proclaims neither a solitary God, 
nor two gods. ' 20 If God is solitary, of course, then the baptismal faith is illusory and 
we do not know him, for `Father', `Son' and `Holy Spirit' do not disclose the solitary 
114 A Son who is a creature clearly is not `the same' as the Creator. 
115 Compare Athanasius's efforts in this regard to distance homoousios from Samosatene taints. Note 
also Hilary's acknowledgement of such difficulties in DeTIV. 3ff. 
116 Galtier 1960: 82 makes this point about the Arians. 
'" Compare Tertullian on this. 
"8 DeT I. 16 and 17. 
119DeT1.17. 
120 Hanson 1988b: 484 rightly observes that the idea God is neither solitary nor diverse is Hilary's 
'watchword'. 
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reality. For Hilary, saving faith is in God the true Father and Jesus the true Son. 121 
Denying divine generation damages salvation. 122 
Therefore Arian and Sabellian theologies present a common target to Hilary, 
in their common belief that divine unity precludes generation. This leads back to the 
divine nature with which this unity is associated. 
6.5. Generation and the Divine Nature -`Of and `In' Terminology 
C. Kaiser illuminatingly proposes that Hilary largely interprets relations 
between Father and Son from two sets of distinctive johannine usages, the `of and 
`in' terminologies. ' 23 He rightly stresses that these usages are prominent, and they 
will be adopted as a framework for discussion, although supplemented in due course. 
6.5.1. Whose Son? - the Significance of `Of terms 
The heart of Hilary's case can be expressed shortly. The Son is who and what 
he is by virtue of his generation. He is born of God, of/from the substance of the 
Father. 124 This precludes being made of/from nothing or from any other substance 
than the Father, whether or not that alternative substance eternally pre-existed. 125 
Here, of course, Hilary adheres both to the positive statement of the original Nicene 
Creed ('of the substance of the Father') combined with its anathema section: those 
who say 
... that there was a 
time when the Son of God was not or that before he was 
begotten he was not, or that he was made of things that were not, or that he is of 
a different substance or essence [sc. from the Father] or that he is a creature, or 
121 DeT I. 17. 
122 Cp. D. H. Williams 2001: 171. 
123 Kaiser 1976: 240. 
124 DeS 88. See too DeS 79.84. 
125 DeT III. 3 . 
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subject to change or conversion - all that so say, the Catholic and Apostolic 
Church anathematizes them. 
This stress on `of-ness' means the Son must be considered in terms of his 
derivation. If the Son is `of the Father, ultimately attention focuses on the Father: 
one looks at the Father's nature to discern the Son's. So, what is the Father like? 
Hilary raises the matter thus: ' 26 
Est Filius ab eo Patre qui est, unigenitus ab ingenito, progenies a parente, vivus 
a vivo. Ut Patri vita in semetipso, ita et Filio data est vita in semetipso. 
Perfectus a perfecto, quia totus a toto. 
This is enormously enlightening. In the first sentence Hilary accumulates a series of 
a/ab clauses, the first of which qualifies the Father who generates as `He who is'. 
This echoes Hilary's earlier remarks on the self-authoring God127 whose absolute 
existence is affirmed in Exodus 3: 14128 in terms, inter alia, of `is qui est'. Hilary 
starts by recalling key thoughts about God's nature. Generation must be considered in 
that context. 
The Father is, of course, above all, alive, vivus (in the absolute sense of 
existing). This concept forms the hook for the next sentence, which describes the 
Father's life as `vita in semetipso'. This language of internality paraphrases Hilary's 
earlier thought that the Father depends on nothing external for his existence. 129Hilary 
can now combine his reflections on the Father's `vita' with the eternally generated 
`vita' of the Son. Here the echo is with John 5: 26130 and the `given' life of the Son. 131 
126 DeT IL 11. 
127 DeT I. 4. 
128 Quoted DeT I. 5. 
129 DeT I. 4-6. 
130 John 5 is a frequent port of call for Hilary. 
13' The Vulgate reads `sicut enim Pater habet 1vitam in semet ipso sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in 
seniet ipso', although of course Hilary would not 
have used this translation. The similarity of phrasing 
is nevertheless striking. 
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Both have this special kind of life `in semetipso', and such life, derived from nothing 
external, characterises divine being. 132 In effect Hilary combines Exodus 3: 14 with 
John 5: 26, glossing the absolute `qui est' with `vita in semetipso'. 
Several reflections arise. First, Hilary has indeed preserved the `giving' 
language of John 5: 26.133 He has, however, phrased this passively, comparatively de- 
emphasising the Father's giving. Certainly little is made here of the Father's giving 
and the personal relational aspects that implies. Hilary stresses the quality of the life 
rather than the fact it is given. Nevertheless, although the Son's life is vita in 
semetipso, it is derived: derivation is at the heart of the Father-Son relation. 
Secondly, is this blending of Exodus 3: 14 and John 5: 26 legitimate? Brown 
argues that `life' in John 5: 26 is `a creative life-giving power exercised towards men' 
and that the trinitarian life is not in view. 134 However, this seems unsatisfactory. The 
context is a controversy over blasphemy and rebellion against God (5: 18). Jesus is 
faced with charges that his reference to his `Father' means he is establishing himself 
alongside God. It is, then, exactly his relation to his Father that is at stake, that is, the 
`trinitarian relations'. Further, the Father-Son relationship is in focus in 5: 19 and 
5: 30.135 Thus the surrounding context of this discussion of the Son's life is 
trinitarian. 1 36 
132 Ridderbos 1997: 199 comments that Jesus like God `has life in himself. 
133 The significance of `giving' language in the Gospel will be dealt with in chapter 8 below. 
134 Brown 19711: 214. 
l; s The theme of Jesus not acting `independently' of his Father in 5: 19 and 5: 30 forms an inclusion, 
bracketing the intervening material. 
136 In Brown's own discussion the issue is further complicated by his view that vv. 19-25 and vv. 26-30 
represent different stages of the johannine tradition: Brown 1971 1: 219. 
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Brown's approach also risks falsely dichotomising between 'God's-own-life' 
and 'God's-overflowing-creative-life-to-others'. Yet within the chapter 5 controversy, 
what Jesus can do is intimately connected with who he is. Giving life to the dead in a 
general resurrection (5: 28f) seems to require divine power and is certainly associated 
with God in Daniel 12: 1 ff. This suggests that, unless Jesus has `divine life', he cannot 
fulfil his claim in 5: 27ff to grant life. It is uncontroversial that God's life is not a 
created life. Hence, the interpretation that sees here the Father granting an `uncreated' 
(but begotten) `life' to the Son recognises what Jesus' claims imply. 
Hilary goes on in De Trinitate 11.11 to say that the Son is perfect as from a 
perfect being (perfectus a perfecto). The implication is that a perfect being must 
necessarily generate perfectly. ' 37 P. Burns rightly stresses the significance of a perfect 
birth. 138 This means that the Son shares the Father's perfections, which in Hilary's 
terms cluster around infinity, eternity and omnipotence. ' 39 For Hilary, the Son holds 
these not in part, but fully (totus a toto), since otherwise the generation would be 
imperfect. It should be stressed in this connection that Hilary envisages all that the 
Father is being given to the Son, on the basis of John 16: 15. For Galtier this is 
significant. 140 Hilary dwells on the text: 
He says, All things are delivered Me of My Father.... All things are delivered unto Him; from 
this All there is no exception. If They possess an equal might; if They share an equal mutual 
knowledge, hidden from us; if these names of Father and Son express the relation between 
Them, then, I demand, are They not in truth what They are in name, wielders of the same 
omnipotence, shrouded in the same impenetrable mystery? God does not speak in order to 
141 deceive. 
137 Compare DeS 22. 
138 Burns 1993: 26. Compare also the emphasis of Borchardt 1966: 79 that `origin' is decisive. 
139 See the earlier discussion on DeTI. 4-6 and 11.6 & 7. 
140 Galtier 1960: 97. 
14 ' DeT VI. 26. 
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Here Hilary uses John 16: 15 to support the contention that the Son really is a Son and 
has full divine powers, which he links in the following chapter with the `works' that 
his Father has given him to do as witnesses. 142 Again, derivation ideas are important. 
In short, the Father's perfect nature entails a perfect generation, in which the Son has 
the Father's properties, 143 and, having those properties in their entirety, he must be 
fully God. 144 
However, with Hilary, the Father's nature also repels heretical understandings 
and attacks. Clearly Arianism with its doctrine of ontological subordination cannot be 
correct. After all, the perfect Father begets a Son according to his own eternal and 
uncreated nature. Generation also opposes Sabellians because generation pre- 
supposes two. 
Yet why does this not constitute ditheism (the original charge Hilary mentions 
that the Arians and Sabellians brought)? 145 Ditheism could arise if generation 
involved emanation or some other severance. Such a theory would be disastrous on at 
least four counts. First, if the severance were not eternal, this would violate 
unchangeability and indivisibility. Secondly, if the severance were eternal, that would 
simply amount to two gods. Thirdly, if severance amounted to apportioning the 
divine substance, the Son would not appear to have `all' one needs to be divine, but 
only part. Fourthly, would this not also mean God the Father ceased to be fully God if 
4 part' of him were apportioned to the Son? 
1 42 From John 5: 36f 
143 E. g. DeT III. 4. 
144 DeTV. 37. 
145 DeT I. 17. 
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Hilary in fact is emphatic that generation rules out not merely a solitary God 
(whether in Arian or Sabellian forms), but also ditheism. 146 Here Hilary actually 
adopts part of the Arian/Sabellian case. He is not disturbed by God's eternal 
indivisibility. Rather his point is that generation from God must rule out any 
partition. 147 Since God is unchanging, there can be no diminution through 
generation. 148 God, being God, could only generate by giving in his entirety, yet 
without losing what he is and has. Given that he generates, it must be this way. 
Versions of generation that somehow involve change in God are ruled out by Hilary's 
strong doctrine of a self-authoring God and its corollaries. Therefore, he repeatedly 
states, the Arian/Sabellian criticism that generation collapses into ditheism, fails. 
The obvious response is that this might hold if the first step is satisfied, `given 
that he generates'. To support that proposition, one might turn to the `of 
terminology. This, though, is less straightforward than might appear. For it might be 
argued that `son of terms in John's Gospel do not necessarily entail being begotten 
rather than made, let alone eternally begotten. 149 For instance, the term `children of 
God' (John 1: 12) refers to a relationship with a beginning, for people become 
children. 150 
However, `of language does not necessarily betoken merely being created or 
deriving one's existence from some-one or something. For in John 8: 23 the Jews are 
told by Jesus that they are `of this world'. This cannot mean the world `creates' them 
since John 1: 1-4 has already declared that all exists through the work of the Word. 
146 DeT VIT 
, 147 DeT IL 8, DeS 61 on no separation. 
14S DeT 11.22. 
149 A point which the Arians rightly made. 
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John 8: 44 shows rather that `son of language can denote obedience and shared 
values: 15' Jesus' Jewish interlocutors choose to do the desires of their `father', namely 
Satan. ' 52 It is also evident that in John 8 Jesus stresses his own obedience to the 
Father's will. 153 The obvious question is whether Jesus' `son of relationship 
precisely parallels that of the Jews towards Satan, something ethical, rather than 
ontological. 
Here Hilary takes up the question whether the Son is true God or not, 154 which 
he proposes to answer as follows: 'ss 
It is clear that the truth, or genuineness, of a thing is a question of its nature and 
its powers. For instance, true wheat is that which grows to a head with the beard 
bristling round it, which is purged from the chaff and ground to flour, 
compounded into a loaf and taken for food, and renders the nature and the uses 
of bread. Thus natural powers are the evidence of truth; and let us see, by this 
test, whether He, Whom Moses calls God, ' 56 be true God. 
In other words, does the Son do the works God does? If he does, that implies 
that while he may be an ethical `son of God, he must also be something more. Hilary 
points out that in creation God the Son creates from nothing at the Father's behest. '57 
Does the Arian hypothesis that the Son is created and that he is the intermediary for 
creation fit this? While Athanasius argued that this hypothesis involved infinite 
regress, Hilary develops a different point, asking in effect, could a creature create 
150 John 1: 13 tends to confirm this difficulty: see L. Keck 1996: 275. 
151 Cf Keck 1996: 280,282. 
152 Space precludes detailed engagement with the charge that John is anti-Semitic. Much depends on 
how `anti-semitism' is defined. Here it is the `worldliness', not the ethnic Jewishness, of `the Jews' that 
largely excites John's criticism. Obviously some would see just this as anti-semitic on the grounds that 
it blurs distinction between Jews and Gentiles, but this is a different anti-semitism from that which 
depicts ethnic Jews as separate from, and thus inferior to, Gentiles. John 8: 23 ('you are of this world') 
supports the contention of A. Lincoln 2000: 19 that the corporate character `the Jews' represent `the 
world' in John's Gospel. 
153 John 8: 26,28 (in terms of speech and teaching) and 42 (in terms of coming in obedience to the 
Father's sending). 
154 DeT V. 3. 
, 155 DeTV. 3. 
156 Hilary here builds on his earlier interpretation of the OT angelophanies and theophanies as 
manifestations of the Son. 
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from nothing? In the background, it seems, is the position that only God can create 
from nothing. 
Hilary argues as he contemplates the Son creating at the Father's command: 
How then is He not true God, Who creates, if He is true God, Who commands? 
If the word spoken was truly Divine, the deed done was truly Divine also. God 
spoke, and God created; if it was true God Who spoke, He Who created was true 
God also; ... 
Thus in the Son of God we behold the true Divine nature. He is 
God, He is Creator, He is Son of God, He is omnipotent... He, by Whom all 
things were made, is God. So much the creation of the world tells me about 
Him. He is God, equal with God in name; true God, equal with true God in 
power... And now again I ask by what authority you deny, in your confession of 
Father and Son, the true Divine nature of Him Whose name reveals His power, 
Whose power proves His right to the Name. ' 58 
Characteristically Hilary uses the opportunity both to infer divinity from the power 
and to link it to the `name', showing that `God' is not merely titular but applied to the 
Son as reality. The soteriological consequence is obvious: 159 the `name' into which 
we are baptised refers to the reality of God. 
It is, though, notably in Book VII that Hilary produces more sustained 
exegetical argument along the lines that works prove identity. As already mentioned, 
Hilary saw Book VII as pivotal. 160 He claims that he has demonstrated earlier that 
there is a true birth. Now he must turn to the proposition that the Son is `in the truth of 
his nature God'. 161 He outlines is intention to do this from the name, birth, nature, 
power and assurances of Jesus himself. 162 In fact, the birth attracts Hilary's emphasis. 
He observes that birth tends anyway to encompass those other categories. 163 In the 
57 DeT V .4 and 
5. 
158 DeT V. 5. 
159 Note the start of DeT 11.1. 
160 DeT VII. 1. 
161 DeT VII. 8. 
162 DeTVII. 9. 
163 DeT VII. 16. 
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centre of his discussion of birth is John 5: 18-30,164 which indicates a priority for this 
passage in Hilary. Since John 5 is critical in the Gospel's discussion of right and 
wrong views of Jesus, this is well-taken. 
Commenting on John 5: 19ff, Hilary says: 
Thus He, Whose nature has power to do all the same things as the Father, is 
included in the same nature with the Father... Two truths are combined in one 
proposition; that His works are done likewise proves His birth; that they are the 
same works proves His nature. 
165 
Hilary returns to the idea of the same works showing the same nature later, 166 and it is 
from the perspective of the nature disclosed by the works that he moves to discuss 
John 10: 27-38.167 
John 5: 19ff is a judicious choice for showing that the Son has divine powers. 
It both refers to the divine powers of giving life and exercising judgement, and 
compares these to the Father's powers, placing them in the context of sonship. 
Eventually he must answer the Arian interpretation that John 5: 19 actually shows, the 
Son's ontological inferiority. Hilary will deal with this later. 168 
One further feature of interest should be drawn from Hilary's handling of John 
5: 19ff. Hilary starts to suggest that the Son is doing not merely works similar to the 
Father's, works of the same magnitude, but the same works. Taking up the phrase 
Omnia enim quaecumque facit Pater, eadem et Filius facit similiter, he comments: In 
164 DeTVII. 15-21. 
'65 DeT VII. 18. 
166 DeT VII. 21. 
167 DeTVII. 22-32. 
168 In DeT IX. 43 ff. 
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his enim quae et quaecumque et eadem sunt, nec diversitas potest esse nec 
reliquum. ' 69 This indicates identity between the works of Father and Son. 
This is understandable within Hilary's framework. There is one undivided 
nature and power at work and the Son works with his Father's power. ' 70 This is 
inevitably so since all the Son is and has is `of the Father. 171 However, the Father is 
not severed from his nature while the Son works. Hence, says Hilary, the Father is in 
the Son doing the works the Son does. 172 Thus, Hilary's account of the Son working 
in his Father's single power and nature anticipates Augustine's distinctive theme, 
inseparable operation. 173 
To summarise, Hilary has used derivation language extensively, the `of 
language suggested by John in particular. To be the son of a father is to be born of 
that father's substance - to share his nature. Thus a father with a divine nature will 
generate a son with that nature, and a divine father who generates will do so without 
losing his divinity, for the divine nature is indivisible. Since that nature is 
unchangeable, it follows that the generation is eternal. God's eternal nature requires 
that there be no time when he was not Father. ' 74 Further, since the divine nature is 
indivisible, the Son generated `of such a nature will be inseparable from his Father. 
Such a generation is confirmed when the putative Son does his Father's works. 
169 DeT VII. 18. 
170 DeT VII. 17 '.. unigenitus Deus paternae virtutis operationibus operaretur... ' 
171 DeTVI. 26. 
172 DeT VII. 17 `... significans tarnen hoc quod ipse ageret Patris esse opus intellegendum, quia ipse in 
se operaretur operante. Taking the second ipse as having the Father as its subject, following the NPNF 
translation and Durand, Morel and Pelland 2001. 
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Hilary's own summary puts it thus: 
The nature with which God is born is necessarily the same as that of His Source. 
He cannot come into existence as other than God, since His origin is from none 
other than God.... Hence, in the generation of the Son, the incorporeal and 
unchangeable God begets, in accordance with His own nature, God incorporeal 
and unchangeable; and this perfect birth of incorporeal and unchangeable God 
from incorporeal and unchangeable God involves, as we see in the light of the 
revelation of God from God, no diminution of the Begetter's substance. 175 
6.5.2. The Father and Son are One: the Significance of `In' 
Derivation language does not exhaust Hilary's discussion of divine 
generation. We turn to Kaiser's second category, 176 the `in' terminology, denoting 
`indwelling' and strongly linked to circumincession. Three issues arise: the place of 
the `in' language, its relation to the `of/from' language, and its relation to 
circumincession. 
The importance of the language of Father and Son being `in' each other is 
evident from the place it occupies in Books I-III. In Book II it buttresses the thought 
that the baptismal formula deals with names referring to the realities of the one 
God. '77 In Book III, `I in the Father and the Father in me' introduces the Book 
itself. 178 In both instances, the terminology occurs at structurally important points as 
Hilary sets out his own thought most positively. The `in' language seems more than 
polemical. 
Hilary points out what the considerable difficulties with the terminology are: 
It seems impossible that one object should be both within and without another, 
or that (since it is laid down that the Beings of whom we are treating, though 
they do not dwell apart, retain their separate existence and condition) these 
17; DeT VII returns to inseparable operation at 21 and 36. 
1 74 DeTXII. 21. 
175 DeTV. 37. 
176 Kaiser 1976: 240. 
177 The baptismal formula is introduced in 11.1 while John 14: 1 Of is cited in 11.8. 
17' DeT Ill. 1. 
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Beings can reciprocally contain One Another, so that One should permanently 
envelope, and also be permanently enveloped by, the Other, whom yet He 
envelopes. 179 
This formulation revealingly indicates several elements in Hilary's 
understanding of `in' terminology. It deals with a relationship of beings who are: 
" not isolated180 (non solitaria) 
" discrete 
9 reciprocal (invicem) 
9 permanent 
These characteristics start to show the role the `in' terminology can play. His 
over-riding concern is to avoid the perils both of the solitary God (whether Sabellian 
or Arian) and of ditheism. If Father and Son are permanently discrete Persons then 
modalism is impossible. The one does not simply reduce to the other (or to a hidden 
third). 
If the relationship is permanently reciprocal, so that the Son contains the 
Father as well as vice versa, this `in-ness' appears to be different from the way the 
Father is `in' creation. The creator-creation relation is neither permanent, nor 
reciprocal. Thus Hilary describes the Father: Ipse extra omnia et in omnibus, capiens 
universa et capiendus a nemine. 181 Yet `containing' the Father is just what the Son 
does. 182 God is somehow `external' to the universe, but this reciprocal `in-dwelling' 
negates such externality. 
179 DeTIll. 1. 
180 `apart' in the translation cited above. 
181 DeT III. 2. 
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If Father and Son are permanently `not isolated', then clearly the Father in 
particular cannot be `solitary'. Moreover, if Father and Son are permanently not 
isolated, they are not two independent severable beings: this, then, negates ditheism. 
For Hilary, the `in' terminology provides an account of divine unity, a theme he 
develops emphatically. 
The development of `in-ness' in terms of unity is especially evident in 111.4. 
Hilary writes: 
What is in the Father is in the Son also; what is in the Unbegotten is in the only- 
begotten also. The One is from the Other, and they two are a Unity [uterque 
unum]; not two made One [non duo unus], yet one in the Other, for that which is 
in both is the same. The Father is in the Son, for the Son is from Him; the Son is 
in the Father, because the Father is his sole origin; the Only-Begotten is in the 
Unbegotten, because He is the Only-Begotten from the Unbegotten. Thus 
mutually each is in the Other, for as all is perfect in the Unbegotten Father, so all 
is perfect in the Only-begotten Son. This is the Unity [unitas] 183 which is in Son 
and Father. 
This interestingly echoes John 10: 30 and Hilary's understanding of that verse. 
This is evident in the sharp, if fine, distinction, between the masculine unus and the 
neuter unum. 1 84 Hilary follows 185 the path mapped by Tertullian and others 186 to the 
effect that John 10: 30 envisages Father and Son as distinct Persons with one nature. 
Hence Sabellianism cannot be true, as shown by the explicit denial in III. 4: non duo 
unus. 
However, this stress on unity touches also on what it means to say there are 
two. The two are not simply two separate, independent, beings. They have a unitas. It 
182 DeT 111.1. 
183 Not a unio but a unitas. 
184 Reflecting, of course, Jesus' statement in John 10: 30 that he and the Father are one (neuter), rather 
than one (masculine). 
185 DeT VII. 25. 
186 See Hanson 1988b: 472 to the effect that Tertullian and the Latin tradition are more influential in 
Hilary's interpretations than the Greek traditions. 
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is this aspect that Book VII develops so strongly, '87 and part of its interest is its 
lengthy discussion of both the major johannine passages that deal with indwelling. 188 
Book VII. 39 provides a useful summary focus. The denial of ditheism is part 
of this chapter's climax, 189 but arises from discussion of what John 14: 10 implies. 
Hilary quotes the `indwelling' words and comments: `Inseparabiles esse per 
naturalem similitudinem Patrem et Filium... '. This involves two elements: that Father 
and Son are inseparable, something which applies at the level of Persons; and that 
there is a similarity at the level of nature. The two are here related: the personal 
inseparability arises from (is per) the `similitude of nature', thereby underlining again 
the importance of Hilary's underlying doctrine of God. 
Here he is drawing together thoughts that have appeared at greater length and 
perhaps more disparately in his discussion of John 10: 38. Commenting on the 
indwelling language he says: 
Ita in Deo Patre et Deo Filio neque duos connominabis deos, quia unum uterque 
sunt; neque singularem praedicabis, quia uterque non unus est. Non habet igitur 
fides apostolica duos deos quia nec duos patres habeat nec duos filios. 
Confitendo Patrem confessa Filium est; credens in Filium credidit et in Patrem: 
quia et nomen Patris habet in se Fili nomen. Non enim nisi per Filium Pater 
est: quia non nisi ex Patre sit Filius. 190 
Once again unus is distinguished from unum, echoing John 10: 30.191 More 
striking, though, is Hilary's consideration of ditheism. There would be ditheism were 
there two fathers or two sons - duplication at the personal level. Hilary then uses an 
argument from co-relativity, for the apostolic faith asserts the Son in confessing the 
187 Hilary sees this as centrally important in his defence of the baptismal faith: DeT VII. 1. 
188 John 10: 27-38 in DeTVII. 22-32 and John 14: 6-11 in VII. 33-41. 
189 Dum in Patre et Filio credere Deos duos inpium est... Hilary characteristically also adds that it is 
sacrilege to hold the Sabellian belief that Father and Son are one solitary God. 
190 DeT VII. 31. For the NPNF translation, see Appendix 8. 
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Father and vice versa. Co-relativity means that the Father and Son are inseparable. 192 
A creed of two fathers or two sons would not involve inseparable persons. True, they 
would be distinct, but one could `name' one of the `fathers' without logically 
invoking the other. 
193 They would to that extent be independent of each other. 
194 
Thus, the personal level for Hilary involves distinction (hence no Sabellianism) but 
also inseparability (hence no ditheism). 
Hilary discusses ditheism further in VII. 32. The one divine nature is much 
more visible here: 
Thus the apostolic faith in proclaiming the Father, will proclaim Him as one 
God, and in confessing the Son will confess Him as one God: since one and the 
same nature exists in both [quia et eadem adque indissimilis Dei natura sit in 
utroque] 
Therefore ditheism can also be rebutted because Father and Son each has eadem 
adque indissimilis natura. However, since Hilary says that Father and Son are 
inseparable per naturalem similitudinem, 195 these personal and natural levels are not 
to be sharply distinguished. 
We thus reach a very significant point in Hilary's argument. He rebuts 
ditheism because there is co-relativity and mutuality at the personal level. This 
mutual relation at the personal level arises from'96 one and the same nature being in 
both, such that both are unum197 and have a unitas. 198 Hence one is driven back to 
191 This does not appear clearly in the NPNF translation, hence the need for citation in the original. 
192 DeTVII. 39. 
193 Hence there is a very clear case for the conception being polytheist. `Father' becomes a generic 
terms and two generic `fathers' is aptly paralleled by two generic `gods'. 
194 Compare Augustine's discussion of relative predicates De Trinitate V-VII. 
195 DeT VIL39. 
196 Stressing the phrase from DeT VII. 39 per naturalem similitudinem. 
197 DeT 111.4, VII . 
31. 
198 DeT III. 4. 
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consider this one nature. Clearly Hilary has excluded any understanding that the Son 
has a nature dissimilar to the Father's - the term indissimilis shows that this cannot be 
so. ' 99 Hilary's reaction to the Sirmium blasphemia, which was open to an anomoean 
interpretation, confirms this. 
However, one returns to the criticisms recounted by Moignt against Hilary, 200 
that he is content with something other than numerical identity in the divine nature, 
that generic identity suffices. 201 To assess this, it is necessary to examine the role 
`nature' plays in Hilary's discussion of the `in' language. This entails looking at the 
relationship between Hilary's `of and `in' terminology. 
Not merely are both `of and `in' terminologies present in Hilary, they are 
related. Thus the `in' relationship seems founded on the `of relationship. 202 For 
instance, Hilary writes: 
The Father is in the Son, for the Son is from Him; the Son is in the Father, 
because the Father is his sole origin'203 
The same rationale appears later: 
yet still the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father, and this by no 
interchange of emanations but by the perfect birth of the living nature. ... 
204 
Here, the `of' language refers directly to the Son's generation or nativity, while `in' 
relations are seen as an outcome of that generation. However, this means that the `in' 
language must, like the `of language, be then intimately tied to the nature which 
generates. This is evident from the following argument: 
199 DeT VII. 32. 
200 Moignt 1968: 160. 
201 Hanson 1988b: 480 feels it is `not obvious' whether Hilary goes beyond generic unity. 
202 Kaiser adverts to this as a possibility but does not pursue it. 
203 DeT III. 4. 
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There is no hint of more natures than one in what we are told of Their 
possession of the one Divine nature. The truth that God is from God does 
not multiply God by two; the birth destroys the supposition of a lonely God. 
And again, because They are interdependent They form an unity; and that 
They are interdependent is proved by Their being One from One. For the 
One, in begetting the One, conferred upon Him nothing that was not His 
own; and the One, in being begotten, received from the One only what 
belongs to one. 205 
Hence the `in' relation, with its features of personal distinction yet 
inseparability, reciprocity, and permanence, emerges as a consequence of generation 
from a divine nature. Generation from a divine nature means the Begetter retains in 
whole the nature in which he begets. But such a perfect begetter also gives perfectly. 
This is a vital difference between human and divine generation. 206 Humans cannot 
give a `perfect' self-sustaining nature to their offspring, because they do not have that 
nature to give. 207 Hilary's observation that the Son is neither generated from nothing 
nor from any other than the Father carries immense force. Generated solely from the 
Father, he necessarily has the Father's nature. 
It will be clear by now that not merely does the `in' terminology seem to arise 
from the `of terminology for Hilary, but that the `in' terminology is nuanced by the 
`of terminology. This is important and raises the question whether Hilary faithfully 
retains johannine thought. 
After all, John's Gospel uses `in' terminology of human relationships as well 
as of the divine relationship: the striking reference is John 17: 21-23 . 
208 This section 
refers to humans dwelling `in us' (sc. Jesus and the Father: verse 21), so that 
204 DeT VII. 31. 
205 DeTVII. 32. 
206 DeT VII. 28. Cf Galtier 1960: 104. 
207 The Ota they can give is not vita in semetipso. 
208 John 15: 1 ff is also relevant since verse 4 deals with a mutual `abiding in'. 
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indwelling is not only between divine Persons, and discusses one-ness in terms of the 
Father and Son, on the one hand, being one and human believers, on the other hand, 
being one (17: 22). If humans, who are not divine, can in-dwell God, why should the 
Son's in-dwelling point to divinity? 209 
Clearly, John's Gospel has features pointing away from Arianising 
conclusions: thus the `in-dwelling' of humans in God on any view differs from the 
Son's, since the latter is a given within the Gospel, while the former is something that 
happens, a becoming. Moreover, John speaks of the Father's will to glorify his Son 
and have humans honour the Son as they do the Father (John 5: 23). This is not so of 
humans generally. Further, the Son is strikingly presented as unique: he is the one the 
Father sends into the world, uniquely from the Father. It is on this basis that the Son 
knows the Father in a way humans ordinarily do not (John 1: 18,3: 13). 
In effect, of course, Hilary's `of terminology has picked up this category of 
sending. His construction of that terminology has already excluded Arianising 
possibilities, 210 and since the in-dwelling of Father and Son has been built on the Son 
being `of the Father, it is logical for him to qualify the in-dwelling in a non-Arian 
way. 
This does not do violence to John 17: 21-23: Athanasius had noted that this 
material could be construed as exemplarist. Further, human in-dwelling and Father- 
Son in-dwelling cannot be precisely parallel since John presents the former as 
209 The Arian question is natural. This is not, of course, to say that their answer is natural. 
210 See especially his exposition if John 5: 17-30 in DeT VII. 
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something that has a beginning and is not eternal. 
211 The latter as intrinsic, indeed, 
pre-Incarnate to judge by John 17: 5. The discussion therefore centres on a matter of 
degree: how close is an admittedly limited parallel. 
One concludes, though, that Hilary's understanding of indwelling is nuanced 
by his explanations of the `of terminology, so that the perfectly generated Son is in 
his perfect Father. This is, in effect, an account of circumincession, to which 
discussion now turns. 
Circumincession, to use a non-Hilarian term, is thus a consequence of divine 
generation. The fact that it is divine nature which generates is decisive. This in turn 
suggests Hilary's answer to the charge that he is not fully committed to numerical 
identity. 
The presenting issue is whether two divine natures can exist eternally. 
Hilary's consideration of God's nature apparently precludes this. It was stressed 
earlier that God for Hilary is a self-authoring being, independent of others who are 
external (extra). Hilary is hostile to the existence of an external nature equal to 
God's: 
No creature is equal or like to God, no nature external [naturae alienae] to 
His is comparable in might to Him; it is only the Son, born from Himself, 
Whom we can without blasphemy liken and equal to Him. Nothing outside 
Himself [extra eum] can be compared to God without insult to His august 
majesty. If any being, not born from God's self, can be discovered that is 
like Him and equal to Him in power, then God, in admitting a partner to 
share His throne, forfeits His pre-eminence. No longer is God One, for a 
second, indistinguishable from Himself, has arisen. On the other hand, there 
is no insult in making His own true Son His equal. For then that which is 
like Him is His own; that which is compared with Him is born from 
Himself, the Power that can do His own works is not external to Him [extra 
se]. 212 
zl l Compare John 1: 12f to the effect that believers become children of God. 
212 DeTVII. 26. 
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Hence, ditheism arises when one god is extra the other (and vice versa). This would 
violate Deuteronomy 6: 4, and logic, since God, by definition pre-eminent, 213 is that no 
longer. However, this means that Hilary's thought apparently ý: 4s generic 
identity of substance. For plurality of substance cannot arise from the generation, 
since the divine nature is indivisible. Nor, though, can plurality of substance `pre- 
exist', since Hilary's understanding of divine nature precludes this. Therefore phrases 
like eadem adque indissimilis Dei natura214 demand the meaning that the nature is 
numerically one. 215 
Hilary's handling of the relative merits of homoousios and homoiousios 
supports this. Hilary notes, of course, the problems over the term homoousios. He 
draws attention to three potential errors in using the word: 
The assertion of the one substance of the Father and the Son signifies either 
that there is one Person who has two titles, or one divided substance that has 
made two imperfect substances, or that there is a third prior substance which 
has been usurped and assumed by two and which is called one because it 
was one before it was severed into two. 216 
Hilary here refers to some standard objections to homoousios terminology, notably its 
Sabellian associations. Yet his conception of perfect generation ensures that 
homoousios cannot have these obnoxious senses. It cannot be Sabellian, because 
generation implies distinction. Nor can it imply division, because the nature that 
generates is indivisible. Nor does it imply an anterior third substance, subsequently 
divided, for the same reason. Instead he goes on to uphold what homoousios means in 
positive terms: 
Z" DeT I. 4-6 and the earlier discussion. 
214 DeTVII. 32. 
215 Contra Hanson 1988b: 480, Hilary seems clear. 
216 DeS 68. 
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He is not the Father, but the Son begotten of Him. He is not any portion of 
God, but is whole God. He is not Himself the source but the image; the 
image of God born of God to be God. He is not a creature but is God. Not 
another God in the kind of His substance, but the one God in virtue of the 
essence of His exactly similar substance. God is not one in Person but in 
nature, for the Born and the Begetter have nothing different or unlike. After 
saying all this, he does not err in declaring one substance of the Father and 
the Son. Nay, if he now denies the one substance he sins. 
217 
The telling phrase here is `not one in Person but in nature'. Persons and nature, 
where the former is undoubtedly numerically plural, 218 are contrasted, thus suggesting 
that the unity is numerical and not merely generic. 219 This tallies well with Hilary's 
misgivings about homoiousios, which he sees as far from satisfactory, despite the 
potential misunderstandings of homoousios. 220 For Hilary, `a true natural connexion' 
implies homoousios. 221 
The indwelling language is also related to Hilary's understanding of John 5: 19 
that the Father and Son perform the same works. 222 When discussing the in-dwelling 
language of John 14: 1 Of, Hilary returns to this theme and comments that reciprocal 
indwelling means the Son does the Father's work, while the Father works in the 
Son. 223 Such in-dwelling does not mean that the two are indistinguishable, a criticism 
mounted of Augustine's account of inseparable operation. 224 For Hilary the Father 
works through (per) the Son. 225 But personal asymmetries within the 
circumincessionary relations remain undeveloped, although the motif of derivation, 
`of-ness', from which circumincession is finally drawn, suggests their presence. 
217 DeS 69. 
218 Otherwise there would be a risk of Sabellianism. 
219 Cf Moignt 1968: 164 who reaches similar conclusions, following earlier writers. 
220 DeS 89 speaks of the word's `inadequacy'. Figura and Doignon 2001: 44 and Fortman 1972: 130f 
note the preference for homoousios. 
"1 DeS 89. 
222 See 6.5.1. above. 
223 DeTVII. 40. 
224 Answers to the fear that inseparable operation loses personal distinction are discussed in chapters 7 
and 8 below. 
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To summarise with respect to the `in' terminology in Hilary, this is derived 
from the perfect birth. 226 Since the Son is born `of the Father alone, whose perfect 
nature is indivisible, it follows that Father and Son are `in' each other, in a unity of 
nature, as distinct but nevertheless inseparable persons. Thus Hilary's 
circumincession arises too from derivation. Such a God is not solitary at the personal 
level, nor ditheist, for there is no divine nature external to Father and Son. 
Hilary's conception of circumincession, then, ultimately traces back to his 
understanding of God's nature. Further, because it traces back to the Father's nature 
given to the Son, there is a relational asymmetry. There are not two fathers or two 
sons, but Father and Son of the Father. Circumincession neither undoes nor negates 
the Father-Son relation from which it arises. What circumincession achieves is a 
personal relationship which is reciprocal yet without any external or alien nature: it 
enshrines personal diversity without ditheism. 
6.5.3. The Language of Externality 
It has been stressed that the Father is not subject to `externality'. In his early 
discussion of the doctrine of God, Hilary has noted: `... that which is self-existent 
cannot have left outside itself [extra se] anything superior to itself. '227 Nor is it simply 
superiority that creates problems. This is clear from later argument: 
If any being, not born from God's self, can be discovered that is like Him and 
equal to Him in power, then God, in admitting a partner to share His throne, 
forfeits His pre-eminence. 
228 
225 DeT VII. 40. 
226 It should be stressed that Hilary envisages the `in' terminology as present in the OT as well. He 
places considerable reliance on Isaiah 45: 11-16. However, the correctness of Hilary's case does not 
stand or fall by this point, so his treatment of the passage is to be found in Appendix 6. 
227 DeT 1.4. 
228 DeTVII. 26. 
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Hilary explains this later in the section in terms of a power that arises outside God 
(extra se). The rationale, clearly, is that this would eliminate the unfettered monarchy 
Hilary associates with God, and that the objection to something extra God which is 
his equal is its independence of him. 
The generation of the Son, though, involves no such externality. Born `of the 
Father, the Son has not arisen extra the Father. 229 Moreover, since birth from such a 
God involves no separation, but entails each being `in' the other reciprocally 
(invicem), the Son never becomes extra the Father. This in-dwelling means that 
although the Father is Father by relation with another Person, that relationship is not 
with one extra himself. Therefore, the `of and `in' language negates any polytheistic 
idea that personal differentiation amounts to saying there is a god extra God. 
What, though, of the Son? If the Son is truly God, then clearly there cannot be 
any god extra him either. Hilary was apparently well aware of this logic. He 
recognises the force of the heretics' arguments over Jesus' ignorance: they argue that 
the ignorance suggests an external force more powerful than he. 230 Hilary similarly 
feels that he must deny the Son came to earth because of external power. 23' 
However, again the generation aids Hilary. Hilary does have a place for the 
Son's ordered obedience to the Father, 232 but here the point is that if the Son is `in' the 
Father such that he is not external to the Father, the Father is equally `in' the Son and 
229 E. g. DeT V. 37: the Son is not born aliunde. VII. 2: the Son is neque aliunde auf ex nihilo sed ex Deo. 
230 DeT IX. 58 vis aliqua exterior eo potior... 
231 DeT X. 69 exterior potestas. 
232 See 6.6. below. 
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not external to him. In the case of the Son too, then, `of' and `in' language negates 
any externality that would deny his divinity. 
To this extent, the language of externality forms the converse of the `in' and 
`of language noted by Kaiser, 233 and contributes significantly to Hilary's trinitarian 
grammar because it clarifies what he wishes to deny 
6.6. Generation and Divine relationships 
6.6.1. Material in De Trinitate 
Hilary, therefore, has used generation to ground relations in which the Son 
fully shares the Father's power and life. The question then arises of how the wills of 
Father and Son relate. The Arians propose that unanimity of will adequately explains 
Scripture's unity language. 234 Hilary deals with this at length in book IX of De 
Trinitate, stressing that the Son indeed has harmony of will with the Father: `... it is 
true that where the unity of nature is proclaimed the agreement of will cannot be 
denied... '. 235 He picks up various texts used in this connection by the Arians, 236 and 
deals with them in the rest of the book. His perspective is that the Son remained fully 
God in the Incarnation, 237 and consequently there are two natures at stake in the 
events of Jesus' earthly ministry. There is thus a twofold aspect to Jesus' teaching, 
things pertaining to his humanity and things relating to his divinity. 238 
233 Kaiser 1976. 
234 Obviously John 10: 30 in particular. 
235 DeT IX. 1. 
236DeT IX. 2 He mentions Mark 10: 18; John 17: 3: 5: 19; 14: 28 and Mark 13: 32. Proverbs 8: 22 is, of 
course, reserved for Book XII. 
237 DeT IX. 4. 
238 DeT IX . 5. 
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Hilary is not, apparently, directly faced with the argument that obedience in 
itself in the Incarnation necessarily disproves the Son's divinity. 239 Certainly Arians 
did rely on John 5: 19, but the argument about the verse that Hilary meets is focused 
not on the question of obedience but on the Son's apparent lack of power. 240 Hilary's 
answer does not therefore explicitly deal with arguments about obedience. Instead his 
discussion suggests that the verse deals with authority, not strength and power, 241 and 
he majors on the Son's work being identified with the Father's work, 242 thereby 
implying the Son's nature is equal to, and identical with, 243 the Father's. 
However, De Trinitate IX contains indications of how the obedience argument 
could be faced. First, when discussing the twofold aspect of the Son's earthly 
ministry, Hilary comments: 
Nec tarnen se Deo Patri non et fili honore et hominis condicione subdente: cum 
et nativitas omnis se referat ad auctorem, et caro se universa secundum Deum 
profiteatur infirmam. 244 
This speaks of subjection (se... subdente), but the question arises whether this is only 
qua the Son's humanity. On this view, fili honore and hominis condicione refer to the 
same relationship; human-God. This, though, is unattractive on syntactical grounds. 
The et... et construction perhaps more naturally suggests a parallelism, a possibility 
supported by the next clause where nativitas and caro are differentiated. Moreover, 
nativitas is a key term Hilary uses to designate the eternal relation between Father and 
Son. In the work's overall context, it is more attractive to see the Sonship in question 
as divine, not human. A further consideration is that a reference to the two aspects of 
239 Contrast later Homoian arguments produced by Maximinus against Augustine. 
240 DeT IX. 43. 
241 DeTIX. 45. 
242 DeTIX. 44. 
243 The equality suggests the identity: aequalitatem autem non nisi ex eadem esse natura. 
244 DeT IX. 5. 
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Jesus Christ, divine Son and real human, is precisely the immediate context of IX. 5. 
Lastly, the idea that `sonship'/nativity is readily glossed as referring to a human 
creature of God is exactly something Hilary wishes to attack. It would therefore be 
inept for him to muddy the waters by conflating the ideas here. 
On balance, then, this passage suggests a two-fold submission to the Father by 
the Son in the Incarnation: one qua Son, and one qua human being. This, of course, 
implies that the Son's generation itself grounds obedience to the Father. Since that 
generation is an eternal relation independent of the Incarnation, this further suggests 
that the Father's authority is eternal. 
Certainly authority language is used of the Father, notably in De Trinitate 
IX. 45 as Hilary deals with John 5: 19. For Hilary, the phrase `can do nothing' refers to 
authority (auctoritas), which the Son derives from the Father. The logic of this is that 
the Father is the ultimate source of authority (otherwise why refer to him? ), and that 
the Son's is derived. 245 Ultimate authority also seems to reside in the Father in 
Hilary's discussion of Mark 13: 32 and the day of the Son's return. As Hilary closes 
his discussion of the Son's apparent ignorance, 246 he appeals to the Father's authority 
(potestas). 247 This is something the Father has reserved to himself, which again leaves 
the Father as the one ultimately setting out the plan for the ages. 
A possible response is that the Son is indeed subject to the Father's authority, 
but only for the events of the Incarnation. This would, though, be costly. Hilary 
245 This relates closely to ideas of divine monarchy, even if the term is not employed. 
246 Hilary in fact thinks the Son does know but is not at that point disclosing. Contrast Athanasius, who, 
amongst others, attributed this to the humanity. 
247 DeTIX. 75. 
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stresses that the Son indeed reveals the Father in the Incarnation. 248 It would therefore 
be uncomfortable for Hilary to concede that the Incarnation and the relations it 
discloses are not truly those of Father and Son. 
6.6.2. Material in De Synodis 
However, Hilary's thought on this point is clearest in De Synodis. He needs to 
comment on Anathema XVII of the Sirmium Creed aimed at Photinus, which says 
`For we do not make the Son the equal or peer of the Father, but understand the Son 
to be subject. ' Hilary observes that the aim is to refute ditheism, not to deny that the 
Son is truly God. His explanation merits lengthy citation. 
That the Son is not on a level with the Father and is not equal to Him is chiefly 
shewn in the fact that He was subjected to Him to render obedience, in that the 
Lord rained from the Lord and that the Father did not, as Photinus and Sabellius 
say, rain from Himself, as the Lord from the Lord; in that He then sat down at 
the right hand of God when it was told Him to seat Himself; in that He is sent, in 
that He receives, in that He submits in all things to the will of Him who sent 
Him. But the subordination of filial love is not a diminution of essence, nor does 
pious duty cause a degeneration of nature, since in spite of the fact that both the 
Unborn Father is God and the Only-begotten Son of God is God, God is 
nevertheless One, and the subjection and dignity of the Son are both taught in 
that by being called Son He is made subject to that name which because it 
implies that God is His Father is yet a name which denotes His nature. Having a 
name which belongs to Him whose Son He is, He is subject to the Father both in 
service and name; yet in such a way that the subordination of His name bears 
witness to the true character of His natural and exactly similar essence. 249 
Here the subjection is described exactly as obedience. The obedience, 
moreover, is not limited to the Incarnation, but covers events of pre-Incarnation 
salvation history too. Obedience does not, then, start with the assumption of human 
flesh. Obedience cannot even be restricted to salvation-history broadly considered, for 
Hilary here relates it to the filial relation itself. The very relationship grounding the 
248 Note his insistence that it is not enough to think there is a God: saving faith is in him as Father: DeT 
I. 17, and this knowledge is available in the Incarnation. 
249 DeS 51 
. 
242 
Son's divinity is used here to indicate the Son's subjection to the Father in obedience 
terms. Hilary says: 
Having a name250 which belongs to Him whose Son He is, He is subject to the 
Father both in service and name. 251 
Hilary also deals explicitly with whether obedience subtracts from the Son's 
divinity. He confirms it does not. 252 The filial relationship results in both. It therefore 
seems difficult in Hilary's thought to have a Son who is divine through generation 
from a perfect nature without that Son being subject to his Father by virtue of that 
same generation. 
Later material in De Synodis supports this. Commenting on John 5: 19 Hilary 
stresses the Son's obedience even while doing the same works as the Father, which 
reveals his nature. 253 Later, he demands to know why some refuse to recognise the 
divinity of the Son: 
Is this due to ignorance that the Son, like all other things, is made subject to the 
Father, and while thus subjected is not distinguished from them? A distinction 
does exist, for the subjection of the Son is filial reverence, the subjection of all 
other things is the weakness25`' of things created. 
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For Hilary, therefore, not all obedience betokens ontological inferiority. Obedience 
may rest on distinguishable grounds. For the Son, such obedience exists, and rests, on 
the very fact that he is Son, that is, `of the Father. 
Could one, then, deny the obedience yet retain the Sonship? Not on Hilary's 
rationale. Instead his position entails that denying the obedience denies the relation 
250 The name in question is, of course, that he is God. For Hilary this name refers to the 
Son's nature. 
'51 DeS 51. 
252This is also strongly suggested in DeT IX. 53 and XI. 12. 
253 DeS 75. 
254 Note the terminological similarity to DeT IX. 5 and the theme of the weakness of the flesh. 
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itself. If the relationship of sonship is absent, then Hilary's account of how both First 
and Second Persons may be truly divine without ditheism would fail. The obedience 
does not seem to be readily severable from the rest of Hilary's account of divine 
sonship. 
6.7. Conclusions 
The doctrine of God is consistently important in Hilary's theology, and relates 
to several features in his thought. First, God's infinite nature renders him inaccessible 
to human speculation. This, secondly, highlights the significance of the Incarnation of 
God's Son as the means by which God is truly known and underlines the importance 
of defending the Son's divinity, for without this the knowledge of God evaporates. 
Thirdly, since God is a fully self-authoring being, any externality that is independent 
of him, either so as to act imperativally on him, or so as to be immune from him, is 
precluded. Divine monarchy is present, then, in Hilary, albeit Tertullian's terminology 
is absent. Fourthly, Hilary uses this very nature of God to provide an account of 
generation that is neither emanationist nor involves dividing the divine nature, but is 
an eternal filial relationship in which the Son shares his Father's nature and throne. 
The perfect begets the perfect. Derivation plays an important part in this account. 
Since the Son is `of the Father alone, he fully shares his Father's indivisible nature 
and is himself inseparable from the Father. This derivation means that all ultimately 
traces back to the Father. 
Hilary is driven to provide an account of generation by the Incarnation, which 
he regards as revelatory. He regards Jesus' claim to be the Son as substantiated by 
255 DeS 79. 
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him doing the works that God alone can do. Jesus as Son entails that God is not 
solitary (Father and Son mean there is differentiation), but also precludes ditheism. 
Hilary's terminology here proves richly fruitful. Since the Son is `of the perfect, self- 
authoring God, and `in' him, there is no externality between Father and Son that 
would constitute polytheism and destroy the Father's monarchy. Being `of the Father 
and `of nothing else, the Son is not independent, and because Father and Son are `in' 
each other, there is no division that means they are external to each other. The `in' 
language is not at odds with the `of language, but derives from it, so that relations of 
circumincession are drawn from, not opposed to, the relations suggested by 
generation. 
Within this framework, Hilary is bound to pursue the filial relationship in 
terms of the Son's obedience to the Father: this is given within the data of the 
Incarnation itself, and to repudiate this aspect of the revelation of the Incarnation risks 
compromising the Incarnation as the source of the knowledge of God. Hilary regards 
himself as without any taint of ontological subordinationism. Since the perfect Father 
begets perfectly, the Son is all that the Father is except Father. As the Father is `in' 
the Son and vice versa, the Son's obedience does not constitute an obedience to an 
external, independent person which would be inconsistent with his own divinity. 
Father and Son `have' alike the Father's nature and the Son's actions in the 
world are done with the Father's power. This implies that, as well as being 
inseparable since they are `in' each other and the Son is `of the Father, their actions 
in the economy are inseparable also: the Father works in the Son. This is relatively 
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undeveloped in Hilary. It remained for Hilary's successor, Augustine to articulate this 
more fully. To him we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 7: AUGUSTINE AND THE INSEPARABLE YET 
DISTINCT TRINITY 
It is proposed that: 
7(a). Augustine's conceptual framework for Trinitarian theology features 
two pairs of ideas: inseparability and distinction, and eternal relation and 
temporal action. 
7(b). The Father-Son relationship involves both inseparability (there is no 
Father without the Son) and a personal distinction involving particularity 
or personal uniqueness (the relation of Father and Son is not reversible). 
7(c). The Father-Son relation requires equality of nature. 
7(d). Personal inseparability yet distinction in the eternal relation 
grounds Augustine 's doctrine of inseparable divine operation in temporal 
action in which the Father and Son do numerically identical actions, not 
simply actions of the same genus. 
7(e). Inseparable operation is important for Augustine in refuting 
polytheistic ideas of discrete and independent actions by the Persons. 
7(f). Augustine 's is not a modalising trinity. 
7(g). Augustine does not subordinate the Persons to the one substance. 
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7(h). Augustine's account is most vulnerable in the areas of the mission 
and of the Son 's obedience, where some of several explanations he offers 
are open to challenge as departing from the data of the Incarnation. 
7(i). Augustine's writings nevertheless contain a theme which stresses that 
the Son is the obedient agent of the Father who acts with and through him, 
but not symmetrically. This reflects and preserves the principle that the 
Father is the principium of deity, and that the Son derives filially from 
him. 
W. Augustine draws his account particularly from his exegesis of John 
5: 19ff and is not uniformly committed to severing the economic and 
immanent trinities. This in turn requires commitment to the revelatory 
value of the economy. 
7(k). The eternal relations of Father and Son are grounded in the 
character of God as simple and unchanging. 
7(l). Fullness of happiness lies in knowing the triune God. 
7(m). Augustine 's stress on inseparable operation drawn from inseparable 
personal relation stands in continuity with, but articulates more fully, 
earlier accounts of joint operation. 
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7.1. Introduction 
R. Jenson remarks that Augustine's intellectual and spiritual experience `has 
blighted our trinitarianism'. ' This is striking but not unrepresentative of some of the 
adverse comment that Augustine's trinitarian theology has excited in recent times. 
The perspective for viewing this apparently unsatisfactory trinitarian theology 
was proposed by one of Augustine's early and most influential modern critics, A. 
Harnack. He spoke of Augustine `carrying out monotheism strictly and thoroughly. '2 
In what follows monotheism and its entailments form a constant backdrop, with the 
persistent question whether Augustine somehow over-stresses it. 
7.2. Criticism of Augustine 
I. Chevalier long ago observed that Augustine tended to attract either 
unqualified praise or merciless criticism. 3 The latter has perhaps pre-dominated since 
Harnack, 4 but significant challenges to that perspective over the last decade make it 
necessary to review these criticisms in some detail. 5 
7.2.1. The Broader Context - `the de Regnon Paradigm' 
L. Ayres describes a common assumption that western trinitarian theology 
starts with unity and moves to tri-unity, while eastern trinitarian theology does the 
Jenson 1982: 116. 
2 Hamack 1898 V: 4. 
3 Chevalier 1940: 3-6. 
4 Harnack's statements IV 1898: 130 and 131 n. 1 set the trend for English-speaking scholars such as 
Jenson 1982, La Cugna 1991, A. Plantinga 1991 and C. Gunton 1997. 
5 M. R. Barnes 1999a, Bray 1992, S. Lancaster 1996, Ayres 2000a and 2000b and earlier in French F. 
Bourassa 1977 alike challenge common charges. 
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opposite. 6 Barnes had earlier suggested such views were versions of T. de Regnon's 
contrast between `patristic' and `scholastic' trinitarian theologies.? Within this polar 
depiction of theological history, Augustine is often envisaged as decisively moving 
away from `Greek' or `Eastern' methods. 8 
Two other factors must be considered with this `de Regnon paradigm', as it 
may be called. First, the influence of Harnack's view, that Augustine is incipiently 
modalist, 9 and secondly the enormous concern, associated perhaps especially with J. 
Zizioulas, 10 that the concept of `person' not be evacuated of content and abstracted 
from relationship. Such a loss of `person' could contribute to a solipsistic 
individualism of fundamentally indistinguishable human units. If Augustine's 
trinitarian theology indeed leads to such conclusions, then, within the de Regnon 
paradigm of two very different branches of trinitarian thought, the alternative 
inevitably looks preferable. Cappadocian theology, of course, is felt to offer such an 
alternative. 
However, such use of the de Regnon paradigm is dubious. First, has Augustine 
been accurately represented and Harnack's influential dictum in particular been 
justified? The current chapter largely revolves around this. 
Secondly, have the Cappadocians themselves been rightly construed? 
Reservations have been voiced about the Cappadocians' commitment to a `social' 
6 Ayres 2000a: 40. 
7 M. R. Barnes 1995: 55. Barnes depicts de Regnon himself as holding a nuanced and less evaluative 
view of differences between `East' and `West'. 
See M. R. Barnes 1995: 51-54. 
8 See the description in M. R. Barnes 1999a: 152. 
9 Harnack IV 1898: 131 n. 
10 Zizioulas 1991. 
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version of the Trinity. Thus one central text falling for interpretation is Gregory of 
Nyssa's Ad Ablabium. Yet Ayres plausibly contends that Gregory deals with three 
human persons here, not because it is his preferred trinitarian analogy but because his 
correspondent raised the issue. " Similarly, S. Coakley insists that Gregory does not 
`start' with the three. 12 Rather, the Cappadocians shared certain concerns with 
Augustine: divine simplicity; 13 and the inseparability of divine operations. 14 Hence J. 
Milbank cautions against over-drawing contrasts between Augustine and Gregory of 
Nyssa. l5 
Thirdly, caution has been sounded more generally about `... construing 
"persons" as "relations"... ', 16 let alone finding such ideas in the Cappadocians. ' 7 
Overall, these criticisms suggest greater commonality between Augustine and 
the Cappadocians than the polarity envisaged by the de Regnon paradigm admits. ' 8 
This re-evaluation does not necessarily impinge on the contentions of Zizioulas and 
others that personhood must be so grounded as to preserve individual and relational 
values while guarding against solipsism. 
11 Ayres 2002: 447. 
12 Coakley 1999: 125. 
13 Coakley 1999: 131 fn. 30. 
14 Ayres 2000a: 48 and 2002: 481 and Coakley 1999: 133 commenting on Ad Graecos 24-5. 
15 Milbank 1998: 94. 
16 Coakley 1999: 123f, citing H. Hams' critique. Hams' misgivings relate, inter alia, to the ethical 
consequences of such relational construction of persons -a `relational 
determinism' in which, without 
relations, one might not count as a person. Harris 1998: 217,231-33. 
17 L. Turcescu 2002: 530-34. 
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7.2.2. Specific Criticisms 
Within the de Regnon paradigm, several distinct although related criticisms 
have been made. It is fitting to start with the charge of modalism. Harnack famously 
comments: 
We can see Augustine only gets beyond Modalism by the mere assertion that he 
does not wish to be a modalist, and by the aid of ingenious distinctions between 
different ideas. ' 9 
Harnack prepares the ground for this by commenting on Augustine's desire to 
eradicate lingering subordinationism, but adding this took Augustine towards 
modalism. 20 Augustine's doctrine of simplicity, he continues, tends finally to 
eliminate the distinct characteristics of the Persons. 2 1 He cites De Civitate Dei XI. 10 
as disclosing what simplicity is for Augustine. 22 Earlier, Harnack had described 
modalism as envisaging `... Christ to be God in a human body, the Father become 
flesh. '23 Considerable later scholarship has found Harnack persuasive, 24 frequently 
for Harnack's reason, namely, Augustine's doctrine of divine simplicity. 25 Simplicity 
therefore emerges as a key area for consideration. 
If modalist, Augustine would, further, inevitably tend to sunder economic and 
immanent trinities, 26 as happened to Praxeas, according to Tertullian. Modalism 
could readily therefore pressurise Augustine's concept of revelation. 
18 Thus Bray 1992: 148 envisages Augustine as beginning with a recognisably Cappadocian picture, 
although developing it. Contrast e. g. Jenson 1982: 119 who sees Augustine rejecting Cappadocian 
theology. 
19 Harnack 1898 IV: 131 n 1. 
20 Harnack 1898 IV: 129. 
1 Harnack 1898 IV: 129. 
22 Harnack 1898 IV: 130 n. 1. 
23 Harnack 1897 111: 51f The surrounding context is Sabellianism and its uioitätCwp. Harnack writes 
`The central proposition of Sabellius ran that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit were the same. Three 
names accordingly were attached to one and the same being. ' 
24 Plantinga 1991: 308 speaks of `endless suspicions of modalism'. 
25 E. g. Jenson 1982: 119 and Plantinga 1991: 316. 
26 Jenson 1982: 116. 
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Just such pressure is evident, perhaps, in the starting-point of Augustine's 
trinitarian theology. Ayres mentions the common assumption that Augustine starts 
with divine unity, 27 and standard histories of theology often reflect this. 28 Naturally, 
this criticism may stem from a de Regnon paradigm portraying the Cappadocians as 
starting with 'three-ness'. 
However, the notion of `starting-point' is ambiguous. `Starting-point' may 
mean simply the first proposition in the sequence of presentation of argument. 
Alternatively, it may mean the dominating principle governing others. It is, no doubt, 
important to note that the sequence of argument in De Trinitate in particular starts by 
examining Scripture. 29 However, one-ness could conceivably still be the dominating 
principle. 
If one-ness is indeed dominating, other themes may become attenuated. The 
misgiving is that personal categories are diminished, even subsumed, under the 
category of substance. 30 One section of De Trinitate especially falls for construction, 
Book VII. 11: this is frequently cited as disastrously fusing person and substance. 3 
If there is an ultimate one-ness and a fusion of person and substance, there is a 
risk, the argument runs, that God becomes merely reflexive or narcissistic. If God is 
ultimately monopersonal, then the love the `Persons' have seems really a love of self, 
27 Ayres 2000a: 40. 
28 E. g. Fortman 1972: 140, Lampe 1997: 117. Although Fortman does not necessarily see this as linked 
to modalism: see Fortman 1972: 143. 
29 DeT 1.4 But first we must establish by the authority of the holy scriptures whether the faith is in fact 
like that [sc. that God is triune]. ' 
30 Notably in the argument of La Cugna 1991: 88 and Zizioulas 1991: 39f. La Cugna in fact sees 
Augustine as inconsistent: La Cugna 1991: 89. 
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not the other. La Cugna associates this with Augustine's very extensive use of 
psychological analogies. 32 The psychological analogies may show precisely a love of 
oneself. 33 Some references in De Trinitate proceed on just these lines. 34 Such an 
understanding would fit only too well with the individualism decried by Zizioulas. 35 
Certainly Augustine's psychological analogies have caused grave concern, 
being associated with modalism, 36 and the division between eastern and western 
theologies. 37 Clearly the psychological analogies are used in De Trinitate only after 
extensive scriptural and linguistic discussion. Thus, Augustine does not commence 
his trinitarian explanations from the analogy. It is, though, equally true that the 
analogies are scarcely `mere' analogies. First, there is the sheer bulk of De Trinitate 
the analogies occupy, and secondly, Augustine's signal preference for discussing 
these analogies rather than the more normal stock from pro-Nicene literature: why the 
preference for the psychological analogies? 38 
In conjunction with the psychological analogy comes a fear that this leads 
readily to a natural theology of a highly suspicious variety, 39 where God's 
characteristics are read off from the presumed contours of the human psyche, an 
accolade for Feuerbach from an unexpected source. 
31 The passage is cited by e. g. La Cugna 1991: 88, Plantinga 1988: 46,1991: 308 fn. 20, Gunton 1997: 42. 
The interpretation is disputed: see e. g. Chevalier 1940: 49-51. Ayres 2000b: 64 also draws different 
conclusions from DeT VII. 
32 La Cugna 1991: 101. 
33 The plural is apt given the variations ofDeT Books IX-XIV. 
34 DeT IX. 8, XIV. 10,11. 
35 Zizioulas 1991. 
36 Noted, but not expressly endorsed. by O'Collins 1999: 10. 
37 Noted, but again not expressly endorsed, by Hart 2002: 542. 
38 Augustine is certainly familiar with e. g. light and radiance (Sermons 117.11 and 118.2) and river and 
fountain and root and tree (De Fide et Si"mbolo 17). 
;9E. g. La Cugna 1991: 101. Jenson 1982: 117f likewise fears a natural theology in Augustine but 
because of the appropriation of Hellenic ideas. 
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Finally, there is criticism that in Augustine's theology any member of the 
Trinity could have become incarnate. Not all, perhaps, would see this position as a 
ground for criticism. It is, however, a very distinctive position attributed to 
Augustine. 40 Its significance would possibly be that the Son's mission is not a 
function of his eternal generation by the Father, tending therefore to sever mission 
and procession. This again would diminish the economy's revelatory significance. 
7.2.3. The Criticisms in Review 
These criticisms cluster around a nexus of topics: 
- one-ness (implicated in the charges of modalism, narcissism, 
starting-point and sacrifice of relational categories); 
- revelation (implicated in the charges about modalism, the 
significance of the economic trinity, natural theology, and the issue 
of who became incarnate); and 
- person (implicated in the charges about modalism, the significance 
of the economic trinity, starting-point, narcissism, the sacrifice of 
relational categories, natural theology, 41 and the issue of who 
became incarnate). 
The characteristic flavour is that one-ness has been so emphasised as to distort 
revelation and person. 
With these current criticisms in mind, it falls to review the contexts in which 
Augustine found himself articulating trinitarian doctrine. 
40 As Bourassa 1977: 672 fn. 2 notes. 
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7.3. The Polemical Context of Augustine's Trinitarian Theology 
7.3.1. Was there a Polemical Context? 
An important feature for earlier trinitarian theologians was their polemical 
setting. Is this also true for Augustine? There is an identifiable target in some later 
works, the Answer to an Arian Sermon (419)42, the Debate with Maximinus (427/8), 
and the Answer to Maximinus (427/8). 43 The target here is 'Arianism" 
, 
44 although 
what that entails at this date requires further discussion. 
It is, though, significant to have these later sources. For they should reflect 
Augustine's mature thought after completing De Trinitate, so providing extra 
interpretative control, 45 and also because comparisons with earlier pro-Nicene 
theologians are more straightforward where `Arianism' is expressly the issue. 
Concerns with `Arianism' are also signalled by the superscriptions to Sermons 117, 
135 and 14046 and mentioned in the body of the sermon in Sermons 117.6 and 126.8. 
These refutations of `Arianism' are, obviously, in the course of Augustine's pastoral 
ministry. 
Does De Trinitate itself, though, have a polemical setting? Barnes has spoken 
of the dangers of abstracting De Trinitate from its polemical context. 47 Clearly 
Augustine wishes to address certain questions that have been put to him: `People ask 
41 This charge arises from the prominence of the psychological analogy, which is entwined in the issue 
of the human person. 
42 So Teske 1995: 119, although he notes the more usual date is 418. 
43 Dates for the Debate with Maximinus (hereafter Deb Max) and the Answer to Maximinus (hereafter 
Ans Max) are taken from Teske 1995. 
44 Anslt'er to the Arian Sermon (hereafter Ans Ser) 1,1 `the preceding Arian sermon'. In Deb Max 2 
Maximinus says he holds the faith ratified at Ariminum, a council associated with `Arianism'. 
4 H. Drobner 2000: 19f notes the danger of establishing Augustine's trinitarian thought from too 
narrow a range of material. M. R. Barnes 1995b: 248 laments the comparative neglect of these later texts. 
46 This sermon is preached against the errors of Maximinus, `a bishop of the Arians'. 
47 M. R. Barnes 1995b: 245,247. 
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us these questions to the point of weariness... ' 48 As it happens, those questions relate 
to inseparable operation49 and the Holy Spirit, and are not explicitly linked to 
`Arianism'. However, the questions of 1.8 are not manifestly hostile. Augustine wants 
to teach, rather than refute, the questioners. 50 
`Arianism' is nevertheless very much in Augustine's mind. De Trinitate V. 4 
describes a `most cunning and ingenious device', an argument that the ingenerate 
Father and generate Son cannot be of the same substance, since all predicates of God 
are predicates of substance. This argument is the ground for the extensive discussion 
of Books V-VII so that its refutation seems important for Augustine. 
It is less clear who the `Arians' of Book V are. 51 E. Hill suggests 
Eunomianism is the target, 52 and Eunomius was not unknown to Augustine. 53 
However, the argument explicitly linked to Eunomius is not that of Book V, but one 
relating to the Father's will in begetting the Son. While the argument of Book V may 
have a `Eunomian' ring, 54 this does not alone demonstrate Eunomius was in mind. It 
is obviously difficult to demonstrate that only Eunomians deployed this argument. 
Indeed, the `Arian' Maximinus produces something very similar. 55 Barnes thus 
48 DeT 1.8. 
49 Also an issue in Sermon 126 on John 5: 19. Inseparable operation in Augustine's hands is inconsistent 
with the `Arian' idea that the Son is less: Sermon 126.8. 
50 This does not preclude DeT I interacting with Homoian theology. Such theology might have sparked 
the questions for the faithful. 
51 For Arianism and Homoianism, see Appendix 5. 
5' Hill 1985: 68f. Chevalier 1940: 22 had reached similar conclusions. 
53 DeT XV. 38. 
54 Eunomius was renowned for dialectical and philosophical skills and the argument in Book V is about 
substance and accident and proceeds in a quasi-syllogistic 
form. 
55 Deb Max 13. This would not preclude Maximinus from deriving it from a Eunomian source. 
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prefers Latin Homoianism as the target of Book V, 
56 arguing that Eunomianism was 
not a real problem in the Latin West. 57 
Therefore Augustine has a concern with `Arianism' both within De Trinitate 
and elsewhere. While not, perhaps, the sole target for De Trinitate, it emerges as one 
major concern. It is therefore fitting to consider the `Arianism' that Augustine 
encountered. 
7.3.2. Definitions of `Arians' 
Augustine can well distinguish varieties of `Arianism'. Thus he discriminates 
between early Arians, who asserted of the Son that `there was a time when he was 
not' and late Arians who admitted the Son had no beginning in time. 58 Importantly, 
however, both are described as `Arian'. Augustine's knowledge in De Trinitate of 
Eunomius has already been mentioned. Elsewhere, in Heresies Augustine 
differentiates Arians from Semiarians, the latter conceding that the Son is of like 
essence with the Father while full Arians denied even likeness. 59 However, a clue 
about the `essence' of `Arianism' in Augustine's view comes with the Arian denial 
that the Father, Son and Spirit `are of one and the same nature or substance... '. 60 
This denial aptly covers early Arians, who said once the Son was not, and also those 
holding fast to the Council of Ariminum (359), who said the Son was like `according 
to the Scriptures', but would not say that he was like in all respects. 
56 M. R. Barnes 1993: 185. 
57 M. R. Barnes 1993: 188f. 
58 DeT VI. 1. 
59 Arians appear as entry XLIX and Semiarians as LI. 
60 Heresies XLIX. 
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Augustine did witness or encounter active Arianism (within the above 
definition). Late in his ministry he was, of course, faced with Maximinus in North 
Africa, but earlier in Milan he had the chance to observe Ambrose's resistance to 
`Arian' inroads. To that extent, Arianism would still have appeared as a live issue for 
Augustine. 
This means Augustine can plausibly be envisaged as facing a species of what 
current scholarship would term western Homoianism, with an allegiance to the 
Council of Ariminum, but which he would categorise as Arianism since its restricted 
formula `like "as the scriptures teach"' fell short of endorsing homoousios. 61 
7.3.3 Arguments Augustine was concerned to meet 
Three `Arian'/Homoian arguments are of particular concern. First, there is the 
important argument concerning substance outlined in De Trinitate V. 4.62 Augustine 
has pointed out that God cannot be modified. 63 `Arians'/Homoians use the point to 
argue as follows: 64 
- since nothing can be said of God 'modification-wise', 
65 all that is 
said of God is said 'substance-wise'; 66 
- To say the Father is ingenerate is then a `substance-wise' 
statement; 
- But the Son is not ingenerate, but generate; 
- Ingenerate and generate are different 
61 Note the definition in Heresies XLIX. 
62 Maximinus argues something very similar Deb Max 13. 
63 DeT V. 3. Deo autem aliquid eiusmodi [sc. mutatio] accidere non potest. This is joined to a reference 




05 Hill's translation (Hill 1991) of `secundum accidens'. 
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- Since ingenerateness is taken `substance-wise', Father and Son 
differ at the level of substance. 
This admittedly elegant argument contains interesting features. It builds on a point 
accepted by Augustine and his pro-Nicene predecessors, that God, as the God who is, 
is unchangeable. " Another feature is the view that all predications are either 
`substance-wise' or `modification-wise'. Therefore when one eliminates a predication 
from one category, it must fall into the other. Augustine will go on to challenge just 
this mutually exclusive but exhaustive dichotomy. Finally, another, in itself, 
uncontentious point, the Father is ingenerate and the Son generate. The question is 
about the significance of this difference. 
A second argument Augustine must face concerns the sending of the Son and 
the Spirit. Augustine cites the objection to the orthodox faith that the sending of Son 
and Spirit demonstrates the Father is greater. 68 This is not described as an Arian 
argument in De Trinitate, but occurs as such in the Answer to the Arian Sermon. 69 
A third argument, closely related to the foregoing, is that the Son's obedience 
in the Incarnation indicates that the Father is greater. The Arian Sermon itself states: 
... 
[T]he obedience shows that the one towers above and that the other stands 
underneath in subjection. 70 
Such arguments are present too in the Debate with Maximinus, 7' and, as will be seen, 
Augustine produces several distinct arguments to meet them. 
66 Hill's translation (Hill 1991) of `secundum substantiam'. 
67 Compare Athanasius on unchangeability CAr 1.35 Also Expositiofidei 3; Ad Episcopos Aegytpi 17; 
CAr I. 10,52; 11.10; Ad Afros 7. For Hilary, God as the self-authoring God is not subject to externally 
imposed change DeT I. 4-8,11.6,7. 
68 DeT 11.7. They argue: `Maior est qui mittit quam qui mittitur'. 
69AnsSer 111.4 and IV. 
70 Arian Sermon 34. ipsa vero obedientia alium supra eminentem, alium subsistentem et subiectum 
declarat 
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One may note here Teske's contention that Maximinus especially holds a 
principle inevitably leading him to subordinationism. 
Though not formulated with any philosophical precision, Maximinus again and 
again implies that to have one's origin from another or to have received 
something from another means to be inferior to that other. 72 
Given Harnack's charges of modalism, it is important to recall that Augustine 
repudiated Sabellianism and claimed in contrast to uphold distinctions between the 
Persons, 73 and also to clarify what he thought constituted it. Denying that there are 
three `somethings' in the Trinity is envisaged as being just what Sabellius held, 74 
while the Noetians are charged with holding that Christ `is identical with the Father 
and the Holy Spirit'. 75 This indicates that for Augustine Sabellianism arises if a 
theology does not assert distinctions between Father, Son and Spirit but allows them 
to be identical. 
Letter 120 indicates Augustine was aware that trinitarian theology could be 
accused of holding to a `fourth thing' behind, as it were, the three Persons. He rejects 
such a description. This is relevant for the charge that he starts with one divine 
substance. 
For Augustine to be successful on his own terms, his account must meet these 
arguments, while also not creating the problems with which he has been associated in 
71 Deb Max 15.14,18 and 23. 
72 Teske 1995: 178. 
7; Ans May I. xiii `nos autem [in contrast to the Sabellians] alium quidem esse Patrem, et alium Filium, 
sed tarnen quod Pater est, hoc esse dicimus Filium. ' See too Tractate 70.2. 
74DeTVII. 9. 
75 Heresies XXXVI. Heresies XLI depicts Sabellians as differing little from Noetians. 
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some current scholarship. We turn now to Augustine's fundamental statement of his 
trinitarian theology. 
7.4. Augustine's Foundational Statement 
7.4.1. De Trinitate I. 7 
This passage usefully summarises key features of Augustine's trinitarian 
theology both inside and outside De Trinitate. Augustine first clears the ground. He 
outlines the kinds of misconceptions with which people approach the Trinity, 76 
explains how the Scriptures adapt their expression to our weakness to raise our sight 
towards God, 77 promises to investigate first whether the scriptures do teach a 
trinitanan faith, 78 and warns that his work will not please all. 79 He can then set out 
that faith. 
[1] The purpose of all the Catholic commentators I have been able to 
read on the divine books of both testaments, who have written before me on the 
trinity which God is, has been to teach that according to the scriptures Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine 
unity; and therefore there are not three gods but one God; although indeed the 
Father has begotten the Son, and therefore he who is the Father is not the Son; 
and the Son is begotten by the Father, and therefore he who is the Son is not the 
Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit 
of the Father and of the Son, himself coequal to the Father and the Son, and 
belonging to the threefold unity. 
[2] It was not however this same three (their teaching continues) that 
was born of the virgin Mary, crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate, rose 
again on the third day and ascended into heaven, but the Son alone. Nor was it 
this same three that came down upon Jesus in the form of a dove at his baptism, 
or came down on the day of Pentecost after the Lord's ascension, with a roaring 
sound from heaven as though a violent gust were rushing down, and in divided 
tongues as of fire, but the Holy Spirit alone. Nor was it this same three that 
spoke from heaven, You are my Son, either at his baptism by John, or on the 
mountain when the three disciples were with him, nor when the resounding 
voice was heard, I have both glorified it (my name) and will glorify it again, but 
it was the Father's voice alone addressing the Son; although just as Father and 
76 DeT I. 1. The errors are: (a) trying to approach incorporeal things on the basis of knowledge of the 
corporeal; (b) trying to approach eternal unchangeable things on the basis of changeable human 
intellectual life; and (c) approaching these things not on the basis of corporeal. or changeable 
incorporeal things, but on one's own suppositions. 
77 DeTI. 2 and 3. 
78DeTI. 4. 
79 DeT 1.5 and 6. 
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Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably. This is also 
my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith. 8° 
This requires several remarks. First, Augustine presents himself as 
conservative, suggesting his statement is both drawn from Scripture and represents no 
novel synthesis of it, but rather teaches what his predecessors taught. 
Moving, secondly, to the passage's main structure. Hill usefully highlights 
that it falls in two major sections, paragraph 1 dealing with the eternal relations of the 
generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, and paragraph 2 with the 
temporal actions of the triune God. 
However, there is a further complexity. Within each paragraph, two topics are 
in view, inseparability and distinction. Thus in paragraph I dealing with the eternal 
relations, the Persons are inseparable yet distinct: the Son is not the Father, the Father 
not the Son and the Spirit neither Father nor Son. In paragraph 2 the actions are 
described first in their distinction (the Son alone is born, suffers, dies and rises, and so 
also with the distinct actions of the other Persons), and are then described as being 
inseparable actions. 
This structural analysis thus yields two pairs of ideas. 
" eternal relations < --------------------------------------- > temporal actions 
0 inseparability < ----------------------------------------> 
distinction 
80 The paragraphing follows Hill 1991 and enumeration 
is added for clarity. The Latin text is set out in 
Appendix 9. 
263 
Neither pair features straightforward opposition. Thus the eternal relation-temporal 
action pair is very close to the conceptual pair procession-mission, and procession 
and mission are very closely correlated by Augustine. 8' Similarly, distinction and 
inseparability are presented as both true, not mutually exclusive. Finally, because 
eternal relation and temporal action are linked, two other linkages emerge. One is 
between distinction at the levels of eternal relation and temporal action and the 
second is the linkage between inseparability at the levels of eternal relation and 
temporal action. The parallelism in the concluding phrase `... just as Father and Son 
and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably' points in just this 
direction. What follows will largely reflect the conceptual vocabulary articulated 
here, inseparability and distinction in their temporal and eternal settings. 
7.4.2. Innovative or conservative? 
Reference was made earlier to Jenson's remark that Augustine knows and 
repudiates the work of the Cappadocians. 82 It is therefore interesting to see De 
Trinitate 1.7 portraying Augustine as standing in the lines of tradition. 83 Doubtless 
these asseverations could be deemed disingenuous, but they have some substance. 
Augustine not merely appeals to earlier tradition but employs some of its 
8! DeT IV. 28 `So the Word of God is sent by him whose Word he is; sent by him he is born of. The 
begetter sends, what is begotten is sent. ' Compare also the derivation of the 
Spirit's procession from 
both Father and Son in relation to the sending of the Spirit by both Father and Son. However, 
Augustine does not operate a simple correlation of procession and mission: see 
below. 
82 Jenson 1982: 119. 
83 `This is also my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith. ' 
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argumentation 84 and interpretative rules. 85 Like his predecessors, he is concerned to 
demonstrate and refute by reference to Scripture. 86 
It is, however, unsatisfactory to see Augustine as simply conservative. 
Bourassa, concerned to assert Augustine's continuity with earlier pro-Nicenes, rightly 
admits that he extends preceding theology. 87 Most conspicuously, perhaps, Augustine 
re-visits the Old Testament theophanies, 88 declining to take them uniformly as 
appearances of the Son, 89 but insisting that the Father appears at least once in the Old 
Testament. 90 Thus Augustine avoids suggesting that the Father is essentially invisible 
while the Son is essentially visible. Earlier interpretations of Old Testament 
theophanies as simply huiophanies risked just that, and were therefore exposed to the 
`Arian'/Homoian charge that, if the Father was essentially invisible, but the Son 
essentially visible, then they were essentially unlike. 91 
Similarly, Augustine examines predications about the Persons, the presenting 
issue being the statement that Christ is the wisdom of God (1 Corinthians 1: 24). 92 
Augustine notes that pro-Nicenes used this to illustrate the absurdity of the early 
84 So Bourassa 1977: 697. This is supported by, for example, the argument that a father begets in his 
own nature Ans Max II. xiv. 2; also Sermon 139.2. 
85 E. g. understanding certain verses as being said of Jesus in his human nature: DeT I. 14,22. Tractate 
78.2 and Ans Max I. v. 
86 Hence the considerable exegetical content of DeT I-VII. Bourassa adds (1977: 686) that DeT VIII- 
XIV is likewise in close contact with Scripture. Necessarily the later material featuring Maximinus has 
exegetical content. 
87 Bourassa 1977: 715. 
88 DeT 11.17-32,111.3-27. 
89 DeT II. 32. 
90 DeT II. 33. He has in mind the vision of the Ancient of Days in Daniel 7: 9-14. 
91 Compare the argument relying on the point that anything predicated of God is predicated 
substantially. DeT V. 4. 
92 Raised DeT VI. 1. 
265 
Arian view that `once the Son was not'. God could not conceivably have been 
without his wisdom. 93 
However, Augustine explains that simply asserting that Christ is the Father's 
wisdom could imply that the Father is not wise in himself but only wise by the 
wisdom he begets. 94 This would mean that Father and Son were not alike in all 
respects. Augustine is thus compelled to re-examine the earlier argument precisely to 
defend the Nicene homoousion. 95 Matters of predication are taken up on this basis in 
De Trinitate VI-VII. 
Another striking innovation is the extended use of psychological analogies. 96 
It is worth locating this innovation within the framework De Trinitate 1.7 outlines. 
When faced elsewhere with the riddle of a triune God who acts inseparably but whose 
Persons apparently perform distinct actions, 97 Augustine uses a psychological 
analogy, based on memory, understanding and will. 98 Barnes rightly observes that the 
analogy's purpose is to undergird inseparable yet distinct operation. 99 
These three innovative features can be partially grouped around the issues of 
inseparability and distinction. Old Testament theophanies and the issue raised by 1 
Corinthians 1: 24 are so handled as to prevent distinctions implying that Father and 
Son differed in nature. The third feature, psychological analogy, appears outside De 
93 DeT VI. 1. 
9' DeTVI. 2ff. 
95 Contrast e. g. Jenson 1982: 119 who regards Augustine in some respects as sacrificing the Nicene 
settlement. 
96 Augustine was not the first to employ psychological analogies, nor, given his appeals to Genesis 
1: 26, does he do so purely arbitrarily. But the extent is breath-taking. 
97 Sermon 52 deals with Jesus' baptism in Matthew 3: 13. 
98 Sermon 52.20. 
99 M. R. Barnes 1999a: 164 fn 30. 
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Trinitate as Augustine attempts to illustrate that divine operation 
is both inseparable 
and distinct. Hence Barnes contends Augustine was indeed appropriating the Nicene 
settlement, but re-articulating it, in particular towards a revelation of the unity of the 
Trinity in its inseparable activities. 100 The idea of inseparable operation is not 
exclusive to Augustine. ' 01 He recognises though that such ideas have raised 
questions. 102 The issue is whether his answers do not unintentionally innovate in the 
way Jenson, La Cugna and others allege. 
7.5. Scripture 
7.5.1. Rules of Interpretation Outlined 
In effect Augustine has three rules for interpreting Scripture, one referring to 
the divine nature (forma dei), the second to the human nature (forma servi), but the 
third to relation, the relation of origin or generation. 
These first two rules are found, of course, in earlier pro-Nicene material and 
are, for Augustine, closely linked to Philippians 2: 6f1°3 and its terminology of forma 
servi/forma dei. 104 A passage is taken forma dei when it deals with unity and equality 
of substance, 105 and as forma servi when it deals with the Son as less than the Father. 
This enables Augustine to deal readily with, for instance, John 14: 28 in ways similar 
to his predecessors. 
100 M. R. Barnes 1999a: 154. 
101 Documented in the Cappadocians by Ayres 2000a: 48,2002: 459, referring to Ad Ablabium; Coakley 
1999: 133 referring to ad Graecos 24-5 and Jenson 1982: 113 referring to Gregory of Nazianzen 
discussing three suns with one beam. 
102 DeT I. 8 immediately raises the question after I. 7 has set out the conceptual pairs of eternal relations- 
temporal action and inseparability-distinction. 
103 Pelikan 1987-8: 25 rightly stresses the importance of Phil 2: 5-11 for Augustine's canon of 
interpretation. 
104 Note the extensive quotation in DeT I. 14. 
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However, Augustine sees that this initial forma dei/forma servi scheme must 
be supplemented because sometimes it produced absurdity. Thus John 5: 19 cannot be 
taken under the forma servi rule because the Son in his creaturely form did not 
physically see his Father doing all things first. '06 Hence he develops a third rule, a 
rule of origin: 
... which tells us not that the 
Son is less than the Father, but that he is from the 
Father [de Patre]. This does not imply any dearth of equality, but only his birth 
in eternity. 
107 
7.5.2. Comment on rules of interpretation 
Within this scheme, equality is consistently allocated to the first, forma dei. 108 
After all, Augustine's translation of Philippians 2: 6 reads: Qui cum in forma Dei 
esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo. Thus the verse itself links forma 
dei (a question of substance or nature) and equality. '09 So, for Augustine equality 
relates to predications about nature. It is denied if something is predicated rendering 
one nature less than another. Hence the maior of John 14: 28 compares the divine 
nature and the Son in his human nature, forma servi. 1lo 
The final rule, the rule of origin, is indeed highly desirable. Without it, there is 
even some risk that the filial relationship could become inarticulable. However, this 
rule's application may be less straightforward than it seems. Thus, having applied the 
forma servi rule to John 7: 16 in De Trinitate 1.22, Augustine later points out in De 
Trinitate 11.4 that John 7: 16 could equally well be explained using the origin rule. 
los DeT 11.3. 
106 DeT II. 3. 
107 DeT 11.3. See too the earlier statement in DeT 11.3 that there are passages `... which mark him 
neither as less nor as equal, but only intimate that he is from the Father [de Patre ]... ' 
108 So also E. Hendricx 1955: 42 `... il reste done que 1'egalite du Fils est d'ordre substantiel... ' 
109 Compare the insistence of De Fide et Svmbolo 16 that the Persons are equal in nature, and the late 
response to Maximinus that origin and equality are distinct questions Ans Max II. xviii. 3. 
110DeTI. 14. 
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Conversely, John 5: 26 is at one point allocated to the fiwnw clc'i rule, ' hit 
subsequently produced as an example of the origin rule. ''2 Again, a flagship text for 
`Arians'/Hornoians, John 6: 38, falls under the 
. 
0-ma ser"vi rule, III only to he 
explained in terms of origin in the later works against Maximinus. ' 14 
Therefore both, /bi-ma dei and forma set-vi texts can, occasionally, be explained 
under the origin rule. The origin rule can cover texts invoked to show equality and 
also texts invoked to show inferiority. This seeming paradox invites closer focus on 
the nature of the relation that the origin rule describes, that the Son is `God from 
God. " 15 
7.6. Inseparability 
De Trinitate 1.7 disclosed two conceptual pairs, first, inseparability and 
distinction and, Leternal relation and temporal action. It now falls to examine 
Augustine's trinitarian theology using this conceptual vocabulary. De T "initutc I. 7 
indicates that inseparability bites at the level both of action and of relations. 
Inseparability at the level of action will be discussed first. 
7.6.1. Inseparable action 
Inseparable action is no arbitrary choice of Augustine's for describing triune 
activity in the world. He contends, rightly, as we have seen, that it is accepted by the 
III DeT. 1.22. 
H2DeTI1.3. 
11; DeT. 1.22. 
1'4 Ans Max I I. xx. 3. This is not because Augustine had renounced the forma ser i rule. See Ans Alus l. v 
and Il. xiv. S. 
115 De T 11.2. `... Deum de Deo... ' 
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Catholic faith, part of the church's tradition in the best sense, 
116 but more importantly 
it is scriptural. It is difficult to over-stress how important John 5: 19ff is to him as 
undergirding this. l17 Attention especially focuses on John 5: 19 itself and it is worth 
now comparing Augustine's Latin with the Greek. Augustine fastens on two phrases 
(which he quotes separately): ' 18 
(a) non potest Filius a sefacere quidquam nisi quod viderit Patremfacientem 
for 
ov Süvatial 6 uiöS not v «p' toi ov&EV £äv µ1j titi ß? 1rß 'zöv imatiEpa 
notovvtia 
and 
(b) Quaecumque... Pater facit, haec eadem et Filiusfacit similiter 
for 
CC 11 1 )l ýyäp äv EJEIvo5 Jtotfi, tiaivtia icai 0 uiöS öµoüiS 1roiEt. 
The first phrase with its reference to `seeing' leads us, says Augustine, to 
consider the Son's origin. 119 He reasons that this cannot refer to physical seeing. 
Hilary anticipated him in this. 120 Had the Father created anything independently so 
that the Son could watch, the Son would not have been creator of all. Physical seeing 
here would be incompatible with the Son's creation of all. 12I This argument proceeds 
on important lines: it tends to preclude the Father working independently, even on 
similar projects. This will be pursued in the exposition of the second phrase. 
1 16 Tractate 20.3: Catholica autemfides habet, quod Patris et Fi1ii opera non sunt separabilia. 
117 As well as the relatively extensive discussion of DeT I1.3, Sermons 126 and 127 and Tractates 18-23 
deal with it. 
118 In DeTI1.3. 
9 De T. II. 3. 
120 Hilary DeT VII. 17,18. 
121 See Tractate18.5. Sermon 126.9 follows essentially these lines. 
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Having excluded physical seeing and imitation by the Son, Augustine instead 
relates seeing to the Son's origin, to being born of the Father. Behind the phrase lies 
the view: 
... that the work of the Father and the 
Son is indivisible [inseparabilis'22 est 
operatio], and yet the Son's working is from the Father just as he himself is 
from the Father; and the way in which the Son sees the Father is simply by being 
the Son. For him, being from the Father, that is being born of the Father, is not 
something different from seeing the Father; nor is seeing him working 
something different from his working equally; and the reason he does not work 
of himself is that he does not (so to put it) be of himself [sed ideo non a se123 
1quia non est a se] ... ` 
Augustine's analysis makes good contextual sense. In John 5: 19ff, Jesus is 
explaining why his conduct and statements are not blasphemous. Augustine's 
explanation excludes Jesus as an independently existing deity, 125 working 
independently. He does not work independently, because his life is not a life separate 
from the Father, but `from' the Father: deus de deo. Augustine's explanation means 
that Jesus answers the charges. 
Further, the idea that the Son cannot a sefacere quidquam is taken as relating 
to inseparable operation. Operation is inseparable in that the Son does not work 
without the Father. 126 Moreover, the Son's temporal working is placed in parallel 
with his eternal relationship with the Father. As related in eternity, so the Son 
operates on earth. Possibly this correlation of eternal relation and temporal action 
may ultimately fail, but Augustine clearly asserts economic and immanent 
considerations are connected, not severed. 
1" For reasons developed later, translating inseparabilis by `indivisible' can be unfortunate. 
123 Referring to the phrase non potest Filius a sefacere. 
124 DeTII. 3. Compare Tractatc' 21.2: `... but in the Son Himself [the Father] showeth Him what He 
doeth. ' 
125 Note Tractatt' 19.12 carefully asserts there are not two lives such as to constitute two gods. 
ý`' Using the terms of Tractacte 18.6 on John 5: 19. Cf. Appold 1976: 281. 
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Finally, one might ask whether Augustine has over-read John's phrase. Some 
modern scholarship relates the phrase to a parable or proverb of a father's loving 
demonstration of his work to his son. 127 However, Ridderbos comments that 5: 20b 
refers to the specific Son and Father, 128 so that a parabolic reference in 5: 20a is 
contextually awkward. Further, `seeing' and `hearing' within the Gospel tend to refer 
to the relation that the Son has with the Father: what the Son `sees' in heaven belongs 
to the range of ideas stressing the Son's uniqueness in his relation to the Father. 129 
This brings one back to the question of what kind of Son he is. 
With the second phrase, Quaecumque... Pater facit, haec eadem et Filiusfacit 
similiter, Augustine strikingly emphasises eadem, so that `... the works of the Father 
and the Son are the same works', not the Father doing some works while the Son does 
others. 130 Nor does the Son simply perform essentially similar works, for he is not 
`like a painter copying pictures'. 131 Instead inseparable operation means Father and 
Son `do' numerically identical actions, not just generically similar actions. Again, 
Hilary had earlier made this point, 132 but less frequently and emphatically. 
Inseparable operation is less central to him. 
Augustine's Latin version clearly commits him to this interpretation, 133 but it 
is perhaps less obvious in the Greek. A key word in the phrase ä yäp äv ExEivoq 
irotfj, tc to xai o uiöS öµotwq itotEt is iavia. Does this mean `these things' from 
ovioq ('this') or `the same things' from cd töS ('the same')? If the latter, then 
127 E. g. Brown 1971 1.218. 
128 1997: 191 f. 
129 Note here John 1: 18 - no-one has `seen' God and John 3: 11 to the effect that Jesus testifies of what 
he has `seen'. 
130 Tractates 18.8,20.3. 
131 DeT II. 3. 
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Augustine's translation is, of course, correct. Jerome, however, construes iaüia as 
`these things'. 134 
However, even taking tiav'ca as `these things', Augustine's substantial 
exegetical conclusions are not necessarily proved wrong. 135 For ca-bra functions 
pronominally here, referring back to ä ... 
äv FKEivoq 1toLlj. It should, strictly, have 
the same scope. Strictly, therefore, both clauses, ä yetp äv Excivog noth, and tiavia 
icai o otoq oRoicoc noiEI, have the same reference, co-ordinated by the 
demonstrative pronoun. 136 That suggests that the Father and the Son do numerically 
identical actions, not just actions of the same genus. Augustine would be right, after 
all. 
Various considerations support this. Semantically, if John 5: 19 were saying 
Father and Son did similar but not numerically identical actions, then a term is 
available to make that perfectly clear, tiolav'ta from tiotob coq, `such'. This is not 
employed. 137 Further, the Gospel's overall theology does join Jesus' works to the 
Father. Indeed, Ridderbos reaches a similar view to Augustine: the Father `makes 
himself present in all that the Son does. ' 138 In general terms, Jesus' works are 
characterised as `works of my Father', ' 39 in that they are works the Father gives him 
1 32 Hilary DeT VII. 17,18. 
13; Hilary's Latin text is substantially the same. 
134 quaecumque enim ille fecerit haec et Filius similiterfacit. Later accenting supports this since John 
5: 19 is accented as 'raüia, the neuter plural of ovTo;, not TavT6, the neuter plural of aviög. 
135 Even if he did think the form was `the same things'. 
136 The point that Tavtia has the same scope as ä ... 
äv is not affected by the fact that ä ... 
äv is 
indefinite. 
137 No textual variants seem relevant. 
138 Ridderbos 1997: 193. Barrett 1978: 216 speaks of the Son's actions always being `a reflection of 
God's own work. ' This seems less strong than Ridderbos or Augustine, and Barrett does not deal in 
depth with the semantics of John 5: 19. 
139 John 10: 337. 
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to do, 140 and in which the Father is involved, '4' and which, finally, Jesus attributes 
directly to the Father in John 14: 10,142 for the Father is in the Son. '43 This latter 
statement, of course, returns one to the category of relation: if the Father is in the Son, 
in what sense could the Son's actions be discrete and separate from the Father? 
Hence, for Augustine John 5: 19ff warrants inseparable operation, in which 
Father and Son are involved (to attempt to put it neutrally) in numerically identical 
actions. There are no works `done by the Father without the Son, or by the Son 
without the Father. ' 
144 
However, such inseparable operation seems costly. Augustine readily 
acknowledges it provokes questions, 145 notably that it possibly implies that the Father 
too becomes incarnate. 146 Inevitably one wonders why the principle is so important - 
what does it protect? Perhaps most basically, inseparable operation preserves the 
integrity of divine action. This is important in several respects, first, with regard to 
monotheism and creation. While explaining inseparable operation, Augustine refers 
to the Father and Son creating together in one inseparable operation. 147 Indeed he 
uses creation in his exposition of John 5: 19ff. 148 This, though, is significant because 
of Augustine's views about creation. 
140 John 5: 36. 
141 The healing of the man born blind is seen to be the work both of Jesus and the God who hears him. 
142 `... the Father... works.. ' 
'43 John 14: 11. 
144 Tractate 18.6. 
145DeTI. 8. 
146 See Letter 11 to Nebridius where just this is raised. 
147 DeT I. 12. 
'48DeT 11.3, Tractate18.5. and Sermon 126.9. 
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Augustine envisages a dichotomy between creator and created. A being is one 
or the other. 149 It is, though, by being creator that one is sovereign over what one 
creates. ' 50 Creating, then, is a decisive mark of deity. ' 51 This implies that were there 
several discrete creative acts by discrete creators, no one creator would be lord of all. 
For each one, there would be something he had not created. There will be no being 
who is omnipotens in the sense of powerful over all, at least not without further 
considerations. ' 52 
Therefore inseparable action preserves a `cosmological monism'' 53 in which 
the triune God (and the Father in particular) has a monarchy, not a polyarchy. ' 54 
Since creation is one operation, and since only the creator is worthy of worship, ' 55 it 
follows that inseparable operation in creation founds monolatry, the worship of the 
triune God alone, in which each Person is worthy of worship. Thus, inseparable 
operation allows Augustine to contend the triune God alone creates, and alone is 
worthy of worship. 
Conversely, Augustine gives indications that separable divine operations are 
polytheistic. His treatment of Manichaeism illustrates this. Augustine accuses Faustus 
of polytheism, ' 56 despite Faustus' earlier assertion that Manichaeans worship one 
deity under a `threefold appellation' 157 Now, the charge of polytheism is most 
1 49 DeT 1.9. So too with Athanasius. Ayres 2002: 450 rightly says Nicene theology held to an absolute 
distinction between creator and created. 
150 De Fide et Symbolo 2. 
15 1 Against Faustus 21.4. 
152 So too G. Heidi 2001: 175. 
153 S. Macdonald 2001: 84. 
I'4 Compare Augustine's remarks in Sermon 126.10 that there is one majesty given the one operation 
of the Trinity. 
Iss Dc' Ciritate Dei (hereafter DCD) VII. 27. 
156 Reply to Faustus 20.5. 
157 Reply to Faustus 20.2. 
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obviously true in relation to the `principle' Hyle. Since Hyle does what only a god 
can, it must be called god. ' 58 However, Augustine's criticism is wider. He also 
criticises Manichaean conceptions of trinitarian operation. In discussing the idea that 
God is light, he comments: 
This light is one divine being, in an inseparable triune existence; and yet, 
without supposing any assumption of bodily form, you assign to separate places 
parts of the immaterial, spiritual and unchangeable substance. 159 
His primary concern is the Manichaean separation of the Son's attributes, 160 but a 
subsidiary theme is the allocation of the Persons to different places or spheres of 
activity and the way this separates what is properly inseparable. The upshot is that 
Manichaeans resemble pagans (i. e. polytheists) `in assigning to your gods different 
powers, and functions and employments' .' 
61 In their mythology `They are all distinct 
persons. ' 1 62 Hence, inseparable operation both fits with monotheistic emphases on a 
single creation whose triune creator is alone worthy of worship and also guards 
against polytheistic implications arising from separable action. Harnack's comment 
that Augustine carries out monotheism `strictly and thoroughly' is here well-taken. 163 
Inseparable operation also preserves the integrity of divine action in other 
respects. Augustine turns to salvation itself as the joint action of the Trinity. 
164 This 
follows naturally from seeing each Person as worthy of worship through their 
inseparable operation of creation. The one majesty of the creator must act inseparably 
158 Reply to Faustus 21.4. 
159 Reply to Faustus 20.7. 
160 See Reply to Faustus 20.8. 
161 Reph' to Faustus 20.10. Compare Leftow's comment that divine persons with distinct spheres of 
activity sounds like an 'Olympian' (i. e. polytheistic) model of 
divine action: Leftow 1999: 237. 
162 Reply to Faustus 20.12. 
163 Harnack 1898 V: 4. 
164 DeT XIII. 15. 
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in righting the creation. Indeed, without inseparable action in redemption, the 
question arises whether it is perfected. 
A further area is revelation. This may seem unexpected, since Augustine has 
incurred substantial criticism over revelation. ' 65 However, Barnes argues that it is 
inseparable operation that allows the divine unity to be expressed. 166 Without 
inseparable operation, how does one know that the Father is indeed in the Son? In the 
background here is the question of how actions might reveal not just a relationship 
which is personal and harmonious, but a perichoretic personal relationship. Indeed 
there is a further question whether giving the information that a perichoretic 
relationship exists is the same as revealing it by instantiating it to onlookers. This, 
though, starts to move towards the inseparability of persons. Is this justified? This 
brings us to the theological basis for Augustine's inseparable operation. 
At various points Augustine suggests a rationale for inseparable operation. As 
indicated earlier, De Trinitate 1.7 links inseparable operation in the temporal sphere 
with persons whose eternal relations are inseparable. ' 67 A similar movement emerges 
in Letter 11 to Nebridius. Questioned about inseparable operations, Augustine 
outlines an inseparable union which inevitably produces inseparable operation. 168 The 
overall train of thought comes out perhaps most clearly thus: 
... 
Patris et Filii opera inseparabilia sunt. Quod est quod dixi? Quomodo ipse 
Pater et Filius inseparabiles sunt, sic et opera Patris et Filii inseparabilia 
165 E. g. La Cugna 1991: 97 points precisely to works ad extra as severing the Persons from the 
economy. 
166 N1. R. Barnes 1999a: 158. 
167 quamvis Pater et Filius cat Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sent, ita inseparabiliter operentur. 
The point is the parallel between sicut and ita. 
168 Letter 11.2 to Nebridius. 
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sunt. 169 Quomodo Pater et Filius inseparabiles sunt? Quia ipse dixit: Ego et 
Pater unum sumus. Quia Pater et Filius non sunt duo dii, sed unus Deus. 
1,70 
The works, then, are inseparable, because the Persons are inseparable, an 
inseparability drawn from monotheism (again recalling Harnack's comment on 
Augustine's vigorous monotheism)17 ' and John 10: 30. Inquiry therefore shifts to the 
inseparability of the Persons. 
7.6.2. Inseparable Persons 
The passages cited above demonstrate Augustine's commitment to the 
Persons' inseparability, 172 associated with monotheism and with that key text for 
Nicene trinitarian monotheism, John 10: 30.173 To that extent, Augustine's 
inseparability of Persons possibly correlates with perichoretic indwelling and 
monotheism in Athanasius and the `in' terminology of Hilary. The final instruction of 
Tractate 20 re-inforces this: 
Intellegite ergo, fratres carissimi, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum 
inseparabiliter coharere, Trinitatem hanc unum Deum, et omnia opera unius 
Dei haec esse Patris, haec esse Filü, haec esse Spiritus Sancti. 174 
After all, cohaerere and its cognate adhaerere are used in De Trinitate to describe 
personal relations which conduce to `one-ness. ' 175 
The Persons are inseparable at least in that one cannot properly talk of the 
Persons in individual isolation: ' 76 
169 Structurally similar to the expression of DeTI. 7. 
170 Tractate 20.3. on John 5: 19. 
171 Harnack vol. 5 1898: 4. 
172 This notion is widespread in Augustine's works: DCD XI. 24 and 29; Reply to Faustus 20.8; 
Confessions XIII. xi. 12, as well as more obvious places such as DeT 1.7, Ans Max II. x. 1, Sermons 118.2 
and 152, Tractate 20.3 etc. 
173 Tractate 20.3. 
1 74 Tractate 20.13. 
175 DeT VI. 6 Augustine speaks of Father and Son alike being God, but one God, not two and adds ita 
enim Bibi cohaerent. DeT VI. 9. uses adhaerere. 
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Quamquam non invenitur quomodo dici possit auf Pater solus, auf Filius solus 
cum semper atque inseparabiliter, et We cum Filio sit et We cum Patre, non ut 
ambo Sint Pater auf ambo Filius, sed quia semper in invicem'77 neuter Bolus. 178 
One can therefore paraphrase inseparability as meaning that the Persons are always 
with each other. The relations are eternal and unchangeable - they cannot be lost. 179 
Augustine's language therefore illustrates the connection between inseparable 
persons and inseparable actions. The Persons never are without each other, so 
naturally they never act without each other. 
We must now return to the `Arian'/Homoian argument that asserts any 
predication about God is predicated `substance-wise' and that suggests that the Father 
and Son are of different substances because one is ingenerate, the other generate. ' 80 
Augustine answers like this. He accepts God cannot be `modified in any 
way'. '8' A `modification' here is something that can be lost from the thing it 
modifies, 182 but whose loss leaves the thing modified essentially the same, intact. 
God, however, has or is nothing that can be changed or lost. ' 83 This, then, is what 
Augustine wishes to defend, that nothing can be lost or changed in God. 
Augustine can now challenge the false dichotomy in the `Arian'/Homoian 
argument. They assumed all predicates were stated either `modification-wise' or 
`substance-wise'. Any predicate that was not a modification must therefore be of 
substance. Augustine, however, argues for a third category of predication, things that 
176 Again, strongly reminiscent of Hilary. 
177 A term with perichoretic associations. Compare DeT VI. 12. but also significant in relative or 
relational propositions. DeT V. 6,12,15; and VII. 2,3,7,11 and 12. 
178 DeT V I. 9. 
1 79 DeT V. 6. 
'80DeTV. 4. 
181 DeT. V. 3. God admits no mutatio. 
182 DeT V. 5. Accidens autem dici, non solet nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. 
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are said `with reference to something else' 184 or relatively. For Augustine, relational 
predication in God is no modification precisely because it is eternal and 
unchangeable. 1 85 It cannot be lost. Hence he preserves the key value, that nothing 
changeable be predicated of God. The `Arian'/Homoian objection therefore fails. 
Augustine's argument merits reflection. First, it aims to ensure relational 
predication is distinguished from substantial predication. If it is not, then personal 
distinctions entail difference of substance and the objection succeeds. This bears 
strongly on the criticism that Augustine equates person with substance. ' 86 Were that 
so, he would admit the objection by the back door, but the refutation of the objection 
is a major structural component in De Trinitate, which suggests this would be very far 
from his intention. 
Secondly, it is important to see what this account of relational predication 
requires. Two conditions must be satisfied. First, that there be `another': for relational 
predications are made ad alterutrum. ' 87 Distinction is presupposed. The second 
condition relates to what that other must be: eternal and unchangeable. Otherwise, the 
relation in which it partakes will also be modifiable. Doubtless for such reasons 
Augustine slips into discussing the eternity of the Persons within the relation. '88 
183 DeT V. 5. Nihil itaque accidens in Deo, quia nihil mutabile auf amissibile. 
184 DeT V. 6. `with reference to something else' is Hill's translation of ad aliquid (Hill 1991). Augustine 
also speaks of predications secundum relativ um, balancing secundum accidens and secundum 
substantiam. 
185 DeTV. 6. 
186 E. g. La Cugna 1991: 88. 
187 DeTV. 6. 
188 DeTV. 6. 
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Thirdly, while this account of relations requires genuine distinction, it has not 
yet progressed to individual particularity or uniqueness-'89 Whether Augustine 
maintains genuine distinction without affirming individual particularity or uniqueness 
will be addressed later. 
Fourthly, obviously Augustine provides his accounts of relational predication 
because he accepts that things cannot be predicated of God `modification-wise '. 190 
The basis for this needs examination, ' 91 and raises Augustine's doctrine of 
unchangeability more generally. 
It will be recalled that Augustine envisages that things are either created or 
uncreated. 192 Everything other than the triune God is created by him. This gives rise 
to three related concepts. First, creation of all from nothing suggests God's 
omnipotence. 193 For all created things depend on his will, while the uncreated, which 
alone truly `is', depends on nothing. 194 
Secondly, this in turn implies that the creature external to God cannot subject 
him to necessity. This seems to be the heart-beat of divine unchangeability or 
immutability in Augustine. ' 95 Divine unchangeability asserts, not a static and 
unmoving God, but one who cannot be subjected or coerced. 
189 Another criticism of the Augustinian account of Persons. E. g. Gunton 1997: xxiv. 
190 DeT V. 3. 
191 Obviously an alternative response to the `Arian'/Homoian argument would be to assert the 
possibility of predicating things of God `modification-wise'. 
192DeTI. 9. 
193 N. Torchia 1997: 267. 
194 Macdonald 2001: 83. 
195 Thus DCD VIII. 5 puts immutability in terms of not being changed by an external object. Against 
Fortunatus Day 1.6,7,11 suggests God suffers no necessity. Compare Confessions VII. iv. 6. 
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Thirdly, being uncreated implies simplicity. Created things are not simple, and 
their lack of simplicity means they are changeable. ' 
96 Simplicity is extensively 
discussed in De Civitate Dei XI. 10. Here Augustine argues that God's triunity does 
not deny simplicity. Initially this seems odd, for the passage also states that the Father 
`has' (habet) the Son, not `is' (est) the Son. Yet the same passage speaks of 
something being simple in the sense that it `is' rather than `has' something. The 
resolution lies in that simplicity is denied where one may lose what one 'has'. 197 Yet 
the Father so `has' the Son, and vice versa, that the other cannot be lost. The relation 
must be unchanging and is `simple' in that sense. 
Simplicity in Augustine is, then, closely tied to unchangeability, and both 
arise from God's uncreatedness. Simplicity and unchangeability govern our 
understanding of God so that we predicate nothing of him `modification-wise'. 
Otherwise, by having something he could lose, the door is opened to change and to 
composition. Augustine's account of predications of relation and substance thus form 
part of an integrated description of an uncreated God. 
In practice, Augustine has arrived at a position not dissimilar to Athanasius. 
Athanasius too made much of the simplicity and unchangeable nature of God, who 
was adiairetos, yet with personal differentiation, and, like Augustine, this was largely 
drawn from the idea that God was uncreated. 
196 DCD XI. 10. See too DeT V1.8. 
197 DCD XI. 10: possit amittere. 
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7.7. Inseparability and Distinction 
It was noted earlier that inseparability and distinction are not mutually 
exclusive in Augustine. One question about Augustine is whether inseparability in 
fact subsumes distinction. Within Augustine's conceptual vocabulary, this could 
occur either at the level of personal relations or of temporal actions. We move now to 
consider the subsuming of distinctions in each field. 
7.7.1. Inseparability Subsuming Distinction of Actions 
If the temporal actions of the triune God become personally indistinguishable, 
then it becomes highly problematic to assert that they reveal a triune God. 198 Hill 
remarks that if external actions are indistinguishable, our relation as human creatures 
is simply, undifferentiatedly, to 'God'. 199 As such, Hill suggests, the Trinity itself 
becomes irrelevant. Revelation is attenuated, producing a corresponding need to 
resort to natural theological methods. 200 Further, since the undifferentiated action 
renders access to the distinction of Persons problematic, personal distinction, looks 
insignificant even though it is asserted. Moreover such personal distinction looks 
increasingly to be the result of speculation not revelation. Personal distinction could 
become marginalised, possibly entailing that personal distinction and particularity are 
trivialised, just as Zizioulas and others lament. 201 
For Plantinga this derives from emphasising God's simplicity far beyond 
scriptural warrant. 202 This requires scrutiny, although, as noted above, simplicity is 
198 See for instance the remarks of La Cugna 1991: 99 that the Persons seem irrelevant in the economy. 
199 Hill 1985: 95£ 
200 One recalls the misgivings of Jenson 1982: 117 and La Cugna 1991: 101 in this respect. 
201 Zizioulas 1991. 
202 Plantinga 1991: 316. 
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not exclusive to Augustine. 203 If simplicity itself creates the problem, then this 
problem should be present in other theologies than Augustine's. 
It is intriguing and important to observe that this particular problem is not 
4modalist'. 204 Traditional modalism asserted, in effect, threeness at the temporal level 
masking oneness at the immanent. Instead, the problem here is that three-foldness is 
so indistinguishable within the triune God's single inseparable action that one cannot 
move to the distinct Persons existing in eternity. One-ness at the temporal level masks 
an immanent three-ness. While this is doubtless undesirable, the description 
`modalist' is misplaced. 
Nor would it be modalism were one to assert that in Augustine inseparability 
subsumes the distinction of Persons. In that case inseparable, indistinguishable 
temporal operation leads one quite accurately (within the framework) to inseparable, 
indistinguishable personal relations immanently. This unites the economic and the 
immanent. 205 This would unquestionably be disastrous, 206 but, again, would not be 
`modalism'. 
Harnack's charge, then, pays too little attention to the very thing that 
Augustine so emphasised: inseparable temporal operation. Harnack's charge could 
only be preserved either by broadening the definition of `modalism' or by asserting 
that the actions are distinguishable but the Persons are not. To the possibility of 
indistinguishable persons attention now turns. 
203 Hill 1985: 55 and 58 remarks that Arians as well as Athanasius held this. 
204 This is the traditional accusation of Harnack 1898 IV: 130 n. 1. 
205 Contra e. g. Jenson 1982: 116. 
206 Not least for the kinds of reasons Zizioulas 1991 outlines. 
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7.7.2. Inseparability Subsuming Distinction of Persons 
If the Persons are so inseparable as to be indistinguishable, then clearly 
undesirable consequences follow. Relations to God become imperilled precisely 
because one asks `who' one relates to. Augustine stressed the need to worship the 
creator and famously posed the question how one could love one whom one did not 
know. 207 If the persons are ultimately indistinguishable, then even partial knowledge 
seems difficult. Furthermore, God's immanent relations are apparently transformed 
from love of other to love of self, thereby yielding a reflexive, even narcissistic, 
God. 208 Further, personal relations more generally risk devaluation, for there is no 
ultimate personhood in God, and personal knowledge of others more generally seems 
secondary rather than primary. Indeed, if the reflexive love of God becomes the 
exemplar, then human relations even risk being seen as a means by which one loves 
oneself, not God or one's neighbour. 
It is, of course, such a collapse of the personal into the substantial that has 
been associated with Augustine. 209 Interestingly this collapse of personal distinction 
is linked with simplicity, 210 also cited as the culprit for the collapse of inseparable 
actions into indistinguishable actions. The role of simplicity is thus crucial, again 
highlighting the importance of the issue of monotheism in Augustine. 
Thus, whether distinction collapses at the level of temporal action or 
immanent personal relation, the consequences are of the utmost seriousness. It is 
207 DeT VIII. 6. 
208 La Cugna 1991: 103. 
209 E. g. La Cugna 1991: 88. 
210 So Harnack 1898 vol IV: 129 and Jenson 1982: 119. 
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therefore necessary to see whether in fact inseparability does subsume distinction. 
The first area requiring investigation is that of immanent personal relation. This 
priority follows from Augustine's grounding of inseparable operation in inseparable 
immanent relations. 21 So, if the Persons are indistinguishable, it is hard to see how 
their operation could be otherwise. 
7.8. Does Inseparability Subsume Distinction at the Level of Person? 
7.8.1. The significance of De Trinitate VIL11 
The most obvious reason for thinking that inseparability subsumes distinct 
personal relations is that Augustine himself apparently says so. Several critics cite De 
Trinitate VII. I 1 to this effect. 212 La Cugna draws particular attention213 to the passage 
and produces one of the more extensive quotations from it, as follows: 
[I]n God to be is not one thing, and to be a person another thing, but it is 
wholly and entirely one and the same thing. When we say the person of the 
Father, we mean nothing else than the substance of the Father. Therefore, as 
the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not insofar as He is the Father 
but insofar as He is, so too the person of the Father is nothing else than the 
Father Himself. For He is called a person in respect to himself, not in relation 
to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, just as He is called in respect to Himself, God, 
great, good, just, and other similar terms 214 
In fact, La Cugna omits a substantial part without indicating she has done so. 
Following the first sentence in La Cugna's version, Augustine introduces some 
significant argument. 215 Initial reading, though, of La Cugna's abridged version 
apparently substantiates her contention that Augustine `equates person with 
substance'. 216 If so, then this must be considered with his argument that any 
predicates of substance must be applied to each Person. The combined position 
211 Tractate 20.3. 
212 E. g. La Cugna 1991: 88, Plantinga 1988: 46,1991: 308 fn. 20, Gunton 1997: 42. 
21; She describes it as `difficult' (La Cugna 1991: 89). 0. Du Roy describes it as a place of `tourment'. 
His interpretation is contestable, his description is not. 
214 La Cugna 1991: 88£ Her emphasis. 
215 See below. 
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apparently entails that what may be predicated of the Father as a person, can equally 
be predicated of Son and Spirit. This would eradicate, not necessarily personhood, but 
certainly personal particularity. La Cugna recognises that earlier in De Trinitate 
Augustine did uphold personal distinction and particularity, 217 but sees this as an 
irreconcilable inconsistency within De Trinitate. 218 
Of course, it is possible that Augustine simply contradicts himself. However, 
such inconsistency on such a question from such a man is perhaps not to be accepted 
casually. De Trinitate VII. 11 therefore merits closer inspection. 
7.8.2. The Broader Context 
Concerning the broader context of V11.1 1, Augustine has stated he is 
defending a Faith which stipulates that the Father is not the Son. 219. Furthermore, 
more immediately, Books V-VII form an argument which started at De Trinitate V. 4 
by stating the `Arian'/Homoian objection that anything said of God is said 
`substance-wise'. In answering that, Augustine accepts that, minimally, Father and 
Son differ in that one is ingenerate, the other generate. 220 If he consistently thought 
that the Persons were, ultimately, indistinguishable, he could not accept that initial 
`Arian'/Homoian point as he does. Instead, as outlined above, his argument relies on 
some things being true of the Persons (that one is Father, another Son) precisely 
because there is an eternally irreducible other. 221 Without such another in the relative 
statements, his defence to the `Arian'/Homoian charge fails. Thus if one holds that 
216 La Cugna 1991: 89. 
217 Notably in DeT V. 
218 La Cugna 1991: 89. 
219 DeTI. 7. 
220 DeT V. 4. 
22 1 DeTV. 5 and 6. Compare Ayres 2000a: 56.72. 
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Augustine `equates person with substance', 222 then not merely has he been 
inconsistent, but his broader project in Books V-VII founders. Doubtless, this is 
possible, but it illuminates the magnitude of the inconsistency La Cugna suggests. 
7.8.3. The Immediate Context of Book VII - `Persons' 
Within the closer context of Book VII itself, VII. 1-6 clearly pursue one aspect 
of predications about the Persons. The presenting issue is raised by 1 Corinthians 
1: 24 which describes Christ as the Wisdom of God. Does this mean that God is only 
wise with the wisdom of Christ? Such an approach opens the door to 
`Arian'/Homoian arguments that the Son was not truly homoousios - for `wisdom' 
would be differently predicated for Father and Son. Augustine concludes that one 
may say both are alike wise, but not both are alike begotten or unbegotten, because 
these are terms of relationship. 223 This closely recalls Athanasius' statement that the 
Son is all the Father is, except Father. Significantly, though, Augustine pursues 
distinction at the relative level in Book VII itself, not just in earlier material. 
Book VII. 7 introduces a new but related topic, the terminology in which these 
things are described, which differs between Greek and Latin theologians. This is not 
insignificant since VII. I 1 itself opens by referring to this difference. That hints that 
VII. 11 belongs to this section of argument. 224 Interestingly, what Augustine is 
concerned to safeguard is that there are three. He comments: 
That there are three is declared by the true faith, when it says that the Father is 
not the Son, and the Holy Spirit which is the gift of God is neither the Father nor 
the Son. 225 
777 
La Cugna 1991: 89. 
223 DeTVII. 6. 
224 Evidently Hill's view too since he brackets VII. 7-11 as `chapter 4' of his 1991 translation of Book 
VII. 
225 DeTVII. 7. 
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This shows that, at the beginning of the section to which VII. 11 apparently belongs, 
Augustine still explicitly holds that the persons do not reduce to each other, which 
necessarily entails they do not each reduce to the one substance. This renders the 
inconsistency thesis increasingly problematic. Instead, Augustine is concerned with 
`three what? '226 In asking this, Augustine is enquiring about what is held in common: 
So Father and Son and Holy Spirit being three, we ask three what, meaning what 
do they have in common? They do not have in common what is meant by 
Father, so that they are three fathers to each other, as friends who are so called 
with reference to each other can be called three friends which they are toward 
each other.... If three persons, then what is meant by person is common to all 
three. 227 
Augustine writes here both about the irreducibility of the individual Persons 
(the Father is not the Son and so forth), but he also refers to another issue: not simply 
about distinctions, but about what the distinct Father, Son and Spirit are in common. 
They are called in common `Persons'. 
However, Augustine reasons, the normal use of `person' presents difficulties. 
It can only be a generic name, not a species-name, because it covers things of a 
different nature. After all, it encompasses, not just the divine persons, but also human 
persons, who are clearly of a different nature. 228 Therefore `person' does not precisely 
specify what the Father, Son and Spirit are in common. 
VII. 8-9 are apparently devoted to showing how complex the terminological 
discussion is, pointing out that the plural language about `person' (which is 
something the distinct Father, Son and Spirit are) could equally be invoked to permit 
226 
quid tria Sint. 
227 DeTVII. 7. Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quoniam tres sunt, quid tres sint quaeramus, quid 
commune habeant. Non enim commune illis est id quod Pater est ut invicem sibi sint patres; sicut 
amici, cum relative ad alterutrum dicantur, possunt 
dici tres amici quod invicem sibi sunt.... Quid 
igitur tres? Si enim tre's Personae, commune est eis id quod persona est. 
228 DeTVII. 7. 
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talk of three Gods. Conversely the singular language about God could be invoked to 
say God is one person. 229 Given these terminological difficulties, Augustine returns to 
the ideas the terms aim to defend. The purpose is to avoid anything that could be 
taken as `diversity in that supreme and ultimate equality'230 and also anything that led 
to `any idea of singleness'. 231 Thus, importantly, Augustine explicitly re-affirms his 
repudiation of Sabellianism here, seeing it as denying that the Son is not the same as 
the Father and so on. 
Book VII. 9-10 continues with terminological questions, broaching the term 
`substance'. This is significant partly, of course, because the Latin substantia 
etymologically corresponds with the Greek hypostasis, which had been used to denote 
`three-ness'. Augustine is at least aware of these different formulae, 232 but shows no 
sense that the Greeks differ from him in theological substance. 233 He does argue, 
however, that substantia's normal associations (the underlying thing to which 
modifications or accidents attach) are inappropriate for God. When used by 
extension, although `improperly', it defends what God is by reference to himself, not 
by way of relationship. 
234 
Therefore, Augustine gives no indication before the start of VII. 11 that he 
allows the inseparability of persons to subsume personal distinction so that the idea of 
229 DeTVII. 8. 
230 DeT VII. 9. ne intellegeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. 
23 DeT VII. 9. di_i-it substantias sive personas,... sed singularitatem noluit ut non solum ibi unitas 
intellegatur. 
232 DeTVII. 7. 
233 a nostris Griac'eis sounds friendly. Compare Hill's translation `our Greek colleagues' (Hill 1991). 
234 DeT VII. 10. 
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person is equated with that of substance. Instead, he insists that the Father is not the 
Son and so on. 235 The issue is the terminology with which to do this. 
7.8.4. The Substance of De Trinitate VIL11. 
The passage starts: 
Perhaps then it is more correct to say three persons than three substances. But 
we must inquire further into this, in case it looks like special pleading for our 
own usage against that of the Greeks. 
Two points arise. First, the passage is closely joined with what precedes. The 
reference to Greek and Latin usage brackets what follows with the discussion of 
usage starting in VII. 7 where the apparently different usages of `substance'/ 
'hypostasis' were set out. 
This suggests, secondly, that Augustine is not discussing here the `thing' to 
which reference is being made, but the terms for making the reference and their 
comparative adequacy. He is not, then, discussing the subsuming of persons into 
substantial one-ness. He has by this time consistently asserted that the aim is to 
defend orthodox belief against tendencies to `diversity' or `singleness', 236 
Augustine thinks he has by this point shown the inadequacy of `substance', 
given its etymology and ordinary use. 237 Clearly one may take issue with an argument 
that disposes of a term because of its etymological or everyday sense. But it would be 
fallacious to suppose that Augustine has rejected the idea purely because he has 
rejected a term for inadequately describing the idea. Rather, that may simply reflect 
that Augustine's definitions are different. 
235 Most conspicuously VII. 9. 
236 The terms used in DeTVII. 9. 
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Augustine next observes that the Greeks could say tria prosopa rather than 
treis hypostaseis, but recognises that the latter may better suit their language. This too 
continues the theme of terminological adequacy within a given language, not the 
content of the ideas to which those terms refer. He proceeds: 
Now exactly the same arguments238 hold in the case of persons; it is not one 
thing for God to be and another for him to be a person, but altogether the same. 
This again clarifies that Augustine is continuing an existing argument. The `same 
arguments' (the Latin is singular: eadem ratio) take the reader back to the argument 
of VII. 10 and the terminological inadequacy of `substance'. This is indicated by the 
pattern of phrasing: `it is not one thing for God to be ... and another ... to 
be a 
person... '. Characteristically Augustine has used phrases of the pattern `it is not one 
thing to be ... and another to 
be [happy, or wise, or some other predicate]' to refer to 
God's simplicity, in that happiness or wisdom are not modifications or accidents in 
him. Applied here, then, he actually denies that `person' is a modification or accident. 
This must be stressed. In itself it renders uncomfortable an interpretation of VII. 11 to 
the effect that the category we call `person' is secondary or epiphenomenal. 
However, invoking concepts of simplicity perhaps raises other problems. 
Simplicity language can suggest that God's attributes are all equally fundamental so 
that, some argue, God's mercy becomes `the same' as his anger. A traditional answer 
could be that God is himself always the same and consistent in his dealings with 
creation. The attributes seem distinct to our perception because God's actions have 
diverse effects, but do not reflect differences in God himself. 
239 Nevertheless this 
237 See the start of DeT VII. 10. 
238 in personis eadem ratio est. 
239 So Turretin Institutes of Elenctic Theology Topic 3. Q 5. IX and X. 
292 
would be unfortunate here, since it could suggest that the distinction of Persons is like 
the distinction of attributes: only economic. Has Augustine opened the door to this? 
We now reach the section of VII. 11 La Cugna omits. 240 Augustine continues: 
If he is said to be with reference to himself, and called person by way of 
relationship, then we could call Father and Son and Holy Spirit three persons in 
the same way as we talk about three friends or three neighbours or three 
relatives with reference to each other, not with reference to himself. So each of 
them is the friend or neighbour or relative of the other two, because these names 
signify relationships. What have we got then? Is it agreed that we can call the 
Father the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the 
Father and of the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and of 
the Son. But that is not how we are in the habit of using person in any context; 
This involves several stages: 
1. Using `person' as a relational term ('relationship-wise' in Hill's 
translation) entails being able to talk about the three persons as one would 
about three `friends' or `neighbours'. All are relational terms. 
2. Talking about three friends or neighbours relationship-wise means one 
may say about any one of them: `X is the friend or neighbour of the other 
two'. 
3. But, if `person' works identically to `friend or neighbour', such usages 
should also hold good for talking about the trinitarian persons. 
4. One should therefore be able to use `person' similarly for Father or Son or 
Holy Spirit. One should therefore be able to say `The Father is the person 
of the Son' and similar sentences. 
5. Augustine rejects this as contrary to ordinary usage. 
This argument, then, tests the adequacy of a term, `person', taken as a 
relational predicate. Augustine compares the term with other relational terms (steps 1 
240 La Cugna 1991: 88£ See above. 
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and 2 above) and then tries to handle `person' in the trinitarian context as one handles 
relational terms like `friends' (steps 3 and, in particular, 4 above). He implies that 
such handling of `person' produces absurdity (step 5 above). 
Several observations are appropriate. First, what is at stake is the term 
`person'. The focus here is on what each of the three are, what they have in common. 
This ties the debate closely to the issue raised in VII. 7, which states that if we call the 
three `three persons', `person' is what the three have in common. 241 The point, then, 
is commonality between the persons, not what constitutes distinction. Augustine has 
already repeatedly said that, for example, being Father is not what the three have in 
common. 
242 
Secondly, this relative use of `person' entails describing all three in the same 
way one would describe mutual friends and neighbours (step 1 above). However, 
Augustine has already noted the limits of just such a description of the Trinity 
`... because only the Father is father'. 243 The reason for earlier rejecting the `three 
friends' designation is because the `three friends' usage does not capture what 
distinguishes the Father from the others, his particularity. So, if `three persons' is 
equivalent to `three friends', then, far from protecting personal values and relations, it 
is open to the objection that it does not reproduce Trinitarian distinctions in their 
particularity. 
Thirdly, Augustine's final objection turns largely on the equivalence he has 
constructed between `three friends' and `three persons'. We can sensibly say `A is the 
241 commune est eis id quod persona est. 
242 E. g. DeT VII. 7. Non enim commune illis est id quod 
Pater est. 
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friend of B', and `B is the friend of A'. If the predications are really equivalent, one 
could substitute `person' for `friend' in sentences of this kind. Augustine's point is 
that one cannot: `A is the person of B' does not, in ordinary linguistic usage, equate to 
`A is the friend, or neighbour or relative of B'. The term `person' does not function 
like that. 
Augustine's examples starkly reveal the problems caused by such usage of the 
term `person'. What is the difference between `The Father is the Father of the Son' 
and the `The Father is the person of the Son'? The phrase `The Father is the person of 
the Son' risks attenuating the personal distinction and particularity of the Persons and 
their relations. The Father relates paternally to the Son and the Son filially to the 
Father. However, if one says `The Father is the person of the Son', or `the Son is the 
person of the Father' the relations readily sound identical, and those relating may also 
sound identical, completely matching images of each other. To pick up Augustine's 
earlier example, 244 the Trinity is not just a society of three friends. Indeed, the phrase 
`The Father is the person of the Son' could even risk obliterating distinct identities, 
making it sound as though Father and Son were one and the same, something 
Augustine has only just characterised as Sabellian. 245 
Augustine is not, therefore, disputing the personal distinctions between Father, 
Son and Spirit. Instead he argues a particular use of `person', resulting in phrases like 
`The Father is the person of the Son', is unworkable. The context for this is not an 
elimination of personal distinction but precisely his upholding of the particularities of 
the personal distinctions in question. This inadequacy of `person' is anticipated by the 
243 DeT VII. 7. tantum Pater ibi pater. 
244 DeT V II. 7. 
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earlier observation that `person' in answer to the question `Three what? ' inevitably 
speaks of what the three have in common. 246 Once `person' is so used, inevitably it 
cannot also tell us the content of distinctions between Father, Son and Spirit. 
This section of VII. 11 therefore fits very poorly with an interpretation that 
Augustine sacrifices personal distinction. La Cugna's omission of it is extremely 
unfortunate. 
La Cugna's quotation then resumes: 247 
When we say the person of the Father, we mean nothing else than the substance 
of the Father. Therefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not 
insofar as He is the Father but insofar as He is, so too the person of the Father is 
nothing else than the Father Himself. For He is called a person in respect to 
himself, not in relation to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, just as He is called in 
respect to Himself, God, great, good, just, and other similar terms 
La Cugna concludes that Augustine `denies the relative character of a divine 
person'. 248 This is not quite accurate. Augustine's argument has tended to a subtly 
different point. He has denied that the term `person' by itself is predicated `relation- 
wise'. To say `A is a person' does not pre-suppose an existing relationship. 249 He 
does not deny that the different terms `Father' and `Son' are predicated relation-wise. 
In fact later in VII. 11 he re-asserts the need to talk about three, and continues to 
explain John 10: 30 precisely in relational terms: 250 
... in Evangelio scriptum est: 
Ego et Pater unum sumus. Et unum dixit et sumus; 
unum secundum essentiam, quod idem Deus; sumus secundum relativum, quod 
ille Pater, hic Filius 
245 DeT V II. 9. 
246 DeT V II. 7. 
247 La Cugna 1991: 88£ 
248 La Cugna 1991: 89. 
249 To be a person without relationship may be impoverishing and leave one unfulfilled. It is more 
ambitious to say a person does not exist without a relationship. See Harris 1998: 217. 
250 DeT VII. 12. 
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`Father' and `Son' are predicated `relation-wise' because they do pre-suppose 
an existing relationship. One cannot have Father without Son. 251 The suspicion, 
therefore, is that La Cugna has merged Augustine's treatment of the term `person' 
with his very different treatment of the different terms `Son' and `Father'. From this 
merger she seems to have inferred that, because Augustine insists the term `person' is 
not to be predicated 'relation-wise', 252 while insisting the terms `Father' and `Son' are 
to be taken 'relation-wise'. 253 Augustine contradicts himself. 254 This interpretation is, 
however, unnecessary if one reads VII. II both fully and in the context of a discussion 
of the adequacy of terms used to safeguard against `diversity' and 'solitude'. 
7.8.5. Concluding Remarks on De Trinitate VII. 11 
Thus the proposition that personal distinction has somehow been subsumed by 
inseparability remains unsubstantiated. It is, though, worth turning to other criticisms 
that this section of Book VII might generate. First, there is the consistent appeal in 
VII. 10-11 to conventional usage and etymology. Doubtless, looking to the etymology 
and traditional uses of hypostasis and substantia risks short-changing Cappadocian 
subtlety in handling ousia/hypostasis distinctions. Still, Augustine's critique of 
terminology in VII. 7-11 has the merit of concentrating attention on what the terms are 
meant to express or protect255 and of increasing an awareness that some of a term's 
usual nuances may need to be shed when applying it within Trinitarian discourse. 
While new usages may indeed need coining, nevertheless this can contribute to 
confusion. 
251 DeT V 
. 
6. 
252 DeT VII. 11. 
253 DeT V. 6, DeT VII. 12 etc. 
254 La Cugna 1991: 89. 
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Secondly, and more substantially, there is Augustine's contention about the 
term 'person': that one may say `A is a person' without pre-supposing that A has any 
relations. This obviously raises the question whether Augustine has not here in fact 
made personal relations secondary, a non-relational view of person. 
This raises two slightly different issues. The first deals with the significance 
of the difference between the term `person' (which does not pre-suppose relation in 
Augustine's view) and the terms `Father' and `Son' (which do). Does the non- 
relational view of the term `person' predominate? This does not follow from De 
Trinitate VII. 11. There Augustine discussed the terminological adequacy of `person', 
concluding that the proposition `A is a person' does not presuppose relations. He is 
not denying relational categories exist but suggests not all relations apply to the 
Trinity. They are not `three friends' or `three Fathers' or `three Sons'. He is trying to 
ensure the relations are described in their proper specificity. 
Moreover, since these relations are eternal and unchanging, they are not 
equivalent to modifications or accidents. 256 That means the specific and particular 
relations within the Trinity cannot be secondary. He has, moreover, repeatedly 
emphasised that he wants to defend both personal irreducibilitY157 (the point that the 
Father is not the Son) and the relative nature of `Father' and `Son' (these terms pre- 
suppose another in relation). Hence discussion about distinction and its viability must 
focus on the particular relations. The Father-Son relation therefore will fall for 
examination later. 
255 Hence we may use `person' in order to say something in response to `three what? ' DeT VII. 11. 
256 DeT V. 6. So e. g. T. Wassmer 255f, Fortman 1972: 143£ 
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The second issue relates to the more general propriety of arguing that the 
proposition that `A is a person' does not pre-suppose relationship. Augustine is not 
committed to saying that relationships within the Trinity are secondary, since the 
specific trinitarian terms presuppose eternal relations. Yet, has Augustine made 
relations secondary for human persons? After all, human relations are necessarily 
temporal and contingent, for humans are. Human relations cannot be defended by 
reference to an uncreated being's eternity, as God's can be. Conceivably, a 
secondariness in human relations is supported by the psychological analogy if it 
implies self-sufficiency in human individuals, for each is made in the image of the 
triune God, 258 who is complete in himself. 
It is dangerous to pose questions for Augustine which he did not address, and 
caution is required in considering his possible answers. Nevertheless one relation is 
consistently present in his thinking and is irreducible for humans and can never be 
lost, 259 namely that God is their creator. Other relations may be superadded during an 
individual's history, marriage may or may not occur, friendships may or may not be 
formed. This creator-created relation, though, is inevitable. If I exist at all, I exist as a 
creature, 260 and, as a creature, one who must worship its creator. 261 Here, then, an 
Augustinian framework has the resources to describe a relation for humans, which is 
primary, not secondary. 
257 The term of Ayres 2000a: 56,2000b: 59. 
258 This is the repeated rationale for using the psychological analogy in DeT VIII-XIV. 
251' Compare the `lose' motif in the discussion of divine simplicity DCD XI. 10. 
260 Compare Macdonald 2001: 83. 
261 DCD VII. 29. 
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This approach has a further advantage in contemporary debate. H. Harris 
questions the stress in recent theology on becoming persons through relations. 262 She 
points out that this implies that, without relations, personhood is not established. 263 
This results in what she terms `relational determinism'. Rather, she contends, we 
should admit that persons are prior to relations, 264 a formulation strikingly similar to 
Augustine's in De Trinitate VII. 11. 
Perhaps part of this concern is that `becoming persons through relations' 
confers significant power on those to whom one relates. They apparently have the 
power to confer or deny personhood on one by affirming or denying relationship. 
This could even imply that those others, objectively, confer or deny value. One might 
say that if people deny value to others, they also deny it to themselves. This is, 
perhaps, scant comfort, for one remains devalued. Harris' contention that identity is 
independent of relations ensures that one is not completely defined by one's 
relationships, or lack of them. 
A possible answer is that while it may be deplorable that relations function 
thus, nevertheless they can. It is not nonsensical in everyday speech to say the victim 
of an abusive relationship `is not the same person'. Harris could well respond that 
abusive (or benign) relationships do not necessarily construct a person for ill (or 
good): some survive abusive relationships, and others remain unaffected by benign 
relationships. She might add that when we say that a relation has changed some-one 
202 Harris 1998: 214. 
263 Harris 1998: 217. 
264 Hams 1998: 227. 
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we refer primarily to that person's attributes and do not intend to deny continuity of 
identity. 265 
However, unqualified acceptance of Harris' argument is not possible within 
an Augustinian framework. The difficulty arises from his insistence on the creator- 
creature relation. There it is extremely difficult to accede to Harris' suggestion that 
human persons are ontologically prior to relations. 266 We exist in a creaturely 
relationship. This leaves open Harris' case that human-human relations such as 
friendship and marriage are not instances of `becoming persons through relations', 
despite the enriching qualities of such relations. 
In short, if one accepts that creating humans in God's own image establishes 
relation, then Augustine's proposal that to say `A is a person' does not pre-suppose 
relation is more difficult to argue in the case of human persons than might initially 
appear. 
7.9. Does Inseparability Subsume Distinction in the Field of Temporal Action? 
Augustine understands inseparable action as the Persons working the same 
numerical act. This was evidently his position from soon after his conversion. 
267 
However, the notion of inseparability there is so tight that even a relatively 
benevolent commentator like Ayres can comment that Augustine almost implies 
265 After all, normally people retain memories of life before and after particular relationships, and 
memory, suggests B. Home 1991: 71, helps provide an integrating principle 
for the momentary egos of 
an individual's history. 
266 Hams 1998: 227. 
267 Letter 11 to Nebridius is dated typically 389. 
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patripassianism. 268 The Augustinian account of the missions most sharply illustrates 
such pressures. 
7.9.1. The Problem of the Missions 
One `Arian'/Homoian argument is that the Son's sending by the Father 
indicates inferiority. It is a form of the argument that the Son obeys the Father and is 
therefore lesser ontologically. The `Arian'/Homoian argument runs that traditional 
pre-Nicene responses, which would refer obedience to Christ's human nature, are less 
applicable here, 269 since the Son was sent before he was human. Therefore the Son is 
inferior in nature. 
Augustine, then, must examine the mission especially in the light of what it 
discloses about the eternal relations of Father and Son. 270 He has several responses to 
this `Arian'/Homoian argument, 27' but one substantial strand is very troubling. It runs 
like this. Augustine argues that `sending' does not mean the Son and the Spirit came 
to a world from which they were previously absent. 272 Rather, they came visibly to a 
world in which they were already present. 273 In this sending, the Son, jointly with the 
Father, sends himself. 274 At one level this simply apparently applies inseparable 
operation to the specific case of the missions, 275 and answers the `Arian'/Homoian 
objection. Inferiority does not arise because the Son sent himself. 
268 Ayres 2000a: 58. 
269 Augustine's forma senvi principle. 
270 Such an examination of the mission means the issue of the relation of the economic to the immanent 
is inherently present. 
271 As he does to the obedience question more generally. 
272 DeT 11.7. 
273 DeT. 11.9. 
274 E. g. DeT I1.9. 
275 Similar arguments can be launched for the Holy Spirit. 
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However, such a move without further qualification has devastating 
consequences. The obvious concern is the effect on the link between economic and 
immanent relations. Augustine faces a dilemma: 
1. If he persists in asserting: - 
(a) that the Son and Father jointly send the Son; 
and 
(b) that the economic mission reveals the immanent relation, 276 
then his account of the immanent relation seems to be that the Father and the 
Son inseparably and jointly beget the Son. 
or 
2. If he persists in asserting: 
(a) that the Son and Father jointly send the Son; 
and 
(b) that the Father eternally begets the Son who does not beget but is 
begotten, 
then he seems to sever the revelatory link between economic and immanent 
relations. 
Regarding the first horn of this dilemma, Augustine has already asserted that 
God does not beget himself. 277 Moreover, if joint sending implies joint begetting, then 
the Father is not distinguished by begetting, but presumably by being unbegotten. 
Regarding the second horn, Augustine again finds himself faced with inconsistency, 
for here he seems to be denying that the economic discloses the immanent, while 
elsewhere invoking the very principle that it does so in the case of the Holy Spirit. 
276 Apparently one of Augustine's grounds for asserting the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son. 
277 DeT I. 1. 
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Further the johannine material, especially, simply does not on its surface 
suggest that the Son and Father jointly send the Son. Fatherhood is linked with 
sending, but the Son is not expressly said to send with the Father. This underlines the 
impression that economic considerations are under-played, thus supporting the view 
that Augustine ultimately severs the economic from the immanent Trinity. 278 
A related problem is the application of inseparable operation principles to 
prayer and salvation. In terms of prayer Augustine can talk of Jesus praying for us as 
`less than the Father. . . 
but as his equal he hearkens to us with the Father'. 279 This 
does, though, prompt the question whether Augustine envisages the Son as eternal 
Son addressing the Father specifically in the incarnation, as, for example, Tertullian 
thought. Concerning salvation, Augustine apparently regards the operation as so 
inseparable that the whole Trinity can be addressed as Father. 280 The relevant phrase 
reads: recte dicimus etiam: Patrem nostrum, per gratiam suam nos regenerantem. 
Hill describes this as a `disastrous' inference from inseparable operation. 28' He 
reasons that this renders the trinitarian distinction of Persons irrelevant to us. 282 As 
observed earlier, this does sever the economic from the immanent, 283 but this is not 
modalism in the normal understanding. Here one inseparable operation masks an 
eternal threeness. Yet Augustine also insists that inseparable operation does not mean 
the Persons are involved in the same action in the same way. Thus the Father is not 
278 E. g. Jenson 1982: 116. 
279 DeT I. 21. The relevant phrase reads . 
Ex hoc enim rogat quo minor est Patre; quo vero aequalis 
exaudit cum Patre. Hill has softened the problem by inserting to us' to qualify exaudit. 
`80 DeT V. 12. 
281 Hill 1991: 203 n. 21. 
282 As Hill had earlier noted 1985: 95f. Our relations become to an undifferentiated `God'. 
283 Hill 1985: 95£ 
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crucified, buried and raised. 284 This brings us to possible solutions for the problems 
outlined above. 
7.9.2. Solutions to the Encroachments of Inseparable Operation 
The most obvious prospective solution is the doctrine of appropriation. For La 
Cugna, once Augustine has created the problem of effectively indistinguishable 
works, the pressure somehow to re-connect the economic and immanent spheres leads 
to the construction of the doctrine of appropriations. 285 She comments (her 
description is representative): 
Appropriation means assigning an attribute (wisdom) or an activity (creation) to 
one of the three persons without denying that the attribute or activity applies to 
all three. 286 
As put, appropriation inevitably sounds somewhat artificial in that a given 
appropriation on this account does not seem truly distinctive. It simply does not meet 
the problem that inseparable operation can seem indistinguishable. Put bluntly, it 
looks precisely like an avoidance of full-orbed inseparable operation. This apparently 
remains so even if appropriation is because of a scriptural association, such as the Son 
being Wisdom. Hence La Cugna's tepid reception of this version of appropriation is 
justifiable. 287 Accordingly, other strands within Augustine's theology start to attract 
attention. However, before looking at the possibility of inseparable yet truly distinct 
operation, two preliminary questions must be aired, one terminology, one scriptural. 
284DeTI. 7. 
285 La Cugna 1991: 97f, 99f 
286 La Cugna 1991: 100. 
287 La Cugna 1991: 100. 
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As regards terminology, Augustine is associated with maxims such as opera 
trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt. 288 Is indivisus terminology meant to convey operation 
which is `inseparable', or `undivided', or `indistinguishable'? If the operations are 
indivisa in the sense of `indistinguishable' this maxim would naturally generate the 
question of how one can arrive at personal distinctions. 289 
Yet is this Augustine's maxim? The critical section De Trinitate I-VII does 
not use it. Moltmann claims Augustine `laid the foundation' for this maxim in Book 
XV, 290 but this is baffling since indivisus terms do not occur at the reference he gives. 
Nor does Augustine prefer cognates of indivisus to express unity of operation. He 
uses inseparabilis. 291 Inseparability readily implies that two things or entities exist, 
for we speak of two things being inseparable from each other. `Indivisible', however, 
readily includes the idea of one single entity. Anyway, subtle differences exist 
between works being indivisa, literally, of course, `undivided', as against 
indivisibilia, literally `not able to be divided'/'indivisible' and which more readily 
connotes 'indistinguishable'. 292 
There is a danger that the maxim opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt, with 
its indivisus terminology, misrepresents Augustine, since he prefers phrases like 
inseparabiliter operentur. 293 Augustine's inseparability of operation may have been 
distorted. 
288 E. g. Moltmann 1981: 108,237 n. 21 and La Cugna 1991: 97. The critical point is the indivisus 
terminology. 
289 La Cugna 1991: 97f proceeds down just this path. 
290 Moltmann 1981: 237 n. 21. 
291 E. g. DeT 1.7,8,12.15,25.11.3,9,18; and IV. 30. 
operation not simply inseparability of Persons. 
Many of these relate specifically to inseparable 
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As regards Scripture, La Cugna notes rightly of the doctrine of appropriations 
that certain attributes and actions are allocated to particular Persons, theoretically on 
the basis of Scripture. 294 Manifestly, actions are characteristically attributed in 
Scripture. However, this needs supplementing. Scripture also allocates the same 
action to different persons. Thus G. Fee draws attention to the New Testament's 
presentation of the appropriation of individual salvation as the work of each 
Person, 295 having earlier commented on the equating of activity between the three that 
Paul suggests in 2 Corinthians 13: 14. 
Thus, problems about distinctions in inseparable operation are present in 
precisely the materials Augustine attempts to synthesise. 296 Does Scripture itself 
attempt or imply any resolution? Creation, of course, is a highly significant example. 
The Son's association in creating is one of, the most powerful indications of his 
deity. 297 Creation is also, of course, associated with both Father and Son, 298 but with 
the suggestion that the Son is the agent, through whom the Father creates. 
Such an account tallies closely with John's Gospel. If one accepts that the 
works the Son does are indeed the Father's too, 299 then the obvious pattern of 
integration is that the Son does what his Father wishes: 
... 
for I have come down from heaven not to do my own will, but the will of him 
who sent me. 30° 
292 Tertullian Anima 51 uses it of the soul as a single entity. 
293 From DeT I. 7. 
294 La Cugna 1991: 100. 
295 Fee 1999: 54. 
296 Plantinga 1991: 316 asserts Augustine goes far beyond what scripture requires, but fails to discuss in 
depth what version of inseparability Scripture does require. 
297 See Reply to Faustus 21.4. 
298 E. g. I Cor. 8: 6, used in this kind of regard by Augustine DeT 1.12. 
299 Sec e. g. John 5: 36,14: 10. 
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The Son is his Father's agent, and the actions are truly his and his Father's. 301 There 
is inseparability but also distinction, because Father and Son are asymmetrically 
involved, one as principal, one as agent. 
Bourassa argues that Augustine envisaged inseparable operation occurring 
according to the order of the relations. 302 Supporting evidence occurs at several 
points. There is Augustine's sermonic material on John 5: 19. Thus addressing the 
Son, Augustine comments `All things that the Father doeth, He doeth by thee'303 and 
other material closely echoes this. 304 This strongly suggests an inseparable operation 
in which, while each actor is `equally' involved, each is not involved symmetrically. 
The Father operates by the Son. 
This is the consistent pattern in a lengthier dealing with this problem: Sermon 
52 on Matthew 3: 13. The issue here is Jesus' baptism where each Person appears to 
be doing something different. `Here then we have the Trinity in a certain sort 
distinguished. '305 Augustine reaffirms that the Trinity is inseparable, yet also that the 
Father is not the Son nor vice versa. 306 This is a characteristic way in which 
Augustine refers to the distinction of Persons. He moves then to the issue of 
apparently separate action, namely that the Son is born. 307 His resolution starts in 
Sermon 52.4 when he asks: `Doeth the Father anything without the Son? ' For 
Augustine the answer is `No' and he immediately appeals to the work of creation. 
Creation is then explained in terms of the Son's agency. Quoting John 1: 3a he states: 
Soo John 6: 38. 
301 Compare the work of P. Borgen 1970 on Jesus as God's agent or shaliach in John's Gospel. 
302 Bourassa 1977: 366. 
303 Sermon 126.12. 
304 Tractate 19.2. 
305 Sermon 52.1. 
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We understand then by this that the whole creation was made by the Son, the Father made by His Word - God by His Power and Wisdom308 
This principle of agency is extended to God's government of the world, so that God 
creates and rules by his Son. 
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Augustine then states a fundamental fear about inseparable operation, that it 
introduces patripassianism, 310 and goes on to discuss the birth of Christ, 311 the Passion 
of Christ, 312 and the Resurrection. 313 He concludes that none of these was done without 
both Persons, but each was performed by the Son. He therefore comments: 
You see then a distinction of Persons, and an inseparableness of operation. Let 
us not say therefore that the Father doeth anything without the Son, or the Son 
anything without the Father. 314 
This phrasing is interesting. The Persons have done the same thing in that no 
action is done `without' the other. But their `contributions' to particular actions have 
not been identical. The Father creates by the Son, not vice versa. Because the 
`contributions' are distinct, the distinctions of Persons can indeed be discerned, even 
though the operation is inseparable. This means that inseparable operation does not 
subsume distinction such that it cannot be discerned or is irrelevant. Augustine 
stresses that the Son himself does the dying, but that the giving over to death is the 
action of both. 
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306 Sermon 52.2. 
307 Sermon 52.3. 
308 Sermon 52.5. 
309 Sermon 52.5. 
310 Sermon 52.6. 
311 Sermon 52.8-11. 
312 Sermon 52.12. 
313 Sermon 52.13. 
314 Sermon 52.14. 
315 Sermon 52 goes on to discuss how inseparable operation can be illustrated, using memory, 
understanding and will to this end (Sermon 52.19). But they are distinct and an act of will is not the 
same as an act of memory, although it may involve it. 
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This, perhaps, helps resolve some problems discernible in Augustine's 
account of the missions. It will be recalled that Augustine argued that the Father and 
Son jointly send the Son, thereby creating a pattern which cannot be readily 
transferred without qualification to the Son's generation. 
However, Augustine does qualify the idea of joint sending. This emerges in 
the initial discussion of mission in De Trinitate 11.20-22 when Augustine notes that 
the Scriptures do not speak of the Father as sent. The rationale for this is developed 
later: 
Not because one is greater and the other less, but because one is the Father and 
the other the Son; one is the begetter, the other the begotten; the first is the one 
from whom the sent one is; the other is the one who is from the sender. For the 
Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son. 316 
The mission pattern, that the Son is the one sent, is not arbitrary, but reflects the 
eternal relation. Thus for Augustine the Father could not have been sent in the 
Incarnation. It makes sense, then, to see the Father's sending of the Son as being a 
sending `not without the Son'. 317 But the statement that the Son is sent `not without 
the Son' affirms that this sending is no independent action by the Father. It is not 
designed to assert that Father and Son are identically involved. 
Augustine considers this further in Answer to Maximinus: 
It was not fitting that the Begetter be sent by his Son, but that the Son be sent by 
his Begetter. This is not inequality of substance, but the order of nature. 318 
316 DeT IV. 27 Non quia ille maior est et ille minor; sed quia ille Pater est, ille Filius; ille genitor, ille 
genitus; ille a quo est qui mittitur, ille qui est ab eo qui mittfit. Filius enim a Patre est, non Pater a 
Filio. 
317 Using the terminology of Sermon 52. 
318 
. -ins Max 
II. xiv. 8. Non enim genitorem ab eo quem genuit, sed genitum a genitore mitti oportebat: 
verum haec non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae. 
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As with De Trinitate II-IV, Augustine is concerned to refute ideas that the sending of 
the Son shows inequality of substance. To answer why the Father should not be sent, 
he appeals to the filial relationship. The Son is sent because he is `of the Father. 319 
The Father sends because he begets. The mission indicates origin. 320 
This in turn preserves a certain priority for the Father. He is revealed as the 
principle of origin, 321 as the end of the section in De Trinitate dealing directly with 
the missions makes clear: 
We should understand that these sendings are not mentioned in scripture 
because of any inequality or dissimilarity of substance between the divine 
persons, but because of the created visible manifestation of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit; or better still, in order to bring home to us that the Father is the source 
and origin of all deity. 322 
This provokes several observations. First, this underlines the importance of 
Augustine's third interpretative rule, that some statements are understood as referring 
simply to the Son's origin. 323 
Secondly, this stress on the Son's origin provides a way to qualify 
inseparability of persons and operations that allows distinctions to be preserved. It is, 
though, a major qualification of inseparability. The obvious question is why 
Augustine did not make it clearer. The obvious answer is that in his polemical context 
of dispute with `Arians'/Homoians, distinctions of some kind were a given. The 
common presupposition was of distinction. Inseparability, though, is the point of 
difficulty and this is what he stresses. Harnack, though, has encouraged an approach 
319 Hill 1985: 66. 
-10 Hendricx 1955: 53. 
321 Clark 2001: 94. 
322 DeT IV. 32. She enim propter visibilem creaturam she potius propter principii commendationem, 
non propter inaequalitatem yel imparilitatem vcl dissimilitudinem substantiae 
in Scripturis haec posita 
intelleguntur. 
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to Augustine through his account of distinction, but that was not Augustine's 
polemical priority. 
Thirdly, this stress on the sender naturally leads to a consideration of the 
Father. 324 Mission and procession are traced back to the Father specifically, not to a 
`fourth' entity lying beyond the Persons. There is unexpected contact with 
Cappadocian emphases on the Father as arche. 
Fourthly, the issues of distinction of Persons and distinguishability in actions 
have alike led back to the relation of generation. To that, attention now turns. 
7.10. Relational Order, Inseparability and Distinction 
Augustine uses generation to develop several important concepts. 
7.10.1. Generation Guarantees Nature 
Augustine insists that the Son is a true son, 325 and a true son is of the same 
nature as his father. 326 Hence it is generation that means the Son is of the same nature 
as his Father (a strong point of contact with Hilary). Generation therefore entails 
equality, but specifically equality of nature. 327 Equality of nature means that what the 
Father is, so is the Son too, 328 but generation is the framework within which to 
construe equality. 
323 DeT 11.3. 
" Augustine did, of course, teach the Spirit's procession from both Father and Son, but insisted the 
Spirit proceeds principally from the Father. 
325 Drawn from I John 5: 20. DeT 1.9,22,26. 
320 Sermon 139.3. 
327 Sermon 1 17.14, Tractate 71.2. 
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7.10.2. Generation Means Distinction of Relations 
While Augustine stresses that generation grounds equality of nature, 329 
generation also entails distinction. However, the Persons are not distinct merely as 
duplicates of each other. Generation suggests rather non-reversible or asymmetrical 
relations. Augustine captures this with statements such as the Son is `of or `from' the 
Father, not vice versa. 330 This means the Persons are not the 'same" 331 even though 
there is equality of nature. 
Their distinct individuation, moreover, depends on their relations. The Father 
is `Father' because of the Son. 332 This means that the relations ground not only 
equality of nature between the Persons, but also their uniqueness and particularity, for 
the relations are both reciprocal and also asymmetrical. Generation entails 
individuated persons who are unique because of their relations. We turn now to 
consider something close to the heart of `Arian'/Homoian objections, obedience. 
7.10.3. Does Generation Mean a Relation of Obedience? 
Faced with the `Arian'/Homoian argument that the Son's obedience on earth 
shows he is not truly equal to the Father, Augustine produces several responses. First, 
he appeals to the rule of interpretation applying the forma servi principle to some 
texts. 333 Aside from any tendency to erode connections between the economic and the 
immanent, this has the disadvantage of not covering all the texts cited. John 5: 19ff is 
28 Sermon 139.2. 
329 Sermon 139.3. 
330 Sermon 127.4, Tractates 20.4,22.14. 
331 De Fide et Symbolo 16. 
332 Tractate 19.13 Compare Conf XIII. xi. 12 to the effect that the Persons are defined by their relation to 
each other. See too DeT V. 6. 
333 This is true as late as the controversies with Maximinus: Ans Max Lv. 
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an obvious problem, for instance, because Jesus' words take us beyond the 
Incarnation. 
Secondly, sometimes Augustine seems to envisage only one will in the 
Trinity, not simply in the sense of unanimity (whether produced through an order of 
relations or through the consent of equals), but in that the Trinity has numerically 
only one will. 334 The difficulty here, as Tertullian had long ago noted, is that this 
apparently leaves finally an undifferentiated unity, which is misleadingly revealed in 
the Incarnation. Personal distinctions seem very tenuous on this basis. To that extent, 
this response coheres but poorly with Augustine's insistence that the relations mark 
genuine distinction of an asymmetrical kind. 
Thirdly, at one stage in the controversy with Maximinus, Augustine seems to 
move towards fully symmetry of relations between Father and Son. Thus: 
But just as the Son does the will of the Father, so the Father does the will of the 
Son. 335 
Augustine justifies this from John 17: 24 where, in Augustine's version, Jesus 
addresses the Father in jussive terms (volo) rather than petitionary terms (Rogo or 
Peto). The Father would do what he wanted, just as he did what the Father wanted. 
At first glance this strongly states that relations between the Father and the 
Son are fully symmetrical. It forms part of an argument that finishes by citing John 
5: 19 to the effect that Father and Son perform inseparably the same operations. 
336 The 
334 E. g. DeT IV. 12. 
335 
. -Ins 
Max II. xx. 4. Siccrt airtem Filiusfacit i, oluntatem Patris, sic et Pater acit vo untatem Filü. 
336 Teske 1995: 303 leads less clearly to this point (although the destination is the same) because in the 
clause et non alia ille, alia isle; sed quae ille, haec etiam isle he appears to supply the verb volt or 
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idea that the Father `does what the Son wants' picks up the theme that the Father's 
actions (in John 17: 24 ensuring the preservation of Jesus' followers) are not without 
the Son. Nevertheless this striking remark requires further comment. First, 
exegetically, this represents a very strong reading of the `want' language of John 
17: 24 (6£ß, (o). The word does not necessarily denote authority but is consistent with 
request. 
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Secondly, Augustine's reading tends to erode the distinctions in inseparable 
action that he establishes elsewhere. Elsewhere, the pattern of the Father acting 
through the Son appears consistent with their eternal relations. But here the 
reversibility of the Father doing the Son's will as the Son does the Father's will means 
that the uniqueness and particularity shown in the Father acting by the Son begins to 
evaporate. 
Thirdly, this may well indicate that coupling John 17: 24 with John 5: 19 here, 
actually joins two disparate elements together. Augustine's normal approach to 
inseparable operations based on John 5: 19 invokes non-reversible relations, just what 
John 17: 24 as here explained, tends to deny. It is, of course, disputable whether the 
exegesis of John 17: 24 or that of John 5: 19 should take precedence in discussing 
Augustine's trinitarian thought. This question will be dealt with below. 
equivalent, but the context makes it more attractive to supply facit since the finite verbs before and 
after are from facere. 
337 E. g. John 12-21 and the request to see Jesus. Compare John 15: 7 where Jesus instructs his followers 
to ask for what one wants. 
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A fourth strategy by which Augustine attempts to answer the `Arian'/Homoian 
argument is that the Son simply is the Father's expressed Word. 338 Since the Son's 
obedience could only be to a command, that is, a word, from the Father, and the Son 
is himself the Word of the Father, the Son would in a sense be obeying himself. As 
such one can scarcely pose the question `Does the Son's obedience establish his 
inferiority? ' 
This, however, is far from satisfactory. It raises questions about who said he 
was doing the Father's will. 339 The forma servi rule covers such verses uncomfortably 
because one may think more characteristically of a person obeying, albeit in a nature. 
On that basis the Son obeys and the forma servi principle only specifies the nature in 
which the divine person obeys. Thus the `Arian'/Homoian question would remain. 
Equally, such a response only invites the supplementary question whether the Word is 
contoured, so to speak, as the Father wishes. If the Word is not so contoured, this risks 
making the Father appear subjected to some necessity, contrary to basic Augustinian 
thought about the uncreated creator. 340 If, however, the Word is so contoured, this 
once again raises the `Arian'/Homoian question about the primacy of the Father's 
will. Therefore, this response by Augustine at best only postpones the question. It 
does not answer it. 
A fifth strategy Augustine employs runs like this. Obedience does not 
establish inferiority of nature. Instead, Augustine pursues the analogy with human 
sons. When human sons obey their parents, they do not show inferiority of nature. He 
writes: 
338 Ans Max Il. xxiv. 
339 John 6: 38. 
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Of what else are they trying to convince us by these testimonies of the sacred 
scriptures34' but that the Father and the Son have different natures, because the 
Son is shown to be obedient to the Father? They would not of course, say this in 
the case of human beings. After all, if a human son is obedient to his human 
father, it does not follow that the two of them have different natures. 342 
This argument offers considerable advantages for Augustine. He can concede that the 
Son does indeed obey, but can also appeal to the same relation, sonship, which he 
uses to establish equality of nature and asymmetrical distinction. Part of the 
asymmetry between Father and Son on this view is that the Son, at the level of person 
rather than nature, does the Father's will. 
This allows him both inseparable action, for the Father acts by his Son, and 
yet also particularity and distinction, for Father and Son are not symmetrically 
involved in inseparable operation. This rationale for inseparability and distinction in 
temporal action is derived from, and reveals, the eternal relation. Hence Hendricx's 
striking comment that the Father-Son relation, that is the personal relation, as distinct 
from questions of nature, is not one of equality but inequality. 343 
This would not be wholly alien to Augustine's thinking elsewhere. Thus, 
while conceding that man and woman are alike in the image of God, an equality of 
nature, he comments of domestic arrangements that a house is rightly ordered when a 
husband commands and a wife obeys. 344 Such an economy of marriage might be 
rejected in contemporary thinking, but this indicates that for Augustine obedience 
340 E. g. Against Fortunatus Day 1.6. 
i" Sc. Gal. 4: 4, Jn. 6: 38, Lk. 4: 43, Jn. 12: 49, Mt. 26: 39 and Phil. 2: 8. 
and 9. 342 . -Ins 
Arian Sermon VI. 6. See too Ans Max II. xiv. 8 
34; Hendricx 1955: 41. `Leur relation reciproque [sc. that of Father and Son] n'est pas une relation 
d'egalite mais d'inegalite. ' 
344 Tractate 2.14. 
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within a relationship did not necessarily demonstrate inequality of nature. This is not 
just special pleading against the `Arian'/Homoian objection. 
Such a scheme offers Augustine the further advantage of defending the 
Father's principium, something he is concerned to do both in his denial that the 
Father could have been sent to be incarnate, 345 and in his insistence that the Spirit 
proceeds principally from the Father. 
346 
7.10.4 Concluding Remarks on Obedience 
Which of these avenues should be pursued? The first, the application of the 
forma servi rule, as he himself tacitly concedes, 347 does not meet all the relevant texts. 
The second, that there is only one will in the Trinity, tends to leave Augustine 
vulnerable to the ultimate evaporation of the personal distinctions. The third avenue, 
having a fully symmetrical relation where `... the Father does the will of the Son', 348 
again tends to eliminate particularity in the relations. The fourth avenue, where the 
Son simply is the Father's expressed Word, 
34' does not meet, but only postpones the 
point that Maximinus and others were making. The fifth avenue, in which sonship 
provides equality of nature and also a personal relation whose asymmetry involves 
particularity, accounts for Augustine's core themes of inseparable operation and 
distinction. It is thus the explanation best cohering with Augustine's overall purposes. 
Its place within his framework, however, is obscured by the presence of other, 
competing, explanations. Moreover, the second and third avenues outlined above 
34' DeTIV. 27.32. 
34" Augustine famously describes the Spirit as `gift' DeT V. 12, XV. 29,33-36. This important point is 
raised in the next chapter dealing with John's Gospel. 
347 By introducing his third rule of interpretation. DeT II. 3. 
348 Ans Max II. xx. 4. 
349 Ans Max II. xxiv. 
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seem ultimately incompatible with Augustine's insistence on particular and 
asymmetrical distinction between the Persons. 
7.11 Conclusion 
Augustine's basic trinitarian framework revolves around two pairs of ideas, 
eternal relation and temporal action on the one hand, and inseparability and 
distinction on the other. Sonship plays an integrating role here. The Father-Son 
relation necessarily involves the existence for each Person of the other (supplying 
notions of distinction) and is a relation from which the other cannot be abstracted or 
lost (supplying notions of inseparability). The notion of simplicity is decisive for 
regulating these ideas. The relation is asymmetrical in that the Son is of the Father, 
not the Father of the Son and this entails the Persons are individuated and unique. The 
Father-Son relation entails equality of nature since the true Son shares his Father's 
nature. This Father-Son relation explains too the inseparability yet distinction of 
operation found in the economy, for Father and Son do the same acts, but the Father 
does them by the Son, his agent. 
The Father-Son relation is also relevant to obedience. Obedience within the 
economy relates back to the eternal relation of Father and Son. Obedience is best 
referred to the personal relation between Father and Son and is part of their 
distinction and particularity. Obedience does not, then, bear on equality of nature. 
This further suggests that denying the Son's obedience may undercut 
Augustine's account of inseparable yet distinct operations, in particular undermining 
distinctions which are not just numerical but involve particularities. This in turn may 
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produce two different trajectories of development. One would be towards an account 
in which the Persons themselves become indistinguishable. This could give rise to 
concerns for understandings of the human person. The second would be towards 
defending distinction in the economy at the expense of inseparability. Such separable 
operation arguably moves one closer to a polytheism Augustine associated with gods 
who had separable spheres of operation and ultimately acted independently. 
This means that Augustine has more substantial contacts with earlier Nicene 
supporters and ante-Nicenes than is sometimes imagined. He shares Athanasius' 
emphasis on divine simplicity, which entails personal relations which cannot be lost 
but retain differentiation. He shares Hilary's insistence that the true Son is of the 
same nature as the one who begot him, hence his insistence on equality of nature. He 
shares Tertullian's commitment to God's cosmic monarchy in his assertion of the 
integrity of the act of creation as an inseparable operation of the Trinity. 
However, some strands in his thought indeed could open the door to 
inseparability subsuming distinction. This arises partly from seeing the mission as a 
joint sending of Father and Son. Here Augustine seems distant from the biblical 
witness and vulnerable to some disastrous implications. This is offset by his accounts 
of how inseparable operation is not symmetrical but reflects the Father acting by the 
Son, and by his insistence that the Father is not sent because he is not begotten. These 
qualifications show again the importance of the Father-Son relation, on which they 
both depend. Nevertheless, without these qualifications, Augustine's account of the 
missions could well erode distinctions. 
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A similar tendency can be found in the willingness to argue against 
Maximinus that the Father and Son, so to speak, reciprocally do each other's will. 
Again, other competing elements can offset this, but this leaves the reader needing to 
discern the dominant lines in Augustine's thought. In both these charges, though, one 
aspect of the problem is inseparable operation and the difficulty of establishing 
distinctions within that. 
All this warrants considerable revision of some charges lodged against 
Augustine. Harnack's foundational charge of modalism, from which so much else 
flows, cannot be accepted without more argument. As just indicated, a central 
pressure-point for Augustine is inseparability and distinction in the economy, not 
apparent three-ness at the economic level yielding to a hidden one-ness. Moreover, 
given Augustine's framework which stresses personal distinction and inseparability, 
it is hard to see his theology as necessarily sacrificing relational categories to 
substantial ones, indeed the key text of De Trinitate VII. 11, so often cited to prove 
this, has an alternative and preferable explanation. Similarly the idea that Augustine 
starts with substantial `one-ness' as his dominating thought fits poorly with the place 
he gives personal distinction. Nor, of course, does the structure of De Trinitate permit 
the idea that Augustine starts with substantial `one-ness' as his opening point in a 
sequence of argument. The stress on personal distinction also renders much more 
vulnerable the view that Augustine's God is ultimately narcissistic. The psychological 
analogies may, of course, still create this trajectory, but not only does that fall outside 
the present enquiry, it would be a movement that existed despite, not because of, 
Augustine's basic framework of inseparability and distinction. Nor, on reflection, 
does Augustine wantonly downplay the economy, thereby creating a need for a 
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natural theology. His doctrine of inseparability turns repeatedly to the economy 
demonstrated and explained by Jesus, above all in John 5: 19ff. He consistently tries 
to relate that economy to the immanent being of God, for inseparable operation is 
understood not despite links between the economic and the immanent, but in the light 
of connections between the economic and immanent. Augustine may, of course, 
wrongly interpret John 5. But the fault then would be exegetical, not the 
methodological error of disregarding the economy. 
Problems remain, naturally, for a modern theologian reading Augustine. First, 
which of his strands of argument on the obedience question in particular should be 
preferred? The best fit relates to the conception of an obedient Son, for the reasons 
outlined earlier. Secondly, Augustine has given a very stark picture not just of the 
actions of Jesus but of the actions of the Father. He sees their actions as being 
inseparable in the economy. It is apt therefore to turn to the economy of the Father's 
actions as given in John, the Gospel on which Augustine relied so heavily in 
defending his account of inseparable operation. 
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CHAPTER 8: JOHN'S GOSPEL AND THE GIVING FATHER 
It is proposed that: 
8(a). John 's Gospel should not be approached purely as a christocentric 
account, but as a theocentric account built up through christology. 
8(b). The Father is importantly characterised not just as the sender of Jesus 
the Son, but as the giving Father. 
8(c). This giving is manifested in the eternal relations in the gift of life-in- 
himself to the Son and economically in the gift of authority over the cosmos to 
the Son. Giving spans both economic and immanent. 
8(d). The Father's giving is not confined to the Son but also characterises his 
relation to the world and believers. 
8(e). As a comprehensive giver, the Father is characterised as inherently 
generous, but also as sovereign, in that he can only give what he has the right 
to give. 
8(f). As the final source of what is given to the Son and what the Son has to 
give, the giving motif creates a strongly patrocentric movement in the Gospel. 
The Gospel 's theocentricity is a patrocentricity. 
323 
8(g). As the giver of the Son 's life and authority, the Father emerges as having 
paternal authority over the Son, confirmed by the Son's insistence on his 
sonship being marked by obedience. 
8(h). The words and works of Jesus are depicted as joint operations disclosing 
the Father's indwelling of Jesus. 
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8.1 Introduction 
It now falls to review some of the trinitarian material in the Gospel of John, 
the Gospel on which the accounts outlined above so heavily relied. 
8.1.1. Patristic concerns 
Despite dissimilarities, the patristic writers examined above exhibit some 
fundamental common concerns. All alike wish to repudiate polytheism as well as 
assimilation of the Persons. A common feature of their strategies for doing this, albeit 
variously expressed, is their conception of the Father as the one from whom the Son 
derives all he is and has. Tertullian speaks of the Father's monarchy, in which the Son 
shares. Origen likewise sees the Son as perfectly and eternally imaging his Father and 
being given authority from his Father. Athanasius envisages again a cosmic monarchy 
in which the Son is a `good' Son, not independent of the Father, but from him alone, 
and therefore holding things from him. Hilary likewise stresses the Son's filial 
derivation from the Father, resulting in the Son's perfect sharing his perfect Father's 
nature, and in filial obedience. Augustine, far from breaking with earlier pre-Nicene 
theology, develops it into a more articulated version of inseparable operation in which 
the Son, on the most consistent version of his arguments, shares his Father's nature 
and, as an obedient Son, is the executor of their joint actions. 
This pattern of derivation provides integration. The Son is inseparably of the 
Father and no independent, `second power' in heaven. Jesus' actions are those of an 
obedient son, rather than a being who acts independently in the economy of space and 
time and who therefore exists eternally somehow independently of the Father. 
Derivation also entails distinction. For the Son to derive means there must be an 
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`other' from whom derivation takes place. Thus derivation patterns readily serve the 
needs of both monotheism and personal distinction. 
However, derivation is from the Father. It thus inevitably leads back to the one 
from whom the Son derives being in himself and authority in the cosmos. This means 
that the issues raised by these authors readily become patrocentric, ' not merely 
theocentric, but patrocentric, because it is as Father that God gives and delegates to 
his Son. 2 Therefore, Nils Dahl's highly pertinent remark about the need for a theology 
in the strict sense is well-taken, but requires in this examination of John a more 
specific focus, 3 namely, what picture of the Father does the Gospel present? For 
arguably it is here that these Patristic syntheses stand or fall on their own terms. 
8.1.2. Using John's Gospel 
At first glance, John 20: 31, inter alia, focuses the reader's attention on Jesus 
and his identity, as the Christ and Son of God. 4 This is supported by Jesus' continual 
presence in the narrative and the authorial perspective, which employs techniques, 
such as irony, to `enlist' the reader to see things from Jesus' view. 5 R. Bultmann 
comments: `The Gospel of John fundamentally contains but a single theme: the 
Person of Jesus. '6 
T. Torrance 1995: 64 applies the term to `Nicene' theology. It is extended here to include the pre- 
Nicene Tertullian and Augustine, whose proximity to Nicene thought has not always been fully 
recognised. 
2 Tertullian, of course, can envisage the Word as the primary category for the Second Person. Even so, 
the trajectory of his thought tends in a patrocentric direction given his stress on the reliability of the 
Incarnation as revelation. 
3 Dahl 1991: 153-163. 
4 Carson 1991: 662 contends that this should be rendered `that you may believe the Christ, the Son of 
God, is Jesus'. This does not affect the point made here. 
5 See D. Marguerat 1993: 223 to the effect that irony is a language of initiation. 
6 Bultmann 1971: 5. 
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Were this the whole story, there would be some discomfort in reading John for 
confirmation of a patrocentric trinitarian synthesis. However, it is unsatisfactory to 
see John as exclusively christocentric. Taking John 20: 31, even the term `Christ' takes 
one beyond Jesus - anointed by whom and for what? As for `Son of God' this 
manifestly raises issues of derivation: who is the God whose Son Jesus is? Further, 
there is the prevalent `sending' language and the Gospel's emphasis that Jesus is not 
simply claiming to be God tout court, but the Son of God. Hence G. O'Day 
perceptively remarks: 
To focus exclusively on Jesus is to miss [John's] central claim. John celebrates 
what Jesus reveals about God, not what Jesus reveals about himself.? 
Hence, it is not necessarily procrustean to examine the extent, if any, to which John 
endorses a patrocentric reading. 
This should not, of course, preclude all christological reading. Jesus' identity 
is at stake, Culpepper remarks, in scene after scene, 8 but above all in terms of where 
he comes from, 9 his derivation. Barrett comments: `[t]here could hardly be a more 
christocentric writer than John, yet his very chri stocentri city is theocentric. ' 1° It is 
plausible to ask whether the Gospel focuses the reader theocentrically via the Father- 
Son relationship. If so, then the kind of Father the First Person is contributes 
substantially to John's theology in Dahl's sense. 
However, investigating the Gospel's account of God as Father is not 
straightforward. The Gospel does not list God's attributes, " but instead narrates 
O'Day 2001: 29. 
8 R. Culpepper 1998: 89. 
9 Culminating in 19: 9 where Pilate asks Jesus where he is from. Anticipated in earlier disputes at 7: 27ff 
(ironically) and 8: 14. 
10 Barrett: 1982: 32. 
11 Compare Thompson 1997: 232 on this. 
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them. 12 Naturally this does not mean the Gospel denies that predication is possible 
concerning God. The narrative form does not necessitate strongly apophatic theology, 
although specific narrative content might. Predicates are, anyway, made of God. Thus 
Jesus describes God as äX rjOit; in 7: 26, ' 3 and as nv£vµa in 4: 24. The difficulty with 
the narrative form in John is rather that attributes emerge from the action and can 
relate to implicit ideas about God. 14 Moreover, the narrative form obviously involves 
sequence and development in which character and action often unfold. ' 5 This means 
important characteristics may be latent at early points. 
This calls for interpretative caution, and a recognition that inter-textual 
references may be illuminating since they may indicate what kind of God or divine 
attribute John assumes. However, the narrative form also tends to put a premium on 
construing wider passages than simply individual verses. Such exegesis assumes still 
greater importance since such predications about God as John does contain are 
relatively infrequent, and, of course, still require contextualised interpretation. 
Obviously, approaching John with the Patristic syntheses in mind risks forcing 
John into a mould, and becoming deaf to nuances falling outside the framework 
outlined above. One attractive safeguard is to exegete some lengthy johannine 
material which falls outside the normal range of reference for those authors examined 
above. The Bread of Life discourse of John 6: 25-7116 has been selected for this. 
12 Thompson 1997: 232, Culpepper 1998: 88. 
13 Compare 3: 33. 
14 Thompson 2001: 9 rightly notes the importance of implicit ideas about God. 
15 Cf. Culpepper 1998: 67 on plot as comprising sequence. causality, unity and affective power. 
16 The question of the Discourse's extent will be dealt with below. 
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Several reasons underlie this. First, it is relatively underused in the 
Monarchian and Arian/Homoian controversies. ' 7 The focus falls rather on the 
Sabbath dispute of 5: 17ff, John 10: 30,14: 6-11 and 14: 28. It may therefore provide a 
useful control for Patristic Trinitarian theology. Secondly, John 6 can be seen as 
further developing themes referred to in chapter 5, notably Moses and Scripture. ' 8 
Hence, if these patristic writers have faithfully understood chapter 5, then one might 
well find some corroboration of their views in John 6. Thirdly, John 6 is not 
unrepresentative of the Gospel as a whole, with its motifs of life and the importance 
of belief. 19 Fourthly, the discourse is quite long and thus suitable. Fifthly, the 
Discourse contains material dealing with the works of both Father and Son and their 
relationship. It is therefore apt for elucidating how John avoids those traditional 
pitfalls of polytheism and modalism. It should be added that the emphasis below will 
inevitably be on this aspect rather than the extent of sacramental references in the 
Discourse. 20 
A final, sixth, factor is the strong use of `gift' language in the Discourse. This 
is extremely significant. Thompson valuably comments that `God' is not a self- 
interpreting term, even in biblical literature. 21 Rather one must see how the term is 
qualified, with whom the `god' relates and how, and what the `god' does. 22 In terms 
of John's Gospel it is enormously tempting to fasten on the phrase `the Father who 
sent' or equivalents, because this is both striking and prevalent. The concept of the 
1' It is used, of course. The question is one of emphasis. 
18 U. von Wahlde 1981 argues that the witnesses of ch 5: 31 ff, XöyoS, Epyä, and ypc«pij are developed 
in 8: 13-59,10: 22-39 and 6: 31-59 respectively. 
19 Note the presence of both in the purpose statement of 20: 31. 
20 Scholarship on this remains divided. Ridderbos notes that the difficulties with a strongly 
sacramental' view are contextual, terminological and theological. 1997: 236ff, 240ff. 
21 Thompson 2001: 22. Compare Jn 10: 35. 
22 Thompson 2001: 22ff. 
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sending Father is indeed reflected in the thought of the writers examined. 23 Further, 
modern scholarship, particularly after Borgen's work on the shaliach concept, 24 
would see this as an important area and to that extent would recognise some 
legitimacy behind the patristic emphasis. 25 Moreover, the sending motif is present in 
the Discourse (6: 29,38,44). 
However, another prominent theme is giving, especially giving by the Father. 
This is highly prominent statistically26 and occurs at significant points in the Gospel's 
development (notably 3: 16ff and the `high priestly prayer' of chapter 17, as well as 
chapter 6). This theme is sometimes present in the patristic material, but is strongly 
present in John 6. John 6 therefore deals extensively with a johannine motif 
qualifying God and which the patristic arguments flag less strongly. Inevitably one 
asks if this represents a significant cleavage between John's account of the Father and 
that of the patristic writers. 
8.2. John 6 
8.2.1. Outline and Exegesis 
The temporal markers of 6: 1 and 7: 1 tend to enclose chapter 6, while within it 
the incidents of feeding the Five Thousand, walking on water and the Bread of Life 
Discourse itself appear to follow in rapid succession. 27 The Discourse and Feeding 
are closely tied since the Discourse addresses those who saw the miracle (6: 26). 
`'; Not least because the Arian/Homoian opponents of some had made such play with it. 
Borgen 1970. 
25 Divine origin for the agent's commission would not in itself preclude the divinity of the agent 
himself. See L. Hartmann 1978: 95. 
26 The Father appears as giver some 28 times. He appears as sender (including sender of the Spirit and 
John the Baptist) some 45 times. Obviously giving and sending may interpret each other. 
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Thematically, Moses and the events of the Exodus are prominent. The time is 
Passover (6: 4), Jesus is on a mountain-side (6: 3), and the miraculous provision of 
food recalls manna (Exodus 16), a life-giving miracle par excellence. The crowd 
apparently respond along `Mosaic' lines. Some construe the reference to the 
`Prophet' as picking up the prophet-like-Moses of Deuteronomy 18: 15ff, 28 and the 
statement of 6: 30 again seems to refer to Moses. If the walking on water of 6: 16-21 is 
taken as reprising the Red Sea miracle, 29 this further strengthens associations with 
Exodus and Wilderness. The crowd (and some disciples) continue the Wilderness 
themes as they, like the Israelites, grumble (6: 41,61). The question of Jesus' relation 
to Moses was, of course, raised in 5: 45f, and in some ways chapter 6 clarifies just 
that. `The Prophet' was also the climax of Jesus' self-disclosure to the Samaritan 
woman in 4: 26. 
Much of the Discourse focuses on Jesus as the bread from heaven, again a 
description raising the question of origin. Origin issues lie behind the grumbling of 
6: 41-42. Origin and derivation continue as bones of contention in chapters 7 and 8: in 
chapter 7 Jesus is under suspicion about the provenance of his teaching, 30 while in 
chapter 8 the dispute highlights paternity, 31 again a question of origin. 
Structurally, much has been made of resemblances in chapter 6 to homiletic 
patterns, 32 in which a text is given, and, after initial exposition, has key elements 
further developed. This fits the synagogue setting (6: 59). The discourse contains the 
27 Thus the walking on the water appears later in the day of the feeding (6: 16), while the address is to 
the crowd who had started searching for Jesus the day after the miracle (6: 22). 
)` So e. g. R. Schnackenburg 1980 II: 18, Brown 1971: 1: 614. 
29 E. g. Stibbe 1993: 88. 
30 Following e. g. Pancaro 1975: 91. 
31 See e. g. Stibbe 1993: 97. 
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somewhat familiar pattern of interjections and reactions. The interjections help propel 
the discourse into slightly different areas. The interjections first seem favourable 
(6: 34), but progress through grumbling (6: 41,42) to sharp internal debate (6: 52). This 
intensifies in 6: 60-70 as the focus moves from the crowd's reactions to the disciples, 
some of whom move from grumbling (6: 60f) to outright desertion (6: 66), while the 
final reference to Judas' betrayal adds an even darker hue. R. Kysar perceptively 
speaks of the Discourse's `essentially tragic' movement, as conflict and offence 
become ever starker. 33 
This progression tends to bracket 6: 60-70 with 6: 25-59. Thematic links 
intensify this: the same teaching is under discussion, and the themes of the Father's 
drawing (6: 65), and of life-giving (6: 63) are repeated. The editorial comment of 6: 59 
may somewhat mark off what follows, 34 but the thematic links nevertheless mean that 
6: 60-70 comments on the main Discourse. Therefore 6: 60-70 will be included here. 
Like other johannine dialogues, the Discourse starts with `discontinuous 
dialogue'35 as the crowd's question (6: 25) about Jesus' return to Capernaum is met by 
his remarks about why they seek him (6: 26). However, 6: 22-24 softens the 
disjunction by stressing the crowd's anxiety to find Jesus. 
Verses 26f, though, both confirm the crowd's incomprehension of the sign 
they have seen (anticipated by Jesus' withdrawal at their decision to `make' him king 
`by force' (6: 15)), and also introduce an idea fundamental to what follows, a bread 
32 Notably after Borgen's 1965 work. 
13 Kysar 1997: 171. 
34 If 6: 58's reference to the fathers who ate is taken as forming an inclusio with 6: 3 1, the demarcation is 
still stronger. So Ridderbos 1997: 244. 
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enduring to eternal life. This life motif is, of course, central to the Gospel. 
36 Belief in 
the Son brings life (e. g. 3: 16,3: 33) and life appears in chapter 4 in terms of living 
water which Jesus will give. Living water is featured in chapter 7, while Jesus the 
light of the world is glossed in 8: 12 as the light of life. The raising of Lazarus 
concerns life par excellence (chapter 11), while chapter 8 warns of the opposite of 
life, dying in one's sin (8: 21,24), 37 put elsewhere as having God's wrath remain on 
one (3: 36). Finally, the Gospel's stated purpose in 20: 31 deals with life. 
Life, of course, has a double resonance in Old Testament ideas about God. 
First, God has life while created idols do not, 38 and secondly God gives life to his 
creation. 39 Such associations are natural here because of the persistent ties with 
Israel's Wilderness experiences of God where he provides life for them in the desert, 
despite their distrust. 40 
The Son of Man is to give this bread enduring to eternal life (6: 27). This 
introduces the giving motif. Here, though, the giver is the Son of Man. The attentive 
reader will identify this as Jesus, 41 and Jesus as life-giver has just been the subject of 
intense scrutiny in 5: 21 ff. However, 5: 26 has indicated that Jesus has life in himself, 
just as the Father has life in himself. Thompson comments this is a remarkable 
35 The term is from Stibbe 1993: 87. 
36 Cf Brown 1971 I: 505f. 
37 Dying in sin is apparently the opposite of life/eternal life, because 8: 24 associates dying in sin with 
disbelief 
38 See e. g. Jer. 10. 
31' Compare Thompson 2001: 74. 
40 E. g. the manna incident itself Ex 16: 3 and later the demand for water Ex 17: 2, repeated on another 
occasion in Numbers 20: 2f. Compare also Numbers 14: 3f for the fear that invasion of Canaan will 
bring death not inheritance. 
41 Especially because of John 1: 51, although the Son of Man references of 3: 13-15 are quickly glossed 
in terms of God's Son (3: 16-18), who is readily identified as Jesus. 
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claim, 42 rightly, since having life in this way is associated with divinity, as is being 
able creatively to give life. 43 This giving by the Son of Man is, however, immediately 
related to the Father. God the Father sets his seal, that is, authorises, 44 the Son of 
Man. This means that the Son of Man does not give life independently of God the 
Father. 
The identity of this bread remains here unspecified, although people should 
work for it (6: 27). This work terminology is picked up in 6: 28 as the Jews ask what 
work God requires. 45 The transition is not harsh, for Jesus' earlier words about bread 
that does not perish opens up figurative meanings for bread. J. Pryor argues that 
Torah and Wisdom were figuratively seen as manna. 46 The new figurative manna, of 
course, will prove to be Jesus. 
Jesus replies (6: 29) that the work God requires is belief in the one he sent. 
Such belief has already been described as showing that one accepts God is truthful 
(3: 33), thereby demonstrating its importance to God, and one honours the Father by 
honouring his Son (5: 23). Thus God's character and honour are inseparably tied to 
the Son sent into the world. 
Verse 30 challenges Jesus for a vindicatory sign and returns to the manna with 
a quotation resembling Psalm 78: 24. This quotation forms the basis for much of what 
follows. Jesus `corrects' the quotation at several levels in 6: 31-33.47 First, the giver is 
4' Thompson 2001: 78£ 
43 Thompson 2001: 43. 
44 Following Ridderbos 1997: 225, Carson 1991: 284. 
'' See Carson 1991: 284. 
46 Pryor 1992: 31. 
47 Compare his `correction' in 4: 21-23 of the Samaritan woman's comments of 4: 20. 
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not Moses but Jesus' Father. Thus the Father is now portrayed as the life-giver since 
the bread from heaven is so closely associated with giving life. This further means 
that the Discourse now envisages the Father (6: 32) and the Son of Man (6: 27) giving 
the same thing, the bread of life. Both are givers. The question is how that giving is 
integrated. Secondly, the giving occurs now (present tense rather than perfect). 48 This 
rules out a `dispensational' view such that the Father gave in the Old Testament but 
Jesus gives in the New Testament. 
Thirdly, this given bread is described as the true bread. This is expanded in 
6: 33 as the bread of God which descends from heaven and gives life to the world. 
This comment reminds the reader that the bread from heaven does not arrive 
independently of God, but derives from him. For the bread's descent `from heaven', a 
circumlocution for `from God', re-inforces the genitive äptioq toi OF-ob. This relates 
the life that the Son of Man will give back once more to the Father. Given the 
conception that God is creator and life-giver this occasions no surprise. 
The crowd respond to this description just as the woman had responded in 
4: 15 when hearing of living water, and ask to be given the bread (6: 34). Here Jesus is 
taken as the giver, notwithstanding the way 6: 32f focused on the Father as giver. 
Jesus answers by identifying the bread of life as himself. After 6: 32f this also 
identifies him as the bread God gives. Jesus' superiority as bread emerges from the 
statement that he leaves the partaker completely satisfied. 49 Partaking is explained as 
`coming' to Jesus, thus suggesting that this bread is appropriated by faith. 
48 Following C. Koester 1995: 95f. Carson 1991: 286 notes this could possibly be a present historic. 
However, the tense form contrasts with the original citation, and is set in the midst of other corrections. 
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Faith explicitly returns to the centre (6: 29 has already made it important for 
the Discourse) in 6: 36 as Jesus resumes his critical tones of 6: 26. Verse 37 then 
states, first, that `everything' the Father gives to Jesus will come and, secondly, that 
Jesus will not expel one who comes. This continues the coming-in-faith theme from 
6: 35-36, but those who come are described as `given' to Jesus by the Father, another 
act of giving by him, but this time to Jesus. The Father, then, emerges as a giver, not 
here of the bread of life to the believer, but of the believer to the bread of life. The 
effectiveness of the giving is underlined by the universality of the `everything' and 
the certainty of the two future phrases `will come' and `will not cast out'. 
These two clauses co-ordinate the Father's giving with the Son's reception. 
Jesus expands on this (6: 38), commenting that he has come down from heaven to do 
the will of him who sent him. Personal distinction is highly prominent here given 
6: 37. It is therefore contextually unattractive to take `the will of him who sent me' as 
referring to the single will of all three Persons. More straightforwardly, the Father's 
will is at stake, supported by the references to will in 6: 39-40, especially 6: 40 where 
the will is finally called the will `of the Father', phrasing normally taken to denote 
personal distinction. 
Verse 38 explains how the giving and receiving of believers between the 
Father and Son is co-ordinated. The action is unanimous, based on the Father's will. 
This will receives expansion in 6: 39-40. Verse 39 states its content: that Jesus will 
lose nothing of what the Father has given. The Father's giving and his will are 
therefore closely tied. What the Father gives and what Jesus holds are therefore 
49 Compare Sirach 24: 21 on the way one wants only Wisdom after tasting her. 
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exactly coterminous, matched by the similar correspondence between a person being 
given and that person coming in faith (6: 37). Instead of loss, such a person is raised 
on the last day, thus clarifying what life the bread brings and picking up the 
resurrection promise of 5: 28f. Verse 40 re-states the resurrection promise in terms of 
the Father's will that believers will be raised. Hence a person's faith in Christ has 
been doubly related to the Father: it is a work of God as a work God requires, but also 
a work showing God has given that person to the Son. 
The reaction is murmuring (6: 41), an objection to Jesus' claim to be this bread 
from heaven. As 6: 42 shows this constitutes contesting Jesus' heavenly origin, that is, 
his derivation from God. Jesus both knows, and disapproves, of the objection (6: 43) 
and returns in 6: 44 to the theme of `coming' to him. This is only possible if the Father 
who sent Jesus draws one. Thus the giving of 6: 37-40 is strongly active. The gift is 
not merely available to Jesus but actively placed in his hands by the Father's drawing. 
This puts a primacy on the Father's action. 
That primacy continues in 6: 45 as Jesus takes a second scriptural citation 
(about the teaching of God) and relates this to belief in himself. 50 The believer is one 
who has learned from the Father. Importantly, then, belief/disbelief in Jesus is also an 
indicator of relation to his Father. 5' 
However, the Father's primacy does not constitute action independent of 
Jesus. Unity of action between Father and Son is underscored again in 6: 46, here 
so Isa 54.13. Some argue this second citation is characteristic of a rabbinic homiletical pattern. 
51 Compare 8: 47. 
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regarding revelation. Jesus denies any vision of God independent of him: he alone has 
seen the Father. 
The following verses (6: 47-51) return to the themes that one who believes in 
Jesus has life, and of Jesus' own identity as the bread of life, in contrast to the bread 
the fathers ate which could not give life. Jesus adds (6: 51) that the bread is his flesh 
which he gives for the life of the world. This introduces, of course, a new kind of 
giving: the giver here is the Son who gives his own human life. 
This, of course, produces further objections amongst Jesus' audience, now 
called `the Jews' (6: 52). 52 Jesus emphasises in 6: 53f that his flesh must be `eaten', 
intensifying the offence by adding that his blood must be drunk. Only thus can there 
be resurrection life. After all, Jesus' flesh is true food, and his blood true drink (6: 55), 
which presumably refers to the original distinction between life-giving bread and 
perishable bread. The one who partakes of Jesus' flesh and blood dwells in Jesus and 
is indwelt by him (6: 56). 
Verse 57 associates such indwelling with life. He who `eats' Jesus will live 
through (StO) him. Strikingly, though, this is compared to Jesus himself living 
through (8lä) the Father who sent him. This is consistent with 5: 26, which speaks of 
the Father giving life to the Son. However, the believer does not have life `in 
himself, which limits the scope of the comparison. This comparison, though, draws 
attention to the Father as the ultimate source of life. The Son as bread of life brings 
life, but life that ultimately traces back to the Father, for the Son himself holds life 
52 Ridderbos 1997-2339 suggests this should be understood as a mutual discussion of `astonishment and 
displeasure', rather than implying that some were for, some against Jesus. 
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through the Father. If the Father had not first (as a logical rather than temporal 
priority) given life to the Son, the latter would, apparently, have no life to give in 
turn. 
Jesus concludes the Synagogue address in 6: 58 by re-asserting the superiority 
of the bread that descends from heaven over the bread which the fathers ate in the 
wilderness but still died. After an editorial comment (6: 59), the passage moves to 
those who would, at first glance, be thought more receptive, his disciples (6: 60). They 
too regard Jesus' `word' as harsh. 53 Once again, Jesus is aware (6: 61) of the 
`grumbling' (a continuity with the main discourse) and responds with an incomplete 
conditional sentence (6: 62) which raises the question of what their reaction would be 
if they saw the Son of Man ascend to where he was before. This refers, most 
naturally, to the ascension, which would confirm Jesus' identity and thus his 
reliability, rather than to the crucifixion. He then speaks of the life-giving Spirit 
(literally, who makes live: ý(oonotovv: 6: 63). While eminently consistent with the 
Spirit references of the Nicodemus dialogue (chapter 3), this means chapter 6 has 
now associated the conferring of life with Father, Son and Spirit. However, the 
Spirit's life-giving function is closely integrated with the actions of the other Persons. 
For 6: 63 links the Spirit to the words of Jesus, which are themselves depicted as 
given by the Father to the Son. Jesus' concluding comments to the disciples 
acknowledge that some do not believe (6: 64), while an editorial addition states that 
Jesus knew both who believed and who would betray him (6: 65). 
'i The 'harshness' may relate not to the origin of Jesus but to his teaching that he will die. So 
Ridderbos 1997: 245. 
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This addition is not insignificant. The main discourse showed that belief 
results from the Father giving to Jesus and `drawing' some-one to Jesus. Jesus' 
knowledge here of who believes indicates therefore that he knows whom his Father 
gives and draws. Jesus does not merely do his Father's will: he knows its content. 
This is underlined by 6: 65 as Jesus re-states that no-one can come to Jesus in belief 
without the Father drawing them. This too, however, is described as gift: no-one can 
come unless it is given to them, literally, out of the Father. 54 This means that for the 
believer giving has a double quality: the believer is given to the Son, but the `coming' 
is given to the believer. 
At this, some in Jesus' audience defect (6: 66), while Peter confesses that Jesus 
has the words of life and is the Holy One of God (6: 68f). Once again, Jesus' life- 
bringing ministry is joined to his identity as one from God. 
Jesus ominously closes the section by predicting that one of the Twelve would 
betray him, yet even this is put within a framework of divine knowledge and control 
as he states that he himself chose the Twelve, including his betrayer (6: 70). The 
editorial comment underlines this by pointing out Jesus' identification of Judas 
(6: 71). 
8.2.2. Significant Themes concerning the Father in John 6: 25-71 
Two points are especially notable about the Father in this Discourse, first, his 
identity as a giver, and secondly the primacy of his will. 
54 Compare 3: 27, although there the gift is `out of heaven'. The E1( + genitive construction with a verb 
of giving is perhaps most naturally taken as indicating source or origin. For ' is denoting origin see 
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The Father emerges as a giver. The place of giving in the structure of Jesus' 
speech shows its importance. Humans desperately need the bread of life, which the 
Father gives. Humans feed on the bread of life by `coming' to it, that is, believing. 
But belief arises from the Father giving to the Son and to the believer. Life in the 
Gospel depends on giving. 
The giving is, though, manifold. He is the one who both gives the bread of 
life to `you' (6: 32) and who gives believers to the Son (6: 37-40). This coming is also 
a gift to the believer (6: 65). The purpose of this giving is life, a life that ultimately 
traces back to the Father (6: 57). This pluriformity suggests the giving's effectiveness 
because every aspect of the process of receiving life derives from the Father. The 
johannine idiom that nothing given will be lost expresses this effectiveness. (6: 39). 55 
This naturally leads to a consideration of the will of the Father. 
The Father's will is intimately involved in the giving of chapter 6. He gives 
with a purpose (6: 390, which is benevolent both towards humans (that they enjoy 
life) and also towards the Son (that he be honoured and adored). Jesus presents his 
own giving as thoroughly integrated with the Father's, so that Father and Son are not 
pursuing independent, albeit benevolent, projects towards humanity. Rather both give 
in one operation a life ultimately traced back to the Father. Jesus, though, locates this 
one operation in his Father's will, with this relational language suggesting an 
individuated will of the Father, which he obeys. 
Porter 1994: 155f. 
55 Jesus returns to the motif of effectiveness in 10: 29f and importantly in 18: 9. 
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8.3. The Giving Motif 
Given this review of the Father's giving in chapter 6, the character of the 
Father's giving more generally falls for examination. 
8.3.1. Giving and its relations 
Of course, the Bread of Life Discourse is not alone in depicting the Father's 
pluriform giving. This pluriformity also emerges strongly in John 17 in the so-called 
High Priestly prayer. John 17 is demarcated as discrete by editorial comments of 
introduction, in 17: 1, and of departure, in 18: 1. Within that, the prayer can be 
profitably divided around the various petitionary foci. At its simplest, this produces 
three divisions, 17: 1-5 (on Jesus' glorification), 17: 6-19 (for the disciples) and 17: 20- 
26 (for those who believe through the disciples). 56 However, the Father's giving is 
present throughout. 57 The prayer's position at the end of the Upper Room Discourse, 
just before the arrest and Passion proper, renders it prominent. Its content also attracts 
attention since it is the most sustained direct address by Jesus to his Father in the 
Gospel: we `overhear' the godhead. 58 Carson notes that in some respects it 
summarises the Gospel to this point. 59 
Within the first division outlined above (17: 1-5), the Father's giving appears 
first in verse 2, which speaks of the authority given by the Father to the Son. Verse 4 
again features a gift by the Father, of work the Son was to do. 
56 Cp L. Moms 1995: 634, J. Marsh 1968: 553. 
57 17: 2,4,6,7,8,9,11,12,22,24. 
58 Stibbe 1993: 178. 
59 Carson 1991: 551. 
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In the second division (17: 6-19), Jesus is once more the beneficiary of the 
Father's giving as he refers to the Father's giving of specific people out of the world 
(17: 6). Verse 7 repeats that everything the Father has given Jesus is from the Father 
and that the believers know this. Verse 8 shifts the emphasis slightly to speak of the 
words given by the Father to Jesus, which he in turn has transmitted. Verse 9 stresses 
that Jesus prays for those the Father gave him, while verse 11 resumes the giving 
theme, this time as the name the Father has given (see also 17: 12). Giving appears 
finally in this section in verse 14 where Jesus is the giver, but now of `your word', 
something, of course, that verse 8 has already indicated was given to Jesus. 
In the third section (17: 20-26), giving occurs at verse 22 as Jesus speaks of the 
glory the Father gave him and which he has given on in turn. In verse 24, the Father's 
giving of believers re-appears, as does the glory the Father gave the Son. 
The Father's giving is as extensive as in chapter 6, if not more so. In chapter 
17 he gives glory, words, work, name and believers, and the predominant direct 
recipient of these gifts is Jesus. He gives on in his turn, and the prayer contemplates a 
giving to those for whom Jesus prays. The Father's giving is, perhaps, unsurprisingly 
prominent in a prayer. Prayers characteristically ask for things. Even so, the giving 
terminology is cast strongly in terms of gifts the Father has already given, 
specifically, to the Son. The Father's generosity is emphasised in his dealings with his 
Son. 
343 
It is expedient here to return to Augustine's trinitarian account. He 
characteristically presents the trinitarian role of the Spirit as being Gift. 
6° Positively, 
this facilitates Augustine's presentation of eternally rooted divine love (for the Spirit's 
role as Gift is eternal) and his characterisation of God as love. 61 More negatively, this 
can obscure the extent of the Father's giving to the Son. 62 Augustine, paradoxically, 
may under-state the Father's giving by over-concentrating on the Spirit as Gift. 
The Father's giving to his Son is linked both to his love and to his will. Thus 
the Father loves the Son and has given everything into his hands (3: 35). This suggests 
that the giving of believers in chapter 6 also relates to the Father's love for the Son, 
since they are included in the `all' God has given his Son. (6: 37,39). Similar patterns 
occur in 17: 24 where Jesus grounds the Father's giving of glory to the Son on the 
Father's love for the Son before the foundation of the world. Love motivates, so to 
speak, the Father's giving to the Son. 63 Similar motivation prompts the giving of the 
Son by the Father. The Father gives the Son because he loves the world (3: 16). 
As for relating giving to will, the review of chapter 6 has already outlined this. 
The Father gives both Son and believers to fulfil his will. This is supported by the 
thought that the Son is `given' works to complete (5: 36), which are themselves 
related to the Father's will (compare 4: 34). 
Therefore, the Father's giving, will and love are related concepts informing 
each other, and not mutually exclusive. Hence, altering the understanding of one of 
60 DeT V. 12, XV. 29,33-36. 
61 E. g. DeT XV. 27,28 and 31. 
62 Augustine does not dispute other fields of giving. The question is one of emphasis. 
63 F. Larrson 2001: 247 comments that the Father's love is connected with the giving of gifts. 
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them may well impact the others too. To abstract love from giving alters the character 
of the Father's gift. Similarly, to discuss the Father's giving without reference to his 
will obscures both the purposes of the giving and the Father's place. As related 
concepts, will and love cannot be taken disjunctively. 
Turning to the relation of johannine giving and sending terms, while John's 
sending language is obviously highly distinctive, 64 it is nuanced by the giving 
language. 65 Thus 3: 16 and 3: 17 link the giving of the Son with the sending of the Son: 
his sending is a species of gift. Moreover, the Son is sent both to work (e. g. 4: 34) and 
to bring words (e. g. 12: 49), but words and works are things given by the Father (17: 4 
concerning works and 17: 8 concerning words). The purpose of the Son's sending is 
salvific (3: 17), and, in particular, saving belief is related to believing that Jesus is one 
whom the Father sent (e. g. 6: 29 and 17: 3). However, such saving belief in the one the 
Father sent in turn depends on the giving of the Father (6: 37,44f, and 65). Hence, the 
character, purpose and effectiveness of sending are glossed by giving. 
However, as well as having many ways of giving, the Father also gives to 
different beneficiaries, both believers and the Son. We turn to the Father's gifts to 
Jesus the Son. 
8.3.2. Gifts to Jesus the Son 
John's Gospel concerns the giving of life to those who walk in darkness. 
Jesus, however, traces his own life back to the Father (5: 26,6: 57). Within the context 
of 5: 19-30 the giving of life by the Father to the Son is the basis for the Son's giving 
64 For present purposes nothing turns on putative distinctions between ntµnaw and änoaisXXcw. J. 
Seynaeve 1977 asserts a distinction. A. Kostenberger 1999 suggests they are virtual synonyms. 
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of life to believers in his turn. This emerges from the connective 'yap at the start of 
5: 26, which indicates that 5: 26 explains the claims of 5: 25. The life the Son has, 
though, is life-in-himself (Ev i(xutcI ), 66 paraphrased by Carson as life like God in 
being a `self-existent' life. ' 
This is significant because Jesus here speaks of something beyond the events 
of the Incarnation, or events within creation. The granting of authority could 
conceivably relate simply to creation: the Son has authority over created things, to 
give life and exercise judgement. Here, though, since the Word, identified as the Son, 
stands outside the realm of created things (1: 1-4), a relation outside creation is in 
view. The giving of life to the Son is part of the eternal relation between Father and 
Son. Carson comments: 
The impartation of life-in-himself to the Son must be an act belonging to 
eternity, of a piece with the Father/Son relationship, which is itself of a piece 
with the relationship between the Word and God 68 . 
This differentiates the giving language. It is clear that in the sending the 
Father gives to the Son in various ways, and the giving of cosmic authority could be 
related to that. However, the giving of life stands outside that salvation-historical 
giving. It is nevertheless a giving. This is suggestive. Obviously, much has been made 
of the sending motifs reflecting the eternal processions of Son and Spirit, but, 
nevertheless, `sending' is not attributed to the eternal relation between Father and 
Son. Giving, though, is applied to relations both in the economy and also in eternity. 
Therefore, the giving motif merits serious consideration as providing a common 
factor between eternal and economic relations. 
65 Thompson 1997: 225 points out that sending does not alone explain the Sonship relation. 
66 1: 4 may form a parallel depending on whether the phrase Ev aviw ýwrl rlv is taken with v3 or v 4. 
67 Carson 1991: 256. 
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In fact, the eternal giving provides the basis for the Son's own economic 
giving. The Son's giving of life can be related back to the giving of authority to him 
over the cosmos by the Father and derives from the Father's eternal giving of life to 
the Son such that he has it in himself. 
Equally striking is the Father's giving of authority. This emerges in several 
ways. First, the Son gives life to whomever he wishes (5: 2 1), and, of course, the Son 
as life-giver is a major Gospel theme. The giving of life, though, is an act of divine 
prerogative, and expressed in authority terms in 17: 2: 
Ka96e6wica; ci 'c eýovai. av iräaqS ßapKöS, i. va itäv ö SEScwxa; aviäw 
Sc; )ß l ainot; c 0)1'1v cd6vtov 
This passage shows that Jesus' authority is universal, over `all flesh', but also 
indicates that the life-giving prerogative is not exercised independently of the Father. 
There are not two wills for salvation. 
Secondly, authority is given regarding the other great divine prerogative, 
judgement: see 5: 27, which again uses Eýoußia terminology. The Son indeed has 
divine authority but as a gift. 69 Thirdly, John employs language of universal giving: 
`everything' or `each thing' is given to the Son. 70 This universalising suggests the 
Son's universal sovereignty over the cosmos (compare, too, 17: 2). 
Sovereignty also appears, fourthly, in the insistent depiction of Jesus as king, 
notably in the Trial. Jesus characterises his kingdom as `not of this world' (18: 36), 
68 Carson 1991: 257. 
69 Compare Culpepper 1998: 152 who comments that Jesus' authority comes from the Father. 
70 3: 35,6: 37,13: 3. 
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which refers both to its nature and origin. ' The issue of origin raises once more the 
derivation of Jesus and his claims. 
John also presents the works and words of Jesus as gifts from the Father. This 
occurs in concentrated form in John 17, where Jesus speaks of the work given to him 
to complete (17: 4- compare 5: 36), but also says that the Father gave him words 
(17: 8,14) which he has in turn given to the disciples. As in chapter 6, the Father's 
giving has a twin aspect. He gives to Jesus both people from the world (17: 6) and also 
the words to give to these people (17: 8,14). 
This pattern again integrates the operation of Father and Son patrocentrically, 
since words and works are ultimately referred back to the Father as the giver. Jesus 
consistently stresses, of course, that he does not exceed what the Father desires in 
word or deed. He `completes' or `perfects' the works the Father gives (17: 4) and 
teaches what his Father wishes (7: 17,8: 26). 
There is a final nuance to the giving of words and works to Jesus. On 
occasion (10: 18) the work of laying down his life given can be described by Jesus as 
a command (F-vtioXi ), as can the words that Jesus brings (12: 49). The latter command 
is one the Father `gives'. This element of command integrates Jesus' words and 
works still more closely with the Father's will. 
The prayer of John 17 confirms and explains the pattern found in the Bread of 
Life Discourse that the Father gives believers to the Son (17: 6,9,24). Those whom 
71 Brown 1971 II: 853. 
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the Father gives are `out of the world' (bx rob xöaµov: 17: 6), and are therefore 
objects of the world's hostility (17: 14). The Father's giving of them is glossed in 
terms of him being one to whom they rightfully belong (17: 6 aoi ijaav; 17: 9 ao ° 
£irnv). This presupposes they are his in the first instance. This means the Son's `title' 
to those who are his derives from the Father's prior title. If they are not the Father's to 
give, then prima facie they are not legitimately the Son's either. Carson remarks on 
verse 6 `Thus in a profound sense they belonged to God antecedently to Jesus' 
ministry. ' 72 
8.3.3. The Father's gifts to human believers 
Most obviously the Father gives the Son (3: 16) and the Spirit (14: 16). It is 
worth observing briefly how closely the Spirit's work is tied to Jesus'. Just as Jesus' 
work is integrated with the Father, so too the Spirit's work is integrated into the same 
complex of action towards humans. The Spirit is, of course, another Paraclete, 
suggesting similar, although not identical, work to Jesus'. 73 Crucially the Spirit is the 
Spirit of the Truth (14: 17,15: 26 and 16: 13), but the revelation or truth the Spirit 
brings is profoundly focused on Christ, his words and identity (14: 26,15: 26. See also 
I6: 8ff). Since Christ and his words are themselves patrocentric, it follows that the 
Spirit's work is likewise patrocentric, and is so through the Son. The gift of the Spirit 
further exemplifies the Father's integrated giving. 
More subtly, belief itself is characterised as a gift to the believer (6: 65). Kysar 
understandably stresses that chapter 6 features God's role `in originating the faith 
72 Carson 1991: 558. 
73 Brown 1971 11: 644. 
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response', 74 but this origination is a giving, of the believer to Jesus and also of 
belief 
to the believer. 
The Father can also be said to give himself in that his name, which he gives to 
the Son (17: 11 and 12), is manifested by the Son to believers. `Name' here surely 
includes God's identity as Father of the Son, something that only believers know, 
since only believers accept the Son as Son. Thus Augustine links the manifestation of 
God's name with the manifestation of the Son ('a name that could not be manifested 
without the manifestation of the Son himself ). 75 Given that verses 7-8 explain verse 
6,76 and verse 8 deals with the words the Father has given Jesus, words which 
consistently centre on his own sonship, Augustine's construction seems apt. 77 
Nevertheless this self-giving of the Father in manifesting his identity of Father 
has a slightly different quality from the gift of the Son or Spirit. The initiative for the 
gift lies ultimately in the Father's own will. Certainly the Son's giving of his life can 
be described as self-giving, but it is also a giving initiated in his Father's will. Finally, 
the Father is one who gives answers to prayer (15: 16 and 16: 23). Again this is not 
independent of the Son, for prayer is in the Son's name. 
74 Kysar 1997: 178. 
75 Tractate 106.4. Chrysostom Homily 81 pursues a similar thought. 
76 So Schnackenburg 1980 11: 177. 
77 Carson 1991: 558 includes the identification of Father. Ridderbos 1997: 550 fn 224 speaks of God `as 
he reveals and makes himself known in action'. But in John this making known is principally as Father. 
Brown 1971 11: 756 sees the name as the `I AM' given to Jesus. While not unattractive, this may not 
give full weight to the apparently personal identity hinted at in the repeated references to `your' name. 
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8.3.4. Jesus the Son as Giver 
The Father, of course, is not the only giver in the Gospel. The Son also gives. 
In particular he gives life, as the bread of life and the resurrection, but he also gives 
commands to his people (13: 34), peace (14: 27), revelation (17: 8) and glory (17: 22). 
This fundamentally resembles his Father's giving, but the Son's giving is informed by 
his Father's will. His giving is, grounded in the prior giving of the Father. 
8.4. The Doctrine of God Implied by God as Giver 
The Father as the great giver suggests several important things. First, the 
Father emerges as all-powerful. That he can give all to the Son (e. g. 13: 3) implies he 
rules all. This is clearest when those believers given to the Son are said to be the 
Father's (17: 6 and 9). Notably his gift to the Son includes not only giving life (17: 2), 
but judgement over humanity (5: 22). This suggests the ability to command 
effectively, which the Father must first have himself before he can vest it in the Son. 
The giving of rule presupposes a rule to give. 
Other features support this view of the Father's sovereignty. Thus John 10: 29 
tells us that nothing can seize anything from the Father's hand. Further, the reliability 
of the words the Father gives, either directly to the incarnate Son or in the Scriptures, 
is stressed. John 18: 9 underlines that the Son lost none that the Father gave, 78 and at 
several points John is anxious to emphasise the fulfilment of scriptural words. This is 
especially evident in the crucifixion narrative, 79 exactly when one might otherwise 
78 It may be objected that this relates rather to the keeping of Jesus' word. Yet it should be recalled that 
Jesus says that he speaks what his Father has given him to speak. The word finally derives from the 
Father. 
79 19: 24,28 and 36f. 
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suspect God was not in control. As it is, these instances of fulfilment indicate the 
truth of the claim that power had been `given' to Pilate from on high (19: 11). 
Naturally, biblical presentations of God underline his truthfulness. The ability 
to speak truthfully, or effectively, about the future distinguishes God from false gods. 
Lincoln remarks of Isaiah 40-55 that Yahweh is decisively vindicated by the 
`effective fulfilment of [his] word... '80 God can speak truth because he is sovereign. 
Indirectly, too, the Father's sovereignty emerges from the victory the Gospel 
describes over the devil. Twelftree remarks that Jesus' whole ministry is `a battle with 
Satan'. 8' This battle is decisively won at the Cross, 82 a victory claimed in 12: 31f, and 
vindicated in the resurrection. This victory, however, is of the Father's will, and Jesus 
`fights' with what the Father gives him. 
Secondly, the Father emerges as generous. Giving involves no contractual 
quid pro quo and so suggests a certain spontaneity and graciousness in the giver. The 
Father as generous giver needs qualification, though. This appears to be his eternal 
characteristic rather than one which is confined to salvation-history and therefore 
contingent or secondary. For giving life to the Son to have `in himself (5: 26) is an 
eternal giving. Furthermore, the Father's generosity is emphasised by the scale of his 
giving. He gives in various ways, for example, cosmic rule to his Son, and life to 
those who need it through the giving of his Son's human life. He gives to various 
groups, his Son and those whom he draws out of the world. This is related, of course, 
to the way love is entwined in the Father's giving (3: 16 and 3: 35). 
so Lincoln 2000: 40. 
81 Twelftree 2001: 141. 
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This is especially evident in his giving of the Son, which is the giving of life. 
This rests on no prior merit in the donees, but rather on their need as those who 
otherwise walk in the darkness of death. There, loving generosity is gracious and 
unconditional. 
These characteristics of sovereignty and generosity eminently cohere with 
characteristics evident in the OT. 83 There Yahweh also emerges as a giver. He is a 
giver of life (e. g. Ezra 9: 9, Psalm 21: 4,80: 18,119: 40,107,154,156), notably of 
offspring (e. g. Genesis 17: 16), of judgement (e. g. Psalm 78: 50,118: 18), of wisdom 
and revelation (e. g. 1 Kings 4: 29, Daniel 2: 23), of his Spirit (e. g. Nehemiah 9: 20, 
Ezekiel 11: 19,36: 26), and of inheritance (e. g. Genesis 24: 7). Further, critically, God 
gives sovereignty and authority, both in secular rule (e. g. Daniel 4: 17,27 and 31) and 
eternally (Daniel 7: 14). God's king is also a gift (Isaiah 9: 6). Such widespread 
patterns are rightly traced back to God as `the only true owner of all creation' who 
therefore has sovereign rights of disposal. 84 These categories overlap substantially 
with giving in John and assume a similar ability to give. 
However, sovereignty and generosity characterise the Son as well as the 
Father. Here Thompson's observation that usurping divine prerogatives invites 
censure for blasphemy is very pertinent indeed. 85 It now falls to consider how 
blasphemy is avoided in the Gospel. 
82 So G. Burge 1987: 73f. He argues that the focal point of the battle is Satan's denial of Jesus' identity. 
8 See also Lincoln 2000: 185 to the effect that the Gospel presupposes the world of Jewish scripture. 
84 C. Labuschagne 1997: 788ff. 
85 Thompson 2001: 43. 
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8.5. Joint Operation 
It is here expedient to renew consideration of joint operation. 
8.5.1. Joint Words and Works 
The words and works of Jesus are presented as things given him by the Father. 
Jesus' works do not merely resemble the Father's in scale, nor are his words simply 
genuine revelation. They are also works and words that the Father has commissioned 
or given the Son to do. 
Thus, Jesus' acts of wonder can be associated with the Father as well as Jesus. 
The healing of the man born blind illustrates this. Answering the question (9: 2) 
whether the man or his parents had sinned that he should be born blind, Jesus instead 
says (9: 3) that it was that God's works might be manifested in him. This introduces 
the subsequent action not as an independent work of Jesus, but as a work of God. 
Jesus' further comment (9: 4) strengthens this, namely that 'we' 86 must do the works 
of the one who sent Jesus. God's identification with the action is emphasised again 
when the healed man states (9: 31) that God hears one who reverences him and does 
his will. The idea of doing God's will is present in both 9: 4 and 9: 31. 
The raising of Lazarus similarly associates the Father with the work. In 11: 4 
Jesus states that Lazarus' illness is for God's glory and also for the glory of the Son, 
in fact hinting that the glory of each is in the glorification of the other. Jesus returns to 
God's glory in 11: 40 and this imbues Lazarus' subsequent resurrection with the sense 
86 The plural is most obviously taken as Jesus associating the disciples in his work (see e. g. Brown 
1971 1: 372, Carson 1991: 362, Ridderbos 1997: 333f. 
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that it is God's glory. This is re-inforced by 11: 41 f in which Jesus addresses the 
Father and states that the Father has heard him. The summoning of Lazarus from the 
tomb (11: 43) then is partly depicted as the Father answering prayer. Brown captures 
this well: 
Because his prayer is heard, they will see a miraculous work which is the work 
of the Father. Through the exercise of the power of Jesus which is the power of 
the Father, they will come to know the Father and thus receive life themselves. 
87 
Carson, amongst others, rightly relates Lazarus' coming forth to the claims of 
5: 25 and the Son's summoning of the dead. 88 In this sense the raising of Lazarus 
conforms to the pattern outlined in 5: 19ff of power given by the Father. 
More generally, the great works of divine prerogative, giving life and 
exercising judgement, are portrayed essentially as works of both Father and Son. 
Thus, the Son gives life, and this life is ultimately traceable to the Father, who fully 
intends it be given by the Son to believers (see chapter 6). Augustine's description is 
apt: this is an inseparable operation. 89 As for judgement, this is given wholly to the 
Son (5: 22), but its genuineness rests on Jesus' identification with the Father (8: 16). 
There is apparently one judgement, by the Son at the delegation of the Father and 
according to his will. Therefore, the divine prerogatives are exercised as a unity. 
Similarly with the words that Jesus brings. These are not simply accurate 
remarks of one who knows about the Father, although Jesus does possess such 
otherwise hidden knowledge (1: 18,3: 13,6: 46). Rather the Father has given Jesus 
words to say so that Jesus' words are also the Father's words (7: 16,8: 26 and 28, 
17: 8). This means that belief or disbelief in the Son is also an index of belief about 
87 Brown 1971 1: 436. 
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the Father: the one who accepts the testimony of the Son has `sealed' that God 
himself is truthful (6A, 90 %) (3: 33). 
8.5.2. Joint Operation and Indwelling 
However, joint operation in John is not merely a case of two independent 
individuals co-operating, but reflects relations between the Father and Son, in 
particular their mutual indwelling. This emerges in two passages. First in 10: 37-39, 
part, of course, of the sequence in which the unity claim of 10: 30 occurs. The Jews 
demand to know if Jesus is the Christ (10: 24). Jesus responds (10: 25) that testimony 
already exists in the works he has done in his Father's name. The problem is that the 
audience do not believe. Thus, from the start of the unit, works have been introduced, 
and specifically in relation to the Father. The focus on works resumes in 10: 32, as 
Jesus responds to preparations to stone him. Jesus again characterises the works in 
relation to the Father, here as works `from' (Ex) the Father. They are also described as 
good. The crowd reply (10: 33) that they are not trying to stone him for any good 
work he has done, but because he has blasphemed, and `made' himself God's Son. 
This reply merits attention. First, it presupposes some difference between 
Jesus' works and words. They are here responding to what Jesus has just said in 
10: 30, not to what he has done. Their repetition of the adjective `good' may even 
tacitly concede that he has done good works, which would imply that while the works 
may have been good, the words were not. Even if there is no such tacit concession, it 
remains that they focus on his words rather than his works. Secondly, however, `the 
88 Carson 1991: 418. 
89 Not just between Father and Son, of course. The Spirit too is portrayed as life-giving. 
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Jews' fasten only on part of Jesus' description of his works. He twice relates those 
works in this section to his Father (10: 25 and 10: 32). They are paternal works. This 
characterisation aligns the works with the words expressing the paternal claim, and 
does not separate them, as `the Jews' have done. 
In 10: 34-36, after citing a Scriptural example of calling created beings `god', 
Jesus returns to the objections to his words: they say he has spoken blasphemy. He 
answers this in the climactic verses to this section, 90 10: 37-38, and turns once more to 
the works. These are again depicted as the Father's. This is sharply juxtaposed to the 
claim in words to be God's Son (10: 36). Jesus indicates that the works and words 
have the same character. The words state that Jesus is the Son. The works are those of 
Jesus' Father. Both have the Father-Son relationship in view. 91 Believing the works, 
then, means (10: 38) believing and knowing something about the Father-Son 
relationship, namely that it features the mutual indwelling of Father and Son. The 
works reveal the mutual indwelling of Father and Son. 
This pattern of words and works recurs in 14: 8-11. Philip asks to be shown the 
Father (14: 8), adopting Jesus' terminology of `Father'. Philip may have accepted 
there is a Father, but his request for revelation of that Father stands at odds with 
Jesus' final remark of 14: 7 `you have seen him', 92 and shows that Philip has not fully 
accepted Jesus' words. 
90 They are climactic because they are the final contribution to debate. The scene changes in 10: 40, 
after a renewed desire once to stone Jesus (10: 39a), which he evades (10: 39b). 
91 Similarly Culpepper 1998: 94 concludes that the words and signs alike point to the Father: this can 
only be through the Father-Son relation. 
92 As Ridderbos 1997: 494 notes. 
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Jesus' response (14: 9) indicates that Philip's request was unnecessary and 
lacked full knowledge of Jesus. The shortcomings in Philip's belief are then specified 
(14: 10a): he should believe that Father and Son indwell each other. This implies that 
if he grasps this mutual indwelling he will realise that he has seen the Father. Mutual 
indwelling of Father and Son, then, indicates that the believer has seen the Father in 
the Incarnation. Ridderbos rightly speaks of the indwelling formula as implying 
reciprocal 'immanence '. 93 In Augustinian terminology, the Father and Son are never 
without each other, including in the economy. 
It is, then, natural for Jesus to explain this reciprocal immanence in terms of 
the words and works of the Incarnation. His words (14: 1Ob) are not simply from 
himself, but, as earlier discussion indicated, are given by the Father. In 14: 1Oc Jesus 
returns to the works. Now, and very strikingly, he says that the Father does his works 
while abiding in Jesus. In 14: 11 reciprocal indwelling is once again related to 
believing in the works. The works reveal mutual indwelling. 
The statement of 14: 1Oc is, perhaps, a high water mark for joint operation in 
John. The works here are `his', that is, the Father's, and the operator is now directly 
said to be the Father: he is the subject of noi, 6. These things are so, because he abides 
in the Son. 
This has several important consequences. First, 14: 1Oc closely associates the 
Father-Son relationship with economic operation. This provides textual support for 
Augustine's proposition that inseparable relation entails inseparable operation. 
93 Ridderbos 1997: 495. 
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Secondly, the incarnate Son does not merely bring information about a penchoretic 
relation outside space and time. Rather mutual indwelling is also realised through the 
works of the Son which are also the works of the Father indwelling him. 94 Thirdly, 
Jesus' consistent position that treatment of him constitutes treatment of the Father is 
all the more intelligible. 95 Fourthly, perichoretic indwelling renders impossible 
notions that the Son is a second power usurping the Father's place. 96 This brings us to 
the Father's monarchy. 
8.6. The Monarchy of the Father 
Jesus claims the divine prerogatives of giving life and exercising judgement. 
This could readily resemble a polytheistic (and therefore blasphemous) framework of 
multiple divine rulers. Yet, the giving motif forbids this interpretation. The Father has 
given all authority to the Son and the Son consistently acknowledges this. His claim 
to authority rests precisely on deriving title from his Father. Furthermore, he 
acknowledges that his life-in-himself, too, is given by the Father. 
It has been stressed that the Father acts through the Son and the Son's 
authority over the cosmos is derived. Without that derivation, and to that extent 
subordination, of the Son's authority to the Father, several features in the presentation 
of Father and Son become attenuated. If the Son's authority in the cosmos is 
underived, then the Son appears to reign independently in a cosmic dyarchy, and 
God's monarchy disappears. Prima facie, this is polytheistic. Moreover, the 
Incarnation as grounding divine revelation becomes highly problematic. For the 
principle to which the Son himself appeals as the basis for his cosmic authority has 
94 Compare Appold 1976: 102. 
95 It is striking that hatred of him is hatred of God (15: 23 and 25). 
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been rejected. This seems odd. If the Son reveals at all that he holds a cosmic 
monarchy then it seems perverse to reject the basis on which he legitimates it. 
Oddities are equally apparent for the Father if the Son's derived authority is 
rejected. If the Son reigns independently of the Father, how does the Father exercise 
his own cosmic monarchy? Nor are effects confined to the Father as monarch. For he 
shows his love by giving all authority to the Son (3: 35). If no such gift has been 
made, the Father's love is correspondingly less apparent. This risks obscuring the 
character of the Father's love towards the Son. Moreover, this issue of dyarchy has 
soteriological implications. Granted that the Son has a non-derived authority, does 
this extend to offering a salvation effective against the Father? 97 The johannine thrust 
of inseparable operation means that the salvation achieved by Jesus is also the 
salvation given by the Father. But the denial of derivation apparently excludes such 
an inseparable operation. 
As it is, the Father's giving means the relation between Father and Son is 
typical of ideal father-son relations. Ideally, the Father provides life and inheritance 
for his son. 98 Typically also the father-son relation is not one of mutual submission or 
equality of authority: the ideal ethical pattern is for the son to obey the father. 99 John 
minors this, since the Son insists his words and works are the performance of his 
Father's will. '00 Jesus simply does not explain his words and works in terms of 
agreement with the Father, but as implementing his Father's will. 
96 Compare the useful account of what constitutes blasphemous affront to God in Thompson 2001: 43. 
97 Compare the soteriological questions of Marcion's two gods. 
98 So Thompson 2001: 58 on OT patterns of fatherhood. 
99 Thompson 2001: 62 '... [T]his is not a democratic relationship of peers. ' 
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Several observations can be made. First, taking the references to will as 
referring to the single will of the Trinity sits uncomfortably with those texts featuring 
personal distinction, either with the distinguishing term `Father' (6: 38 as glossed by 
6: 40), or by referring to the Father's distinct activity as sender (4: 34,5: 30). Secondly, 
taking the references to the Son's performance of the Father's will as relevant for the 
Incarnation only is likewise inadequate. The words and works done at the Father's 
will instantiate the perichoretic indwelling of Father and Son (10: 37f, 14: 10c). If that 
perichoretic indwelling were different from what the Incarnation manifests, the 
Incarnation would not itself demonstrate the Father indwells the Son: Philip would 
not have seen the Father. The price, therefore, for asserting that the obedience is only 
for the Incarnation is the denial that it reveals the divine relations as Jesus claims it 
does. It severs the economic from the immanent Trinity. 
Such a severance would be problematic anyway. There must be some 
rationale for asserting that the Incarnational obedience of the Son does not reflect the 
immanent relations. But what is it? If there is such a rationale, clearly the 
presupposition is that we have decisive information about the immanent Trinity by 
which we can weigh what the Incarnation reveals. Not only does John speak directly 
against such a presupposition (1: 18,3: 13,6: 46), but this renders the Incarnation 
superfluous as revelation. Thirdly, to deny the obedience of the Son risks instating the 
Son's actions as in principle independent. This approaches an `Olympian' model of 
divine operation, in which independent deities have distinct spheres of operation. 101 
1°0 4: 34,5: 30 and 6: 38. 
101 Leftow 1999: 237. 
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Not all, however, would characterise the Son's performance of his Father's 
will as obedience. 102 Thus Thompson observes that the word `obey' is never actually 
used. However, she resorts to such terms when she comments: 
The Son's obedience to the Father does not establish their unity, nor is it an 
obedience construed in terms of submission to an alien command. 
103 
Moreover, terms normally translated as `obey' are not used in John of human 
relations to either Son or Father. Yet what is decisive is not the presence of the term 
but the concept, and the concept of obedience is found in human relations with the 
Son. The Son gives commandments (13: 34), but this is just what the Father does to 
the Son (12: 49). 
Moving to Thompson's observation that obedience does not constitute the 
divine unity, it is true that the one-ness of John 10: 30 is not something once absent 
but then actualised by the Son's obedience. However, the pattern of inseparable 
operation suggests that the unity evidenced by the mutual indwelling of Father and 
Son is one where the Son conforms to the Father's will. 
Nor is this happily conceived as obedience to an alien command. In the 
johannine context, while the Father's will appears distinctly from the Son, the 
inseparable indwelling of Father and Son means that the Son does not obey an 
external and independent Person. The Father is what he is in relation to the Son. 
Athanasius distinguished the Father-Son relation from one of externality on just this 
basis. Thus the relation of Father and Son reflects the biblical ideal not just in paternal 




Longenecker 1994: 486 sees obedience as central to sonship throughout the 
Gospel accounts. M. De Jonge 1977: 133 makes the point that the Son obeys in the works in John. 
103 Thompson 2001: 95. 
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provision for the Son, but also in paternal authority over the Son and his filial 
obedience. This fits the Gospel's more general handling of what sonship implies, 104 
8.7. Mutuality and Asymmetry in the Father/Son relation 
John strongly portrays a mutual relationship between Father and Son. 
Mutuality appears in two notable ways, the desire of each to glorify the other and 
reciprocal love. 
Jesus characterises himself as seeking the glory of his sender (7: 18; and 
12: 28), and yet also as the one whom his Father seeks to glorify (8: 50,54 and 17: 5). 
Their glory is joined in that, for example, the work of Lazarus' raising glorifies them 
both (11: 4) and their glory is mutually dependent in that the Son glorifies the Father 
that the Father may glorify him (17: 1). Similarly, the Father wills that the Son be 
honoured, such that to dishonour the Son dishonours the Father (5: 23). 
In fact the glory of both is intimately related to Jesus' `hour' as he undergoes 
the Cross. Thus the Father's glory is associated by Jesus in 12: 28f with his hour of the 
Cross, but Jesus' hour is also associated with his own glory (17: 1). This is intelligible 
on the basis that, just as their operation is joint and single, so too is their glory. 
Another important area of mutuality is love. The Father loves the Son (3: 35) 
and the Son loves the Father (14: 3 1). Yet, although mutual, the love is asymmetrical 
in that the Father's love for the Son is joined to his giving to the Son, notably the gift 
of `all things' (3: 35). The Son's love for the Father is shown in doing what the Father 
104 See Appendix 10 on true and false sonship in John. 
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commands (14: 31). This is to be expected generally in father-son relations: fathers 
and sons show love, but in asymmetrical ways, and specifically filial love is 
manifested by obedience to one's father. 
This has an important consequence. To overlook this giving in the Father's 
love actually distorts the relation the Father has. It is tantamount to saying he is not 
properly Father. Sovereign giving is just how the Father is characterised. Similarly, to 
overlook the obedient nature of the Son's love distorts the filial relation the Son has. 
It implies that he is not properly Son. 
8.8. Conclusion 
John's Gospel provides an ultimately patrocentric account of God that is 
christologically focused. The Father emerges vitally as giver, giving to the Son and 
giving the Son, and giving the Spirit too. In this giving he is implicitly sovereign (it is 
all his to give and the giving is for his purposes), and explicitly loving. 
This giving implies patrocentricity because one is led to look to the source 
from which the Son derives what he is and has. It does not imply the Son's 
ontological inferiority since he has life in himself as the Father does, and has the same 
divine prerogatives of giving life and exercising judgement as the Father. 
This patrocentricity also deflects polytheistic interpretations, for the Son's 
activity is consistently related to the Father as work which the Father wills for the Son 
and which he does with him. This inseparable operation reflects an inseparable, 
mutual, indwelling. This patrocentricity can be described in terms of derivation. 
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Obviously the EK language supports this. However, it can, and should, be 
supplemented by the equally johannine stress on the other side of the coin, the giving 
of the Father. One reason why this is desirable is that giving stresses the personal 
element in relation. Derivation alone does not necessarily do this. 
The trinitarian picture this creates is of distinct Persons who mutually indwell 
each other and act both distinguishably and as a unity. Their relations are 
characterised by mutual glorification and love, yet the love is asymmetrically 
expressed, by the Father's giving and the Son's obedient receiving - for he receives 
and exercises his cosmic monarchy as the Father wills. In this the Father conforms to 
the ideal of fatherhood, and the Son to true sonship. 
Believers are given a part in this trinitarian pattern of giving. Eternally the 
Father gives life-in-himself to the Son and gives further to the Son by granting him 
authority, including the authority to give life, which the Son does to those the Father 
gives him. Believers are then, appropriately for adopted children, recipients of the 
Father's giving, but are also objects the Father gives in his eternally giving 
relationship with his Son. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
9.1. The Contribution of the Fathers in the Light of the Initial Questions 
The survey undertaken has, of course, substantial limits simply because so few 
patristic theologians have been examined. It should also be said that even the Fathers 
examined here are not completely unanimous - an outstanding example is the 
insistence by Tertullian and others that Old Testament theophanies are manifestations 
of the Son as against Augustine's critique of this position. Equally, the survey here 
discloses that these theologians are not always internally consistent. Tertullian's 
conception of sonship as a relation that begins in time is open to substantial criticism, 
even though his system has the resources elsewhere to solve this difficulty 
(Proposals3(g) and (h)). Likewise Origen provides several accounts of Personal 
distinction (Proposal 4(b)), two of which (that the Father alone is autotheos and the 
analogies of how two may be one) create real difficulties: proposals 4(c)-(d) and (h)- 
(i). Problems arise with Augustine, too, where some of his responses to 
Homoian/Arian objections detract from his fundamental principles of inseparable yet 
distinct operation and personal relation (Proposal 7(h)). 
Nevertheless, certain features recur amongst these theologians. First, there is a 
consistent emphasis on the importance of revelation and of revelation in the 
Incarnation in particular (Proposals 3(f), 4(e), 5(e), 6(d) and 7(j)). This inevitably 
tends to tie the immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity, in that human beings only 
know the immanent Trinity through the economy. For Tertullian and Athanasius this 
is particularly closely tied to the idea that God is truthful. 
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Secondly, trinitarian considerations are consistently related to other theological 
loci. Strikingly, there is little evidence of a division between the areas of classical 
theism (what one might call the topics of de deo uno) and trinitarian thought (de deo 
trino). Instead the areas are set in conjunction. Tertullian's account is of a cosmic 
monarchy in which the triune God alone is uncreated (Proposal 3(a)). Origen is highly 
concerned to relate trinitarian considerations to simplicity, eternity and incorporeality 
(Proposals 4(c) and (e)). Athanasius analyses trinitarian questions in the light of 
unchangeable and uncompounded simplicity on God's part, values closely related to 
his uncreatedness (Proposal 5(a)). For Hilary, trinitarian theology turns on the 
character and nature of the Father from whom the Son is begotten, and Hilary presents 
him as a fully self-authoring being, again a view tied closely to his uncreatedness 
(Proposals 6(b) and (e)). Augustine, likewise, constantly works through his account of 
substantial and relational predications about God from the point of view of the 
simplicity and unchangeableness of the uncreated creator (Proposal 7(k)). In this way, 
all five writers draw on the tradition of biblical monotheism in which God is 
presented as the incomparable one who is uncreated creator of all (cp. Proposal 2(b)). 
Thirdly, these theologians stress (admittedly to varying extents) the 
significance of trinitarian theology, notably in respect of revelation and salvation 
(Proposals 3(j), 4(e), 5(g), 6(c), 7(1)). By relating revelation in the economy so closely 
to basic trinitarian questions, these theologians advocate approaches similar to those 
evident in Rahner's dictum. 
Fourthly. a nexus of topics is consistently present, albeit articulated with some 
different emphases. This nexus could be put in terms of filial derivation, inseparable 
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persons and inseparable operation. It is striking that with regard to this nexus 
Augustine emerges more as one who develops earlier Nicene theology rather than as 
one who displaces it (Proposal 7(m)). To the elements of this nexus we now turn. 
9.1.1. Filial Derivation 
A pattern of filial derivation is consistently found in that each stresses that the 
Son derives all he is and has from the Father (Proposals 3(c), 4(e), 5(c), 6(g) and 7(i)). 
For Tertullian this is especially evident in explicit terms of `monarchy' fully delegated 
by the Father to the Son, although Tertullian, like his successors, also envisaged the 
Son as deriving by generation from the Father. In this way a derivation pattern is used 
to account both for the eternal relations, and also for the Son's role in the economy of 
the created cosmos as monarch. 
The derivation pattern ensures several things. 
1. It rebuts the thesis of a `solitary God', for derivation necessarily involves 
plurality (Proposals 3(c), 4(g), 5(b), 6(h) and 7(b)). 
2. It rebuts the charge of polytheism in two ways. After all, the Son is not 
external to the Father (a key reflection in Athanasius and Hilary: proposals 
5(c) and 6(i)), for the Father himself is indivisible. Derivation therefore 
militates against a division between the two that would constitute ditheism. 
Moreover, the derivation is a filial derivation, a relation of sonship. As 
Son, the Son is of the same nature as his Father (Proposals 3(c), 5(b), 6(f) 
and 7(c)). 1 Derivation therefore grounds an ontological equality. 
' Origen's treatment of the Son as image suggest this too (Proposals 4(e)-(g), but this is complicated by 
other competing accounts of personal distinction in his theology (Proposals 4(b) and (j)). 
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3. As filial derivation, there is an individuated personal distinction between 
Father and Son. The two Persons are individuated because their relation is 
asymmetrical. There are not two Fathers, nor two Sons. 
4. This means that the pattern of filial derivation tends to create a patrocentric 
thrust. This is inevitable: since the Son takes all he is from the Father, 
attention is drawn back to the Father. 
However, at first blush it could seem as though derivation stands at odds with 
perichoretic ideas. Rather, though, derivation starts to provide the foundation for an 
account of perichoresis or circumincession. This is especially clear in the case of 
Hilary, for whom the `of language (associated with derivation) grounds the `in' 
language (associated with perichoresis): proposal 6(g). Perichoresis arises from what 
the Son derives from the Father and is to that extent contoured by that derivation. The 
in-dwelling is not simply of two eternal persons who are interchangeable. That would 
be an in-dwelling equivalent to two Fathers mutually in-dwelling, or two Sons 
mutually in-dwelling. Rather it is an indwelling of the Son by the Father from whom 
he derives, and vice versa. While the in-dwelling is genuinely reciprocal, it is 
reciprocal between persons in an asymmetric relationship. Thus the derivation pattern 
provides for an integration of perichoresis with the asymmetric pattern of Father-Son. 
Perichoresis does not negate the relational asymmetry. 
In this way the pattern of filial derivation provides the grounds finally for a 
filial obedience or reverence on the part of the Son towards the Father (Proposals 3(i), 
4(0 2 5(b) and (d), 6(k) and 7(i)). The filial nature of the relationship means that 
2 The presence of several other accounts of distinction in Origen would not necessarily affect this point. 
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obedience does not denote inequality of nature (Augustine is explicitly faced with this 
idea and denies it), but rather is a necessary concomitant of filiality (Hilary is 
especially clear on this). The implication of this is that an account of the Father-Son 
which did not include the Son's obedience would for these theologians have been a 
defective Sonship. Naturally, the obedience aspect of the Son's relation underlines the 
patrocenticity of the derivation pattern. It is clear at this point that that part of the 
original charge suggesting that ethical subordination of the Son to the Father was a 
modern innovation is unfounded. 
9.1.2. Inseparability of Persons 
Also associated with derivation and perichoresis is the notion of inseparability 
of Persons. All five theologians stress inseparability at the personal level, in particular 
because there can be no Father unless there is a Son (Proposals 3(d), 4(g), 5(d), 6(i) 
and (1) and 7(b)). It should be stressed that the asymmetricality of a derived 
relationship helps preserve individuated distinctions between the Persons, while the 
divine nature in which derivation takes place ensures that derivation does not amount 
to division. In this way, as noted above, derivation helps to resist inclinations to 
polytheism. 
9.1.3. Inseparable Operation 
Polytheism is a problem not just at the level of immanent Persons, however. It 
can also arise through the pattern of operation in the economy. It is noticeable that at 
some level all five writers endorse a unity or inseparability of operations (Proposals 
3(d), 4(f), 5(d), 6(l) and 7(d)). This is especially important, of course, in the field of 
creational activity. Since divine sovereignty is so closely associated with creating, an 
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account of the Trinity in which only one of the three Persons created would tend to 
undercut the idea that there was one majesty. Instead the pattern could readily assume 
Marcionite proportions. Inseparable operation, therefore, goes hand in hand with the 
stand against polytheism. Conversely, accounts of divine operation which allocate 
particular spheres of action or history to one or other of the Trinitarian Persons (e. g. 
creation to the Father, salvation to the Son or post-Ascension history uniquely to the 
Spirit) start to appear from this viewpoint as incipiently polytheist. 
It is discernible that accounting for inseparable operation becomes 
increasingly important, culminating in Augustine's recurrent descriptions. 
Augustine's fundamental trinitarian framework is of two pairs of ideas: inseparability 
and distinction on the one hand, and temporal action and eternal relation on the other. 
This framework is insufficiently observed. This is unfortunate since it reveals that 
Augustine is indeed developing earlier thought (Proposal 7(m)). The theological value 
of Augustine's account of inseparable operation is that it ensures that perichoretic 
inseparability at the personal level is indeed fully revealed in the Incarnation. Thus, it 
does not deny but follows through the thinking in Rahner's dictum. The theological 
problem linked with inseparable operation is that, arguably, it obscures the 
distinctions between the Persons, rendering the Trinity of speculative interest only. 
Again, though, consideration of the Son as deriving from the Father begins to 
offset this. The Son characterises his work as derived from the Father in the sense that 
it is work the Father has given him to do and which he does in filial obedience. All 
five theologians may present an inseparable operation but it is one in which the 
participation by each Person is asymmetrical, reflecting their eternal relations. If the 
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operation of the Son, for example, was simply independent, or did not embody the 
contours of his filiality, then the link between the economic and the immanent risks 
attenuation. 
Accordingly, the views outlined in the introduction: 
1. that a relation of ethical submission in the Father-Son relationship is 
polytheistic (Bilezikian); 
2. that inseparable operation in the economy is detrimental to a full-orbed 
doctrine of distinct trinitarian Persons (Moltmann); and 
3. that Augustine represents a departure in some sense from authentic 
Nicene and post-Nicene thought, 
are alike shown to be misconceived. The nexus surrounding filial derivation, in which 
inseparable Persons operate inseparably in a perichoretic but asymmetrical 
relationship, has the resources to provide an account preserving biblical notions of 
divine unicity and personal distinction. In this picture, Augustine's stress on 
inseparable operation is a developed articulation which resists polytheistic tendencies 
and which preserves the distinction of the Father's principium. Here, at any rate, he 
stands in continuity with his predecessors. However, this inevitably raises the 
question whether that account is as consonant with the biblical data as the Fathers 
would have wished. 
9.2. The Contribution of the Fathers in the Light of the Johannine Material 
Obviously these five Fathers are strongly indebted to the Gospel of John, and 
the stress of Hilary and Augustine in particular on John chapter 5 is justifiable in view 
of its structural importance. Further, they produce accounts of derivation closely 
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corresponding to the johannine language of origin and sending, a motif similarly 
identified as important by modern scholarship. To that extent they capture a crucial 
component of the Gospel. For the sending motif tends to create the same patrocentric 
emphasis as is present in their synthesis. 
This is re-inforced by the account of joint operation in the Gospel. Ultimately 
the works and words of Jesus are also works and words of the Father. Their joint 
operation reflects and reveals the Father's indwelling of the Son (see especially John 
14: 10: proposal 8(h)). In this way the economic and the immanent are linked and the 
patristic stress on joint operation, finally fully expressed by Augustine, again captures 
a johannine note. However, this joint operation of Father and Son is one in which the 
Father enjoys a certain primacy - the Son does the Father's will (Proposal 8(g)). The 
operation may be joint, but participation is asymmetrical. Again, though, this 
asymmetrical participation is present in these patristic accounts. In this respect the 
patristic account is far closer to the Gospel's understanding of the Father's relation to 
the Son than Moltmann's account of `abba' involving intimacy but not authority. 
Nevertheless, in John the asymmetrical participation in joint operation is 
signalled by the terms of giving: the Father gives works and words to the Son. This 
takes us to the question of giving in John. For, it is strongly arguable that the 
johannine language of giving by the Father is under-represented in these theologians. 
Such terms are certainly present, but are not used to the extent that they are in the 
Gospel, and indeed, in the case of Augustine, they are used in areas which serve to 
limit the full extent of the Father's giving as presented in John. 
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For johannine giving covers both economic and immanent areas (Proposal 
8(c)) and re-inforces the relation between economic and immanent. The Father 
behaves towards his Son in the economy as he does in eternity: he gives to him. This 
also underlines the consistency between God's trinitarian life and his relation towards 
his creation: for the Father gives to his creation, too. To that extent the Father is not 
different in eternity from what he is in the economy of creation. This provides a 
material content to Rahner's dictum. 
However, this pattern of giving is again patrocentric (Proposal 8(f)). Notably, 
Jesus traces his life-in-himself and his rule back to the Father's gift. 3 As gifts, one 
looks to the giver. This is completely consistent with the patrocentricity arising from 
the patristic stress on filial derivation. Nevertheless, the johannine giving motif 
nuances our understanding of derivation. First, the patrocentricity is intensified by the 
scale of the Father's giving, notably with salvation itself being traced back to the 
various gifts of the Father, of the Son to believers, of believers to the Son, of belief to 
believers, of the Spirit to believers. The Father's giving is pervasive and ubiquitous. 
Secondly, the patrocentricity receives its character from the stress on giving. 
Obviously, giving tends to underline the personal rather than impersonal relation of 
the Father towards the Son. Since the Father gives life to the Son, the impersonal 
quality that could lurk simply in the terms of derivation or origin is negated. The 
traditional images of light and radiance or spring and stream likewise do not 
necessarily involve the personal quality that gift does. More than this, giving suggests 
Compare K. Tanner 2001: 39 who likewise stresses the giving by the Father to the Son and Spirit. She 
cites Hilary of Poitiers DeT. VI. 27. rather than John in support. She also points to inseparable operation 
(Tanner 
-1001: 
40). However, the Father's specific characterisation as sovereign and generous giver 
remains relatively undeveloped. 
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a loving generosity on the part of the giver, as well as, especially in terms of the gift 
of authority, a certain primacy. 
To this extent, giving characterises the giver as personal, lovingly generous 
and primary (Proposal 8(e): contrary to the disjunction between love and primacy 
implicit in Moltmann's account). Both love and primacy are underscored by the scale 
of the Father's giving in John: all traces back to the Father's giving, so that the scale 
characterises the Father as lavishly generous. By the same token, that he has all this to 
give characterises him as having extensive rights of possession: he is lord of much to 
give so much. Again, this primacy involved in giving re-inforces the patrocentricity in 
the Father-Son relationship. 
It requires some emphasis that this giving Father does not exercise authority in 
some vicious sense, an authoritarian authority. The primacy the Father has as giver is 
strongly associated by the Gospel with his love and generosity. It is difficult, though, 
to see how the characterisation of loving generosity can remain unaltered if the 
primacy is denied. 
It was observed that the giving motif with respect to the Father is 
comparatively under-represented in these theologians. This requires further comment. 
First, the stress on giving is not at all inconsistent with the presentation of filial 
derivation and what goes with that. Instead, it further supports it. Secondly, one 
plausible reason for the under-representation of giving language is the polemical 
setting of Athanasius and Hilary in particular, where giving had been used by Arian 
advocates to suggest ontological inferiority. Thirdly, the notions of the Father's 
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conjoined love and authority towards his Son are present. The question is one of 
degree. In this respect it is noteworthy that the theologian who most strongly stresses 
the loving character of trinitarian relations, Augustine, is the one who has the 
strongest account of gift in his trinitarian theology (admittedly over-focussed on the 
Spirit). Accordingly, the patristic emphasis on patrocentricity is borne out by the 
Gospel, but requires development in terms of the patrocentricity implied by the giving 
Father, with its fuller implications of a generous, gracious primacy. 
9.3. Considerations Arising from the Giving Father 
First, the pattern of the comprehensively giving Father who operates 
inseparably with his Son and Spirit stresses that the Father is properly called saviour. 
Salvation is not simply an achievement of Son, or Spirit, or both, which the Father 
passively accepts. 
Secondly, on this pattern, the risk of egalitarian presentations of the Father- 
Son relation is an attenuation of the character of the Father. By denying the 
subordination of the Son relationally, the risk is that the kind of giving depicted by 
John (and the kind of filial derivation endorsed by these patristic theologians) distorts. 
The non-primary Father has, so to speak, less to give in the egalitarian version than 
the Son in the Incarnation claims to have received. To this extent, an egalitarian 
version could even risk, not so much a deus absconditus, but a pater absconditus. For 
the Son need receive nothing from him. 
Thirdly, the risk of a pater absconditus is a filius absconditus. This is 
particularly evident with Jesus' claim to lordship. In the johannine account, Jesus 
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finally rests his claim to lordship on the giving of the Father. That giving, as we have 
seen, suggests a primacy for the Father. If, however, one denies the primacy of the 
Father, how, then, can the Father give all authority to his Son? The problem at this 
point, then, is how the reign of the Son can be legitimated on grounds other than the 
ones to which the Son himself appeals. In this respect, the final casualty of an 
egalitarian trinity immanently is the kingship of the Son economically. In this sense, 
Smail's original contention is indeed substantiated: the place of the Father will 
determine the nature of the gospel Christians proclaim. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY AND 
MONOTHEISM 
I. I. Plato's Inheritance 
Several schools of thought constitute Plato's philosophical inheritance. As 
well as Pythagorean influence, two schools are of particular interest here. 
First, there is the influence of the Ionian physicists and their quest for an 
underlying unitary explanation of the cosmos. Frede comments that the nature of their 
enterprise was such that one would be led to look not merely for ultimate material but 
the ultimate agent to form it. ' This point seems well-made given the Ephesian 
Heraclitus' description of the cosmic process. The process itself can be depicted as 
fire, but this is a unitary process: 
It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things 
are one. 2 
This One can be identified with God, 3 and, as Reason (Logos), it orders the process. 
In this respect Copleston's verdict that Heraclitus is `pantheistic' seems justified. 4 
However, in terms of the categories of monotheism outlined above in chapter 
2, such a God is, in a sense, exclusive as regards his being, for apparently nothing 
ultimately exists other than him. However, the impersonal pantheistic nature of this 
One makes the category of worship, seem irrelevant: worship of anything must finally 
1 Frede 1999b: 47. 
2 Frag. 50. 
3Frag 2. 
4 Copleston 1947 1: 38. 
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reduce to worship of the One, although given the impersonal and ineluctable 
operation of the One, worship anyway might be regarded as pointless. 
In respect of the category of relations, Heraclitus' universal Logos may be the 
governor of the cosmos, but as its immanent principle rather than a sovereign ruler 
who is personally distinct. Such a system is readily described as monist, and it is 
certainly arguable that monism ought to be distinguished from monotheism. However, 
to do so too readily here might obscure the fact that Heraclitus is prepared to call his 
One `God'. Clearly terminology is not necessarily decisive, but it remains suggestive. 
Secondly, Plato also, of course, found himself facing the arguments of 
Parmenides and the Eleatics, that change and becoming are illusory and that the Way 
of Truth was rather to acknowledge that there was one unchanging being, the One. 
Thus, like Heraclitus, the finished product is strongly monistic, but is reached by 
stressing Being at the expense of Becoming rather than, as in Heraclitus, Becoming 
rather than Being. Reality in Parmenidean thought was thus not what the senses 
disclosed, and this might be thought to favour a climate sympathetic to religious 
thought about the transcendent. Nevertheless, this might well be offset by the fact 
that, unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides does not appear to describe the One as `God'. 5 
5 In Parmenides' poem Justice explains the ways of Opinion and Truth. There is a strong mythological 
element in the form of Parmenides' explanation. Yet the poem's content leads one away from seeing 
such figures as distinct entities. 
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1.2 Aristotle and the Unmoved Mover 
Aristotle was described in chapter 2 above as having an `unintentional 
teleology'. 6 Metaphysics Book A indicates how this `unintentional teleology' comes 
about: there is, Aristotle claims, an unmoved mover. 
7 The perceived goodness of the 
unmoved mover induces those other entities to move. Hence Aristotle can remark: tiö 
opEK'LÖV Kai. co vogTov KlvEi ob Klvovµ£va. ' As an unmoved mover, God is pure 
actuality, without potentiality, and Aristotle sums up his theological reflections at this 
stage thus: 
We hold, then, that God is a living being [c ov], eternal, most good; and 
therefore life [ýwij] and a continuous eternal existence [aidbv avvcxi15 xai 
at8i. os] belong to God; for that is what God is. 9 
However, Hankinson rightly stresses that this is unintentional teleology, for 
the unmoved mover seems oblivious of the entities striving to resemble him (or it) in 
his perfection: he thinks about himself alone. 10 This is certainly consistent within 
Aristotle's conceptions, for thinking of other entities would be to think of imperfect 
objects, since they are capable of change. Such is the argument in Metaphysics A ix 
1074b26ff. Since there would be the potential to think only of the perfect, the 
perfection, or perfect actuality, of the unmoved would be diminished if it thought of 
an imperfect object. 
Aristotle also himself seems to have wavered over the number of unmoved 
movers. II The crucial sections of Metaphysics A speak of one unmoved mover, but 
6 Hankinson 1995: 128. 
7 Aristotle's reasons for deducing an unmoved mover are, of course, controversial. But that step is not 
the issue here. 
8 MetA ,, If 1072a26f. 9 Met A ,, if 1072b30f. 10 Met A vii 1072b20f. See also 1074b34. If Copleston 1947 1: 315f J. Barnes 1995: 101 ff speaks insistently in the plural: primary substances, 
gods etc. 
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elsewhere more appear. 12 Aristotle does, though, address the number of unmoved 
movers in MetaphysicsA viii 1073a14-1074b39. In this complex and involved passage 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Aristotle is suggesting both a plurality of 
unmoved movers (to account for the number of the heavenly spheres: 1074a18ff) and 
also one supreme unmoved mover (1074a33-38). Postulating a hierarchy has the 
advantage of explaining how the independent movements caused by a plurality of 
unmoved movers may be harmonious, as Copleston observes. ' 3 It is less easy to 
discern what makes the supreme unmoved mover supreme. The answer suggested by 
the text is its complete reality, 14 but this is by no means free from difficulty since one 
might well have thought that any unmoved mover must be pure actuality. 
Nevertheless, given the emphasis on harmonious motion, Frede asserts that Aristotle 
`... does mean to talk about one particular being which governs the world. ' 5 
1.3. Middle Platonism 
J. Dillon cautions both against treating Middle Platonism merely as a 
precursor to Plotinus and against seeing this grouping as merely eclectic. 16 However, 
this does not mean the Middle Platonists spoke with one theological voice, despite a 
common allegiance to the exposition and development of Plato. 17 Several positions 
will be described. 
12 Notably Phl sics 258b11; 259a6ff; 259b28-31. 
13 Copleston 1947 I: 316. 
14 Metaphysics A viii 1074a36f. 
15 Frede 1999b: 46. Plotinus canvasses the idea that Aristotle was undecided Enneads V. 1.9. 
Athenagoras Plea 6 lists Aristotle as a monotheist philosopher. 
16 Dillon 1977: xiiif. 
7 Copleston 1947 I: 451. 
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First, there is Eudorus of Alexandria with a clearly articulated supreme 
principle o ^onEpävw OEoq, or the One, the ultimate source of being. 
' 8 Eudorus, 
though, has a second One, or Monad, who can be called cpcoS, an important metaphor 
in both platonising, gnostic and Christian accounts of `emanation'. There is, however, 
an opposing principle, the Unlimited Dyad. Dillon construes the relationship between 
these three in terms of the Monad being Form and the Dyad Matter, with the Monad 
acting on the Dyad to form Ideas from which comes the material universe. 19 Dillon 
comments on the monistic tendencies here and its fruitfulness for later 
neoplatonism. 20 For present purposes, one notes the terminology of God, and the 
supremacy of the Highest God, as well as his apparently utter transcendence. 
Turning to Plutarch of Chaeroneia (fl 100 A. D. ), unlike Eudorus, he maintains 
an unresolved dualism, having two fundamental principles, the One and the Unlimited 
Dyad. The nature of the One is to give form to the disorder of the Unlimited Dyad, 21 
providing a strong echo of features of the Timaeus. The One is God, true being, and 
directs all things, a providential government sharply contrasting with Aristotle's 
theology. Again, this God, very much in the platonic tradition, is eternal and 
unchanging. 
The One does not relate to the world as creator ex nihilo. As in the Timaeus, 
there is a pre-existing disorder. Form or order is ultimately imposed on this through 
18 Dated by Dillon 1977: 115 to the 60s B. C. Eudorus represents, inter alia, a neo-pythagorean 
influence. 
19 Dillon 1977: 128. He conjectures Plato's Philebus 26E -30E may be source material for Eudorus: 
1977: 127. 
20 Dillon 1977: 128. 
21 Dillon 1977: 199, quoting Def. Or. 428f. 
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an intermediary, the Logos. 22 In fact, intermediaries feature significantly in Plutarch's 
thinking. He appears to see them as, so to speak, amphibians: like humans, they have 
emotions, and, like the gods, they have divine power. 23 Accordingly, they are to be 
reverenced. 
Albinus (fl. 150 A. D. ), the third representative of Middle Platonism, rings yet 
further changes on the enigmatic melodies of the Timaeus. He postulates a threefold 
hierarchy of being, strongly anticipating Plotinus. In ascending order, Soul, Mind and 
the Primal God. Since the object of thought for the Primal God is itself, Dillon sees 
here the influence of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. 24 This Primal God is eternal, 
ineffable, wanting nothing, eternally and entirely perfect. Such a list of epithets 
stresses that the Primal God is both transcendent and, predictably within a platonic 
system, unchangingly perfect and immutable. 
In terms of creation, Albinus appears to follow the Timaeus, 25 so that creation 
is not ex nihilo but wide scope remains for `created' gods, or, rather in Albinus' terms, 
demons. The latter are present throughout the elements of the cosmos (with the 
possible exception of earth) `in order that no part of the cosmos should be devoid of 
soul nor of a living being superior to mortal nature. '26 Cosmic government is related 
to the demons, for Albinus goes on: `and to these [sc. demons] are made subject all 
things beneath the Moon and upon the earth. ' 
22 Developed at length in De Is. where Osiris stands for the Logos. 
'` Def. Or 416cff, quoted by Dillon 1977: 216. 
24 Dillon 1977: 283. 
25 Dillon 1977: 286-8. 
26 Quoted by Dillon 1977: 288. 
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Middle Platonism highlights several things here. The first is that, following the 
framework of the Timaeus, the deity is not distinguished as the uniquely eternal being 
while other beings are created ex nihilo. It is, though, true that only the One or God 
has unchanging continuity. It is not clear, however, that this is essentially personal 
continuity. 
Secondly, exclusive worship is not apparently a major preoccupation. Plutarch 
countenances reverence for demons, while Albinus sees these supernatural beings as 
exercising seemingly lawful authority on earth. Naturally, these Middle Platonic 
demons are not necessarily to be invested with all the biblical connotations, but 
Augustine's testimony that the `Platonists' accepted the practice of worshipping 
demons is very striking. 27 
Thirdly, and very relevantly for consideration of patristic accounts of Father 
and Son, in Eudorus and Albinus we find what look very much like two levels of fully 
divine being, the Supreme or Primal God and beneath him a divine Mind. The 
relationship between the two is potentially highly significant, but perhaps the most 
sophisticated exposition of this in the platonic stream seems to come with Plotinus. 
1.4. Plotinus and the One 
Given the One's perfection and simplicity, Plotinus apparently feels some 
discomfort at why Mind is generated, 28 but explains it as `circumradiation' 
(Mackenna's term), which is then illustrated in terms of light around the Sun, heat 
from fire, cold from snow and fragrance from a sweet-smelling substance. These 
27 De Civ. Dei Bk 8.12. 
28 Enneads V. 1.6. 
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examples drive home how Mind may be `... produced from the Supreme but the 
Supreme unaltering. '29 
As with the relation of Soul and Mind, Mind is described as Image of its 
generator. 30 The generation does not occur in time, 31 and Mind looks to or 
contemplates the One. The One, famously, transcends Being. 32 However, the One is 
not like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover: in its perfection it does not need even to 
contemplate itself, 33 indeed to do so would imply a duality of knower and known 
which would be impossible for the simplicity of the One. 34 
With this in mind it is possible to consider something of the network of 
relationships in Plotinus' system. Dillon helpfully comments35 that this is more than 
vertical hierarchy of being. For there are also concentric aspects, by which one works 
from the outer ring of the sensible world to the inner world of Forms and ultimately to 
the One itself, a path not simply of vertical ascent but of inner penetration, found for 
example in Enneads VI. 8.17 & 18. 
1.5. The Cult of Theos Hypsistos 
For Mitchell, `Hypsistos was one of the most widely worshipped gods of the 
eastern Mediterranean world. '36 There are, however, difficulties in seeing this cult as 
completely uniform. Inscriptional evidence is interestingly varied in that some sites 
are dedicated to Zeus Hypsistos, which would suggest pagan derivation, but Mitchell 
29 Enneads V. 1.6. 
30 Enneads V. 1.7. 
31 Enneads V. 1.6. 
32 Enneads V. 1.10. 
33 Enneads V. 3.13. 
34 Enneads V. 3.10. 
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points out that these are largely in Greece itself and Macedonia, and adds that overall 
there are more dedications to Theos Hypsistos or Hypsistos. 
37 For Kraabel, some of 
the inscriptions are of a clearly Jewish provenance, 
38 but concludes from the overall 
evidence that `the epithet inn 'cog, when it appears in Asia Minor, can never be 
taken, by itself, as proof that the text is Jewish. '39 This sense of variety is heightened 
by Levinskaya's observation that comparison of inscriptions between Zeus Hypsistos 
and Theos Hypsistos show a contrast, for the latter do not have anthropoid images of 
the god. 40 She adds that hypsistos was comparatively rarely used of named pagan gods 
such as Apollo, 41 although Kraabel is doubtless right to note the aptness of the epithet 
for deities such as Zeus. 42 
Notwithstanding this variety, the perception of some Patristic writers is that 
one can talk of `the Hypsistarians'. 43 Notably, Gregory of Nazianzen's father was 
apparently an adherent and Gregory comments briefly on the cult's beliefs in the 
funeral oration for his father: 44 Gregory describes the cult as combining `Greek error 
and legal imposture' while escaping some parts of each. 
For, on the one side, they reject idols and sacrifices, but reverence fire and 
lights; on the other, they observe the Sabbath and petty regulations as to 
certain meats, but despise circumcision. These lowly men call themselves 
Hypsistarii, and the Almighty is, so they say, the only object of their worship. 
This depiction of the Hypsistarians as lying between Greek and Jewish 
positions receives some support from Cyril of Alexandria, but the latter strikingly also 
35 Dillon 1991: xci. 
3h Mitchell 1999: 99 
37 Mitchell 1999: 100. 
38 He cites the Acmonia text with its citation of 6 OEöS 6i ll ncioc: Kraabel 1969: 88. 
39 Kraabel 1969: 91. 
40 Levmskaya 1996: 87. 
41 Levinskaya 1996: 92. 
4 Kraabel 1969: 91. 
43 Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and probably Epiphanius of Salamis. 
44 Greg Naz. Orl 8.5. 
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admits that the cultists accepted other gods, and Mitchell concludes from the 
Oenoanda oracular inscription that Hypsistos was a god `known by many names. '45 
Several points may be made. First, the cultists are clearly not converts to full 
Judaism (especially if the polyonymous stance of the Oenoanda inscription is typical). 
Secondly, this need not preclude a substantial Jewish background for the title, as 
Levinskaya contends (the aniconic nature of many inscriptions is striking). 46 Thirdly, 
Mitchell may well be right to see syncretistic elements in the cult, 47 and this 
economically explains the perception that it lies between pagan Greek and Jewish 
thought. Nevertheless, this syncretism apparently has considerable variations within 
it. Fourthly, the association of light with divinity is interesting given the significance 
of light imagery both in pagan philosophical thought about God, and also in Christian 
explanations of the Father and Son. 
45 Mitchell 1999: 91 
46 She refers both to inscriptional evidence and the usage of the LXX. Levinskaya 1996: 95ff. 
47 Mitchell 1999: 121. 
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APPENDIX 2: ORIGEN AND THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION 
Harl comments that a fundamental part of Origen's conception was that there 
was an intelligible order. 48 Naturally this is unsurprising in a platonising ambience, 
but Ongen was clear the Scriptures themselves mandated this, especially 2 
Corinthians 4: 17-18.49 To this basic framework one must add the viability of 
allegorical interpretation. Again, this is not simply adopted as an available 
hermeneutical technique of Alexandria (although Jews like Philo and the Hellenistic 
commentators on writers such as Homer and Hesiod practise the technique). For 
Origen a biblical mandate comes from texts like I Corinthians 9: 9ff, 10: 1 ff and 
Ephesians 5: 3 l ff, 50 not to mention Galatians 4: 24ff. He also shares with his non- 
Christian setting the idea that an exegesis must be worthy of God. 51 
The spiritual meaning is the important one, 52 and the literal meaning derives 
much of its value from the assertion of the spiritual truth. In consequence Origen is 
not committed to the complete historical accuracy of the bible, 53 although he is 
certainly not committed to seeing nothing as historical. Crouzel seems judicious in 
commenting that Origen has varying room for literal exegesis (consider his insistence 
on the real death of Jesus54) and that he normally at least starts with literal exegesis. 55 
The common thread of his varying spiritual exegesis, notably of the Old Testament, is 
that the Scriptures testify to and prophesy of, Christ. 56 
48 Harl 1958: 368. 
49 Used to assert this notably in AgC VI. 19 and 20, but elsewhere too. 
so Cited in AgC IV. 49. 
51 Crouzel 1989: 78. 
5' Oxigen apparently operates a scheme of triple meaning in which various levels of meaning parallel 
his tripartite anthropology: literal meaning corresponds with body, moral with soul and spiritual with 
spirit. See Crouzel 1989: 79. 
53 Note here OFP IV. 19. 
`4AgC11.16. 
55 Crouzel 1989: 61. 
sb Crouzel 1989: 64. 
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In its time this scheme offered very considerable advantages. Criticisms of the 
barbarism of the Pentateuch could be repelled by the same techniques non-Christians 
employed with respect to Homer and Hesiod. 57 As against Marcionism, this allowed 
for the unity of the Testaments, while within the Christian community people could be 
left with their appropriate levels of meaning. 
This interpretative method has, of course, also been subjected to trenchant 
criticism. Scalise speaks of `a loss of hermeneutical control'58 while Kelly notes that 
Origen's allegorical method is `... capable of almost infinite ramifications'. 59 Kelly 
risks over-statement. For, as observed above, Origen is concerned for a unity in the 
scriptures: they constitute a single 'word', 60 and focus on Christ: 61 that will militate 
against a completely indefinite extension of meaning. 
Nevertheless Oxigen provides very considerable extensions of meaning. It is 
worth pondering briefly why. Kelly helpfully distinguishes between typological and 
allegorical approaches. No doubt one may move readily from one to the other, but 
typology deals primarily with the correspondence between the Testaments, with 
events in the Old prefiguring the New. 62 To that extent control is exerted by the events 
of the Incarnation, which tends to reinforce the significance of history in the sensible 
world. 63 
57 E. g. AgC IV. 37-51. 
'R Scalise 1988: 117,129. 
59 Kelly 1977: 73. 
60 Crouzel 1989: 70. 
61 Compare CJ 1.10. Nassif 1998: 54 draws attention to the concern for inner unity. 62 Kelly 1977: 71. 
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By contrast, a strong allegorical method treats the text `as a mere symbol, or 
allegory, of spiritual truths'T' Such an approach tends to less hermeneutical control 
because what is symbolised may not necessarily be found within Scripture. Harl 
comments that Origen sees human language and events as having a `veiling' quality, 
65 
perhaps an inevitable consequence given the strong allegorical technique. 
Furthermore, such an approach may well take the New Testament itself as 
symbolising something beyond itself, while typology more normally stresses the New 
Testament itself as the fulfilment of what was previously presented as a type. Finally, 
while some New Testament passages may expressly seem to invoke allegory (e. g. 
Galatians 4: 24ff), it does not follow that allegory may be legitimately invoked without 
express warrant within the text, unless one accepts the guiding rule that any exegesis 
must be worthy of God. The problem is, how does one know what is worthy of God 
within Origen's framework, in which only the Son knows God. 66 
A further problem develops over the truthfulness of God's revelation. Trigg 
draws out this aspect of Origen's thought from the homily on Jeremiah 20: 7-12, 
which speaks of divine deception. 67 Noting that Oxigen sees deception as sometimes 
ethically acceptable, 68 he concludes `Origen considered deliberate deception a part of 
God's strategy for winning back erring souls. '69 The outstanding example is, perhaps, 
the warnings of hell and torment. These are uttered in the manner that wise parents 
63 As Kelly notes 1977: 71. 
6' Kelly 1977: 71. 
65 Harl 1958: 141,145 and 148. Cox Miller 1988: 173 speaks of Origen's awareness of the `abyss of 
revelation. ' 
66 AgC VI. 17. 
67 Trigg 1988: 147. Referring to Homily on Jeremiah 20. 
68 Trigg 1988: 155. The cases are those of the physician and the father. 
69 Trigg 1988: 162. 
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threaten their children in order to move them to better behaviour. 
70 The untruth is 
justified on the ground of the benevolence with which it is offered. " 
Nevertheless, these two factors, the unrestrained use of allegory and the 
concept of the medicinal lie, do no little damage to the revelation that Christ brings. 
What we see of Christ, even using the allegorical method, may still, it seems, be a 
medicinal lie. In consequence our knowledge both of him and thus of his Father 
through him, and of their relationship risks becoming highly provisional and 
uncertain. This view of revelation in Origen tends to attenuate further the link 
between economic and immanent trinities. 
70 AgC. 1 14-16. 
71 Trigg 1988: 154. 
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APPENDIX 3: HILARY AND DE TRINITATE 
3.1. Title 
De Trinitate is the title attached by tradition to Hilary's great work. Some have 
felt it not entirely apt, suggesting an original like De Fide. 72 After all, the work is as 
much a christological discussion as a trinitarian one, 73 and the Holy Spirit is 
comparatively absent from discussion. 74 It should be stressed that Hilary does indeed 
discuss the Holy Spirit in 11.29-35,75 suggesting a significant appropriated work for 
him (faith), and in a significant place. 76 Nevertheless, the bulk of the work deals with 
the Son. One would have to add, though, that as a christological discussion the work 
would stand as inadequate in important respects. Thus while it is stressed that Jesus is 
indeed genuinely human and genuinely God, the authenticity of Jesus' human 
experiences is taken in a markedly docetic direction. 77 
De Fide certainly is an apt suggestion at least in this sense, that Books I-III 
deal with an exposition of the baptismal faith. 78 It is, though, an exposition dealing 
largely with the relation between the divine Son and the Father. It is an exposition with 
an agenda in view, even though it may not be captive to that. 
72 Harman 1973: 386. Cf Borchardt 1966: 40. 
73 Galtier 1960: 86. 
74 Moignt 1968: 160 draws attention to German criticism of an earlier period on just this point, to the 
effect that Hilary did not grasp the personhood of the Spirit. Moignt himself 1968: 167 disputes the 
strength of the criticism. 
75 One of the primary aims here is to ensure the distinction of the Spirit. 
76 For the significance of Books 1-111 see below. 
" Hanson 1988b: 500-501 is understandably forceful about the docetic patterns: `In effect he [sc. 
Hilary] concluded that at the very point where Christ's solidarity with humankind is most crucial, in his 
suffering, Christ was not really human. ' This rightly poses the question but risks understating Hilary's 
insistence on genuine humanity, as well as Hilary's polemical setting. Before adjudicating on the 
docetic issue, one needs to ask what Hilary thought constituted authentic human experience, but this 
goes beyond the bounds of the present study. 
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3.2. Date and Unity of Composition 
In terms of date of composition, Meijering contends that the entire work was 
composed in exile, 79 after, that is to say, 356, and as Arianism approached 
its apogee. 80 
The significance of the date is that it heightens the likelihood of Hilary's interaction 
with Greek pro-Nicene theologians during composition, and also illuminates the 
importance of the work in the author's own understanding, placing it more alongside 
De Synodis and Hilary's response to the `Blasphemia' of Sirmium 357.81 Suggestions 
have been made that the first three books, somewhat different in tone, 
82 were written 
perhaps earlier, so that the resulting work is in fact a composition of two distinct 
treatises. 83 
Certainly there are repeated hints of exile in the completed work. There are 
also indications of a designed unity, 84 and Meijering judiciously observes that in the 
absence of `decisive evidence' to the contrary, one should respect Hilary's own 
presentation of the work. 85 One important consideration here is whether there are 
structural fissures in the completed work that do suggest composition of two different 
works. 86 
78 Galtier 1960: 77. 
79 Meijering 1982: 10, following Simonetti. 
80 Dated by Figura and Doignon 2001: 11 ca. 360, not least because of the Council of Constantinople 
w0 hich attempted to suppress ousia and hypostasis terminology. 
81 Figura and Doignon 2001: 27 note that Hilary objected to the proscription of the use of homoousios 
and homoiousios. 
82 Allegedly less polemical: Galtier 1960: 36. 
83 E. g Harman 1973: 387. 
84 Especially Hilary's outline of all 12 books in I. 21-36, in which he represents the whole as composed 
according to a single scheme. 
85 Meijering 1982: 2. 
86 On the structure of De Trinitate see chapter 6 above. 
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APPENDIX 4: VIEWS ON ARIANISM AND HOMOIANISM IN 
CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP 
Some recent scholarship on western theological history has preferred to 
employ the term Homoianism for a range of beliefs in the later 4th and 5th centuries 
that pro-Nicene contemporaries tended to designate as `Arian'. Hanson distinguishes 
this from a neo-Arianism associated with Eunomius and Aetius. 87 The two are said to 
have a somewhat different heart-beat. While both insist the Father is ingenerate, neo- 
Arianism's watchword is said to be heterousios, 88 while Homoianism, at any rate in 
its western form, puts the Ariminum Creed as central, 89 with its claim that Father and 
Son are like `as the scriptures teach'. 90 On such a view, the Father was 
incomparable. 91 Williams contends that such Homoianism was not extant simply 
because of the Gothic penetration, 92 although that doubtless assisted. Rather, 
Ambrose's difficulties in Milan suggest, notwithstanding his successes, Homoianism 
was tenacious. A central Homoian question was how could the Begotten and the 
Unbegotten be of one substance. 93 This is, of course, related to the question 
Augustine faces in De Trinitate V. 4. 
This means that Augustine in particular can plausibly be envisaged facing, 
amongst other things, a species of what he would define, fundamentally, as 
Arianism, 94 and what current scholarship would term western Homoianism, with an 
allegiance to the Council of Ariminum. 
87 Hanson 1988b: 557. The further putative sub-division is between Latin and Greek Homoianism. 88 Hanson 1988b: 601 and 633. 89 Compare Maximinus's self-description in Deb Max 2. 
90 Williams 1995: 11. 
91 Hanson 1988b: 563. 
92 Williams 1995: 69. 
9' Williams 1995: 191. 
94 Given the definition in Heresies XLIX. 
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APPENDIX 5: HILARY AND ISAIAH 45: 11-16 
It is appropriate to mention Hilary's use of Isaiah 45: 11-16, which is strongly 
featured in the latter parts of De Trinitate IV and V. 95 The critical portion is the end 
of verse 14, which Hilary renders (following the LXX) as: 
Et adorabunt te, et in to depraecabuntur, quoniam in to est Deus, et non est 
Deus praeter te. 
Hilary understands the verse as addressed by God to Israel's saviour, 96 her 
Messiah, who is for Hilary Jesus. It must be stressed that both the statements `God is 
in you' and `There is no God beside you' are addressed to Jesus the Son. This 
involves two exegetical moves. The first is to identify the initial addressee of quoniam 
in to est Deus as Jesus the Saviour. 97 The second is to understand et non est Deus 
praeter to as continuing the quoniam clause and not starting a new clause in which the 
addressee has changed to the God who has done the marvels mentioned in the 
preceding verses. 
This suits Hilary's purposes admirably. The phrase `God is in you' both 
stresses personal distinction and links to the Johannine language of indwelling. The 
phrase `There is no God beside you' asserts the Son's divinity while upholding the 
principles of monotheism, a prominent theme of De Trinitate II-IV. Isaiah 45: 14 thus 
provides Hilary with a single text where in-dwelling is linked to monotheism. 
Hilary's approach, though, is vulnerable to the point that he has, albeit 
innocently, used highly tendentious, if not infelicitous, renderings drawn from the 
95 DeT IV. 38-41, V. 38. 
96 See DeT IV. 39 'Deus de Filio suo Deo... locutus'. 
97 Not simply Cyrus or Jerusalem. 
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LXX. This seems justified. However, this exegesis of Isaiah 45: 14 is not essential to 
his case. 
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APPENDIX 6: `ABBA' LANGUAGE IN GALATIANS 4: 6 AND 
ROMANS 8: 15 
6.1. Galatians 4: 6 
Context matters for Galatians 4: 6. The significance of addressing God as 
`abba' appears in verse 7. Paul opposes the notion of sonship to that of slavery, the 
point being that sonship means one inherits from God. Further, the slavery in view 
here is consistently to something other than God. Thus, in verse 3, the slavery is to 
the elemental spirits of the universe, 98 in verses 4 and 5 the slavery relates to the idea 
of being under the law, in verse 8 the slavery is to those who are not gods, 99 while 
verse 9 refers to the Galatians going back into slavery with the elemental spirits. '00 
On this basis, one may indeed speak of a deliverance from slavery implicit in 
the `abba' terminology. Yet, since the slavery in question is not to God, the use of 
`abba' does not exclude the authority of the Father. 1°' That is not the issue. 102 
6.2. Romans 8: 15 
Turning to Romans 8: 15, the preceding context is the difference between life 
according to the flesh and according to the Spirit (verse 9). These are two mutually 
exclusive categories (verses 9 and 13) and verse 14 informs us that those led103 by the 
Spirit are sons of God. The `leading' terminology does not, perhaps, necessarily 
assert authority - lordship, in Moltmann's terms - since a guide may, for example lead 
98 
... TU 
% GTOIXEia ioü xößµov... 
99 ESov). Eu YaTE ioic cpu Et µiß ovaiv 6rotq. 
100 
.. aTotxria... 101 Thus Longenecker 1990: 175 is content to see the term denoting the intimacy of a filial relationship 
as opposed to being under the law, yet is silent on whether this precludes paternal authority. 
102 Although Martynl997: 392 sees Gal 4: 6 as echoing the acclamation of baptizands and, given the mix 
of Greek and Aramaic terms, having a two-fold sense: God is the absolute - and thus absolutely 
liberating- master, and God is the one whose care is without limit. 
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an army without being `in charge' of it. On the other hand, the leading terminology 
is 
consistent with authority and does not exclude it. 
The problem with life according to the flesh is outlined earlier in verses 5-8. 
The minds104 of those living according to the flesh are set on the things of the flesh 
(verse 5), and such an orientation of mind' 05 is death while an orientation of the Spirit 
is life and peace (verse 6). Verses 7 and 8 then state that the orientation to the flesh is 
enmity to God, does not obey God's law, indeed cannot, and cannot please God. 
Disobedience and inability therefore mark the life according to the flesh. 106 This is 
not slavery in precisely the same terms as Galatians 4 envisages, but does suggest 
being in the power of another. This is re-inforced by the language of `capture' found 
in Romans 7: 23. 
In this sense the life of a son is life not captivated and enslaved by the law of 
sin and death and by the orientation of disobedience in the flesh. Indeed, since life in 
the flesh is associated with inveterate disobedience, life in the Spirit might plausibly 
be associated with obedience. Hence the contrast in verse 15 between a spirit of 
slavery and a spirit of sonship is not the contrast between two views of God, one 
authoritarian but not intimate (the spirit of slavery) and one intimate but excluding 
authority (the spirit of sonship). For an authoritarian but not intimate view of God has 
not been in view throughout the passage. The only strongly marked appearance of an 
authority concept has been in the context of the disobedience of the life of the flesh. 
103 v 
ayovTat. 
104 Paul uses the cppovciv group which, as Moo states 1996: 487, tends to deal not just with mental 
process but includes the `general direction of the will' and our affections. 
105 , ýö.. _gpövrlµa 
tS aapxö% S... Moo uses the term `mind-set' (Moo 1996: 487ff). 
106 Moo 1996: 489. 
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Exclusion of authority is present, but in the sense of refusing it improperly, something 
Paul is hardly recommending. 
The succeeding context also does not demand a meaning excluding authority 
for `abba' in 8: 15. The theme that Paul draws out of sonship is again inheritance 
(verse 17) and consequent glorification. The consequence pastorally that Moo 
envisages is the re-assurance that comes from being son. ' 07 Again, this is consistent 
with intimacy but does not demand the sense excluding authority. 
Therefore, the `abba' terms of Romans 8: 16 and Galatians 4: 6 reflect the 
themes of inheritance and bondage, but in neither case is the bondage one to God. 
The adoptive sonship in view does not, then, demand that `abba' terms reflect an 
intimate familiarity that precludes paternal authority. 
107 Moo 1996: 503. 
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APPENDIX 7: AUGUSTINE DE TRINITA TE 1.7 
The Latin runs: 
Omnes quos legerepotui qui ante me scripserunt De Trinitate quae 
Deus est, divinorum Librorum veterum et novorum catholici 
tractatores, hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod 
Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdemque substantiae 
inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem, ideoque non 
sint tres dii sed unus Deus, quamvis Pater Filium genuerit, et ideo 
Filius non sit qui Pater est; Filiusque a Patre sit genitus, et ideo 
Pater non sit qui Filius est; Spiritusque Sanctus nec Pater sit nec 
Filius, sed tantum Patris et Filii Spiritus, Patri et Filio etiam ipse 
coaequalis et ad Trinitatis pertinens unitatem. Non tarnen eamdem 
Trinitatem natam de virgine Maria et sub Pontio Pilato crucifixam 
et sepultam tertio die resurrexisse et in caelum ascendisse, sed 
tantummodo Filium. Nec eamdem Trinitatem descendisse in specie 
columbae super lesum baptizatum, auf die Pentecostes post 
ascensionem Domini sonitu facto de caelo quasi ferretur flatus 
vehemens et linguis divisis velut ignis sedisse super unumquemque 
eorum, sed tantummodo Spiritum Sanctum. Nec eamdem 
Trinitatem dixisse de caelo: Tu es Filius meus, sive cum baptizatus 
est a Iohanne sive in monte quando cum illo erant tres discipuli, 
auf quando sonuit vox dicens: Et clarificavi et iterum clarificabo, 
sed tantummodo Patris vocem fuisse ad Filium factam quamvis 
Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita 
inseparabiliter operentur. Haec et meafides est, quando haec est 
catholica fides. 
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APPENDIX 8: TRUE AND FALSE SONSHIP IN JOHN'S 
GOSPEL 
It is helpful to contrast true and false sonship in John. John 8 provides a useful 
example of this in the intense and hostile confrontation between Jesus and pseudo- 
believers. 108 The pseudo-believers of 8: 31-59 make two sonship claims, that they are 
children of Abraham (8: 39) and children of God (8: 42). Jesus argues, of course, that 
both these claims are false. 
Children of Abraham do `the works of Abraham' (8: 39). Abraham, though, 
did not try to kill the one who speaks the truth (8: 40), which they do. The falsity of 
the sonship claim, then, is built on dissimilarity of action. Parallel reasoning is further 
employed to show they are not children of God either (8: 42). If they were children of 
God they would love Jesus. Again this would be a case of similarity, for the Father 
loves the Son (e. g. 3: 35). 
Instead a different sonship is established in 8: 44. The comment `you are from 
your father the devil' 109 is put in parallel with `you want to do the desires of your 
father'. These desires are further explained in terms of life-taking/killing and lying, 
the very reverse of Father, Son and Spirit who are joined to giving life and speaking 
truth. 110 This forms an apt corollary to the earlier denial of divine or Abrahamic 
fatherhood. There, dissimilarity disproved the claim, but here similarity proves a 
different paternity. 
108 `Pseudo-believers' because they do not believe Jesus is the Son, as the attempt to stone him shows. 
109 Taking tioü StaßöXov from ix rov naTpög cov StaßöXob as appositional. 
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It is pertinent here to ask whether this similarity is one simply of shared values 
between, so to speak, people who agree, or whether something further is intended. 
At 
this point it is perhaps worth recalling that the devil also features in the Gospel's 
analysis of Judas. Judas is himself portrayed as a devil (Si('xßoXoq: 6: 70), whom 
Satan 
enters (13: 27), and into whose heart Satan has put the wish to betray Jesus (13: 2). 
This suggests some measure of sovereignty over Judas. Carson comments (of 6: 70): 
The supreme adversary ... of 
God so operates behind failing human beings that 
his malice becomes theirs. ' 
This notion of control is supported and generalised beyond Judas by the 
depiction of the devil as `the ruler of the world' (12: 31,14: 30,16: 11). The devil 
presents a claim to an alternative cosmic monarchy. Clearly, the alternative monarchy 
is doomed to failure - its ruler is driven out (12: 31), has no power over Jesus (14: 30) 
and is judged (16: 11). Even so, it means one can put the johannine choice in terms of 
which kingdom one belongs to - the ruler of the world's (doomed to fail) or God's 
(which brings life). There is, of course, a tragedy in the cry `we have no king but 
Caesar' (19: 15), rather than no king but God. But `the world', emblematised in this 
instance by the Jewish authorities, implicitly concedes it is under authority. 
In this way, diabolic fatherhood suggests paternal sovereignty. This is not to 
preclude willing participation in diabolic values (the terms of 8: 44 suggest this too), 
but the paternal relation surpasses this. 
110 Witherington remarks 1995: 178 that the devil is the evil counterpart of Jesus. This counterpart point 
can be extended to the other Persons, who share Jesus' characteristics. 
111 Carson 1991: 304. 
402 
This further suggests that true sonship is marked, inter alia, by filial 
obedience. This is manifested towards the devil by the world, and towards the Father 
by the Son. This would only be expected within a milieu so heavily influenced by Old 
Testament norms, in which fatherhood carried authority. 
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